2020年11月4日

RECNA is pleased to host a special live-stream symposium to explore the future of peace and disarmament education as a commemorative event of the 75th anniversary of the Nagasaki atomic bombing, entitled “Peace and Disarmament Education in an Emerging Era of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” on November 25, 2020.


Program

Part1:  Special Lecture
“The Origin of War and the Future of Humanity”

  Juichi YAMAGIWA, the 26th President of Kyoto University
 
Part2:  Panel Discussion  (Names below with * are online participants.)
“Peace and Disarmament Education in the New Era”
  Moderator:
  Mikiko NISHIMURA*, Professor, International Christian University
Panelist:
  Valere MANTELS*, Head of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Vienna Office
  Toshiaki SASAO*, Director, Peace Research Institute, International Christian University (ICU-PRI)
  Kiho YI*, Director, Center for Peace and Public Integrity, Hanshin University, ROK
  Keiko NAKAMURA, Associate Professor, RECNA


Zoom Live Stream

Date:  November 25, 2020
Time:  6 p.m. – 8:15 p.m. (JST), 10 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. (CET)
Language:  English or Japanese
(with simultaneous interpretation)
Registration:  You may register for the live stream from here.
 
Venue:  NBC Video Hall (Nagasaki City)
Organizer:  Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
cooperation:  Peace Research Institute, International Christian University (ICU-PRI)


Requests to all who are planning to come to the venue

• Your temperature will be measured at the reception. If you have a high fever (37.5 degrees Celsius or higher) or a cold, you may be refused admission. Please refrain from visiting if you have subjective symptoms such as fever, coughing, fatigue, or feeling unwell.
• Be sure to wear a mask to prevent the spread of infection.
• You will be asked to fill out and submit your name and emergency contact information.
• We recommend that you install the free app “COCOA”, COVID-19 Contact-Confirming Application, beforehand.

 

Category TOPICS
2020年10月30日

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


Assessing the modernization of nuclear postures
Petr Topychkanov
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Dr Petr Topychkanov (Russia) is a Senior Researcher in SIPRI’s Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, working on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, arms control and the impact of new technologies on strategic stability. Prior to joining SIPRI in 2018, he held the position of Senior Researcher at the Centre for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. From 2006–17, Topychkanov was a Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program. He received his PhD in History in 2009 from the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University. His recent publications include The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk Volume III, South Asian Perspectives (SIPRI: April 2020, editor and co-author).

Abstract

The article examines the recent decisions taken by central nuclear-armed states to give expanded roles to nuclear weapons in their military plans. The decisions reflect the increased salience of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. It marks a reversal of the post-cold war trend toward the relative marginalization of nuclear weapons. Political and military leaders in these countries are moving away from the goal of limiting the nuclear weapons role to the sole purpose of deterring aggression with the use of the same type of arms. Instead, they are emphasizing nuclear options to respond to conventional and even cyber-attacks. This lowering of the nuclear threshold coincides with the stagnation of the nuclear arms control. Simultaneously, the political distrust grows between Russia and the USA, NATO, and also between the United States and China.

Keywords
Nuclear weapon, nuclear doctrine, no-first-use, nuclear deterrence, nuclear modernization, arms control

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines: cooperation around research and production capacity is critical
David G Legge and Sun Kim
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Authors

David Legge, MD, scholar emeritus at La Trobe University, has practised, researched and taught in public health, health policy and global health for many years. He has been active in the People’s Health Movement since its creation in 2000, including its WHO Watch project. Contact: dlegge@phmovement.org. More about PHM at www.phmovement.org

Sun Kim, MS, PhD, Director of Health Policy Research Center at People’s Health Institute (Seoul, South Korea), has researched vulnerability and health care, and access to medicines and pharmaceutical production, from a political economy of health perspective. She has served as South East Asia and Pacific region coordinator of People’s Health Movement since 2019. Contact: sunkim@phmovement.org

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated families and communities and disrupted society and the economy; it has caused over 1 million deaths globally and left a disturbing burden of chronic morbidity. The prompt availability of effective and affordable vaccines against the SARS-2-coronavirus offers the most promising path out of the disease and disruption that the pandemic has wrought.

From the beginning the WHO Director General was emphasising ‘solidarity’ as the key to the global response. Solidarity was reflected in the early publication of the genome sequence and the sharing of protocols for the nucleic acid test. However, the proposal that vaccine technologies be pooled to accelerate vaccine development and production was a step too far for pharma and its nation state sponsors. WHO’s proposed ‘solidarity vaccine trial’ which would yield comparative data about efficacy, safety and cost was likewise boycotted by pharma.

From late March negotiations toward global cooperation for diagnostics, medicines and vaccines moved from WHO to the G20 sponsored ‘Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator’, a new ‘multi-stakeholder public private partnership’. The ‘vaccine arm’ of the Accelerator was the Covax Facility which would enter into advanced purchase commitments for selected candidate vaccines for participating countries. Covax also provided for the mobilising of donor funds to pay for vaccine supplies for low and lower middle income countries. Covax was designed to deliver vaccines for the priority fraction of countries’ populations (up to 20%). After this, countries would return to bilateral purchasing in the open market.

By July however, it was becoming clear that massive bilateral advanced purchase agreements, in particular, by the US, UK and EU, would reserve most of the early supply of effective vaccines and jeopardise the fund-raising for Covax.

The rejection of technology pooling, the rise of ‘vaccine nationalism’, and the underfunding (and under-supply) of Covax all look set to produce highly inequitable outcomes in terms of access to vaccination, particularly during the first year or so after the first vaccine is approved.

Drawing on a review of access-to-medicines debates over the last two decades, an analysis of the evolving business model of transnational pharma, and taking into account the rising call for universal health cover, we propose a policy platform to promote a more equitable roll out of vaccines in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Core elements of such a platform include:
• full funding of the concessional component of Covax;
• a rapid expansion of local production of vaccines in low and middle income countries (L&MICs) supported by an organised program of technology transfer as appropriate;
• an immediate waiver of key provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to intellectual property and technical knowhow necessary for vaccine development and production;
• full transparency regarding key aspects of vaccine development and production, including clinical trial data, production costs, and patent and market approval status; and
• a moratorium on national debt servicing and repayment for highly indebted L&MICs.

Policy initiatives directed at a more equitable and efficient response to the next pandemic need to be put in place now, including:
• scaling up public sector innovation and manufacturing capacity in L&MICs;
• regional and plurilateral agreements on biopharmaceutical technology transfer and capacity building;
• reforming the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate technology pooling in future pandemic emergencies;
• reforming the International Health Regulations to give WHO the power to trigger mandatory technology pooling and mandatory participation in comparative clinical trials (‘Solidarity trials’) in pandemic emergencies; and
• continued mobilisation around delinking and the creation of a global research and development treaty.

Critical to achieving progress in the implementation of this platform will be:
• institutional reform at the national level including legislation for the full deployment of TRIPS flexibilities and for the imposition of conditionalities on public funding of research (open licensing) and the funding of private pharma (transparency);
• protection of the multilateral member-state fora such the UN and the WHO where L&MIC voices can be heard and which can provide leadership in institutional reform; and
• community mobilization around single payer UHC and equitable access to affordable, effective medicines and vaccines.

Keywords
COVID-19, Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A), Covax, vaccines, vaccine development, vaccine production, equity, access, TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licensing, Solidarity Clinical Trials, universal health cover (UHC), pharmaceutical industry, COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP)

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


The Role of Cities as First Responders to Pandemics: Focusing on the Case of the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s Response to COVID-19
Changwoo Shon
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Changwoo Shon received a Ph.D. in Health Science from Seoul National University and currently works for the Seoul Institute. The main research areas are urban health, healthy cities, and community health. Currently, he is conducting research on establishing a system for new infectious disease management, agenda-setting in the Post-corona era. In addition, he recently published research papers related to COVID-19 in the Korea Journal of hospital management (The Response of the Seoul Municipal Hospitals against COVID-19 and Its Implications for Public Hospitals), and the Journal of Korean Society for Health Education and Promotion (The direction of Healthy Cities through the COVID-19 pandemic experience of Seoul, South Korea). In addition, he is an adjunct professor of the Catholic University of Korea, an academic director of the Korea Health Communication Association, an academic director of the Korean Healthy Cities Partnership, and a member of the Disaster Safety Project Evaluation Committee of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety in Korea.

Abstract

This study was conducted to discuss the role of urban governments in the future, including intercity network construction, by reviewing cases of responding to COVID-19 in Seoul amid changes in the international situation caused by COVID-19. This paper is organized into four sections. First, this paper described the outbreak of COVID-19 in Seoul from January to August 2020 and the Seoul city’s response over time. Second, the background of Alliance for Multilateralism and inter-city cooperation in accordance with the changes in the international situation due to COVID-19 was explained. Third, the response of the Seoul Metropolitan Government to the pandemic was reviewed based on the following four characteristics: (i) Social distancing; (ii) Enhanced contact tracing; (iii) Widespread testing; and, (iv) Early preparation. Finally, this paper reviewed how Seoul city cooperated with overseas cities in order to overcome the pandemic crisis, as well as the cases in which 25 autonomous districts of Seoul shared their policies using the Healthy Cities Network.

Keywords
COVID-19, Pandemic crisis, City’s response, Intercity network, Role of cities

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS
2020年10月29日

RECNA Newsletter Vol.9 No.1 (September 30, 2020)

Newsletter Vol.9 No.1 _ Interview Series: Nuclear Weapons, COVID-19, Climate Change – What Lies at the Roots of these Problems
— Fumihiko Yoshida

Policy Paper: 50th Anniversary of the NPT Entering into Force “Opposing a World with Nuclear Weapons” (July 2020)
— Tatsujiro Suzuki

Joint Research on “Disarmament Education”
— Keiko Nakamura

Nagasaki Peace Declaration 2020: 75 years of a “World with Nuclear Weapons”
— Satoshi Hirose

Looking back on Nagasaki Youth Delegation Activities
— Members of the Eighth Nagasaki Youth Delegation

>>for details

 

Category TOPICS

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications
Steven E. Miller
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Steven E. Miller is Director of the International Security Program, Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal, International Security and also co-editor of the International Security Program’s book series, Belfer Center Studies in International Security (which is published by the MIT Press). Previously, he was Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and taught Defense and Arms Control Studies in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Abstract

The hotline concept has evolved to a variety of forms and settings, suggesting a broad utility. But it is what might be called a pure or original version of an idea that remains compelling: making sure that the most important, most heavily armed nuclear rivals can communicate directly and effectively at the highest levels in all circumstances, whether crisis or war, in order to minimize escalation, retain control of dangerous situations, and inoculate against potentially disastrous miscommunication or misunderstanding.

Keywords
Nuclear weapons hotlines, Russia, United States, Cuban Missile Crisis, Arms Control Diplomacy

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS
2020年10月28日

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Authors

Richard Pilch is the Director of Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. A physician by training, Dr. Pilch has focused on national security issues since 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks of 2001. In 2002, he completed a postdoctoral fellowship in chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, after which he spent nearly a decade overseas assessing and addressing biological warfare (BW), bioterrorism, and public health emergencies of international concern, including threats posed by the former Soviet Union’s (FSU) legacy offensive BW program. He has performed onsite assessments of every known civilian BW facility in Russia, led multiple threat reduction programs on behalf of the US government, served on over thirty technical panels and advisory boards, and authored more than sixty technical publications and White Papers. He co-edited the definitive Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Wiley) with his long-time mentor and former CBWNP Director Dr. Ray Zilinskas in 2005. Dr. Pilch received his MD from the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine and MPH from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Miles Pomper is a Senior Fellow in the Washington DC office of CNS. He has written dozens of articles, papers, and book chapters on nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear arms control. Before joining CNS he served as Editor-in-Chief of Arms Control Today, Previously, he was the lead foreign policy reporter for CQ Weekly and Legi-Slate News Service, where he covered the full range of national security issues before Congress, and a Foreign Service Officer with the US Information Agency. He holds a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University and a master’s degree in journalism from Northwestern University.

Abstract

This article provides an Asia-Pacific perspective on biological weapons and their relevance to nuclear deterrence in the pandemic era. The entire class of biological weapons is banned by international law; however, biological weapons are generally less costly and less technically challenging to develop than nuclear weapons. Conversely, nuclear weapons are openly possessed by multiple countries in the Asia-Pacific despite their corresponding cost and technical complexity. These two types of weapons of mass destruction – biological and nuclear – do not exist in isolation but in a multifactorial geopolitical environment where the threat and control of one impact that of the other. A third factor that holds the potential to influence this dynamic is the increasing likelihood of natural outbreaks and pandemics. This paper explores potential intersections of biological and nuclear weapons in the pandemic context. First, it describes the threat of biological weapons, including history, threat assessment methodology, and specific threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Next, it reviews options for biological weapons control. Finally, it discusses nuclear deterrence and escalation in the context of both natural and deliberate biological events. It concludes with a summary of key points and recommendations for regional security and stability.

Keywords
Biological weapons, nuclear deterrence, pandemic era, Asia-Pacific

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


COVID 19 and Labor Demand, Migration, and Military Force Structure Implications in East Asia
Brian Nichiporuk
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Brian Nichiporuk is a senior political scientist at The RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. He has worked on research projects for the U.S. Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during his RAND career. His current research focuses on the following areas: Russian military capabilities and vulnerabilities, the effects of demographic trends in the Middle East and East Asia upon regional security, and the assessment of anti-access threats to the U.S. military around the world. Dr. Nichiporuk has authored or co-authored many RAND reports, including “The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors” (2000) (sole author) and “Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces: An Overview of Budgets and Capabilities” (2019) (co-author). He has worked in the Pentagon as an IPA Fellow in the Programs and Evaluation Directorate of Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Brian has a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

Abstract

The Covid 19 pandemic has thus far not had the same direct health impact in East Asia as it has had in Europe and the US as death and infection rates have been lower in the major East Asian states. Nevertheless, the pandemic has the potential to have major second order effects in East Asia, especially if it continues for a long time.
One of the defining features of the large East Asian states today is their demography. All of them (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea) have aging populations, low fertility rates, and low, or even negative, population growth. All of these states currently allow only low levels of immigration, which do not substantially increase their working age populations. East Asia’s demographic characteristics will have an impact upon the nature of any long-term regional implications of the Covid 19 crisis.
This paper takes a high level look at the potential long-term implications of the Covid 19 crisis in East Asia by using the demographic lens to examine three areas: impacts on labor markets, possible mass migration scenarios, and the effect on regional militaries. In the area of labor markets, the paper argues that Covid will compel most East Asian states to find new ways of utilizing their older workers and to increase the flexibility of their labor markets. In the area of mass migration, the paper examines possible scenarios having to do with North Korean state collapse and urban-rural migration trends in China. Finally, in the military sphere, the paper argues that the Covid crisis could significantly affect nuclear weapons security protocols in the region, the manpower and personnel policies of certain militaries, and the frequency, scope, and size of major exercises.

Keywords
East Asian demography, Population aging in East Asia, East Asian security, East Asian militaries, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, East Asian labor markets, international migration, Chinese internal migration, Covid 19, Covid 19 in East Asia, Covid 19 and international security, nuclear weapons security, pandemics and international security, military personnel policies, military exercises, Covid 19 and defense budgets, Chinese nuclear forces, North Korean nuclear forces, North Korean state collapse scenarios, East Asian fertility rates, Unemployment rates in East Asia

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS
2020年10月22日

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


An Alternative to Nuclear Deadlock and Stalled Diplomacy – Proposals, Pathways, and Prospects for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Michael Hamel-Green
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Michael Hamel-Green is Emeritus Professor in Social Inquiry in the College of Arts, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia. He was previously the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development at Victoria University; and taught in in international security, conflict resolution, and community development subjects.

Abstract

The current nuclear deadlock with North Korea remains unresolved as the initially promising 2018-2019 three-way diplomacy between the DPRK, US and ROK stalls. More widely in Northeast Asia, nuclear confrontation between China and the US is mounting, with increased deployment of nuclear-weapon-capable forces in and around the region, including land and sea-based missiles, missile defence systems, and deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons on mobile platforms. The paper proposes that an alternative to continuing nuclear escalation, and the increasing threat of a nuclear catastrophe, does exist in the shape of a phased establishment of a regional Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) negotiated in tandem with a regional comprehensive security agreement. The comprehensive security agreement would involve a final peace settlement of the Korean War, establishment of a regional security forum, economic and energy assistance to the DPRK, and legally binding security guarantees for the NWFZ from the US, China, and Russia. The paper discusses the precedents of successful NWFZ establishment in other regions, and the history of past proposals for such a zone in Northeast Asia. It examines the special NWFZ features that would be required in this region, including the need for rigorous verification of the dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons and facilities in the DPRK, a Korean War peace settlement, a flexible NWFZ entry into force mechanism that gives time for DPRK to assess the security guarantee benefits of the NWFZ zone, and provisions for preventing forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons within the region. The paper concludes by presenting NEANWFZ proposals emerging from a recent Northeast Asian workshop of regional experts, and identifying potential pathways, advocates, and prospects for its successful negotiation in the current global context.

Keywords
Nuclear weapons free zones, treaties, allies, prohibition, disarmament, arms control, Northeast Asia, DPRK, Korea, China, Russia, United States, diplomacy

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

Category TOPICS
2020年10月16日

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.


Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
Allan Behm
 
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project

About the Author

Allan Behm is Head, International and Security Affairs Program, The Australia Institute, Canberra, Australia. Allan spent 30 years in the Australian Public Service, as a member of the Australian diplomatic service, the Prime Minister’s Department, the Department of Defence and the Attorney General’s Department. He specialised in international relations, defence strategy, counter-terrorism and law enforcement policy, and more recently, climate change.

Abstract

‘Extended deterrence’ and ‘extended nuclear deterrence’, as US security guarantees provided to allies, are artefacts of over six decades of US-led policy and planning. No other Nuclear Weapon State offers such guarantees. In the early post-WW2 years, extended deterrence used the overwhelming conventional military power of the US to deter armed aggression (particularly from the USSR) against its allies. The development of atomic weapons by the USSR and China, and the potential threat that such weapons might have posed for allies, expanded the scope of “extended deterrence” to include deterrence of possible nuclear weapon threats.
Deterrence relies on an aggressor’s uncertainty whether the third party providing the deterrent will provide the overwhelming military power to defeat aggression, and whether the cost of defeat will outweigh the benefit of victory. In other words, is deterrence a bluff or a guarantee?
In recent decades, the credibility of extended deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence, has continued to decline. The fragility of the deterrence doctrine was already evident before the appearance of the coronavirus. But President Trump’s mercurial approach to the coronavirus pandemic and international agreements has encouraged the allies of the US to look at their national security through the lens of his approach to the coronavirus. If the US cannot effectively protect itself against the coronavirus, how can it protect its allies?
Deterrence is a faith-based system. There is no evidence that it works. The logic of deterrence ultimately depends on its failure: the conduct of warfare on a massive scale.

Keywords
Nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, nuclear umbrella, credibility, trust, leadership, alliances

Full text (PDF) is here.
 

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