It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
Attribution: iStock/Petrovich9
THE ROLE OF MISSILE DEFENSE IN NORTH-EAST ASIA
David Wright
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
January 12, 2022
Abstract
This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.
Keywords:
Missile Defense, Nuclear-weapon Use, DPRK, United States, Northeast Asia
Authors’ Profile: David Wright is a research affiliate in the MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering’s Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. From 1992 to 2020 he was a researcher with the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, serving as co-director of the program from 2002 to 2020. Previously he held research positions in the Defense and Arms Control/Security Studies Program at MIT, the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the Federation of American Scientists. He received his PhD in theoretical condensed matter physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist until 1988.
This work was supported in part by the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University.
Full text (PDF) is here. The page for this project is here.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
Credit: Rawpixel stock, U.S. Marine Corps
THE DELIBERATE EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ESCALATION TRIGGERS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Daryl G. Press
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
January 6, 2022
Abstract
This paper focuses on the conditions under which the United States might use nuclear weapons in the context of war on the Korean peninsula. It identifies circumstances that might trigger such a decision, the purposes of US nuclear use, and the plausible targets of US nuclear strikes. Attention is focused on the roles that nuclear weapons may continue to play in US military operations and geopolitical strategy despite US steps to reduce their saliency since the end of the Cold War. This paper argues that because the United States (and its allies) have a strong preference against using nuclear weapons, it would only consider doing so if (1) the mission being performed via the nuclear strike was of critical importance, (2) the mission could not be accomplished with sufficient certainty or speed with non-nuclear weapons, and (3) the use of nuclear munitions significantly increases the probability of mission success. This paper identifies a range of circumstances that could arise during a war on the Korean Peninsula that might satisfy all three of these criteria, and it identifies the pathways that are most likely to trigger US nuclear employment. Examining these conditions can help US allies and other partners identify and resolve disagreements about nuclear employment, enhance deterrence against regional adversaries, and shed light on the logic driving important decisions about US nuclear force structure and modernization.
Keywords:
Nuclear-weapon Use, Escalation, United States, Korean Peninsula, DPRK
Authors’ Profile: Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of Government at Dartmouth College. His work focuses on US foreign policy, deterrence, and the future of warfare. He has published numerous articles and two books: Calculating Credibility (2005), which examines how leaders assess credibility during crises, and The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (2020), which explores deterrence challenges of the 21st century. Press worked as a consultant at the RAND Corporation for nearly twenty years, and he has taught classes on conventional force modeling for two decades. His work has appeared in leading academic journals as well as in the popular press including Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, and The Atlantic Monthly.
Full text (PDF) is here. The page for this project is here.
著者紹介： ダリル・プレス博士は、ダートモス大学政府学教授。主な研究分野は米国の外交政策、抑止論、未来の戦争論。数多くの論文を発表しているが、主要著書として, “Calculating Credibility”(2005) “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age”(2020)がある。前者は、危機において指導者がどう相手を信じるかについて分析したものであり、後者は２１世紀における抑止論の課題について検討したものである。プレス博士は、ランド研究所で２０年近くコンサルタントを務め、通常兵器における戦闘モデルについてやはり２０年近く教鞭をとってきた。彼の論考は、Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, The Atlantic Monthlyなど主要論文誌に多く掲載されてきた。
