It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
The Role of Cities as First Responders to Pandemics: Focusing on the Case of the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s Response to COVID-19
Changwoo Shon
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Changwoo Shon received a Ph.D. in Health Science from Seoul National University and currently works for the Seoul Institute. The main research areas are urban health, healthy cities, and community health. Currently, he is conducting research on establishing a system for new infectious disease management, agenda-setting in the Post-corona era. In addition, he recently published research papers related to COVID-19 in the Korea Journal of hospital management (The Response of the Seoul Municipal Hospitals against COVID-19 and Its Implications for Public Hospitals), and the Journal of Korean Society for Health Education and Promotion (The direction of Healthy Cities through the COVID-19 pandemic experience of Seoul, South Korea). In addition, he is an adjunct professor of the Catholic University of Korea, an academic director of the Korea Health Communication Association, an academic director of the Korean Healthy Cities Partnership, and a member of the Disaster Safety Project Evaluation Committee of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety in Korea.
This study was conducted to discuss the role of urban governments in the future, including intercity network construction, by reviewing cases of responding to COVID-19 in Seoul amid changes in the international situation caused by COVID-19. This paper is organized into four sections. First, this paper described the outbreak of COVID-19 in Seoul from January to August 2020 and the Seoul city’s response over time. Second, the background of Alliance for Multilateralism and inter-city cooperation in accordance with the changes in the international situation due to COVID-19 was explained. Third, the response of the Seoul Metropolitan Government to the pandemic was reviewed based on the following four characteristics: (i) Social distancing; (ii) Enhanced contact tracing; (iii) Widespread testing; and, (iv) Early preparation. Finally, this paper reviewed how Seoul city cooperated with overseas cities in order to overcome the pandemic crisis, as well as the cases in which 25 autonomous districts of Seoul shared their policies using the Healthy Cities Network.
Keywords
COVID-19, Pandemic crisis, City’s response, Intercity network, Role of cities
Full text (PDF) is here.
RECNA Newsletter Vol.9 No.1 (September 30, 2020)
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Interview Series: Nuclear Weapons, COVID-19, Climate Change – What Lies at the Roots of these Problems — Fumihiko Yoshida Policy Paper: 50th Anniversary of the NPT Entering into Force “Opposing a World with Nuclear Weapons” (July 2020) Joint Research on “Disarmament Education” Nagasaki Peace Declaration 2020: 75 years of a “World with Nuclear Weapons” Looking back on Nagasaki Youth Delegation Activities |
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications
Steven E. Miller
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Steven E. Miller is Director of the International Security Program, Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal, International Security and also co-editor of the International Security Program’s book series, Belfer Center Studies in International Security (which is published by the MIT Press). Previously, he was Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and taught Defense and Arms Control Studies in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The hotline concept has evolved to a variety of forms and settings, suggesting a broad utility. But it is what might be called a pure or original version of an idea that remains compelling: making sure that the most important, most heavily armed nuclear rivals can communicate directly and effectively at the highest levels in all circumstances, whether crisis or war, in order to minimize escalation, retain control of dangerous situations, and inoculate against potentially disastrous miscommunication or misunderstanding.
Keywords
Nuclear weapons hotlines, Russia, United States, Cuban Missile Crisis, Arms Control Diplomacy
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Richard Pilch is the Director of Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. A physician by training, Dr. Pilch has focused on national security issues since 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks of 2001. In 2002, he completed a postdoctoral fellowship in chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, after which he spent nearly a decade overseas assessing and addressing biological warfare (BW), bioterrorism, and public health emergencies of international concern, including threats posed by the former Soviet Union’s (FSU) legacy offensive BW program. He has performed onsite assessments of every known civilian BW facility in Russia, led multiple threat reduction programs on behalf of the US government, served on over thirty technical panels and advisory boards, and authored more than sixty technical publications and White Papers. He co-edited the definitive Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Wiley) with his long-time mentor and former CBWNP Director Dr. Ray Zilinskas in 2005. Dr. Pilch received his MD from the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine and MPH from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Miles Pomper is a Senior Fellow in the Washington DC office of CNS. He has written dozens of articles, papers, and book chapters on nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear arms control. Before joining CNS he served as Editor-in-Chief of Arms Control Today, Previously, he was the lead foreign policy reporter for CQ Weekly and Legi-Slate News Service, where he covered the full range of national security issues before Congress, and a Foreign Service Officer with the US Information Agency. He holds a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University and a master’s degree in journalism from Northwestern University.
This article provides an Asia-Pacific perspective on biological weapons and their relevance to nuclear deterrence in the pandemic era. The entire class of biological weapons is banned by international law; however, biological weapons are generally less costly and less technically challenging to develop than nuclear weapons. Conversely, nuclear weapons are openly possessed by multiple countries in the Asia-Pacific despite their corresponding cost and technical complexity. These two types of weapons of mass destruction – biological and nuclear – do not exist in isolation but in a multifactorial geopolitical environment where the threat and control of one impact that of the other. A third factor that holds the potential to influence this dynamic is the increasing likelihood of natural outbreaks and pandemics. This paper explores potential intersections of biological and nuclear weapons in the pandemic context. First, it describes the threat of biological weapons, including history, threat assessment methodology, and specific threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Next, it reviews options for biological weapons control. Finally, it discusses nuclear deterrence and escalation in the context of both natural and deliberate biological events. It concludes with a summary of key points and recommendations for regional security and stability.
Keywords
Biological weapons, nuclear deterrence, pandemic era, Asia-Pacific
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
COVID 19 and Labor Demand, Migration, and Military Force Structure Implications in East Asia
Brian Nichiporuk
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Brian Nichiporuk is a senior political scientist at The RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. He has worked on research projects for the U.S. Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during his RAND career. His current research focuses on the following areas: Russian military capabilities and vulnerabilities, the effects of demographic trends in the Middle East and East Asia upon regional security, and the assessment of anti-access threats to the U.S. military around the world. Dr. Nichiporuk has authored or co-authored many RAND reports, including “The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors” (2000) (sole author) and “Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces: An Overview of Budgets and Capabilities” (2019) (co-author). He has worked in the Pentagon as an IPA Fellow in the Programs and Evaluation Directorate of Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Brian has a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago.
The Covid 19 pandemic has thus far not had the same direct health impact in East Asia as it has had in Europe and the US as death and infection rates have been lower in the major East Asian states. Nevertheless, the pandemic has the potential to have major second order effects in East Asia, especially if it continues for a long time.
One of the defining features of the large East Asian states today is their demography. All of them (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea) have aging populations, low fertility rates, and low, or even negative, population growth. All of these states currently allow only low levels of immigration, which do not substantially increase their working age populations. East Asia’s demographic characteristics will have an impact upon the nature of any long-term regional implications of the Covid 19 crisis.
This paper takes a high level look at the potential long-term implications of the Covid 19 crisis in East Asia by using the demographic lens to examine three areas: impacts on labor markets, possible mass migration scenarios, and the effect on regional militaries. In the area of labor markets, the paper argues that Covid will compel most East Asian states to find new ways of utilizing their older workers and to increase the flexibility of their labor markets. In the area of mass migration, the paper examines possible scenarios having to do with North Korean state collapse and urban-rural migration trends in China. Finally, in the military sphere, the paper argues that the Covid crisis could significantly affect nuclear weapons security protocols in the region, the manpower and personnel policies of certain militaries, and the frequency, scope, and size of major exercises.
Keywords
East Asian demography, Population aging in East Asia, East Asian security, East Asian militaries, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, East Asian labor markets, international migration, Chinese internal migration, Covid 19, Covid 19 in East Asia, Covid 19 and international security, nuclear weapons security, pandemics and international security, military personnel policies, military exercises, Covid 19 and defense budgets, Chinese nuclear forces, North Korean nuclear forces, North Korean state collapse scenarios, East Asian fertility rates, Unemployment rates in East Asia
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
An Alternative to Nuclear Deadlock and Stalled Diplomacy – Proposals, Pathways, and Prospects for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Michael Hamel-Green
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Michael Hamel-Green is Emeritus Professor in Social Inquiry in the College of Arts, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia. He was previously the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development at Victoria University; and taught in in international security, conflict resolution, and community development subjects.
The current nuclear deadlock with North Korea remains unresolved as the initially promising 2018-2019 three-way diplomacy between the DPRK, US and ROK stalls. More widely in Northeast Asia, nuclear confrontation between China and the US is mounting, with increased deployment of nuclear-weapon-capable forces in and around the region, including land and sea-based missiles, missile defence systems, and deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons on mobile platforms. The paper proposes that an alternative to continuing nuclear escalation, and the increasing threat of a nuclear catastrophe, does exist in the shape of a phased establishment of a regional Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) negotiated in tandem with a regional comprehensive security agreement. The comprehensive security agreement would involve a final peace settlement of the Korean War, establishment of a regional security forum, economic and energy assistance to the DPRK, and legally binding security guarantees for the NWFZ from the US, China, and Russia. The paper discusses the precedents of successful NWFZ establishment in other regions, and the history of past proposals for such a zone in Northeast Asia. It examines the special NWFZ features that would be required in this region, including the need for rigorous verification of the dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons and facilities in the DPRK, a Korean War peace settlement, a flexible NWFZ entry into force mechanism that gives time for DPRK to assess the security guarantee benefits of the NWFZ zone, and provisions for preventing forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons within the region. The paper concludes by presenting NEANWFZ proposals emerging from a recent Northeast Asian workshop of regional experts, and identifying potential pathways, advocates, and prospects for its successful negotiation in the current global context.
Keywords
Nuclear weapons free zones, treaties, allies, prohibition, disarmament, arms control, Northeast Asia, DPRK, Korea, China, Russia, United States, diplomacy
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
Allan Behm
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Allan Behm is Head, International and Security Affairs Program, The Australia Institute, Canberra, Australia. Allan spent 30 years in the Australian Public Service, as a member of the Australian diplomatic service, the Prime Minister’s Department, the Department of Defence and the Attorney General’s Department. He specialised in international relations, defence strategy, counter-terrorism and law enforcement policy, and more recently, climate change.
‘Extended deterrence’ and ‘extended nuclear deterrence’, as US security guarantees provided to allies, are artefacts of over six decades of US-led policy and planning. No other Nuclear Weapon State offers such guarantees. In the early post-WW2 years, extended deterrence used the overwhelming conventional military power of the US to deter armed aggression (particularly from the USSR) against its allies. The development of atomic weapons by the USSR and China, and the potential threat that such weapons might have posed for allies, expanded the scope of “extended deterrence” to include deterrence of possible nuclear weapon threats.
Deterrence relies on an aggressor’s uncertainty whether the third party providing the deterrent will provide the overwhelming military power to defeat aggression, and whether the cost of defeat will outweigh the benefit of victory. In other words, is deterrence a bluff or a guarantee?
In recent decades, the credibility of extended deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence, has continued to decline. The fragility of the deterrence doctrine was already evident before the appearance of the coronavirus. But President Trump’s mercurial approach to the coronavirus pandemic and international agreements has encouraged the allies of the US to look at their national security through the lens of his approach to the coronavirus. If the US cannot effectively protect itself against the coronavirus, how can it protect its allies?
Deterrence is a faith-based system. There is no evidence that it works. The logic of deterrence ultimately depends on its failure: the conduct of warfare on a massive scale.
Keywords
Nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, nuclear umbrella, credibility, trust, leadership, alliances
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Pandemics
C G Nicholas Mascie-Taylor and K Moji
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Nick Mascie-Taylor is Professor of Human Population Biology and Health and Director of Research in Global Health at the University of Cambridge, UK and a Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. He has served as President or Vice-President of the European Anthropological Association for nearly 20 years and is an Overseas Fellow of the Hungarian National Academy of Science. Nick has been running, monitoring and evaluating nutrition and health related surveys both from a research perspective and to formulate government policy in South Asia and Africa for over 40 years. He has considerable experience in analysing data and has been running basic and advanced data handling training programmes for Department for International Development (DFID), The British Council, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and The World Bank in 16 countries. Nick has worked in Bangladesh for over 30 years most recently on developing a cohort to study non-communicable disease. With the onset of covid-19 the cohort (n=75,000) has been repositioned to collect longitudinal data via telephone calls on covid-19 symptoms and the social and economic impacts.
Kazuhiko Moji is Professor of Human Ecology and the Dean of Nagasaki University School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Director of Department of Global Health at Graduate School of Tropical Medicine and Global Health. He had been the project leader of the Ecohealth Project “Environmental Change and Infectious Disease in Tropical Asia” between 2008 and 2013 at the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN), Kyoto, Japan. He received his MA (1978) and Ph.D. (1987) in Health Sciences at the University of Tokyo. He was the President of the Japanese Society of Tropical Medicine between 2011 and 2014.
A pandemic is defined as an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people. Pandemics have occurred throughout human history and appear to be increasing because of rising emergence of viral diseases from animals (zoonoses). The risk of a pandemic arises from the combined effects of the Spark Risk (e.g. bushmeat hunting) and the Spread Risk (e.g. mode of transmission and population susceptibility). Pandemics have health, economic, gender, social and political impacts. Building pandemic preparedness is complex and requires considerable coordination. In the context of covid-19 modelling of transmission has been central to many government’s response including introduction of lockdown and physical distancing. Developing vaccines for novel pathogens is not simple or straightforward and community mitigation measures are essential. There are a number of lessons which have been learnt from the covid-19 pandemic including acting quickly, extensive testing, digital surveillance, public trust in government and leaders and cooperation between nations.
Keywords
Pandemic, zoonoses, pandemic consequences, community mitigation, vaccine development, lessons learnt from covid-19
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Nagasaki’s Voice: 75 years’ Experience
Masao Tomonaga
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Dr. Masao Tomonaga is also hibakusha exposed at 2.5 kilometer. After graduation from Nagasaki University Medical School in 1968 he became a physician and hematologist specializing leukemia treatment. He also continued research on how radiation exposure induces maligancy. After retirement he was appointed the Director of Japanese Red Cross Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Hospital. Since 2012 he works for elderly hibakusha at Megumino-Oka Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivor Nursery Home as Director of Clinics.
He was also appointed in 2018 President of Nagasaki Prefecture Hibakusha Association with 2000 members. He is Vice-President of IPPNW (Nobel Peace Prize in 1985) for North Asia Region and Representative for Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly for Nuclear Abolition (ICAN member) and Director for “Nyokonokai” dedicated for Dr. Takashi Nagai, hibakusha radiologist and author of “The Bell of Nagasaki”.
The nuclear weapon age has opened in 1945. We Nagasaki hibakusha experienced 73,000 early deaths as the first victim of human being. We saw the Cold War evoked in 1947. Another 74,000 hibakusha survived and experienced a long period of Cold War until 1992. Around 1955 hibakusha experienced a start of anti-nuclear movement. Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 struck us and whole Japanese. We experienced for the first time a real fear for nuclear war. We also experienced first recognition that human being now had ultimate weapons in human history that is capable of destroying whole humanity.
There developed some good signs such as PTBT Treaty in 1965 and NPT Treaty was enforced in 1970. Further, INF Treaty signed in 1987 between US and Soviet Union succeeded in markedly reducing nuclear warheads in 1990ies. However, we also experienced firmly established nuclear deterrence strategy on the basis of MAD theory by maintaining balanced nuclear powers in order to avoid nuclear attacks. We experienced the end of Cold War without hot war in 1989, but we experienced a strong framework of nuclear deterrence policy has been maintained until now.
NPT regime gradually changed to be inactive around 2010, resulting in shrinkage of nuclear disarmament. Hiabkusha and NGOs such as ICAN aroused for adopting TPNW by a strong solidarity and succeeded in establishing the Treaty in 2017, which is now close to be in force as international law.
Even now in 2020 hibakusha continue to suffer atomic bomb radiation- induced cancers and leukemia. This life-long health consequence prove genuine inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. We must challenge a new stage of nuclear abolition under dangerous divide between NPT supporters and TPNW promoters. To overcome this divide we require power of civil society, especially of citizens of nuclear weapon states to make their governments to abandon nuclear policy. They must listen to Nagasaki’s voice gained from many serious experiences.
Complementary amalgamation of NPT and TPNW into one treaty is key for future nuclear-free world. Coming each review conference of NPT and TPNW should be set as best theaters for confidence-building, dialogue, and scientific collaboration as shown in ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the climate change to overcome the divide. To avoid human extinction by nuclear war, intended or by accident, we will experience next 25 years as a crucial stage. We hibakusha with the most important experiences would disappear by 100 Anniversary of the atomic bombings; to see nuclear-free world or not, is the ultimate question in 21st Century for Homo sapiens.
Keywords
Nuclear Age, Hibakusha, Cold War, NPT, TPNW, Civil Society, Confidence-
building, Nuclear-free World
Full text (PDF) is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
The U.S. Election and Nuclear Order in the Post-Pandemic World
Leon V. Sigal
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project in New York and has participated in Track II talks with North Korea for two decades. He was a member of the editorial board of The New York Times from 1989 to 1995. He served in the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, in 1979 as International Affairs Fellow and in 1980 as Special Assistant to the Director. He was a Rockefeller Younger Scholar in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in 1972-1974 and a guest scholar there in 1981-1984. From 1974 to 1989 he was a professor of government at Wesleyan University. He was an adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs from 1985 to 1989 and from 1996 to 2000 and a visiting lecturer at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School in 1988, 2000, and 2018. Sigal is the author of Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking, Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question (with John Steinbruner), Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Hang Separately: Cooperative Security Between the United States and Russia, 1985-1994, and Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines Ban in American Politics. He edited The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending.
U.S. power and prestige may have diminished in recent years, but the United States still plays a pivotal role in international institutions, alliances, and mass media, so who becomes its president and which party controls Congress matter a lot for the global nuclear order. However unlikely it is that Donald Trump’s expressed desire to contest the election’s outcome could succeed, whether the nation can avert a violent backlash among disappointed partisans is less clear.
Nuclear weapons are often thought to be the esoteric domain of experts. Yet one need only recall that although mass activism does not guarantee policy change, three of the most significant developments in recent decades – the ban on above-ground nuclear tests, the INF Treaty, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall – would not have happened without mass protests in many countries. And citizen involvement, organized by NGOs, can even facilitate monitoring of arms agreements and nuclear developments in some countries.
The public’s understandable preoccupation with COVID-19, economic distress, racial animus, and climate change leave scant scope for paying heed to nuclear risks, which makes mobilization of a mass anti-nuclear movement unlikely. Absent popular action, however, positive change to the global nuclear order will continue to be marginal and fitful. This makes the international milieu critical for the nuclear future – a milieu that a president can influence but not determine.
President Trump’s reelection is likely to have a pernicious effect on that milieu, hindering international cooperation to limit nuclear weapons and accelerating a qualitative arms race that could endanger crisis stability. Yet two of Trump’s more positive impulses are likely to continue. He is unlikely to increase the risk of an intense crisis leading to nuclear war because he wants to avoid U.S. involvement in any wars, not start new ones. He will also try to sustain negotiations with North Korea to curb nuclear developments there, though whether he is prepared to satisfy Pyongyang’s stiffer demands remains in doubt.
His opponent, Joseph Biden, will face those same demands. Personnel is policy, and the Biden administration will likely be staffed with officials who served under President Obama. That means a return to shoring up alliances and international cooperation. It also means continuity with Obama’s nuclear policies. Whether he will curtail Obama’s modernization plans is not clear, but in contrast to Trump, he will try his best to restore the JCPOA, which could head off nuclear weapons development not only in Iran but also in Saudi Arabia. He will also strive to save START, seek technical talks with China, and not abandon the Open Skies accord.
Keywords
Biden, Trump, crisis stability, international milieu, JCPOA, New START, nuclear arms race,
Open Skies
Full text (PDF) is here.
