Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk
“Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)” Project Year 1 Report
The report looks at nuclear weapons use in 2025-2030 as part of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or Northeast Asia, developing use cases for (mostly) limited nuclear war involving the DPRK, US, China, Russia – as the states to use nuclear weapons first. It also considers the possibility of the use of nuclear or other weapons by non-state actors as a triggering event. The report attempts to address the questions: Why does the nuclear use happen? Which state responds to nuclear first use with nuclear weapons and/or conventional forces? What and where are the targets of nuclear weapons in each case, and when does the attack occur? How are the first strikes and subsequent nuclear attacks carried out? How plausible is the nuclear use case, how significant are its impacts likely to be?
長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター(RECNA)では、北東アジア非核兵器地帯と包括的安全保障アプローチの実現をめざした「ナガサキ・プロセス」を支援すべく「北東アジアの平和と安全保障に関する専門家パネル(PSNA)」を2016年度より開催してきました。今年度は、昨年度に引き続き、ノーチラス研究所、アジア太平洋核軍縮・不拡散リーダーシップネットワーク(APLN)との国際共同プロジェクトとして、「北東アジアにおける核使用リスク削減(NU-NEA)」プロジェクトを立ち上げました。北東アジア地域にて、どのような条件下なら核兵器が使われてしまうのか。万が一使われてしまったらどのような影響が出るのか。このような問に答えることで、核抑止論のもつ潜在的リスクを明らかにし、二度と核兵器が使われないよう具体的施策への提言につなげることが大きな目的です。
この度,このプロジェクトの1年目の報告書「Nuclear Weapon Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing the Nuclear Risks」(北東アジアにおける核使用の可能性:核リスク削減にとっての示唆)が完成し、発表いたしました。
「Nuclear Weapon Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing the Nuclear Risks」(北東アジアにおける核使用の可能性:核リスク削減にとっての示唆)
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS THAT MIGHT BE IMPLICATED IN NUCLEAR USE INVOLVING THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Matt Korda
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
January 20, 2022
Abstract
It is highly unlikely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would intentionally launch nuclear weapons in the absence of an existential threat to the continued survival of the state and its political leadership. However, in the event of such a scenario—for example, the prospect of an imminent US invasion or regime change operation—it is possible that the DPRK would use some of its estimated forty to fifty nuclear weapons in an attempt to forestall US action. In that case, the DPRK could use its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles early in a conflict to strike political and military targets in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, it and could potentially use its intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike US military targets on Guam and Hawaii. The DPRK could also hold some nuclear weapons in reserve to strike the continental United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, in the event that its initial nuclear strikes did not prevent an existentially threatening conventional invasion of the DPRK. First nuclear strikes by the United States (and its allies), or by China or Russia, may also be unlikely in the absence of an overwhelming provocation, but the nuclear weapons and launch systems available to these states are also considered.
Keywords:
DPRK, Nuclear Weapons, Delivery Systems, Nuclear-use Case, Korean Peninsula, United States
Authors’ Profile: Matt Korda is a senior research associate and project manager for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, where he co-authors the Nuclear Notebook with Hans Kristensen. Matt is also an associate researcher with the Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO HQ in Brussels. Matt received his MA in International Peace & Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.
Full text (PDF) is here. The page for this project is here.