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Joint ROK-Japan Workshop “From Peace on Korean Peninsula to North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” was held from June 1st to 2nd in Seongnam, South Korea. It was co-organized by Sejong Institute and Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), in cooperation with Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA).
Outline of the workshop is here.
“A Guide to the World’s Nuclear Warheads Count June 2019” was released. Please click on the thumbnail images below and download the pdf guide and poster.
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English Guide to the Worldʼs |
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How to make leaflets:
Print the English Guide (PDF) for making leaflets on both sides of A3 paper, and fold it in two then in three.
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>> Previous editions can be downloaded from here.
Posters of “The World’s Nuclear Warheads Count” June 2019 were released. Please click on the thumbnail images below and download the pdf posters.
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>> Previous editions can be downloaded from here.
Methods for Refining Estimates of Cumulative DRPK Uranium Production
David von Hippel
Nautilus Institute Senior Associate
PSNA Working Paper Series (PSNA-WP-8)
May 27, 2019
Summary
This paper summarizes the history of what is known about uranium mining in the DPRK; describes the major uncertainties regarding DPRK uranium production; notes some of the key techniques, as used in preparing estimates of nuclear sector activity in other nations, that might be available to assist in narrowing the range of estimates of DPRK uranium and processed fissile material production; summarizes estimates of enriched uranium and plutonium production prepared by other authors; describes existing estimates of the amounts of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons tests and exported; provides a demonstration of the potential impact of remote sensing methods and testing in the DPRK in reducing uncertainties in cumulative historical uranium production, and thus in fissile materials inventories; and, offers conclusions, resulting from the potential impacts of uncertainty reduction approaches, as to which verification procedures should be key targets during negotiations with the DPRK.
Verification of DPRK Nuclear Disarmament: The Pros and Cons of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (Specifically, the ROK) Participation in This Verification Program
John Carlson, A Member of Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
PSNA Working Paper Series (PSNA-WP-7)
May 20, 2019
Summary
In the expert and diplomatic communities, it is generally considered that disarmament verification should be undertaken as far as possible on a multilateral basis. Partly this reflects experience with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system, and partly it reflects the view of non-nuclear-weapon states that international participation is required to ensure transparency and credibility in the disarmament process. The main argument against this is proliferation risk from the diffusion of proliferation-sensitive information. However, a number of aspects of disarmament verification will not involve sensitive information, and where sensitive information is involved there are ways of enabling effective verification while protecting such information.
As yet no specific details have been negotiated on how nuclear disarmament in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will proceed, and how this will be verified. Whatever is negotiated, the international community will certainly want assurance of the integrity of the verification process. In particular, the ROK has a very direct interest in what is happening across the DMZ and has every reason to be involved in the disarmament effort. This paper discusses how this can be possible consistent with non-proliferation principles.
