Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

Policy Proposal for Support to Radiation Victims in accordance with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons  [JPN]

Introduction

Nagasaki University and humanitarian disarmament

　The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) legally entered into force in January 2021. In contrast to traditional arms control treaties that merely reduce or prohibit the use of weapons to address national security concerns, the TPNW views these issues from a humanitarian perspective. As such, its ultimate goals are to achieve a total ban of nuclear weapons as inhumane weapons, and to provide support to people who have been exposed to radiation through the use and/or development of those weapons. With these aims, the TPNW is rooted in the concept known as humanitarian disarmament.

　However, we are still far from attaining a world in which all nuclear weapons are outlawed, as countries possessing these weapons, as well as their allies, seem to have turned their backs on the TPNW. Meanwhile, health hazards and anxieties persist due to radiation exposure,including that which occurs from nuclear testing and radioactive fallout. These unabated problems require urgent support from the humanitarian perspective. To demonstrate concrete effectiveness in the early stages of a humanitarian disarmament treaty such as the TPNW, it is essential to devise a system that can provide both physical and psychological support to individuals with radiation exposure, regardless of whether any harmful effects are currently apparent.

　Our institution, under the new educational system introduced through the National School Establishment Law in 1949, employs its educational philosophies and research abilities to actively work toward the creation of a world in which there is unity and peace. This was precipitated by the enormous damage wrought by the atomic bombing of Nagasaki in August 1945. A survey conducted by the A-bomb Material Preservation Committee of Nagasaki showed a devastating human toll, with 73,884 casualties and 74,909 wounded (as of December 1945)¹. Among these victims were nearly 1,000 students and faculty members from the Nagasaki Medical College (the predecessor to Nagasaki University, which included both the Specialized School of Medicine and the Specialized School of Pharmaceutics), Nagasaki Normal School, and Nagasaki Higher Commercial School². In view of this historical background of our institution and the central purpose of humanitarian disarmament framed by the TPNW, the Atomic Bomb Disease Institute at Nagasaki University and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University jointly drafted a proposal to support radiation victims, especially those who have potentially incurred damage from radiation exposure following nuclear testing.

　It would be greatly appreciated if this proposal provided practical reference and was developed to make a significant contribution to advancing the cause of supporting radiation victims at the first Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, scheduled to take place in Vienna in 2022.

Shigeru Kohno, President
Nagasaki University, National University Corporation

English Ver.　[View Full Text]　* Citation URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/00041393

RECNA Newsletter Vol.10 No.2 (March 31, 2022)

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Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk Report — Tatsujiro Suzuki Policy paper published on the topic of disarmament education — Keiko Nakamura Policy Paper: Joint statement of the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states — Michiru Nishida The initiative to put online and digitize the reality of atomic bombing — Mitsuhiro Hayashida The Tenth Nagasaki Youth Delegation begin their activities — Members of the Tenth Nagasaki Youth Delegation RECNA’s Eye — Fumihiko Yoshida [View full text]　[Download full text]

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) issued Statement on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Nuclear Risk on February 25, 2022.

Statement on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Nuclear Risk

Research Center for the Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
February 25, 2022

On February 21, 2022, Russia recognized the independence declarations of the pro-Russian separatists-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, and on February 24, launched attacks on military facilities and major cities in Ukraine. On February 24, UN Secretary-General António Guterres criticized this move, saying it is inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter, while the United States, European Union (EU), and Japanese governments decided to impose urgent sanctions. We, RECNA, strongly criticize Russia’s military invasion and express our deepest concern about the serious harm to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the increasing nuclear risk. We also affirm the risks posed by nuclear weapons and demand that nuclear disarmament is an imperative.

１． The risk of nuclear weapons use
It was reported that President Lukashenko of Belarus said on February 20 that Belarus was ready to host Russian nuclear weapons¹ and, on February 24, President Putin made remarks that appeared to threaten nuclear strikes². Even if they emphasized that their intentions are only for “deterrence” or “threat,” if the military confrontation is aggravated, the risk that nuclear weapons will be used may increase. Such nuclear threats pose the danger of fundamentally overthrowing international order and stability. In order to prevent confrontations among states from escalating to nuclear war, immediate suspension of military operations and dialogue among the countries concerned are urgently needed.

２． Risk of accidents at nuclear facilities in Ukraine
On February 24, it was reported that Russian troops had seized control of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site in Ukraine³. Ukraine is said to have 15 nuclear power plants in operation at four sites, and nuclear power accounts for more than 50% of the total electricity generated. There are six nuclear power plants near the northern Belarusian border and nine near the southern Crimea region. Although a direct attack on these nuclear power plants is unlikely to occur, partly due to the fact that the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, prohibit attacks on nuclear power plants (also ratified by Russia), the safety of nuclear power plants may not be ensured in wartime⁴. There is also the danger of contingencies such as large-scale power outages caused by battles, or accidents due to the resistance or escape of nuclear power plant operators. In this context, too, the earliest possible cessation of military operations is imperative.

３． Risk of degrading the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime
Immediately after the Cold War, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons were left in Ukraine⁵. These were not owned by the Ukrainian government, but in 1994, Ukraine asked for a security assurance as a condition for the return of all its nuclear weapons, leading to the Budapest Memorandum (1994)⁶, agreed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. However, now that it has become clear that the promise was broken, the Ukrainian government must feel betrayed⁷. There are concerns that the fear of other countries facing security threats, including nuclear threats, may lead to nuclear proliferation. The damage to diplomatic efforts for the North Korean denuclearization and the restoring of the Iran nuclear deal will be immeasurable.

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has deepened the gulf between the United States and Russia, and the future of disarmament among the nuclear superpowers has become even more uncertain. Military actions that do not even hesitate to threaten the use of nuclear weapons and shun opportunities for disarmament are acts in violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament, as set forth in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Together with its betrayal of Ukraine, which has denuclearized and joined the NPT, Russia bears an extremely heavy responsibility. It is in Russia’s interest to prevent the increased risk of nuclear proliferation and the growing distrust of the NPT, and it should immediately stop military action and decide to restore Ukraine to its original state.

¹ Tim McNulty, “Ukraine Crisis: Vladimir Putin ready to deploy ‘super nuclear weapons’ on Belarus border”, Express, February 20, 2022. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1569066/Ukraine-Crisis-Russia-Vladimir-Putin-latest-nuclear-weapons-Belarus-World-War-3-vn

² Roger Cohen, “Putin, warning against interference, says that Russia is a ‘powerful nuclear state’”, The New York Times, February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-attacks-ukraine#putin-nuclear-war-ukraine

³ Gul Tusyz, Anastasia Graham-Yooll, Tamara Qiblawi and Roman Tymotske, “Russian forces seize control of Chernobyl nuclear plant, Ukrainian official says”, CNN, February 24, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/24/europe/ukraine-chernobyl-russia-intl/index.html

⁴ Isabella Begoechea, “Nuclear risk from war in Ukraine isn’t targeted missiles but accidental hits on reactors, safety expert warns”, inews, Feb.23, 2022. https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-war-nuclear-risk-russia-missiles-accidental-hits-reactors-1478269

⁵Robert S. Norris, “The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago”, Arms Control Today, Vol.22, No.1, “Loose Nukes Special Issue”, January/February 1992. pp.24-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23624674?refreqid=excelsior%3A1cb8c641bcdbc3918b92567baedec9d3&seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents

⁶Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurance. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia agreed to provide security assurance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in response to their decision to join the NPT. Signed on December 5, 1994.

⁷ Editorial Board of Wall Street Journal, “How Ukraine was Betrayed in Budapest: Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances. So much for that”, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ukraine-was-betrayed-in-budapest-russia-vladimir-putin-us-uk-volodymyr-zelensky-nuclear-weapons-11645657263?mod=hp_opin_pos_6#cxrecs_s

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It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.

REDUCING OR EXPLOITING RISK? VARIETIES OF US NUCLEAR THOUGHT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
 
Van Jackson
 
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
 
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
 
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
 
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
 
February 28, 2022

This paper argues that there is no monolithic “United States perspective” when it comes to theories of nuclear stability, either structurally or during a crisis. Instead, the propensity of American policymakers to use or invest in nuclear weapons is heavily conditioned by their political and ideological orientation. There has always been a rough ideological divide between nuclear hawks (those tending to favor military coercion) and doves (those generally opposing signaling threats of force) in the United States, but the past several decades have seen more diversity in the types of views and preferences expressed in policy circles about strategic stability and the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons. This paper categorizes the various US perspectives on nuclear weapons as “arms-controllers,” who seek to reduce risks to strategic stability and view advanced conventional weapons as heightening the risks of nuclear use, “nuclear traditionalists,” who accept the logic of mutually assured destruction, “nuclear primacists,” who believe stability derives from nuclear superiority, escalation dominance, and the willingness to launch damage-limiting nuclear first-strikes, and “future-of-war” strategists, who de-center the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy in favor of a focus on precision-guided conventional munitions and delivery systems. These categorical distinctions, and which group holds the attention of policymakers, matters. The scope for US nuclear weapons use—and the propensity to engage in actions that trigger adversary nuclear considerations—narrows and widens depending on whose logic and preferences prevail both over time and in moments of crisis or shock.

Keywords:
United States, Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Use, Northeast Asia, Biden Administration
 

Authors’ Profile:
Van Jackson is a professor of International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and a senior associate fellow with APLN. He is the author of two books on US-North Korea relations, as well as the forthcoming book, Pacific Power Paradox: American Statecraft and the Fate of the Asian Peace (Yale University Press). Before becoming a scholar, Van served in several policy and strategy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Obama administration. Research for this paper received additional support from the Federation of American Scientists “Conditions for US-ROK Conventional Arms Reduction” project sponsored by the Korea Foundation.

Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.
 

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.

POTENTIAL USE OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN A KOREAN CONTEXT
 
Eva Lisowski
 
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
 
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
 
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
 
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
 
February 22, 2022

This report explores the potential uses of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It starts with a definition of low-yield weapons—typically, weapons with yields of ten kilotons or less that are designed to be nonstrategic or “tactical” weapons used with shorter-range delivery systems, prepared for the purpose of attacking troops or battlefield infrastructure. The paper then reviews the history of United States legislation regarding low-yield weapons and describes three generic scenarios in which foes possessing low-yield weapons might choose, or not choose, to use them during a military conflict. Examples of radioactive fallout maps are provided based on HYSPLIT modeling for explosions of 0, 3 and 10 kilotons at a location in the Korean demilitarized zone at different times of the year. The arsenals of low-yield weapons in the states possessing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as well as the United States, are compared, and seven possible “use cases” for low-yield nuclear weapons involving the Korean Peninsula are put forward.

Keywords:
Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Issue, DPRK, Denuclearization, Balance of Power
 

Authors’ Profile:

Eva Lisowski is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Education Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from where she graduated in 2020 with a BS in Nuclear Science & Engineering. Her prior publications include evaluations of the attractiveness of fissile materials in advanced nuclear reactors to weapons of mass destruction construction, and analysis of fissile material production in India following the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Her current work focuses on simulating the consequences of nuclear weapon detonations and missile strikes targeting civilian nuclear reactors. As a young member of the American Nuclear Society and 2019 Summer Fellow at the United States Nuclear Industry Council, Ms. Lisowski has participated in nuclear energy advocacy at the Massachusetts State House and on Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. Ms. Lisowski has studied and conducted research at the Tokyo Institute of Technology and hopes to contribute to nuclear security and non-proliferation by strengthening US-Japan research collaboration. She returned to Tokyo Tech in September 2021 to pursue an MS in Nuclear Science & Engineering.

Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.