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It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
Nagasaki’s Voice: 75 years’ Experience
Masao Tomonaga
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Dr. Masao Tomonaga is also hibakusha exposed at 2.5 kilometer. After graduation from Nagasaki University Medical School in 1968 he became a physician and hematologist specializing leukemia treatment. He also continued research on how radiation exposure induces maligancy. After retirement he was appointed the Director of Japanese Red Cross Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Hospital. Since 2012 he works for elderly hibakusha at Megumino-Oka Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivor Nursery Home as Director of Clinics.
He was also appointed in 2018 President of Nagasaki Prefecture Hibakusha Association with 2000 members. He is Vice-President of IPPNW (Nobel Peace Prize in 1985) for North Asia Region and Representative for Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly for Nuclear Abolition (ICAN member) and Director for “Nyokonokai” dedicated for Dr. Takashi Nagai, hibakusha radiologist and author of “The Bell of Nagasaki”.
The nuclear weapon age has opened in 1945. We Nagasaki hibakusha experienced 73,000 early deaths as the first victim of human being. We saw the Cold War evoked in 1947. Another 74,000 hibakusha survived and experienced a long period of Cold War until 1992. Around 1955 hibakusha experienced a start of anti-nuclear movement. Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 struck us and whole Japanese. We experienced for the first time a real fear for nuclear war. We also experienced first recognition that human being now had ultimate weapons in human history that is capable of destroying whole humanity.
There developed some good signs such as PTBT Treaty in 1965 and NPT Treaty was enforced in 1970. Further, INF Treaty signed in 1987 between US and Soviet Union succeeded in markedly reducing nuclear warheads in 1990ies. However, we also experienced firmly established nuclear deterrence strategy on the basis of MAD theory by maintaining balanced nuclear powers in order to avoid nuclear attacks. We experienced the end of Cold War without hot war in 1989, but we experienced a strong framework of nuclear deterrence policy has been maintained until now.
NPT regime gradually changed to be inactive around 2010, resulting in shrinkage of nuclear disarmament. Hiabkusha and NGOs such as ICAN aroused for adopting TPNW by a strong solidarity and succeeded in establishing the Treaty in 2017, which is now close to be in force as international law.
Even now in 2020 hibakusha continue to suffer atomic bomb radiation- induced cancers and leukemia. This life-long health consequence prove genuine inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. We must challenge a new stage of nuclear abolition under dangerous divide between NPT supporters and TPNW promoters. To overcome this divide we require power of civil society, especially of citizens of nuclear weapon states to make their governments to abandon nuclear policy. They must listen to Nagasaki’s voice gained from many serious experiences.
Complementary amalgamation of NPT and TPNW into one treaty is key for future nuclear-free world. Coming each review conference of NPT and TPNW should be set as best theaters for confidence-building, dialogue, and scientific collaboration as shown in ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the climate change to overcome the divide. To avoid human extinction by nuclear war, intended or by accident, we will experience next 25 years as a crucial stage. We hibakusha with the most important experiences would disappear by 100 Anniversary of the atomic bombings; to see nuclear-free world or not, is the ultimate question in 21st Century for Homo sapiens.
Keywords
Nuclear Age, Hibakusha, Cold War, NPT, TPNW, Civil Society, Confidence-building, Nuclear-free World
Full text (PDF) is here.
このワーキングペーパーは、「被爆75年記念事業 ナガサキ・核とパンデミック・シナリオプロセス」のために執筆されたもので、RECNA、ノーチラス研究所、アジア太平洋核不拡散・軍縮ネットワーク(APLN)のウエブサイトに同時に公開されます。国際著作権許可4.0 に基づいて公開されます。
長崎の声:75年間の体験
Masao Tomonaga
(要旨)
核兵器の時代は1945年から始まった。我々長崎の被爆者は、73,000人が人類として最初の犠牲者となった。1947年には冷戦が勃発し、1992年にいたるまで、長期の冷戦時代を74,000人が生き抜いてきた。1955年ごろから、被爆者は反核運動の誕生を目のあたりにしてきた。1962年のキューバ危機は、日本全体を衝撃で襲った。核戦争の恐怖を初めて体験したのである。その時、人類を滅亡させることのできる究極の武器を、人類史上初めて保有したことを私たちは認識したのだ。
1965年の部分的核実験禁止条約(PTBT)、1970年に発効した核拡散防止条約(NPT)といった、いくつかの良い兆候もあった。1987年には、米・旧ソ連との間で中距離弾道ミサイル(INF)全廃条約も締結された。この条約の結果、1990年代には核弾頭数が大幅に削減された。しかし、同じ時期、私たちは「相互確証破壊(MAD)」理論に基づき、核攻撃を避ける目的で両国が巨大な核戦力を維持するという「核抑止戦略」を確立してしまったのである。1989年の冷戦終了は、熱い戦争を呼び起こすことはなかったが、「核抑止政策」という強力な枠組みが構築され、それが現在までも維持されてきたのだ。
2010年以降、NPTレジームは少しずつその効力を失ってきた。その結果、核軍縮も停滞した。被爆者と核兵器廃絶国際キャンペーン(ICAN)のようなNGOは、強力な団結力をもって核兵器禁止条約(TPNW)のために立ち上がり、2017年に見事にその成立に成功したのである。いま、核兵器廃絶に向けて、NPT支持者とTPNW推進者との間に広がる危険な分断という、新たな課題に私たちは挑戦しなければいけない。この分断を埋めるためには、政府の核保有政策を放棄させるために、市民社会、特に核保有国の市民の力が必要である。数多くの苦難を乗り越えてきた長崎の声を聴かなければいけないのだ。
核兵器のない世界を実現するには、相互に補完しあうNPTとTPNWを一つの条約のように機能させることがカギとなる。今後開かれるNPT再検討会議やTPNWの締約国会議は、信頼醸成、対話、そして新型コロナ感染症(COVID-19)や気候変動対応で見られた科学的協力などを進めていく最高の舞台となるだろう。意図的か事故によるかに拘わらず、人類を滅亡させる核戦争を防止するためには、今後25年間が極めて重要な時期となる。最も重要な体験をしている我々被爆者は、被爆100周年を迎える年までにすべていなくなってしまう。核兵器のない世界を実現することが、21世紀の人類にとって、最も重要な課題なのだ。
キーワード: 核時代、被爆者、冷戦、NPT、TPNW、市民社会、信頼醸成、核なき世界
著者紹介: 朝長万左男博士は自身も被爆者で、爆心地から2.5kmのところで被爆。長崎大学医学部を1968年に卒業。血液学と白血病治療を専門とする内科医として治療に当たるとともに、放射線被曝が悪性腫瘍を誘引するメカニズムについての研究に取り組んだ。長崎大学引退後は、日本赤十字社長崎原爆病院の院長に就任し、2012年からは純心聖母会恵みの丘長崎原爆ホーム診療所所長を務める。2019年には、長崎県被爆者手帳友の会(会員数2000人)会長に選出された。核戦争防止国際医師会議(IPPNW)国際副会長(北東アジア地域)、核兵器廃絶地球市民長崎集会実行委員長、核兵器廃絶国際キャンペーン(ICAN)メンバー、被爆者で放射線医者、「長崎の鐘」の著者である永井隆博士に捧げられた如己の会会長。
英語版のみとなりますが、全文(PDF)は こちら からご覧いただけます。
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
The U.S. Election and Nuclear Order in the Post-Pandemic World
Leon V. Sigal
A Working Paper presented to
The 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project
Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project in New York and has participated in Track II talks with North Korea for two decades. He was a member of the editorial board of The New York Times from 1989 to 1995. He served in the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, in 1979 as International Affairs Fellow and in 1980 as Special Assistant to the Director. He was a Rockefeller Younger Scholar in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in 1972-1974 and a guest scholar there in 1981-1984. From 1974 to 1989 he was a professor of government at Wesleyan University. He was an adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs from 1985 to 1989 and from 1996 to 2000 and a visiting lecturer at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School in 1988, 2000, and 2018. Sigal is the author of Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking, Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question (with John Steinbruner), Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Hang Separately: Cooperative Security Between the United States and Russia, 1985-1994, and Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines Ban in American Politics. He edited The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending.
U.S. power and prestige may have diminished in recent years, but the United States still plays a pivotal role in international institutions, alliances, and mass media, so who becomes its president and which party controls Congress matter a lot for the global nuclear order. However unlikely it is that Donald Trump’s expressed desire to contest the election’s outcome could succeed, whether the nation can avert a violent backlash among disappointed partisans is less clear.
Nuclear weapons are often thought to be the esoteric domain of experts. Yet one need only recall that although mass activism does not guarantee policy change, three of the most significant developments in recent decades – the ban on above-ground nuclear tests, the INF Treaty, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall – would not have happened without mass protests in many countries. And citizen involvement, organized by NGOs, can even facilitate monitoring of arms agreements and nuclear developments in some countries.
The public’s understandable preoccupation with COVID-19, economic distress, racial animus, and climate change leave scant scope for paying heed to nuclear risks, which makes mobilization of a mass anti-nuclear movement unlikely. Absent popular action, however, positive change to the global nuclear order will continue to be marginal and fitful. This makes the international milieu critical for the nuclear future – a milieu that a president can influence but not determine.
President Trump’s reelection is likely to have a pernicious effect on that milieu, hindering international cooperation to limit nuclear weapons and accelerating a qualitative arms race that could endanger crisis stability. Yet two of Trump’s more positive impulses are likely to continue. He is unlikely to increase the risk of an intense crisis leading to nuclear war because he wants to avoid U.S. involvement in any wars, not start new ones. He will also try to sustain negotiations with North Korea to curb nuclear developments there, though whether he is prepared to satisfy Pyongyang’s stiffer demands remains in doubt.
His opponent, Joseph Biden, will face those same demands. Personnel is policy, and the Biden administration will likely be staffed with officials who served under President Obama. That means a return to shoring up alliances and international cooperation. It also means continuity with Obama’s nuclear policies. Whether he will curtail Obama’s modernization plans is not clear, but in contrast to Trump, he will try his best to restore the JCPOA, which could head off nuclear weapons development not only in Iran but also in Saudi Arabia. He will also strive to save START, seek technical talks with China, and not abandon the Open Skies accord.
Keywords
Biden, Trump, crisis stability, international milieu, JCPOA, New START, nuclear arms race, Open Skies
Full text (PDF) is here.