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Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) issued Statement on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Nuclear Risk on February 25, 2022.
Statement on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Nuclear Risk
Research Center for the Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
February 25, 2022
On February 21, 2022, Russia recognized the independence declarations of the pro-Russian separatists-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, and on February 24, launched attacks on military facilities and major cities in Ukraine. On February 24, UN Secretary-General António Guterres criticized this move, saying it is inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter, while the United States, European Union (EU), and Japanese governments decided to impose urgent sanctions. We, RECNA, strongly criticize Russia’s military invasion and express our deepest concern about the serious harm to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the increasing nuclear risk. We also affirm the risks posed by nuclear weapons and demand that nuclear disarmament is an imperative.
１． The risk of nuclear weapons use
It was reported that President Lukashenko of Belarus said on February 20 that Belarus was ready to host Russian nuclear weapons1 and, on February 24, President Putin made remarks that appeared to threaten nuclear strikes2. Even if they emphasized that their intentions are only for “deterrence” or “threat,” if the military confrontation is aggravated, the risk that nuclear weapons will be used may increase. Such nuclear threats pose the danger of fundamentally overthrowing international order and stability. In order to prevent confrontations among states from escalating to nuclear war, immediate suspension of military operations and dialogue among the countries concerned are urgently needed.
２． Risk of accidents at nuclear facilities in Ukraine
On February 24, it was reported that Russian troops had seized control of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site in Ukraine3. Ukraine is said to have 15 nuclear power plants in operation at four sites, and nuclear power accounts for more than 50% of the total electricity generated. There are six nuclear power plants near the northern Belarusian border and nine near the southern Crimea region. Although a direct attack on these nuclear power plants is unlikely to occur, partly due to the fact that the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, prohibit attacks on nuclear power plants (also ratified by Russia), the safety of nuclear power plants may not be ensured in wartime4. There is also the danger of contingencies such as large-scale power outages caused by battles, or accidents due to the resistance or escape of nuclear power plant operators. In this context, too, the earliest possible cessation of military operations is imperative.
３． Risk of degrading the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime
Immediately after the Cold War, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons were left in Ukraine5. These were not owned by the Ukrainian government, but in 1994, Ukraine asked for a security assurance as a condition for the return of all its nuclear weapons, leading to the Budapest Memorandum (1994)6, agreed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. However, now that it has become clear that the promise was broken, the Ukrainian government must feel betrayed7. There are concerns that the fear of other countries facing security threats, including nuclear threats, may lead to nuclear proliferation. The damage to diplomatic efforts for the North Korean denuclearization and the restoring of the Iran nuclear deal will be immeasurable.
The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has deepened the gulf between the United States and Russia, and the future of disarmament among the nuclear superpowers has become even more uncertain. Military actions that do not even hesitate to threaten the use of nuclear weapons and shun opportunities for disarmament are acts in violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament, as set forth in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Together with its betrayal of Ukraine, which has denuclearized and joined the NPT, Russia bears an extremely heavy responsibility. It is in Russia’s interest to prevent the increased risk of nuclear proliferation and the growing distrust of the NPT, and it should immediately stop military action and decide to restore Ukraine to its original state.
1 Tim McNulty, “Ukraine Crisis: Vladimir Putin ready to deploy ‘super nuclear weapons’ on Belarus border”, Express, February 20, 2022. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1569066/Ukraine-Crisis-Russia-Vladimir-Putin-latest-nuclear-weapons-Belarus-World-War-3-vn
2 Roger Cohen, “Putin, warning against interference, says that Russia is a ‘powerful nuclear state’”, The New York Times, February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-attacks-ukraine#putin-nuclear-war-ukraine
3 Gul Tusyz, Anastasia Graham-Yooll, Tamara Qiblawi and Roman Tymotske, “Russian forces seize control of Chernobyl nuclear plant, Ukrainian official says”, CNN, February 24, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/24/europe/ukraine-chernobyl-russia-intl/index.html
4 Isabella Begoechea, “Nuclear risk from war in Ukraine isn’t targeted missiles but accidental hits on reactors, safety expert warns”, inews, Feb.23, 2022. https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-war-nuclear-risk-russia-missiles-accidental-hits-reactors-1478269
5Robert S. Norris, “The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago”, Arms Control Today, Vol.22, No.1, “Loose Nukes Special Issue”, January/February 1992. pp.24-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23624674?refreqid=excelsior%3A1cb8c641bcdbc3918b92567baedec9d3&seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents
6Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurance. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia agreed to provide security assurance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in response to their decision to join the NPT. Signed on December 5, 1994.
7 Editorial Board of Wall Street Journal, “How Ukraine was Betrayed in Budapest: Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances. So much for that”, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ukraine-was-betrayed-in-budapest-russia-vladimir-putin-us-uk-volodymyr-zelensky-nuclear-weapons-11645657263?mod=hp_opin_pos_6#cxrecs_s
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
REDUCING OR EXPLOITING RISK? VARIETIES OF US NUCLEAR THOUGHT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
Van Jackson
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 28, 2022
This paper argues that there is no monolithic “United States perspective” when it comes to theories of nuclear stability, either structurally or during a crisis. Instead, the propensity of American policymakers to use or invest in nuclear weapons is heavily conditioned by their political and ideological orientation. There has always been a rough ideological divide between nuclear hawks (those tending to favor military coercion) and doves (those generally opposing signaling threats of force) in the United States, but the past several decades have seen more diversity in the types of views and preferences expressed in policy circles about strategic stability and the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons. This paper categorizes the various US perspectives on nuclear weapons as “arms-controllers,” who seek to reduce risks to strategic stability and view advanced conventional weapons as heightening the risks of nuclear use, “nuclear traditionalists,” who accept the logic of mutually assured destruction, “nuclear primacists,” who believe stability derives from nuclear superiority, escalation dominance, and the willingness to launch damage-limiting nuclear first-strikes, and “future-of-war” strategists, who de-center the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy in favor of a focus on precision-guided conventional munitions and delivery systems. These categorical distinctions, and which group holds the attention of policymakers, matters. The scope for US nuclear weapons use—and the propensity to engage in actions that trigger adversary nuclear considerations—narrows and widens depending on whose logic and preferences prevail both over time and in moments of crisis or shock.
Keywords:
United States, Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Use, Northeast Asia, Biden Administration
Authors’ Profile:
Van Jackson is a professor of International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and a senior associate fellow with APLN. He is the author of two books on US-North Korea relations, as well as the forthcoming book, Pacific Power Paradox: American Statecraft and the Fate of the Asian Peace (Yale University Press). Before becoming a scholar, Van served in several policy and strategy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Obama administration. Research for this paper received additional support from the Federation of American Scientists “Conditions for US-ROK Conventional Arms Reduction” project sponsored by the Korea Foundation.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
POTENTIAL USE OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN A KOREAN CONTEXT
Eva Lisowski
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 22, 2022
This report explores the potential uses of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It starts with a definition of low-yield weapons—typically, weapons with yields of ten kilotons or less that are designed to be nonstrategic or “tactical” weapons used with shorter-range delivery systems, prepared for the purpose of attacking troops or battlefield infrastructure. The paper then reviews the history of United States legislation regarding low-yield weapons and describes three generic scenarios in which foes possessing low-yield weapons might choose, or not choose, to use them during a military conflict. Examples of radioactive fallout maps are provided based on HYSPLIT modeling for explosions of 0, 3 and 10 kilotons at a location in the Korean demilitarized zone at different times of the year. The arsenals of low-yield weapons in the states possessing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as well as the United States, are compared, and seven possible “use cases” for low-yield nuclear weapons involving the Korean Peninsula are put forward.
Keywords:
Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Issue, DPRK, Denuclearization, Balance of Power
Authors’ Profile:
Eva Lisowski is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Education Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from where she graduated in 2020 with a BS in Nuclear Science & Engineering. Her prior publications include evaluations of the attractiveness of fissile materials in advanced nuclear reactors to weapons of mass destruction construction, and analysis of fissile material production in India following the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Her current work focuses on simulating the consequences of nuclear weapon detonations and missile strikes targeting civilian nuclear reactors. As a young member of the American Nuclear Society and 2019 Summer Fellow at the United States Nuclear Industry Council, Ms. Lisowski has participated in nuclear energy advocacy at the Massachusetts State House and on Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. Ms. Lisowski has studied and conducted research at the Tokyo Institute of Technology and hopes to contribute to nuclear security and non-proliferation by strengthening US-Japan research collaboration. She returned to Tokyo Tech in September 2021 to pursue an MS in Nuclear Science & Engineering.
It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.
Avoiding Nuclear War In The Taiwan Strait
Sheryn Lee
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 18, 2022
China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.
Keywords:
Strategic ambiguity, Cross-Straits relations, Nuclear domino effect, US-China relations, Taiwanese Independence
Authors’ Profile:
Dr Sheryn Lee is a senior lecturer in the Department of Leadership and Command and Control at the Swedish Defence University, Stockholm. Dr Lee was previously an analyst for the Office of National Intelligence, Australia. Prior to that she was a lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University. She holds a PhD from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, where she was a TB Millar Scholar, and an AM in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania where she was a Benjamin Franklin Fellow and Mumford Fellow. She has also been a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the CSIS Pacific Forum and a Robert O’Neill Scholar at the IISS-Asia, Singapore.
