“World’s Nuclear Warheads Data” 2023 [All Lists]
The 2023 World’s Nuclear Warheads Data have been published. Please click on the following thumbnail images and download the pdf posters.
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| Jun. 2023 |  |
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◇ “A Guide to the World’s Nuclear Warheads Count June 2023” Released!
Please access here.
◇ You can see previous “World’s Nuclear Warhead Data” from [All Lists].
◆ The 2023 World’s Fissile Material Data have been published too.
Calls for submissions! [JPN]
2nd Essay Contest on a “Nuclear Weapons Free Future”
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), with the support of the Nagasaki Shimbun, invites youth between the ages of 16 and 29 to submit an essay on a “Nuclear Weapons Free Future.”
In January 2023, the “Doomsday Clock” of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist was reset to 90 seconds to midnight, the closest ever to doomsday. The Bulletin did this because of the growing threat of the use of nuclear weapons and the ongoing destruction of the global environment. There are people who argue that nuclear weapons are crucial for national security. But can nuclear weapons really save humans, nations, and the planet?
Awards will be given for outstanding essays on the theme of a “Nuclear Weapons Free Future” taking into consideration the sub-theme of the supposed role of nuclear weapons in national security, the survival of human civilization and the health of the global environment. We look forward to reading your thoughts and innovative ideas.
Entries will be divided into two groups: youth aged 16 to 19 (Under 20) and youth aged 20 to 29 (Under 30). Awards will be given to outstanding essays and there will be one grand prize winner for each age group. The two winning essays will be published in the Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper and the winning authors will be invited to participate in the award ceremony in Nagasaki on Saturday, September 23rd, 2023. If the winner resides in Japan, she/he will be invited to Nagasaki to participate in person. If the winner resides overseas, he/she will be invited to participate in the award ceremony online.
| ELIGIBILITY |
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| • Under-20 (Ages between 16 and 19), Under-30 (Ages between 20 and 29) as of July 31, 2023. |
| • Any residence or nationality is welcome. |
| APPLICATION |
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| Please submit the following documents in PDF format by e-mail to opinion@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp |
| 1. Application [form] * For download |
| 2. Your Essay (Essays should be about 1000 words, in English, and must be original and unpublished. Give your essay an appropriate title.) |
| SUBMISSION DEADLINE |
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| July 31, 2023 |
| You will receive a notice of receipt approximately one week after submission. If you do not receive a notice please contact us at the contact information below. |
| * Please note that applications will not be accepted at the contact e-mail address. |
| ABOUT THE PRIZE |
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| For Youth Under-30: |
| • The grand prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque, prize money of 50,000 yen, and, for a winner who resides in Japan, an invitation to the award ceremony in Nagasaki. (A winner who resides outside Japan will be invited to participate online.) A Nagasaki Peace Tour will be arranged for those who wish to participate. |
| • The second prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque and prize money of 30,000 yen. |
| For Youth Under-20: |
| • The grand prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque, prize money of 30,000 yen, and, for a winner who resides in Japan, an invitation to the award ceremony in Nagasaki. (A winner who resides outside Japan will be invited to participate online.) A Nagasaki Peace Tour will be arranged for those who wish to participate. |
| • The second prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque and prize money of 10,000 yen. |
| AWARD SELECTION AND ANNOUNCEMENT |
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| Two grand prize winners and two second prize winners will be selected after strict screening by the selection committee. The committee members are: |
| • Yuichi SEIRAI, Akutagawa Award-winning author (Chair) |
| • Gregory KULACKI, Visiting Fellow of RECNA (Chair of the English Review Subcommittee) |
| • Yoshiki YAMADA, Editorial Director, Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper, visiting professor of RECNA (Vice chair) |
| • Keiko NAKAMURA, Associate Professor of RECNA (Vice chair) |
| • Mei KOJIMA, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Nagasaki, reporter |
| • Tatsujiro SUZUKI, Vice Director of RECNA, professor |
| • Sumiko HATAKEYAMA, Co-president of Peace Boat |
| • Ruiko MATSUNAGA, peace activist |
| SCREENING CRITERIA |
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| Your Essay will be evaluated on the following criteria: |
| (1) Clarity, (2) Logical consistency, (3) Factual content, (4) Creativity and originality, (5) Expressiveness |
| ANNOUCEMENT |
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| The results will be announced in the Award Ceremony. |
| Time and Date: Saturday, September 23, 2023, 1-2 p.m. |
| Venue: Nagasaki University (https://www.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/en/) |
| The Grand Prize-winning essays will be published in full in the Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper at a later date. All winning essays will be published on the RECNA website. |
| * The copyright of the submitted essays belongs to entrant, but the organizer (RECNA) holds secondary use (publication online or paper format, etc.) right of the winning essays. |
| Sponsored by: the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) |
| Supported by: Nagasaki Shimbun Newspaper |
| Nominal support organizations: Nagasaki Prefecture, Nagasaki City, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Nagasaki, KTN (Television Nagasaki Co.,Ltd.), NBC (Nagasaki Broadcasting Company), NCC（Nagasaki Culture Telecasting Corporation）, NIB (Nagasaki International Television Broadcasting, Inc.) |
* This project is funded by a donation for the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
| Contact |
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Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) TEL: +81-95-819-2164 E-mail: recna_staff@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp Website: https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-top |
RECNA Newsletter Vol.11 No.2 (March 31, 2023)
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The past ten years for RECNA and the PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition — Susumu Shirabe Commemoration events for the 10th anniversary of the establishment of RECNA and PCU-NC The Project on “Reducing the risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)” The Eleventh Nagasaki Youth Delegation begin their activities [Full text] * Citation URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/00042200 |
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) issued Statement on February 24, 2023.
Statement on the One-Year Anniversary of Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
February 24, 2023
One year has passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022. There is still no clear path to a ceasefire agreement, and the number of casualties is continuously increasing. On the 21st of this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the only remaining arms control and disarmament treaty between the United States and Russia. On the 23rd he declared that Russia would increase the nuclear capabilities of its land, sea, and air forces. Tensions between the United States and Russia are rising. If the treaty, which has contributed to confidence-building through mutual on-site inspections and periodic consultations, becomes void and Russia returns to the path of nuclear arms expansion, the risk of the use of nuclear weapons will increase and the path to nuclear disarmament may be closed.
RECNA strongly condemns Russia’s stance and urges it to immediately cease its acts of aggression, accompanied by nuclear blackmail, and to work to restore international order based on law. Suspending the implementation of New START and announcing an increase in nuclear capability is also an act in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which mandates negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Russia should immediately withdraw its suspension of implementation and nuclear force buildup and establish a new framework for arms control and disarmament.
In the context of increased dependence on nuclear deterrence, the responsibility of the other nuclear weapon states, including the United States, as well as the nuclear umbrella states, should also be called into question. In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine and the increased nuclear risk, Europe, Northeast Asia, and other regions are becoming more dependent on nuclear deterrence and are accelerating their arms expansions. Division and confrontation between countries with different interests has deepened, and a situation that should be called a “security dilemma” is now underway.
All nuclear armed states and “nuclear umbrella” states must thoroughly adhere to the “non-use of nuclear weapons” norm that has been in place for more than 77 years, and make the utmost effort to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use. To this end, they should return to the principle of “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” which was reaffirmed in the statement of the five nuclear weapon states on January 3, 2022. It is also significant that the G20 Summit Declaration (November 15, 2022), which includes Russia, clearly states that “the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.” Nuclear weapon states and nuclear umbrella states have the responsibility to prioritize nuclear risk reduction measures, including confidence building and thorough implementation of crisis management measures, as well as to take steps toward more drastic reduction of the role of nuclear weapons.
Finally, every nation is expected to make efforts to overcome the “security dilemma” and explore ways to achieve common security. The recommendations issued by Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (March 29, 2018) noted that nuclear deterrence is “a dangerous long-term basis for global security” and that “all states should seek a better long-term solution.” The upcoming Hiroshima G7 Summit must be the starting point for creative discussions on overcoming nuclear deterrence.
Vol.5, Issue 2 of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND) is now available online. There are 18 open access articles.
For the issue, see here. We have collaborated with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the Toda Peace Institute in editing this special issue on “A Nuclear Trilemma in Southern Asia: China, India, and Pakistan.”
IMPLICATIONS OF THE UKRAINE WAR FOR ROK SECURITY
CHEON Myeongguk
December 5, 2022
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.
In this essay, CHEON Myeongguk explores the possible implications of the Ukraine conflict on the ROK attitudes regarding nuclear weapons. He concludes that the “ROK’s indigenous nuclear option would be a last resort as a deterrence measure against DPRK’s nuclear threat. This option would only be considered by the ROK if Donald Trump were reelected as President of the United States and decided to withdraw US forces from the Korean Peninsula and eventually withdraw the US nuclear umbrella protecting the ROK from DPRK aggression.”
CHEON Myeongguk is a visiting researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) working on DPRK weapons of mass destruction threats such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. Deterrence, protection, counter measures, consequence management, and arms control are also included in his research scopes.
This essay is a contribution to the “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia” (NU-NEA) project, a collaboration between the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Nautilus Institute, and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear non-proliferation and Disarmament, is to reduce and minimize the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the region by developing better understandings of the processes that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons and the potential outcomes of such nuclear weapons use. In the first year of this three-year project, the NU-NEA project team identified over 25 plausible nuclear weapons “use cases” that could start in Northeast Asia, sometimes leading to broader conflict beyond the region. These nuclear use cases are described in the report Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk. The project has commissioned five contributions to update the cases in light of the Ukraine conflict, of which this essay is the fifth.
Keywords: Republic of Korea, Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Northeast Asia, Deterrence
Authors’ Profile:
CHEON Myeongguk is a visiting researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) working on DPRK weapons of mass destruction threats such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. Deterrence, protection, counter measures, consequence management, and arms control are also included in his research scopes.
RECNA Newsletter Vol.11 No.1 (September 30, 2022)
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The TPNW First Meeting of States Parties: Report from Vienna — Masao Tomonaga The TPNW First Meeting of States Parties: Working Paper on Victim Assistance “Nagasaki Before the A-Bomb” Slide Materials and “Aerial Photo Archive” Launch of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) 2 2022 Nagasaki Peace Declaration – Time to Regain an Awareness of Civil Society’s Role Nagasaki Youth Delegation Visits New York [Full text] * Citation URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/00041906 |
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
Anastasia Barannikova
November 7, 2022
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.
In this essay, Anastasia Barannikova argues that although the situation in Ukraine does not affect Russia’s nuclear posture/strategy in Northeast Asia directly, indirect impacts of the situation in Ukraine on Russia’s nuclear policies in this region cannot be ruled out. Examples of such indirect impacts include changes in nuclear weapons planning and deployment by the United States and China under the pretext or because of the Ukraine situation, a change in the nuclear weapons status of one or more of the non-nuclear states in the region, or the breaking out of a military conflict over Taiwan or on the Korean peninsula.
Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia) and non-resident senior fellow of Mongolian Institute of Northeast Asian Security and Strategy (Mongolia).
This essay is a contribution to the “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia” (NU-NEA) project, a collaboration between the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Nautilus Institute, and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear non-proliferation and Disarmament, is to reduce and minimize the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the region by developing better understandings of the processes that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons and the potential outcomes of such nuclear weapons use. In the first year of this three-year project, the NU-NEA project team identified over 25 plausible nuclear weapons “use cases” that could start in Northeast Asia, sometimes leading to broader conflict beyond the region. These nuclear use cases are described in the report Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk. The project has commissioned five contributions to update the cases in light of the Ukraine conflict, of which this essay is the fourth.
Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, Northeast Asia
Authors’ Profile:
Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia) and non-resident senior fellow of Mongolian Institute of Northeast Asian Security and Strategy (Mongolia).
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
Paul K. Davis
October 27, 2022
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.
In this Policy Forum essay, Paul Davis argues: “Anyone sensible worries that a first nuclear use might well lead to escalation and general nuclear war, but the adjective “inexorably” should no longer be included.” He concludes that the Ukraine war has made the range of nuclear-use cases in Northeast Asia that he identified in 2020 even more plausible.
Paul K. Davis is a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a retired adjunct Senior Principal Researcher at RAND. He received a B.S. in chemistry from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. in chemical physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He worked in strategic warning technology and systems analysis before joining the U.S. government to work on strategic force planning and arms control. As a Senior Executive, he then headed analysis of global military strategy and related defense programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. He then joined the RAND Corporation, where his research has dealt with strategic planning under deep uncertainty; deterrence theory; modeling; information fusion; and causal social science for policy applications. He has served on numerous national panels and journal editorial boards. He developed and conducted a prescient nuclear-crisis war game in Seoul in 2016. His most recent major work (co-edited) is Social Behavioral Modeling for Complex Systems (2019), Wiley & Sons. This essay represents his own analysis and is unrelated to RAND research.
This essay is a contribution to the “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia” (NU-NEA) project, a collaboration between the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Nautilus Institute, and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear nonproliferation and Disarmament. The project’s goal is to reduce and minimize the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the region by developing better understandings of the processes that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons and the potential outcomes of such nuclear weapons use. In the first year of this three-year project, the NU-NEA project team identified over 25 plausible nuclear weapons “use cases” that could start in Northeast Asia, sometimes leading to broader conflict beyond the region. These nuclear use cases are described in the report Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk. The project has commissioned five contributions to update the cases in light of the Ukraine conflict, of which this essay is the second.
Keywords: United States, East Asia, Russia, Ukraine, Nuclear Use, Ukraine, NATO, Biden, Putin
Authors’ Profile:
Paul K. Davis is a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a retired adjunct Senior Principal Researcher at RAND. He received a B.S. in chemistry from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. in chemical physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He worked in strategic warning technology and systems analysis before joining the U.S. government to work on strategic force planning and arms control. As a Senior Executive, he then headed analysis of global military strategy and related defense programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. He then joined the RAND Corporation, where his research has dealt with strategic planning under deep uncertainty; deterrence theory; modeling; information fusion; and causal social science for policy applications. He has served on numerous national panels and journal editorial boards. He developed and conducted a prescient nuclear-crisis war game in Seoul in 2016. His most recent major work (co-edited) is Social Behavioral Modeling for Complex Systems (2019), Wiley & Sons. This essay represents his own analysis and is unrelated to RAND research.
IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR SIGNALING DURING THE UKRAINE WAR FOR CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY
TONG ZHAO
October 13, 2022
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.
In this Policy Forum essay, Tong Zhao argues that China fundamentally sees the Ukraine conflict as being caused by hegemonic behavior by the US-led West forcing Russia’s hand. China has been watching and learning from Russia’s implicit use of nuclear threat, and the lessons learned may add further ambiguity and uncertainty to the interpretation and application of China’s No First Nuclear Use policy in potential conflict situations, including those involving Taiwan.
Tong Zhao is a visiting research scholar at Princeton University’s Science and Global Security Program, as well as a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on strategic security issues, such as nuclear weapons policy, deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, hypersonic weapons, and China’s security and foreign policy.
This essay is a contribution to the “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia” (NU-NEA) project, a collaboration between the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Nautilus Institute, and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear non-proliferation and Disarmament, is to reduce and minimize the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the region by developing better understandings of the processes that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons and the potential outcomes of such nuclear weapons use. In the first year of this three-year project, the NU-NEA project team identified over 25 plausible nuclear weapons “use cases” that could start in Northeast Asia, sometimes leading to broader conflict beyond the region. These nuclear use cases are described in the report Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk. The project has commissioned five contributions to update the cases in light of the Ukraine conflict, of which this essay is the second.
Keywords: United States, Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Use, Northeast Asia, China, Russia, Ukraine
Authors’ Profile:
Tong Zhao is a Senior Fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based in Beijing at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, strategic stability, and China’s security and foreign policy. Zhao was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He also has experience as a nonresident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology, and received a B.S. in physics and an M.A. in international relations from Tsinghua University.
