分離プルトニウムの保有量
(2016年末のデータ)
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国名 | 軍事用(トン) | 非軍事用(トン) |
---|---|---|
ロシア | 94.0 | 91.5 |
米国 | 38.4 | 49.4 |
フランス | 6.0 | 65.4 |
中国 | 2.9 | 0.04 |
英国 | 3.2 | 110.3 |
イスラエル | 0.90 | |
パキスタン | 0.28 | |
インド | 6.58 | 0.4 |
北朝鮮 | 0.04 | |
日本 | 47.0 | |
ドイツ | 0.5 | |
その他の国 | 1.8 | |
合計 | 152.3 | 366.3 |
軍事用とは核兵器内にあるか、核兵器に使用する目的の分離プルトニウム、及び将来に軍事利用の余地を残したまま貯蔵している分離プルトニウムをいう。 非軍事用とは、民生用原子炉の使用済み燃料から分離したプルトニウム、及び兵器用としては余剰と公表されたプルトニウムをいう。 |
作成:RECNA核分裂性物質データ追跡チーム
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【参考文献】 |
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