The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear Use Landscape
Rabia Akhtar
July 11, 2024
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.
Acknowledgements: This article was commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.
Abstract
Keywords: nuclear weapons; Asia-Pacific; North Korea; arms control; deterrence
Authors’ Profile:
Full text (PDF) is here.
The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.
The page for this project is here.
No First Use Can Still Help to Reduce US-China Nuclear Risks
Adam Mount
July 2, 2024
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.
Acknowledgements: This article was commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.
Abstract
Keywords: nuclear; no first use; China
Authors’ Profile:
Full text (PDF) is here.
The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.
The page for this project is here.
East Asia’s Alliance Dilemma:
Public Perceptions of the Competing Risks of Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Lauren Sukin and Woohyeok Seo
June 7, 2024
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.
Abstract
Keywords: nuclear; alliances; East Asia; proliferation; security
Authors’ Profile:
Woohyeok Seo is a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.
Full text (PDF) is here.
The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.
The page for this project is here.
“World’s Fissile Material Data” 2024 [All Lists]
As was the case last year, the total amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) declined but the total amount of separated plutonium increased, and the increasing tendency continues.
The total inventory of HEU was 1,255 tons, equivalent to 19,610 warheads (a decrease of 5 tons or about 70 warheads from last year). However, the overall rising trend in separated plutonium continues, with an increase of 7 tons in plutonium for civilian use, bringing the total inventory to 560 tons, equivalent to 93,270 warheads (an increase of 8 tons or about 1,270 warheads from last year). As a result, the total inventory amount increased to equivalent to 112,880 warheads, an increase of around 1,200 warheads from last year (111,680 warheads).
◆ The two images to the right can be enlarged by clicking on them. You can also view and download the following PDF versions.
・The 2024 Global Inventory Map of Fissile Material (PDF)
・The 2024 Global Inventory of Fissile Material (PDF)
◆ You can see the original data of the map from the following links.
・Global Inventory of Separated Plutonium
・Global Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium
◆ You can see previous “World’s Fissile Material Data” from [All Lists].
“World’s Nuclear Warheads Data” 2024 [All Lists]
The 2024 World’s Nuclear Warheads Data have been published. Please click on the following thumbnail images and download the pdf posters.
Japanese | English | Korean | |
Jun. 2024 |
◆we have released a newly revamped “Explanatory Leaflet” and “Digital Guide.”
◇ You can see previous “World’s Nuclear Warhead Data” from [All Lists].
Calls for submissions! [JPN]
3rd Essay Contest on a “Nuclear Weapons Free Future”
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), with the support of the Nagasaki Shimbun, invites youth between the ages of 16 and 29 to submit an essay on a “Nuclear Weapons Free Future.”
The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza show no signs of abating, and the specter of nuclear war persists in various regions. Against this backdrop, the year 2024 has emerged as an international “election year” with potentially significant implications for nuclear policy. The presidential elections in the United States and Russia are the most prominent, but Japan is also grappling with the prospect of a general election.
If you were to send a letter to a single leader of one nuclear weapons state, or the leaders of several or all of the nuclear weapons states, considering the worsening situation surrounding nuclear weapons, what would you ask them to do? We would like you to compose such a message, that you may address to the leader of one nuclear weapons state, or a state under the nuclear umbrella of a nuclear weapons state, like Japan, or the leaders of all or some of the nuclear weapons states (*1) and umbrella states (*2).
Entries will be divided into two groups: youth aged 16 to 19 (Under 20) and youth aged 20 to 29 (Under 30). Awards will be given to outstanding essays and there will be one grand prize winner for each age group. The two winning essays will be published in the Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper and the winning authors will be invited to participate in the award ceremony in Nagasaki on Saturday, September 21st, 2024. If the winner resides in Japan, she/he will be invited to Nagasaki to participate in person. If the winner resides overseas, he/she will be invited to participate in the award ceremony online.
*1: Russia, United States, China, France, United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea
*2: Japan, South Korea, Australia, NATO non-nuclear weapon states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Türkiye, Greece, Germany, Spain, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland, Sweden), and Belarus (Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has declared that it is also extending a nuclear umbrella to Belarus, where Russia has deployed nuclear weapons. Consequently, Belarus is now also considered to be included in this category.)
ELIGIBILITY |
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• Under-20 (Ages between 16 and 19), Under-30 (Ages between 20 and 29) as of July 31, 2024. |
• Any residence or nationality is welcome. |
APPLICATION |
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Please submit the following documents in PDF format by e-mail to opinion@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp |
1. Application [form] * For download |
2. Your Essay (Essays should be about 1000 words, in English, and must be original and unpublished. Your essay should be in the form of a letter/message to the leader(s) of a “nuclear armed states” or a country under the “nuclear umbrella. Make it clear in the title or in the text which leader(s) the message is addressed to.) |
SUBMISSION DEADLINE |
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July 31, 2024 |
You will receive a notice of receipt approximately one week after submission. If you do not receive a notice please contact us at the contact information below. |
* Please note that applications will not be accepted at the contact e-mail address. |
ABOUT THE PRIZE |
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For Youth Under-30: |
• The grand prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque, prize money of 50,000 yen, and, for a winner who resides in Japan, an invitation to the award ceremony in Nagasaki. (A winner who resides outside Japan will be invited to participate online.) |
• The second prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque and prize money of 30,000 yen. |
For Youth Under-20: |
• The grand prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque, prize money of 30,000 yen, and, for a winner who resides in Japan, an invitation to the award ceremony in Nagasaki. (A winner who resides outside Japan will be invited to participate online.) |
• The second prize winner will receive a commemorative plaque and prize money of 10,000 yen. |
AWARD SELECTION AND ANNOUNCEMENT |
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Two grand prize winners and two second prize winners will be selected after strict screening by the selection committee. The committee members are: |
• Yuichi SEIRAI, Akutagawa Award-winning author (Chair) |
• Gregory KULACKI, Visiting Fellow of RECNA (Chair of the English Review Subcommittee) |
• Yoshiki YAMADA, Editorial Director, Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper, visiting professor of RECNA (Vice chair) |
• Keiko NAKAMURA, Associate Professor of RECNA (Vice chair) |
• Tatsujiro SUZUKI, Professor of RECNA, |
• Suzuka NAKAMURA, Co-president of KNOW NUKES TOKYO |
• Sumiko HATAKEYAMA, Co-president of Peace Boat |
• Ayane MURAKAMI , 9th member of Nagasaki Youth Delegation |
SCREENING CRITERIA |
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Your Essay will be evaluated on the following criteria: |
(1) Clarity and Logical consistency, (2) Factual content, (3) Creativity and originality, (4) Expressiveness |
ANNOUCEMENT |
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The results will be announced in the Award Ceremony. |
Time and Date: Saturday, September 21, 2024, 1-2 p.m. |
Venue: Nagasaki University (https://www.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/en/) |
The Grand Prize-winning essays will be published in full in the Nagasaki Shimbun newspaper at a later date. All winning essays will be published on the RECNA website. |
* The copyright of the submitted essays belongs to entrant, but the organizer (RECNA) holds secondary use (publication online or paper format, etc.) right of the winning essays. |
Sponsored by: the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) |
Supported by: Nagasaki Shimbun Newspaper |
Nominal support organizations: Nagasaki Prefecture, Nagasaki City, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Nagasaki, KTN (Television Nagasaki Co.,Ltd.), NBC (Nagasaki Broadcasting Company), NCC(Nagasaki Culture Telecasting Corporation), NIB (Nagasaki International Television Broadcasting, Inc.) |
* This project is funded by a donation for the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
Contact |
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Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) TEL: +81-95-819-2164 E-mail: recna_staff@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp Website: https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-top |
Leon Sigal, Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes,
Chung-in Moon, John Delury, Tom Pickering
April 19, 2024
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
Acknowledgements: Funding from John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and New Land Foundation.
Overview
In this paper we revisit the concept of comprehensive security in Northeast Asia as the guiding principle that should be used to reduce tension, avoid war, and re-engage on a constructive peace-making cooperative security agenda in Northeast Asia, including reducing then eliminating the threat of nuclear war. In section 1, we outline the mostly negative security trends in the region over the last five years. In section 2, we explain how the DPRK’s1 nuclear breakout has become the most urgent threat in the region, but also now demands a more indirect approach at a regional level than in 2018 when we last addressed the issue of comprehensive security.2 In section 3, we explore how inter-Korean relations have spiraled into hostility, rupture, and potentially rapidly escalating conflict and unraveled hard-won channels of communication, cooperation, and collaboration due to how the two Koreas have responded to the evolving external security context and to their respective domestic imperatives. In section 4, we suggest four steps that could ease insecurity in the region, especially in Korea, namely: |
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a) The US and China tacitly act in concert whereby the US tries to restrain Seoul from provocative threats or actions animated at Pyongyang while China seeks to restrain Pyongyang from issuing and acting on threats, especially nuclear threats; b) China reaches out to reassure the ROK3 with concrete steps while the US takes unilateral steps to reassure the DPRK; c) The US engages China to propose a joint statement with all parties on the inadmissibility of use of nuclear weapons and a dialogue on creating a nuclear-weapons-free zone including changes in the nuclear postures of all nuclear-armed states in the region; d) The US and the ROK explicitly outline the benefits to the DPRK of curbing its nuclear arming including improved security, access to advanced information technology, access to space services, and its integration into regional and global institutions with concomitant increased stature. |
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In section 5, we conclude that the steps being taken to reinforce deterrence may lead to a downward spiral that leads to rather than deterring war; and that progress in easing tensions in Korea could then inspire cooperative security efforts elsewhere in Northeast Asia to the benefit of all parties in the region while re-establishing the conditions needed for a comprehensive approach to realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. | |
1 DPRK, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, sometimes referred to as “North Korea.” 2 See: Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, “GENERAL ROADMAP AND WORK PLAN FOR NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH KOREA”, NAPSNet Special Reports, April 10, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/general-roadmap-and-work-plan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/ MORTON HALPERIN, PETER HAYES, THOMAS PICKERING, LEON SIGAL, PHILIP YUN, “FROM ENEMIES TO SECURITY PARTNERS: PATHWAYS TO DENUCLEARIZATION IN KOREA”, NAPSNet Policy Forum, July 06, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/from-enemies-to-security-partners-pathways-to-denuclearization-in-korea/ 3 ROK, the Republic of Korea, sometimes referred to as “South Korea.” |
Authors’ Profile:
Full text (PDF) is here.
The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.
The page for this project is here.
image(left): Wikimedia Commons, US President John F. Kennedy shaking hands with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
image(right): U.S. DepartmentofDefense, Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. Fang Fenghui of the Chinese army, chief of China’s joint staff, sign the joint strategic dialogue mechanism following a roundtable discussion at the Ba Yi, the People’s Liberation Army headquarters in Beijing, Aug. 15, 2017. DoD photo by Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro.
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Ulrich Kühn and Heather Williams
April 16, 2024
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.
Abstract
Keywords: Nuclear weapons; international law; threat of force; nuclear threat
Authors’ Profile:
Heather Williams is the Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is also an associate fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Belfer Center.
Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.
RECNA Newsletter Vol.12 No.2 (March 31, 2024)