分離プルトニウムの保有量
（2018年末のデータ）
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| 国名 | 軍事用(トン) | 非軍事用(トン) |
|---|---|---|
| ロシア | 88.0 | 101.3 |
| 米国 | 38.4 | 49.3 |
| フランス | 6.0 | 67.7 |
| 中国 | 2.9 | 0.04 |
| 英国 | 3.2 | 115.8 |
| イスラエル | 0.92 | |
| パキスタン | 0.37 | |
| インド | 7.1 | 0.4 |
| 北朝鮮 | 0.04 | |
| 日本 | 45.7 | |
| 他の非核保有国＊ | 1.9 | |
| 合計 | 150 | 380 |
| ＊オランダ、イタリア、スペイン、ドイツ、スイス | ||
| 軍事用とは核兵器内にあるか、核兵器に使用する目的の分離プルトニウム、及び将来に軍事利用の余地を残したまま貯蔵している分離プルトニウムをいう。 |
| 非軍事用とは、民生用原子炉の使用済み燃料から分離したプルトニウム、及び兵器用としては余剰と公表されたプルトニウムをいう。 |
| 核物質量は推定値を多く含んでおり、不確実性が高いため、合計数値は丸めた数値となっている。 |
作成：RECNA核分裂性物質データ追跡チーム
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| 【参考文献】 |
| International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), “Fissile Material Stocks”, May 2020, http://fissilematerials.org/ |
| Pavel Podvig and Ryan Snyder, “Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons”, August 15, 2019. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-elimination-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons |
| David Von Hippel, “Methods for Refining Estimates of Cumulative DPRK Uranium Production” (PSNA-WP-8), May 27, 2020. https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/psna2020workingpaper/%e3%80%90may-27-2019%e3%80%91methods-for-refining-estimates-of-cumulative-drpk-uranium-production-psna-wp-8 |
| Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, & Frank von Hippel: “Unmaking the Bomb,” MIT Press, 2014. |
| Communication Received from Japan Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.1-22), 28 August, 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcir549a1-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.2-22), 12 September 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a2-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from Belgium Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.3-19), 18 May 2020. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a3-19.pdf |
| Communication Received from Switzerland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.4-23), 1 March 2019, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a4-23.pdf |
| Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.5-23), 28 August 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a5-23.pdf |
| Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.6-22), 28 August 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a6-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from China Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.7-16). 18 October 2017. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a7-16.pdf |
| Communication Received from the United Kingdom Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.8-22), 23 October 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a8-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.9-21), 5 November 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a9-21.pdf |
