It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
COUNTERFORCE DILEMMAS AND
THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN EAST ASIA
Ian Bowers
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 9, 2022
Abstract
The discovery of new Chinese nuclear missile silos, a seemingly escalating nuclear-conventional arms competition between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the announcement that Australia, in concert with the US (United States) and UK (United Kingdom), is pursuing nuclear-powered attack submarines are events that collectively indicate a worsening security environment in East Asia. Using geostrategic, operational, and technological factors as the basis for analysis, this paper contextualizes these and other developments and assesses the potential for nuclear war in East Asia in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular.
The most dangerous threat to strategic stability is a counterforce dilemma where the conventional weapons of the US, China, and regional East Asian actors may create strategic instability by their intentional or inadvertent entanglement or use to target the nuclear forces of another state, resulting in pursuit of more secure second-strike capability by the countries of the region, and forming the heart of conventional warfighting and deterrence strategies. The many different conflictual or competitive relationships across the region make arms control initiatives unlikely to succeed, but the maritime nature of the geostrategic environment and the lack of existential threat that the United States and China pose to each other may offer fewer natural pathways to the use of nuclear weapons for either China or the United States than there were for the adversaries in the Cold War.
Keywords:
United States, China, Conventional Weapons, Arms Control, Nuclear War
Authors’ Profile: Ian Bowers is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Joint Operations at the Royal Danish Defense College. His research focuses on deterrence, the future operational environment, sea power, and East Asian security. His research has been published in several international journals including International Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Naval War College Review, and the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. His most recent co-authored work, titled “Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula,” was published in International Security. Bowers has also published a monograph on the modernization of the Republic of Korea Navy, and edited volumes on sea power and military change. Bowers holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London.
Full text (PDF) is here. The page for this project is here.
著者紹介：
イアン・バウアーズ博士は、デンマーク王立防衛大学共同作戦センターの准教授。博士の専門分野は、抑止、未来の軍事環境、海上戦力、東アジアの安全保障。博士の論文はInternational Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Naval War Collage Review, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis等に発表されている。最新の研究成果としては、「通常兵器による報復のジレンマ：韓国の抑止戦略と朝鮮半島の安定性」（共著）がInternational Securityに発表されている。さらに、韓国海軍の近代化についての論考、海上戦力と軍事変革に関する編著もある。ロンドンのキングス・カレッジにおける戦争研究分野で博士号取得している。
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
Korean peninsula Nuclear issue：Challenges and Prospects
Anastasia Barannikova
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 3, 2022
Abstract
For the last three decades the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) has been considered as one of the most serious threats to security and stability in NEA (Northeast Asia). To date, none of the efforts by the international community—including Six-party talks, pressure and diplomatic efforts, and more recently, activity started by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2018-2019—have yielded tangible results in addressing the issue. This puts into question the viability of the existing approaches to the DPRK and the feasibility of achieving a KPNI solution.
Keywords:
Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Issue, DPRK, Denuclearization, Balance of Power
Authors’ Profile: Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia) and non-resident senior fellow of Mongolian Institute of Northeast Asian Security and Strategy (Mongolia).
She was a visiting fellow at Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2019, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies in 2020 and Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University in 2021. She holds PhD in History from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University.
Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers, and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, and Japanese languages. Her research interests include (but not limited by) regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation: Korean Peninsula, reunification, DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture.
Full text (PDF) is here. The page for this project is here.
