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A Proposal for a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Hiromichi Umebayashi
Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library Conference
“Toward Nuclear-Free Korea and Northeast Asia: Issues and Agenda for Action”
Seoul, December 10, 2014


§ Introduction
The year 2015 is approaching. It is the year of 9th NPT Review Conference, which marks 20 years after 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the year of 70 years anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. So, it is right time for people in Northeast Asia to put the Northeast Asian nuclear disarmament issue in the global context. Unfortunately even on the Eve of this important year, we have only very dim sight towards the world free of nuclear weapons. The Nagasaki Peace Declaration of August 9 this year expresses concerns about the growing gap between nuclear weapon states plus states under their nuclear umbrella and genuine non-nuclear weapon states, and says “if we cannot overcome this opposition, then next year’s Review Conference will come to nothing.”

The recognition of slow progress to a nuclear weapon free world has reassured the appropriateness of considering regional nuclear crisis as a part of the global nuclear stalemate. The current situation of DPRK’s continuing nuclear program and ROK and Japan’s increased sticking to the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States are mirror reflection of the global reality, where nuclear weapon states envision continuing indefinite possession of their nuclear arsenals and compete among themselves to seek balance and stability through their modernization under the old-fashioned nuclear deterrence theory. In this respect, innovative efforts for a nuclear-free Northeast Asia would have an important implication to the global efforts for a world without nuclear weapons. Thus, the discussion on the establishment of possible Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone (NEA-NWFZ) will be a subject of global interests.

§ Scheme Proposals
After the end of the Cold War, a NEA-NWFZ became more than a political slogan and several concrete proposals with different arrangements have been proposed. A chronology of such proposals is appended at the end of this paper.

The first of such proposals was made by a research group led by John E. Endicott in 1995 after three years research cooperation[1].. One typical scheme they presented is a circular zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom, which encircles the whole land area of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan and Taiwan, and part of China, Russia and Mongolia. The U.S. is also included in the treaty arrangement because it has military bases in the ROK and Japan. The Track II study of such a circular scheme, together with a later elliptical modification, led to a proposal of a Limited NWFZ in which only non-strategic nuclear weapons are prohibited in the zone.

Among others, the present author proposed a scenario called the “three plus three” in 1996[2]., in which a trilateral NEA-NWFZ treaty among Japan, the ROK and the DPRK was envisioned. It included a special protocol with provisions including negative security assurances by the three neighboring nuclear weapon states (NWS) — China, Russia and the United States of America. Later, in 2004, a model treaty was developed by the same author in cooperation with NGOs in Japan and the ROK[3]. id=”_ednref3″>. In that model treaty, while continuing to be based upon the three plus three scenario, a six-party treaty, rather than a three-party treaty, was proposed. The parties to the treaty would be divided into two categories: “Intrazonal states” (Japan, ROK and DPRK) and “neighboring NWS” (China, Russia and U.S.). Geographically, the NEA-NWFZ is composed of the territory of the intrazonal states. Provisions stipulating obligations of neighboring NWS, including security assurances, were incorporated into the main text of the treaty, rather than provided in a protocol because they are deemed essential to the treaty negotiation process from its outset.

The three plus three arrangement is considered to be a most realistic and fundamental arrangement for a NEA-NWFZ because it involves key three countries of the region, namely the ROK, the DPRK and Japan, as the central players and three neighboring nuclear weapon states under the NPT, namely the United States, China, and Russia, as supportive players of the arrangement. It is not an accidental coincidence that these six nations later became the member countries in the Six Party Talks on the nuclear issues of Korean Peninsula in August 2003. While the ROK and Japan are non-nuclear states under the NPT, the DPRK’s non-nuclear position assumed in this arrangement is against its current policy. However, international community continues to urge “the DPRK to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes … and to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its IAEA safeguards agreement.”[4]. More on this subject will be discussed later in the paper.

This three plus three approach could be pursued by taking advantage of the former policies that were once adopted by the intrazonal states. Specifically, the ROK and the DPRK effectuated in 1992 the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, in which they agreed that they “shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons,” and that they “shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.” Also, Japan has been maintaining the “three non-nuclear principles,” which state that Japan will not manufacture, possess, nor allow the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. Also, the 1995 Atomic Energy Basic Law of Japan prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Another merit of the scheme is that in this arrangement one can construct a security system where three “intrazonal states”, rather than outside powers such as the U.S. and Russia, could play the central role in the management of the Zone. Any NWFZ treaty will establish a commission to ensure the implementation of the provisions set forth in the treaty, as well as the executive committee, a subsidiary organ of the commission to serve the functions mandated by the treaty. The representative from one of the “intrazonal states,” rather than neighboring nuclear weapon states, is naturally deemed to take chairpersonship of such commission or committee on the rotational basis because those three states assume most fundamental obligations under the treaty. This will help develop the autonomy of the three regional countries relative to the outside powers.

§ Regional Context and Deadlock of the Six Party Talks
The study on a NEA-NWFZ has been undertaken with mid- or long-term goals of the region in mind.
— To reverse the on-going attempt by the DPRK to acquire and strengthen its nuclear deterrent, as well as the counter military actions by Japan and the ROK by means of the strengthened U.S. extended deterrence including nuclear components.
— To prevent a foreseeable competitive escalation of nuclear development among Japan, the ROK and the DPRK, or between Japan and a reunified Korea.
— To establish mechanisms to implement the provisions of a NEA-NWFZ treaty, including verification and possibly energy cooperation, as the first step toward further confidence building and broader cooperative security mechanisms in the region.

These objectives continue to be relevant today. The primary international forum to pursue them has been the Six Party Talks involving all the six countries in the three plus three scheme. At the time of the introduction of this scheme in 1996, there were no Six-Party Talks, which started in 2003. After two years consultation it issues the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, the fundamental agreement among the six parties that was referred to as a document at a point of return in the most recent NPT Review Conference[5].. The Joint Statement acknowledges the relevance of security cooperation in Northeast Asia to “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” by saying: “The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.” A NEA-NWFZ typifies such ways and means for security cooperation. Moreover, the agreement of February 2007 on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” established five working groups including one devoted to a “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.”

Another innovative element is found in the 2005 Joint Statement. In addition to the DPRK’s commitment to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” the United States affirmed that it has “no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.” This means that future security assurances by nuclear weapon states could be extended to include response to an attack by conventional weapons and that a new dimension of the regional security cooperation mechanism could possibly be envisioned in this regard. The importance of this statement centers on its implication of the transformation of the 1953 Armistice Treaty of Korean War into a permanent peace treaty.

In spite of such achievements, the Six Party Talks has been dead locked for six years since December 2008, when the parties failed to agree on any verification process at a meeting of the heads of delegation during the sixth session of the Talks. The DPRK conducted three underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013. Although the weaponization of those devices has not yet been proven, it will not be surprising if this becomes apparent anytime in the near future. Also, the DPRK demonstrated its ongoing indigenous plan of so-called “Juche-based nuclear power industry”[6]., involving the construction of a prototype small light water reactor (LWR) and a modern centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, as was observed by a team of U.S. experts who visited Pyongyang in November 2010[7]. and its expansion has been observed by satellite image analyses[8]..

The latter development relative to the LWR is considered to be more or less consistent with arguments maintained by the DPRK both before and after the start of the Six-Party Talks and could be used as a renewed path for the international community to engage the DPRK with multi-faceted deliberations[9].. Regarding the former development of escalated nuclear deterrence, it is important to note that the DPRK has never hinted that it would possess a nuclear deterrent for the purpose of parity, but it continues to say to the effect that the deterrence is needed to assure national security and regime preservation. Following intervening events, such as the regime succession by Kim Jong-Un, the U.S. and the DPRK resumption of their bilateral talks in late 2011, resulting in so called “leap day agreement” in 2012, the DPRK’s tense repercussion against the UN Security Council sanction resolution 2094 (2013), and the execution of death penalty of the Nation’s number 2 Jang Sung-taek in December 2013, the DPRK has returned to its posture to seek negotiations. Pak Kil-yon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, stated at the UN General Assembly High-level Meeting on nuclear disarmament on September 26, 2013, “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the consistent policy of our government. The ultimate goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is to completely remove the US nuclear threats against our country and to return the entire Korean Peninsula, including South Korea into the zone free from nuclear weapons.”[10]. In principle, the statement is consistent with the September 19 joint statement. Recently, So Se Pyong, DPRK’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva is reported to say “For the six-party talks we are ready, and as far as I think, China and Russia are ready.”[11].

§ Global Context and Obligation of Japan and ROK under NPT
The establishment of a NEA-NWFZ is increasingly important in the global context, because on one hand it will contribute to contemporary global nuclear disarmament at the time of its difficulty, and on the other hand the international pressure is growing upon non-nuclear weapon states under NPT that are relying upon such weapons.

Today continues to be an historic moment for humanity to grasp the rare opportunity for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The determination to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons has been manifested in numerous statements and documents in recent years. Final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus and thus politically binding for all the state parties to the NPT, reads “All state parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons,”[12]. and “all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes, inter alia, consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”[13]. These two statements are applicable to all NPT member states including non-nuclear states such as ROK and Japan and politically oblige them to make their own efforts to pursue nuclear weapon free world with a certain legal framework. In addition, nuclear weapon states are called upon “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.”[14]. This request is apparently directed to nuclear weapon states, but as interpreted in combination with the obligation posed upon non-nuclear states mentioned above, those non-nuclear weapon states whose security policy relies upon extended nuclear deterrence of the nuclear weapon states are equally called upon to “diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.”

Based upon such globally shared political commitments, countries and people are urged to demonstrate efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies and to pursue the possibility of regional peace and security without reliance on nuclear weapons, especially in Northeast Asia where nuclear weapons have been playing significant roles.

In fact, recent international consultation emphasizes explicitly the roles played by non-nuclear countries that rely upon extended nuclear deterrence. In 2013, the UN Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament discussed about “the role of nonnuclear-weapons States under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.”[15]. In the same context, they also discussed “the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of nuclear weapons.”[16].

As an effort to implement the agreed action plan for nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a ten-nation group initiated by Japan and Australia, called the NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative)[17]., presented a working paper entitled, “Transparency of Nuclear Weapons”[18]. at the 2012 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. In this working paper, they proposed a standard report form to be used the by nuclear weapon states (NWS) in order to secure progressive nuclear disarmament in a transparent manner. In that standard form, one of the items to be included is “the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” Moreover, the NPDI requests the rapid implementation of the report by encouraging NWS to start it at every PrepCom, namely beginning the next year. As is obvious from the discussion above, this request should be directed not only to NWS, but also to non-nuclear states under extended nuclear deterrence, including some NPDI members themselves such as Japan and NATO countries. In fact, this point was addressed by a South African delegate at the same PrepCom, who said, “those states that are part of military alliances which includes NWS, should report, as a significant transparency and confidence-building measure, on steps taken or future steps planned to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in collective security doctrines.”[19]. Again, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone is a typical way toward a security arrangement to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons regionally.

§ Halperin’s Proposal on a Comprehensive Agreement
In late 2011 a new initiative appeared regarding efforts to establish a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone (NEA-NWFZ). Since then, the framework of the discussion has generally shifted from the question of whether such a zone might even be possible and, if so, what kind of scheme it would be, to what kind of approach might to be taken to actually realize it. This shift has been brought about by a proposal made by Morton H. Halperin, a well-known U.S. foreign policy expert, at a workshop on East Asia security that was organized by Nautilus Institute in Tokyo in November 2011[20].. His contribution was soon published in an article entitled “A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia.”[21]. Since then, discussions of this proposal took place at various workshops held in Washington D.C.[22]., Nagasaki, Seoul and Tokyo[23]..

It was in the context of how to overcome the deadlock and to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that Morton H. Halperin proposed a comprehensive agreement including the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. There seem to be two major underlying recognitions that motivated his proposition. One is the devastating consequences of the proliferation domino effect, both regionally and globally, that would result from the emergence of the DPRK as a de facto permanent nuclear power. Thus, he argues, “Until and unless it is absolutely clear that reversing North Korea’s nuclear program is not possible, Western security policy in the region must be directed at persuading the North to give up its nuclear weapons.”[24]. As was cited above, a recent speech by the DPRK Vice-Foreign Minister at the UN General Assembly, affirms the possibility of non-nuclear DPRK still remains. The other is the near success achieved in the relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK in 2000, after a kind of comprehensive negotiations at that time, the near success that culminated in the U.S.–DPRK Joint Communique followed by the visit to Pyongyang by Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State. Halperin served as Director of the Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State at that time. The Joint Communique reads, “As the first important step both sides declared that any of the two governments entertains no hostile intention toward the other and affirmed the commitment to make all efforts to establish new relations free from past antagonism in the future.”[25].

Halperin argues that as long as the U.S. (and its allies) and DPRK cannot agree to the cause of the failure of the implementation of the agreed steps of the Six-Party Talks, “an effort must be made to bypass this dispute.” And, he suggests pursuing a ‘Comprehensive Agreement (or Treaty) on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia’ covering all outstanding issues affecting relations with North Korea”. In a sense, this approach appears similar to the 1994 ‘Agreed Framework’, which created KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) that eventually failed, after the culmination of near success of the year 2000 as mentioned above. However, the new Comprehensive Agreement is meant to be modified to meet today’s circumstances in its comprehensiveness and multilateralism. It will create a permanent organization to implement and enforce the comprehensive agreement unlike KEDO that was meant to deal with the energy issue only.

Six key elements in the comprehensive agreement he proposed include:
1. Termination of the state of war.
2. Creating a permanent council on security.
3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent.
4. Provisions of assistances for nuclear and other energy.
5. Termination of sanctions/response to violations of the treaty.
6. A nuclear-weapons-free zone

While the original papers should be consulted for the detailed accounts of these elements, it is useful to note some features of the proposed NEA-NWFZ. The fundamental structure of the zone is the same as that of a three plus three arrangement. Namely, the geographical zone consists of the territorial areas of Japan, the ROK and the DPRK, and all the five nuclear weapon states, instead of three, are obligated not to store nuclear weapons in the zone as well as not to use or threaten to use such weapons against the countries within the zone. As is the case in other preceding discussions, it is open to modification, such as expansion to include Mongolia and Canada into the zone[26].. It includes a provision concerning the destruction of existing stockpiles as in the case of Pelindaba Treaty which involves South Africa, a past nuclear weapons holder. One of the new challenges that Halperin’s NWFZ proposal might address is to restrict reprocessing by non-nuclear weapon states by some means. The inspection provisions to verify compliance with the treaty are equally applied to countries within the zone and conducted by an organization controlled by the permanent council on security created by the Agreement (or Treaty).

Also it is important to note that the term “Comprehensive Agreement” in Halperin’s concept is used in a limited context so that it can be strictly relevant to solving the current stalemate in relation to nuclear issues and not in a general context for broader regional security. This avoids the situation where a concept of comprehensiveness is unnecessarily broadened and goes beyond the original intent of the agreement. Of course, it doesn’t deny to become a forum to deal with broader security issues in the future if appropriate.

§ Further Subjects for Deliberation
Naturally there are, and will be, discussions pro and con regarding the concept proposed by Halperin. In fact, one can observe a variety of views that appeared in the workshop held in Washington DC in October 2012.[27]. However, there is no doubt that we need a new approach to solve the current stalemate regarding nuclear problems in Northeast Asia and that Halperin’s proposal provides a reasonable starting point to move in the right direction. In the course of recent discussions, there have been raised some areas that will be worthy of further deliberation. Some of them are the following.

Freedom of Space Exploration:
While the comprehensive agreement should be as simple as possible, it may be appropriate to think about possible elements to be added, or to be subordinated, to the six elements proposed by Halperin. For example, since UN sanctions against the DPRK enforced by the UN Security Council Resolution are related not only to nuclear programs, but also to ballistic missile programs, the means by which to address the missile or space rocket issue in the agreement would be a subject to be considered. Even if the nuclear weapons issue is resolved and thus, the missile issue might not be as serious as at present, we need to have a clear picture of the ultimate solution at the very outset. As is properly stated in the recent UNSC resolution[28]., every country has the equal freedom to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law. In this respect, transparency and confidence building measures for space exploration which are applied equally to the state parties to the comprehensive agreement will have to be developed in the region.

Modalities of the General Comprehensive Agreement:
One of the characteristics of Halperin’s approach is that a legally binding treaty with general agreement on a package of six elements should come first, before any negotiations start on steps to be taken to achieve them. A binding treaty will have to be approved by the national parliament of each party to the treaty. So if there are strong national leaders in key countries concerned, the legally-binding-treaty-first option will be the best and most feasible approach. However, a declaration on such an agreement signed by the heads of the governments concerned might work if we have broad national and international public support. It will be worthwhile to further study the modalities of the general agreement, which will serve as the firm and sound, while still feasible, basis for future negotiations.

Ideas on Treaty Provisions of a NEA-NWFZ:
The negotiation histories of the existing NWFZs provide us with rich lessons, including a fundamental understanding that each NWFZ devises provisions unique to its own region, reflecting its regional histories and geopolitics. There have already been such unique ideas proposed for Northeast Asia in Halperin’s paper as well as in others[29]., for example, regarding entry-into-force provisions and regional verification mechanisms. Nautilus Group’s ideas of DPRK’s phased compliance with a NWFZ and a calibrated security assurances by nuclear weapon states during the intermediate phases[30]. are especially worth studying. The systematic review and revision of such ideas will be necessary.

Steps for Preparatory Diplomatic Work:
While it is no doubt important that prior close consultations take place among U.S. and its allies, as pointed out by Halperin, the dialogue between U.S. and China at an early stage is mandatory as well, considering their recent delicate relationship over the security of East Asia, including that of the South China Sea. In order to pursue such dialogues in parallel, we will need a draft text of the Comprehensive Agreement as a shared reference point to ensure mutual trust. The possibility of a party, including from interstate organizations and non-governmental organizations, coming forth in the role of broker or catalyzing agent, deserves serious consideration.

§ Way Forward
In this context, there was an epoch-making progress to invite the UN to play more role. The UN Advisory Board of Disarmament Affairs discussed on a NEA-NWFZ as one of the topics of their 2013 agenda “the relations between nuclear-weapon-free zones in advancing regional and global security,” and issued a recommendation to the Secretary General[31]. in July 2013. It reads “The Secretary General should also consider appropriate action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North-East Asia. In particular, the Secretary-General could promote a more active role for the regional forums in encouraging transparency and confidence-building among the countries of the region.” It is for the first time that a NEA-NWFZ became a UN documented agenda.

This positive development was soon echoed by Mr. Elbegdorj, President of Mongolia, at the UN High Level Meeting on nuclear disarmament in September 2013. He said, “Mongolia is prepared, on an informal basis, to work with the countries of Northeast Asia to see if and how a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be established in the region. Though we know well that that would not be easy and would require courage, political will and perseverance, it is doable, if not right away.”[32]. In fact, this Mongolia’s willingness to play roles for the denuclearization of Northeast Asia was also expressed one year in advance. In 2012, Mongolia marked the twentieth anniversary of its declaration of a unique single-state nuclear weapon free status. Its remarkable diplomatic endeavors drew a five plus one parallel declaration on September 17, 2012 to obtain P5’s reaffirmation of their respect of Mongolia’s status, including negative security assurances. On that occasion, Ambassador Enkhsaikhan, Mongolia’s focal point and the coordinator of the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status, expressed Mongolia’s commitment to the nuclear weapon free Northeast Asia as follows[33].: “Mongolia is a part of the Northeast Asian region and believes that an open, unbiased and comprehensive approach is needed to addressing the region’s pressing issues, especially ridding the region of nuclear weapons. In this respect it is prepared to participate in the joint search for mutually beneficial arrangements and solutions.” Considering the fact that Mongolia is a neighbor to the Six Parties of the three plus three arrangement, in fact making it a four plus three arrangement, that it maintains good relationship with the DPRK, and that it will acquire legally binding negative security assurances in a NEA-NWFZ unlike the non-binding P5 declaration above, Mongolia could play a critical role in initiating the comprehensive agreement process in NEA.

As is described in the Report of UN Disarmament Commission in 1999, a proposal of a NWFZ has to be initiated by any of the countries of the region concerned[34].. In this regards, the initiative of Japan and/or ROK is also crucial in case of Northeast Asia. The 2015 NPT Review Conference will be a most appropriate opportunity for both countries to take a step forward by expressing their interests in discussing on a NEA-NWFZ and call upon resuming the Six Party Talks for that purpose. It will be a great contribution to a successful 2015 NPT Review Conference.
— End

Chronology of Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
   Click here for the Chronology as a PDF file.

March 1995

John Endicott, et al.[35].

Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ), involving only non-strategic weapons. A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom or an elliptical zone.


Andrew Mack[36].

NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan

March 1996

Kumao Kaneko[37].

A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom. Different obligations posed on nuclear weapons state and non-nuclear weapons states.

May 1996

Hiromichi Umebayashi[38].

Three plus Three nations arrangement involving ROK, DPRK and Japan as non-nuclear weapons states and China, Russia and U.S. as nuclear weapons states.

October 1997

John Endicott, et al[39].

NEA League of Non-Nuclear States, involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (and DPRK if possible) as a phase I formation of the LNWFZ.

June 2000

Seongwhun Cheon & Tatsujiro Suzuki[40].

A NWFZ supported by a tri-party treaty among ROK, DPRK and Japan.

April 2004

Hiromichi Umebayashi, et al.[41].

A model NWFZ treaty drafted based upon a Three plus Three nations arrangement.

Spring 2007

J. Enkhsaikhan[42].

An approach to form a zone through relevant non-nuclear constituent states’ attaining single state NWF status.

August 2008

DPJ Disarmament Group[43].

A draft treaty proposal based upon a Three plus Three arrangement

Nov. 2008

Jaejung Suh[44].

Multilateralization of 1992 Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by making protocols to it.

May 2010

Nautilus Institute[45].

An approach to form a zone by establishing first a NWFZ composed of Japan and ROK (with additions).

Nov. 2011

Morton H. Halperin[46].

An approach to conclude a comprehensive agreement among member states of the Six-Party Talks and others on key elements including the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ.

[1] John E. Endicott and Alan G. Gorowitz, “Track II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone for Northeast Asia,” Pacific Review, vol. 11, no. 3, October 1999.

[2] Hiromichi Umebayashi, “A Northeast Asia NWFZ: A Realistic and Attainable Goal,” at INESAP Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, May 30 – June 2, 1996, and published in INESAP Bulletin, No. 10, August 1996.

[3] The model treaty has been revised several times. Draft 4 is available in the Peace Depot Working Paper No.1 E, “A Model Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” November 2005.
The most recent version, draft 7, is available in the appendix of the book in Japanese. Hiromichi Umebayashi, “Hi-kakuheikichitai – Kakunaki Sekai eno Michisuji” (“Nuclear Weapon Free Zone – A Pathway to the World without Nuclear Weapons”), Iwanami-Shoten, September 28, 2011.

[4] 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

[5] ibid.

[6] Foreign Ministry Statement of the DPRK, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s Presidential Statement,” Korea Central News Agency, April 14, 2009.

[7] Siegfried S. Hecker, “Redefining denuclearization in North Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 December 2010.

[8] David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Yonbyon: Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Expands while 5 MWe Reactor is Possibly Shut Down,” ISIS Imagery Brief, October 3, 2014.

[9] David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Engaging the DPRK Enrichment and Small LWR Program,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, December 23, 2010.

[10] Statement by Pak Kil Yon at the high level meeting on nuclear disarmament of the 68th UN General Assembly, New York, 26 September 2013.

[11] Stephanie Nebehay, “Exclusive: North Korea envoy says door is open on nuclear issues, rights, abductees,” Reuters, Oct 2, 2014

[12] Action 1 of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

[13] Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

[14] Action 5 of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

[15] “Report of the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,” A/68/514, 9 October 2013

[16] ibid

[17] Later, NPDI became 12 nations group in September 2013.

[18] “Transparency of nuclear weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative,” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12, 20 April 2012.

[19] Statement by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, at the First PrepCom for the 2015 Review Conference of NPT, 3 May 2012.

[20] “East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop,” Tokyo November 11, 2011, cosponsored by Nautilus Institute, Mansfield Foundation, and Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

[21] > Morton H. Halperin, Global Asia Vol. 6, No.4, winter 2011. Also there is a revised paper “A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,” The Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 34, Aug. 20, 2012.

[22] The workshop “A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,” Washington D.C. October 9-10, 2012, cosponsored by Nautilus Institute and Woodrow Wilson Center.

[23] A series of workshops were organized by RECNA in cooperation with other institutions including Nautilus Institute. “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone — Workshop I,” Nagasaki, December 7-8, 2012; “Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System: Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ – Workshop II,” Seoul, June 20, 2013; “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World: Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ – Workshop III,” Tokyo, September 14-16, 2014.

[24] Morton H. Halperin, “A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia,” Global Asia Vol. 6, No.4, winter 2011.

[25] KCNA, “Joint communique between DPRK and USA,” October 12, 2000.

[26] For example, see note 3.

[27] Peter Hayes, “A Breakthrough Six-Party Summit in 2013? Why Not?,” Global Asia, Vol. 7, No.4, Winter 2012. Papers presented at the workshop can be seen at projects/by-name/korea-japan-nwfz/workshops/gridlock/

[28] UN Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013), S/RES/2087(2013)

[29] See for example; Peter Hayes & Richard Tanter, “Key Elements of Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)”, September 26, 2012. ;
Hiromichi Umebayashi, “A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a three-plus- three Arrangement,” March 13, 2012.
Also see note 3 and note 30.

[30] Peter Hayes, Richard Tanter and Joan Diamond, “General Assessment of the DPRK Nuclear Situation,” December 7, 2012. /recna/bd/files/Peter-Hayes1.pdf

[31] “Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters – Report of the Secretary General,” A/68/206, 26 July, 2013.

[32] H.E. MR. ELBEGDORJ TSAKHIA, Statement at the High-level Meeting of The United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, September 26, 2013

[34] UN Disarmament Commission, “Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,” Report of the Disarmament Commission, Annex I, General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-fourth session Supplement No.42 (A/54/42), 1999

[35] See note 1.

[36] Andrew Mack, “A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone: Problems and Prospects,” Chapter 11 of Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia, UMDIRI95I16, United Nations, 1995

[37] Kumao Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996

[38] See note 2.

[39] John E. Endicott, “The Moscow Memorandum,” Moscow, Russia, 11 October 1997. The text in its entirety can be found in the document cited in note 1.

[40] Cheon Seongwhun & Tatsujiro Suzuki, “The Tripartite Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia: A Long-term Objective of the Six-Party Talks,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2003, pp. 41-68.

[41] See note 3.

[42] J. Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s non-nuclear status – en important element of Northeast Asia security,” Single State NWFZ: progress and prospects, Blue Banner, Ulaanbaatar, 2007.

[44] Suh Jaejung, “Wither the Korean Peninsula? – The U.S., Korea and Northeast Asia at a Critical Juncture,” The Fourth Busan International Symposium, 20 November 2008.

[45] “Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (KJNWFZ) Concept Paper,” Nautilus Institute, May 6, 2010. More advanced discussions appear in a later article by Peter Hayes, Richard Tanter and Joan Diamond, “General Assessment of the DPRK Nuclear Situation,” December 7, 2012. /recna/bd/files/Peter-Hayes1.pdf

[46] See notes 20 and 21.


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