Global Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium 2021
(Data: End of 2019)
*13 countries : Kazakhstan, Japan, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, South, Africa, Italy, Belarus, Iran, Norway, Australia, Syria
The stockpile of fissile materials includes estimated ones with large uncertainties and thus total quantities are expressed in rounded numbers.
The material that can be used in nuclear weapons is highly enriched uranium (HEU) with an enrichment level of 20% or more. It is estimated that in actual fact nearly all is 90% or higher, but there is also uranium with a low enrichment level and precise details have not been made public. Therefore the values for converting to the Hiroshima atomic bomb are a rule of thumb.
Military: HEU used in nuclear warheads or stored for use in weapons; HEU used in reactor fuel for naval nuclear propulsion (including spent fuel)
Non-military: HEU used in fuel for research and testing reactors; HEU declared as surplus for military purposes.
Source: International Panel on Fissile Materials (2021), Podvig and Snyder (2019), IAEA INFCIRC/549 (2021)
©: RECNA Fissile Material Data Monitoring Team
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