高濃縮ウランの保有量
（2018年末のデータ）
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| 国名 | 軍事用(トン) | 非軍事用(トン) |
|---|---|---|
| ロシア | 670.0 | 9.0 |
| 米国 | 480.0 | 85.1 |
| フランス | 25.0 | 5.1 |
| 中国 | 14.0 | 0.24 |
| 英国 | 21.9 | 0.7 |
| イスラエル | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| パキスタン | 3.7 | 0.0 |
| インド | 4.4 | 0.0 |
| 北朝鮮 | 0.5 | |
| 非核保有国 | 15.0 | |
| 合計 | 1220 | 115 |
| 軍事用とは核兵器内にあるか、核兵器に使用する目的の高濃縮ウラン、または原子力推進軍艦の原子炉燃料用に用いられる高濃縮ウラン（使用済みを含む）をいう。 |
| 非軍事用とは、研究・試験炉の燃料中の高濃縮ウラン、及び軍事目的としては余剰と公表された高濃縮ウランをいう。 |
| 核物質量は推定値を多く含んでおり、不確実性が高いため、合計数値は丸めた数値となっている。 |
作成：RECNA核分裂性物質データ追跡チーム
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| 【参考文献】 |
| International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), “Fissile Material Stocks”, May 2020, http://fissilematerials.org/ |
| Pavel Podvig and Ryan Snyder, “Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons”, August 15, 2019. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-elimination-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons |
| David Von Hippel, “Methods for Refining Estimates of Cumulative DPRK Uranium Production” (PSNA-WP-8), May 27, 2020. https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/psna2020workingpaper/%e3%80%90may-27-2019%e3%80%91methods-for-refining-estimates-of-cumulative-drpk-uranium-production-psna-wp-8 |
| Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, & Frank von Hippel: “Unmaking the Bomb,” MIT Press, 2014. |
| Communication Received from Japan Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.1-22), 28 August, 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcir549a1-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.2-22), 12 September 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a2-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from Belgium Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.3-19), 18 May 2020. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a3-19.pdf |
| Communication Received from Switzerland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.4-23), 1 March 2019, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a4-23.pdf |
| Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.5-23), 28 August 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a5-23.pdf |
| Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.6-22), 28 August 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a6-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from China Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.7-16). 18 October 2017. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a7-16.pdf |
| Communication Received from the United Kingdom Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.8-22), 23 October 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a8-22.pdf |
| Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549/Add.9-21), 5 November 2019. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a9-21.pdf |
