Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia:
Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk
“Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)” Project Year 1 Report

The project is co-sponsored by The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA, Japan), The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN, Seoul), The Nautilus Institute (US), with cooperation of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA, Japan).

The report looks at nuclear weapons use in 2025-2030 as part of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or Northeast Asia, developing use cases for (mostly) limited nuclear war involving the DPRK, US, China, Russia – as the states to use nuclear weapons first. It also considers the possibility of the use of nuclear or other weapons by non-state actors as a triggering event. The report attempts to address the questions: Why does the nuclear use happen? Which state responds to nuclear first use with nuclear weapons and/or conventional forces? What and where are the targets of nuclear weapons in each case, and when does the attack occur? How are the first strikes and subsequent nuclear attacks carried out? How plausible is the nuclear use case, how significant are its impacts likely to be?

「Nuclear Weapon Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing the Nuclear Risks」
“Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)” Project Year 1 Report

Full text of the report (PDF) is here.

The page for this project is here.
 

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS THAT MIGHT BE IMPLICATED IN NUCLEAR USE INVOLVING THE KOREAN PENINSULA
 
Matt Korda
 
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
 
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
 
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
 
January 20, 2022
 

It is highly unlikely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would intentionally launch nuclear weapons in the absence of an existential threat to the continued survival of the state and its political leadership. However, in the event of such a scenario—for example, the prospect of an imminent US invasion or regime change operation—it is possible that the DPRK would use some of its estimated forty to fifty nuclear weapons in an attempt to forestall US action. In that case, the DPRK could use its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles early in a conflict to strike political and military targets in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, it and could potentially use its intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike US military targets on Guam and Hawaii. The DPRK could also hold some nuclear weapons in reserve to strike the continental United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, in the event that its initial nuclear strikes did not prevent an existentially threatening conventional invasion of the DPRK. First nuclear strikes by the United States (and its allies), or by China or Russia, may also be unlikely in the absence of an overwhelming provocation, but the nuclear weapons and launch systems available to these states are also considered.

Keywords:
DPRK, Nuclear Weapons, Delivery Systems, Nuclear-use Case, Korean Peninsula, United States
 

Authors’ Profile:
Matt Korda is a senior research associate and project manager for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, where he co-authors the Nuclear Notebook with Hans Kristensen. Matt is also an associate researcher with the Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO HQ in Brussels. Matt received his MA in International Peace & Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.
 

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.

THE ROLE OF MISSILE DEFENSE IN NORTH-EAST ASIA
 
David Wright
 
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
 
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
 
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
 
January 12, 2022
 

This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.

Keywords:
Missile Defense, Nuclear-weapon Use, DPRK, United States, Northeast Asia
 

Authors’ Profile:

David Wright is a research affiliate in the MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering’s Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. From 1992 to 2020 he was a researcher with the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, serving as co-director of the program from 2002 to 2020. Previously he held research positions in the Defense and Arms Control/Security Studies Program at MIT, the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the Federation of American Scientists. He received his PhD in theoretical condensed matter physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist until 1988.

This work was supported in part by the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University.

Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.
 

It is published simultaneously by RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute.

THE DELIBERATE EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ESCALATION TRIGGERS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
 
Daryl G. Press
 
Prepared for the
Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
 
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation of
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
 
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
 
January 6, 2022
 

This paper focuses on the conditions under which the United States might use nuclear weapons in the context of war on the Korean peninsula. It identifies circumstances that might trigger such a decision, the purposes of US nuclear use, and the plausible targets of US nuclear strikes. Attention is focused on the roles that nuclear weapons may continue to play in US military operations and geopolitical strategy despite US steps to reduce their saliency since the end of the Cold War. This paper argues that because the United States (and its allies) have a strong preference against using nuclear weapons, it would only consider doing so if (1) the mission being performed via the nuclear strike was of critical importance, (2) the mission could not be accomplished with sufficient certainty or speed with non-nuclear weapons, and (3) the use of nuclear munitions significantly increases the probability of mission success. This paper identifies a range of circumstances that could arise during a war on the Korean Peninsula that might satisfy all three of these criteria, and it identifies the pathways that are most likely to trigger US nuclear employment. Examining these conditions can help US allies and other partners identify and resolve disagreements about nuclear employment, enhance deterrence against regional adversaries, and shed light on the logic driving important decisions about US nuclear force structure and modernization.

Keywords:
Nuclear-weapon Use, Escalation, United States, Korean Peninsula, DPRK
 

Authors’ Profile:

Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of Government at Dartmouth College. His work focuses on US foreign policy, deterrence, and the future of warfare. He has published numerous articles and two books: Calculating Credibility (2005), which examines how leaders assess credibility during crises, and The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (2020), which explores deterrence challenges of the 21st century. Press worked as a consultant at the RAND Corporation for nearly twenty years, and he has taught classes on conventional force modeling for two decades. His work has appeared in leading academic journals as well as in the popular press including Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, and The Atlantic Monthly.

Full text (PDF) is here.
The page for this project is here.
 

Vol. 4, Issue 2 of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND) is now available online. There are 11 open access articles featuring “The Biden Nuclear Posture Review: Implications for the Asian Allies and Partners.”

For the issue, see here.