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2019年3月8日

After the 2nd US-DPRK Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam: Sustain the Inter-Korean Momentum

Mark Byung-Moon Suh, Council Member, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Member of the German Council on Foreign Relations and
Elisabeth Imi Suh, Research Assistant, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

PSNA Working Paper Series (PSNA-WP-4)1

March 6, 2019

[Japanese version: PDF]

  The much expected and awaited second meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un abruptly ended without any agreement and will go down in history as the 2019 no deal-summit. Surely, the lack of an agreement is disappointing; it does not equate, however, to the end of diplomacy with North Korea. What went wrong and what needs to be done to keep the momentum of peace process in Korea?

Two Track Diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea

  After the tension-loaded year of 2017, diplomacy on the Korean peninsula quick-started after Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s speech at the beginning of 2018. The progressive administration in Seoul had iterated offers for inter-Korean dialogue since the inauguration of Moon Jae-in in May 2017. Moon was very keen on bringing North Korea and the US to negotiating tables, and careful to set the right tone as he did in his Berlin speech July 2017. His genuine interest in dialogue with the North – important not for the sake of accelerated reunification, but in the name of joint Korean ownership of peace and stability on the peninsula – has translated into the re-establishment of crisis communication channels, the institutionalization of working-level dialogue through e.g. the liaison office in Kaesong as well as leader-to-leader meetings that resulted in the Panmunjom Declaration of April 2018, the Pyongyang Declaration and Military Agreement of September 2018. Seoul’s continuous endeavor to constructively engage Pyongyang and to find mutually acceptable steps towards political reconciliation, military confidence-building and economic cooperation has spilled into a relatively stable track of inter-Korean dialogue(s).

  US-North Korean diplomacy, however, stands in stark contrast to this: Donald Trump’s initial willingness to meet directly with Kim quickly fell into oblivion with his 2017 maximum pressure campaign and “fire and fury” rhetoric. While first inter-Korean talks and Pyongyang’s high-level attendance of the Pyongchang Winter Olympics in February 2018 were met with US discontent, nevertheless, Trump gratefully accepted Kim Jong Un’s invitation that was extended by Seoul’s special envoys in March 2018. Diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang since then, however, appears rather as “off-again on-again” momentum of dialogue and summitry: First high-level talks between the Trump administration and Kim regime were followed by the cancellation and then resumption of preparations for their first summit meeting, finally resulting in the Singapore Summit and its consequent declaration of intentions in June 2018. Besides frictions in July, August and November, high-level meetings between Washington and Pyongyang took place in July and October. High-level meetings in the run-up to the Hanoi Summit, and especially working-level talks in January and February, were cause of high hopes for the second encounter of Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. The ups and downs in US-North Korean interactions as well as the no deal-summit reveal the shortcomings of the US administration’s approach to Pyongyang.

The Singapore Summit in June 2018: Start of a new relationship?

  The first-ever leadership interaction between the US and North Korea supposedly marked the beginning of a fundamentally new bilateral relationship and the start of an innovative top-down approach to diplomacy. The Trump administration explicitly distances itself from previous administrations’ North Korea policies – which is correct in terms of its willingness to directly and personally engage Pyongyang’s leader(ship) without explicit preconditions. In terms of content, however, US positions remain the same and rather increasingly emphasize the threats posed to its national security by North Korea’s ICBM and uranium enrichment capabilities.

  On a rhetorical level, Donald Trump has played with ideas of withdrawing all US troops from South Korea, of opening liaison offices and declaring the end of the Korean War. The no deal-summit of Hanoi, however, bluntly revealed the actual stakes being discussed and the narrow room for maneuver: While Pyongyang insists on the partial lifting of sanctions and suggests the focus on confidence- and relationship-building measures, Washington shows no flexibility nor creativity in allowing for compromise in terms of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Although details of the failure to reach agreement in Hanoi remain to be seen, the Trump administration has passed up the opportunity to put Pyongyang’s nuclear testing and missile moratorium into writing, to sign a narrow deal consisting primarily of allowing inspectors into Yongbyon and to declare the end of the Korean War. These three milestones would have put negotiations on track towards building actual confidence, and towards achieving peace and disarmament realistically step-by-step.

The right lessons to be learnt from interactions with Pyongyang

  Moon’s administration is not only building on the fundaments of the Sunshine Policy (1998-2008), but rather developing it. Moon has apparently drawn the right lessons to prioritize political and military confidence-building measures in dialogue with Pyongyang. The prospect of economic cooperation remains an important element in inter-Korean relations, but is understood to not automatically spill into the desired change of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior.
The current administration in Washington, however, has not drawn any lessons from past successful and failed negotiations with Pyongyang. International and unilateral sanctions remain the preferred (and only) tool; a tool that is merely being utilized as ‘sticks’ instead of ‘carrots and sticks’. Besides insisting on the implementation of the complete sanctions regime against North Korea, the Trump administration overestimates the effectiveness of its maximum pressure campaign. Sanctions do have an effect on North Korea’s economy and population; the abrupt changes in its foreign policy behavior and willingness to engage in talks, however, derive from Pyongyang’s own strategic developments and Moon Jae-in’s genuine interest in resuming inter-Korean dialogue as well as facilitating US-North Korean diplomatic interactions.

  As a general lesson to be drawn from past negotiations, willingness to compromise and creative persuasion are more likely to result in constructive dialogue and agreements, than mere coercion. Moreover, a declared end of the Korean War would not only represent the ultimate security guarantee of respecting mutual state sovereignty and the beginning of actual non-adversarial relations, but also alleviate the entire peninsula’s population from the seven decades-long state (and threat) of war, and put a dent in the military’s power within North Korea.

Outlook and Recommendations

  North Korea and the US remain (at least rhetorically) interested in dialogue; both of their leaders insist on having and wanting to extend their positive personal relationship. It is imperative for Seoul to double its efforts and resume its role of facilitator and mediator, continuing the positive momentum of inter-Korean relations and helping to bridge the gaps between Washington and Pyongyang. After having practically agreed to terminate the Korean War in September 2018, the two Koreas must commerce economic cooperation and expand exchanges in all areas to grow together. Extensive inter-Korean relations can encourage US-North Korean relations and help to reduce political and military tensions on the Korean peninsula.

  Independent from the no-deal of Hanoi, there is an urgent need to follow-through on the de facto inter-Korean end of war and declare the end of the Korean War multilaterally. Instead of coercing North Korea into unilateral disarmament, a more realistic step-by-step approach needs to be adopted; a comprehensive approach that conceptualizes steps of a freeze, capacity reductions and then dismantlement, steps reciprocated through selective sanctions lifting. Additionally, military confidence-building measures and institutionalizing bilateral interactions serve to mitigate present and future tensions.

  Most importantly, it is imperative to understand the roots of North Korea’s conviction regarding its possession of an indigenous nuclear deterrent. While the US consideration of nuclear weapons during the Korean War sparked this conviction, Washington’s handling of Iraq and Libya as well as its nuclear-capable strategic assets stationed in Guam, bomber overflights as demonstrations of force and decapitation plans have intensified it. Without substantial changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula therefore, there will be little substantial changes in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programs. It is therefore laudable to continue the indefinite suspension of US-South Korean joint military exercises, which was mostly expected after the Singapore Summit in June 2018. The absence of large-scale military drills serves to build the fundament of normalizing state interactions and constructive dialogue towards a negotiated solution to the deep-rooted security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula.

 


1 This paper was commissioned by RECNA on behalf of Co-chairs of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of PSNA.
 

Category PSNA News

Kim–Trump summitry: Neither breakthrough nor breakdown

Ramesh Thakur, Emeritus Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University and Co-Convenor, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

PSNA Working Paper Series (PSNA-WP-3)1

March 6, 2019

[Japanese version: PDF]

  CANBERRA— The first summit in Singapore last June gave Kim Jong-un legitimacy as the head of a de facto nuclear-armed state engaging with U.S. President Donald Trump as an equal. The second summit in Hanoi on February 27–28 has normalized that status but accomplished little else.

  Trump had successfully managed expectations downwards since last year. Gone were the boasts about the nuclear threat from Pyongyang having ended. Instead Trump shifted the “transformational goal” of total denuclearization to the “transactional goal” of limiting Kim’s nuclear capability. The U.S. walked back from the insistence on total, verified denuclearization as a precondition for improved ties and normalization. Instead it has embraced the principle of simultaneous and parallel steps toward denuclearization and peaceful relations.

  The Hanoi summit offered neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown. White House press secretary Sarah Sanders said that although “No agreement was reached at this time,” the two leaders had “very good and constructive meetings” and “discussed various ways to advance denuclearization.” Trump said the impasse arose over Kim’s demand for a lifting of sanctions in their entirety in return for a promise to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho disputes this account, saying it only asked for limited sanctions relief.

  The Kashmir crisis that flared up dangerously with exquisite timing during the Hanoi summit underlines the logic of Trump’s moves on Korea. Abandoning a demonstrably failed policy over a quarter century, of insistence on a total and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, is no big sacrifice. Engaging with Kim personally to establish a working relationship that can dispel misperceptions, build confidence and trust, deepen inter-Korean relations and in other ways greatly reduce the risks of a war with catastrophic consequences: now that is a big deal.

  For all his strategic illiteracy, Trump may have a surer intuitive grasp of this underlying big-picture reality than most of the devotees of the Washington playbook of increasingly militarized responses to foreign crises. Communications channels are now active between North and South Korea, and between North Korea and the U.S., at summit, high and working levels. This is no bad thing.

  That said, Trump was right to walk away from the demand to lift all sanctions now in return for dismantling just one key nuclear facility. Perhaps Kim misjudged Trump’s eagerness to make a deal, any deal, in order to claim a victory to offset the worsening domestic situation for the president, particularly with his former lawyer’s testimony to Congress. Trump has not reached that point of desperation yet.

 


1 This paper was commissioned by RECNA on behalf of Co-chairs of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of PSNA.
 

Category PSNA News
2019年2月28日
日時:  2019年2月23日(土)14:00-16:00
場所:  国立長崎原爆死没者追悼平和祈念館 交流ラウンジ
講師:  陳昌洙(ジン・チャンス)世宗研究所 日本研究センター長
主催:  核兵器廃絶長崎連絡協議会 (PCU-NC)
共催:  長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター (RECNA)

 

講演をする陳昌洙氏 会場の様子
講演をする陳昌洙氏 会場の様子

特別市民セミナーが2月23日(土)に国立長崎原爆死没者追悼平和祈念館 地下2階 交流ラウンジにて行われました。

「急転する朝鮮半島情勢-北東アジアと日本の選択」と題し、陳昌洙(ジン・チャンス)世宗研究所 日本研究センター長が講師を務めました。

陳昌洙氏は講演の中で、朝鮮半島情勢に関する韓国の対応について、現状は非核化の実現に向けて北朝鮮と共に米国を説得する立場をとっているが、戦略としては周辺諸国と協力して経済制裁を強め、両方を一緒に行い、北朝鮮に変化を求める対応が必要であると述べました。日韓関係については、日韓両政府のコミュニケーション・修復能力不足により、関係が悪化しており、特に日本は朝鮮半島をめぐる情勢の劇的変化に対応できていない。日韓関係改善には、中央政府でなく地方から改善していく方法もある、と講演しました。

講演には約100名の市民が集まり、多くの市民との間で熱のこもった質疑応答が交わされ、大いに盛り上がりました。

講演の録画

配付資料: 韓日関係葛藤:その行く先はどこか?(PDF)

 

※本講演会の内容は講演者及び対談者個人の意見を表すものであり、主催団体及び共催団体等の見解を示すものではありません。

 

2019年2月26日

2月27日、28日にベトナム・ハノイにおいて、第2回米朝首脳会談が行われます。

それに先立ち、本センターが事務局をつとめる「北東アジアにおける平和と安全保障に関するパネル」(Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA))の依頼により、Leon Sigal氏(社会科学調査評議会北東アジア安全保障プロジェクト部長(米国))が「ハノイでの首脳会談において注目すべき点」と題して文書を発表されました。PSNAのウェブサイトで公開しましたので、是非ご覧ください。

レオン・シーガル「ハノイでの首脳会談において注目すべき点」英語原文][日本語訳:PDF
 

Category お知らせ

WHAT TO LOOK FOR AT THE HANOI SUMMIT

Leon V. Sigal, Director of Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council (USA)

PSNA Working Paper Series (PSNA-WP-2)1

February 26, 2019

[Japanese version: PDF]

      Concrete commitments, not the hyperbole of President Trump’s defenders or detractors, will determine how successful the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi should be judged by objective observers.

      From the U.S. vantage point, four commitments matter. First, will North Korea completely halt the production of plutonium and enriched uranium and commit to the dismantlement of all its fissile-material production sites, not just those at Yongbyon? Second, will it stop making intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles? Third, will it permit inspections at its reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and all its enrichment sites, as well as its nuclear test sites, uranium mines and sites where the uranium ore is refined and turned into a gas for enriching in order to bound uncertainty over how much fissile material it may have produced and used in the past? And fourth, has it committed in writing to its moratorium on nuclear and missile testing?

      From the DPRK vantage point, will the United States move away from enmity by declaring an end to the Korean War, opening the way to a peace process that can culminate in a peace treaty? Second, will the United States relax some sanctions by exempting the delivery of humanitarian aid, use of the Mount Kumgang resort and reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea, as well as lifting U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act sanctions? Third, will the two sides be willing to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals?

      Critics will claim that the Yongbyon facilities are old, as if shutting them down is not worth much. That is nonsense. Those “old” facilities, some of which have been operating for less than a decade, can produce three or four bombs’ worth of plutonium and highly enriched uranium a year, as well as the tritium without which the North’s thermonuclear weapons will no longer function after some dozen years or so.

      Critics will also object that the North still retains an unknown quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons and the summit did not yield a complete declaration of the North’s nuclear inventory including how much it has made. But the Trump administration is right to phase in that inventory declaration, starting with the location of its plutonium reactors, reprocessing and enrichment sites. Before seeking an accounting of fissile material and number of weapons, it is prudent to seek access to these locations as well as the North’s nuclear-weapons test sites, its uranium mines, its ore refining plants, and its uranium hexafluoride plant to take various measurements. This nuclear archeology will reduce uncertainty and better enable it to assess how much fissile material the North could have produced. U.S. intelligence estimates vary widely so any number the North would turn over is certain to be controversial, as it was in the initial declaration to the IAEA in 1992, which is now nearly forgotten but for years complicated efforts to contain the growing security threat posed by North Korea’s continued fissile material and missile production.

      It is essential to understand that verification is a political judgment in technical guise. Verification is sometimes confused with playing “gotcha,” seizing on a suspected breach— however minor—as evidence of cheating and using it to discredit a deal. While no agreement can be absolutely verifiable and any breach takes on political significance because of what it implies about a violator’s intention to some, to say that an agreement is adequately verifiable is to assert that residual uncertainties are less consequential than the benefits of keeping the agreement. Absolutism in verification may pose as great a risk to U.S. and allied security as some North Korean violations.

      Getting most, if not all, of the above commitments would be a remarkable achievement. Implementing them will take the two sides further down the road to denuclearization than they have ever gone before. Critics will no doubt carp that such an outcome stops short of complete denuclearization and question whether Kim Jong Il will ever give up his nuclear weapons, but the only way to find out is to continue the negotiations while keeping U.S. commitments, and see how far they can get.

 


1 This paper was commissioned by RECNA on behalf of Co-chairs of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of PSNA.
 

Category PSNA News

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