NEWSResearch Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

【Policy Paper 20-E】”For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Discussions Toward the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the TPNW” published

2024年7月18日

REC-PP-20-E

For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Discussions Toward the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the TPNW (July 2024)

Kazuko HIKAWA, Kimiaki KAWAI, Michiru NISHIDA, Tatsujiro SUZUKI, Toshinori YAMADA

★ Full text of REC-PP-20-E (PDF) is here.
★ List of RECNA Policy Papers is here.

Category TOPICS

【Special report No.23】”The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear Use Landscape” （NU-NEA Project）

2024年7月11日

Image: In the background, a Urakami Cathedral on a hill in Nagasaki.
U.S. National Archives, 1945. 77-AEC-52-4459.

The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear Use Landscape

Rabia Akhtar

July 11, 2024

This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

Acknowledgements: This article was commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.

Abstract

The international landscape, particularly in Northeast Asia, is portrayed as volatile due to the presence of nuclear-armed states, territorial disputes, and escalating geopolitical tensions. Considering this reality, this paper delves into the political ramifications of potential nuclear use in the Northeast Asia. It scrutinizes conceivable power shifts, the evolving role of anti-nuclear groups, and the broader impact on security policies. The exploration extends to scenarios post-nuclear use, encompassing positive, negative, and complex outcomes. The paper concludes by offering recommendations to policymakers, underscoring the imperative of substantive dialogues on arms control and conflict resolution to avert catastrophic nuclear events. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted challenges posed by nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia and offers valuable insights for crafting a more secure global environment. Recent developments point towards a disconcerting unraveling of arms control structures and a growing threat to the nonproliferation regime. The paper underscores the dynamic evolution of nuclear deterrence, highlighting the strategic use of emerging technologies by states to reshape the balance of vulnerabilities.

Keywords: nuclear weapons; Asia-Pacific; North Korea; arms control; deterrence

Authors’ Profile:

Rabia Akhtar is Dean Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Lahore. A Professor of International Relations, she is also the founding Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research and of the School of Integrated Social Sciences at the University of Lahore, Pakistan. Dr. Akhtar has a PhD in Security Studies from Kansas State University. She holds Masters degrees in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and in Political Science from Eastern Illinois University, USA. Her scholarly pursuits have revolved around key areas such as South Asian nuclear security, deterrence dynamics, media in the age of deep fakes and disinformation, nuclear weapons, AI and emerging technologies, Pakistan’s foreign policy and national security imperatives, as well as regional and international security issues. She has authored a book titled, ‘The Blind Eye: U.S. Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan from Ford to Clinton’, which showcases her expertise in the field. Moreover, she serves as the Editor of Pakistan Politico, Pakistan’s pioneering magazine on strategic and foreign affairs. Not only has Dr. Akhtar made significant contributions to academia, but she has also played a vital role in shaping foreign policy as a member of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs from 2018 to 2022. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the South Asia Center, Atlantic Council, Washington DC, and a Nonresident Fellow at BASIC, UK. Dr. Akhtar serves as a visiting faculty at the NATO Defence College, Rome, the NPIHP Nuclear Bootcamp, Rome and ISODARCO, Andalo, Italy. Dr. Akhtar is a visiting scholar (2024-2025) at the Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School.

Full text (PDF) is here.

The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.

The page for this project is here.

Category TOPICS

【Special report No.22】”No First Use Can Still Help to Reduce US-China Nuclear Risks” （NU-NEA Project）

2024年7月2日

Image: President Joe Biden hosts a bilateral meeting with President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, Wednesday, November 15, 2023, at the Filoli Estate in Woodside, California. Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz/Wikimedia Commons

No First Use Can Still Help to Reduce US-China Nuclear Risks

Adam Mount

July 2, 2024

This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

Acknowledgements: This article was commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.

Abstract

No first use declaratory statements are unlikely to significantly affect US-China nuclear crises. China’s nuclear buildup raises serious questions about the meaning and durability of its longstanding declaratory policy, while the United States is unlikely to issue a similar statement. However, no first use can still play an important role in reducing risks between the two countries. First, both countries can take practical planning and posture measures to reduce their reliance on nuclear first use. Second, a bilateral discussion on no first use could lead to a valuable dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons in each country. It may be more consequential to do and discuss no first use than it is to say it.

Keywords: nuclear; no first use; China

Authors’ Profile:

Adam Mount, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, where his work covers U.S. nuclear strategy, conventional deterrence, and progressive foreign policy. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Government at Georgetown and a B.A. from Reed College.

Full text (PDF) is here.

The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.

The page for this project is here.

Category TOPICS

【Special report No.21】”East Asia’s Alliance Dilemma: Public Perceptions of the Competing Risks of Extended Nuclear Deterrence” （NU-NEA Project）

2024年6月7日

Image: U.S. Pacific Fleet, 201020-N-NO824-0097. SOUTH CHINA SEA (Oct. 20, 2020) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), rear, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer JS Kirisame (DD 104), middle, and Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Arunta (FFH 151) sail together in the South China Sea during multinational exercises. These exercises marked the fifth time of 2020 that Australia, Japan, and the U.S. have conducted operations together in the 7th Fleet area of operations. (Courtesy photo)

East Asia’s Alliance Dilemma:
Public Perceptions of the Competing Risks of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Lauren Sukin and Woohyeok Seo

June 7, 2024

This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here.
This report is simultaneously published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).
It was first published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

Abstract

Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing security environment in East Asia, regional actors have seen a surge in “nuclear anxiety.” Worries among citizens of US allies and partners about rising nuclear threats and nuclear proliferation risks critically shape US foreign policy in East Asia. This paper thus asks: What drives nuclear anxiety in East Asia? And how can the United States most effectively resolve it? We situate nuclear anxiety in the dynamics of abandonment and entrapment that exist between allied states, as well as in the unique regional security structure, or the hub-and-spoke system in East Asia. To better understand the implications of nuclear anxiety on regional nuclear policy, we analyze the results of an original survey conducted in June 2023 across Washington’s five allies and partners in East Asia: Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The survey results suggest the presence of the dynamics of both nuclear entrapment and abandonment among these regional actors, as well as mixed interests in indigenous nuclear programs. In addition, we demonstrate how citizens of East Asia evaluate possible policy options that could help Washington mitigate regional nuclear anxiety.

Keywords: nuclear; alliances; East Asia; proliferation; security

Authors’ Profile:

Lauren Sukin is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.
Woohyeok Seo is a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.

Full text (PDF) is here.

The views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions.

The page for this project is here.

Category TOPICS

“World’s Fissile Material Data” 2024 has been published!

2024年6月5日

“World’s Fissile Material Data” 2024　　 [All Lists]

As was the case last year, the total amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) declined but the total amount of separated plutonium increased, and the increasing tendency continues.
The total inventory of HEU was 1,255 tons, equivalent to 19,610 warheads (a decrease of 5 tons or about 70 warheads from last year). However, the overall rising trend in separated plutonium continues, with an increase of 7 tons in plutonium for civilian use, bringing the total inventory to 560 tons, equivalent to 93,270 warheads (an increase of 8 tons or about 1,270 warheads from last year). As a result, the total inventory amount increased to equivalent to 112,880 warheads, an increase of around 1,200 warheads from last year (111,680 warheads).

◆ The two images to the right can be enlarged by clicking on them. You can also view and download the following PDF versions.

　・The 2024 Global Inventory Map of Fissile Material (PDF)