Russian nuclear weapons capability |
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| 【Overview】 | ||||||||
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Compared with the U.S. French, and UK nuclear capabilities, Russian capabilities are quite vague. As for the data pertaining to the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, Russia, unlike the U.S., has not disclosed any breakdown of the number of (deployed/non-deployed) launchers. On February 5, 2018, Russia announced that it attained the new START goals, claiming a total 527 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,444 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry 2018). This chart and the New START Treaty data can be reconciled by replacing the 200 warheads counted under “Strategic bomber payloads” with the estimated number of operational strategic bombers (50) to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads to 502 and 1462, respectively. Given Russia’s limited transparency and day-to-day fluctuations in deployments in reality, this is probably a reasonable estimate. Also, Russia has approximately 160 ballistic missiles on high alert (capable of launch in 15 minutes), and most of them are estimated to be ICBMs (Kristensen, Hans M. 2017). After 2008, 96% of deployed ICBMs are said to be on high alert (Podvig, Pavel 2014). Russia is in the process of systematically replacing Soviet-era SS-18, -19, and -25 systems with the latest SS-27M2 systems with complete replacement by 2020. SS-18s are likewise being replaced by SS-X-30 Sarmats under development（Sputnik News 2014). Strategic nuclear submarines and SLBMs will also be replaced by the latest Borei-class submarines and new SLBM Bulava. Elsewhere, Russia’s bombers, cruise missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers are all being modernized. As a matter of fact, maritime patrols by Russia’s nuclear submarines have gained in frequency in the recent years. However, this Russian fleet comprises about a total 20 submarines per year. Given constraints on submarine patrols, they are believed to be attack nuclear submarines (Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2017). Last year Russia conducted the following ballistic tests: six ICBMs and four SLBMs (Space Launch Report 2017). Every October since 2013, Russia has conducted large-scale military maneuvers involving ICBM, SLBM and cruise missile launches. In February 2018, the Trump administration released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), aimed at the maintenance and modernization of strategic nuclear weapons as well as the development of smaller and more agile warheads and cruise missiles to be launched from surface ships and submarines. In the following month, President Putin, in a State of Federation address, reacted in kind by disclosing the development, not only of SS-X-30 Sarmats, but of nuclear-propelled cruise missiles, bomber-borne supersonic missiles, and unmanned submersible weapons (Kremlin 2018). All this escalation is enough to raise concerns reminiscent of Cold War nuclear buildup. |
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| Updated : June 1, 2018 | ||||||||
| Click here for pdf version of this table. | ||||||||
| NATO designation | Missile/bomb | No. of warheads per weapon | No. of warheads | Yield (kt) | Year first deployed | Remarks | ||
| Deployed | 652 | 1,612 | ||||||
| Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) | 308 | 804 | 1) | |||||
| SS-18 Mod.6 SatanIntercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：R-36M2 Voevoda NATO designation：SS-18 Mod.6 Satan Propulsion：Two-stage liquid propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 10 warheads Launch platform：Silo Specifications：Length 34.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 211 ton Range：11,000km Circular error probability：220m a) |
46 | 6 | 276 | 500 or 800 | 1988 | |||
| SS-19 Mod.3 StilettoIntercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：UR-100N UTTH NATO designation：SS-19 Mod.3 Stiletto Propulsion：Two-stage liquid propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 6 warheads Launch platform：Silo Specifications：Length 24.3 m, Diameter 2.5 m, Weight 106 ton Range：10,000km Circular error probability：350-430m b) |
10 | 6 | 60 | 400 | 1980 | |||
| SS-25 SickleIntercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：RT-2PM Topol NATO designation：SS-25 Sickle Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：1 warheads Launch platform：Transporter erector launcher Specifications：Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton Range：10,500km Circular error probability：350-430m c) |
72 | 1 | 72 | 800 | 1988 | |||
| SS-27 M1 (silos)Intercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：RT-2PM2 Topol M NATO designation：SS-27 Mod.1 (Silo) Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：1 warheads Launch platform：Silo Specifications：Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton Range：10,500km Circular error probability：350-430m d) |
60 | 1 | 60 | 800 | 1997 | |||
| SS-27 M1(mobile)Intercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：RT-2PM2 Topol-M NATO designation：SS-27 Mod.1 (mobile) Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：1 warheads Launch platform：Transporter erector launcher Specifications：Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton Range：10,500km Circular error probability：350-430m e) |
18 | 1 | 18 | 800? | 2006 | |||
| SS-27 M2(mobile)Intercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：Yars NATO designation：SS-27 Mod.2 (mobile) Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 4 warheads Launch platform：Transporter erector launcher Specifications：Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton Range：10,500km Circular error probability：250m f) |
90 | 3 | 270 | 100? | 2010 | |||
| SS-27 M2 (silos)Intercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：Yars NATO designation：SS-27 Mod.2 (Silo) Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 4 warheads Launch platform：Silo Specifications：Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton Range：10,500km Circular error probability：250m g) |
12 | 4 | 48 | 100? | 2014 | |||
| SS-X-30 (silos)Intercontinental ballistic missile Russian designation：Sarmat NATO designation：SS-X-30 Satan 2 Propulsion：Two-stage liquid propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 10 warheads ? Launch platform：Silo Specifications：Length 36.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 200 ton Range：11,000 km Circular error probability：？ h) |
– | 10 | – | 500? | (2020) | |||
| Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) | 144 | 608 | 2) | |||||
| SS-N-18 Mod.1 StingraySubmarine-launched ballistic missile Russian designation：R-29R NATO designation：SS-N-18 Mod.1 Stingray Propulsion：Two-stage liquid propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 3 warheads Specifications：Length 14.1 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 35.3 ton Range ：6,500km Circular error probability：900m Submarine ：Delta III i) |
16 | 3 | 48 | 50 | 1978 | Carried by the Delta III-class nuclear submarineStrategic nuclear submarine Russian designation：Kalmar NATO designation：Delta III Submerged speed：25knot（km/h 46km） No. of tubes：16 Specifications：Length 155 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,000 ton No. of submarines in service：3 l) |
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| SS-N-23 SinevaSubmarine-launched ballistic missile Russian designation：Sineva NATO designation：SS-N-23 Mod.1 Propulsion：Three-stage liquid propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 10 warheads Specifications：Length 14.8 m, Diameter 1.9 m, Weight 40.3 ton Range：8,500km Circular error probability：500m Submarine：Delta Ⅳ j) |
80 | 4 | 320 | 100 | 2007 | Carried by the Delta IV-class nuclear submarine Strategic nuclear submarine Russian designation：Delfin NATO designation：Delta Ⅳ Submerged speed：22-23knot（km/h 41-43km） No. of tubes：16 Specifications ：Length 167 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,600 ton No. of submarines in service：6 m) |
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| SS-N-32 BulavaSubmarine-launched ballistic missile Russian designation：Bulava NATO designation：SS-N-32 Propulsion：Three-stage solid-propellant No. of warheads：Maximum 6 warheads Specifications：Length 12.1 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 36.8 ton Range：8,300km Circular error probability：250 – 300m Submarine：Borey k) |
48 | 5 | 240 | 100 | 2014 | Carried by the Borey-class nuclear submarineStrategic nuclear submarine NATO designation：Borey Submerged speed：25knot（km/h 46km） No. of tubes：16 Specifications：Length 170m, Width 13.5 m, Displacement underwater 19,400 ton Where deployed：Northern Fleet base (Gadzhiyevo) (1st and 3rd vessel) ：Pacific Fleet base (Vilyuchinsk) (2nd vessel) No. of submarines in service：2 Remarks：One submarine is operational and one is in shakedown testing. n) |
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| Strategic bomber payloads | 200 | 200 | 3) | |||||
| AS-15A Kent ACruise missile Russian designation：Kh-55 NATO designation：AS-15A Kent A No. of warheads：1 warheads Range：2,500km Carried by：Tu-95MS6 (NATO designation：Bear H) o) |
200 | 1 | 200 | 200 | 1984 | Carried by the Bear HStrategic bomber Russian designation：Tu-95MS6/16 NATO designation：Bear H6/16 Max. speed：830km/h (Propeller aircraft) Specifications：Length 49.5 m, Span 51.1 m Range：10,500km Payload：AS-15A Remarks：Bear H6 internally carries six missiles ：Bear H16 externally carries an additional 10 missiles underneath the wings r) |
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| AS-15B Kent BCruise missile Russian designation：Kh-55SM NATO designation：AS-15B Kent B No. of warheads：1 warheads Range：3,000km Carried by：Tu-160（NATO designation：Blackjack） p) |
1 | 200 | 1987 | Carried by the BlackjackStrategic bomber Russian designation：Tu-160 NATO designation：Blackjack Max. speed：2,200km/h Specifications：Length 54.1 m, Span 55.7-35.6m Range：14,000km Payload：Carries 12 AS-15Bs internally Remarks：Variable wing aircraft s) |
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| AS-16 KickbackShort range attack missile Russian designation：Kh-15 NATO designation：AS-16 Kickback No. of warheads：1 warheads Range：150km Remarks：Believed to have been retired from strategic air force deployment. q) |
1 | 350 | 1987 | |||||
| Nuclear bomb | 1 | |||||||
| Reserve / Nondeployed | 2,735 | 4) | ||||||
| Ground-based (ICBM, etc.) | 854 | |||||||
| ICBM | 334 | 1) | ||||||
| Ground-based non-strategic nuclear weaponsGround-based non-strategic nuclear weapons ●Anti‐ballistic missile 53T6 (Gazelle) ●Air defense missile S-300P (SA-10/20) S-300V (SA-12) ●Coastal defence missile Redut (SSC-1B) ●Short-range ballistic missile Tochka/-U (SS-21) Iskander (SS-26) t) |
520 | 1 | 520 | 5) | ||||
| Sea-based (SLBM, etc.) | 980 | |||||||
| SS-N-18 | 48 | 50 | 2) | |||||
| SS-N-23 | 64 | 100 | 2) | |||||
| SS-N-32 | 48 | 100 | 2) | |||||
| Sea-based non-strategic nuclear weaponsSea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons ●Anti‐ship cruise missile P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9) P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12) P-700 Granit (SS-N-19) Kn-41 Moskit (SS-N-22) ●Land-attack cruise missile RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21) ●Anti-submarine rocket RPK-2 Vyuga (SS-N-15) RRK-6 Vodopad (SS-N-16) ●Torpedo ●Depth charge u) |
820 | 1 | 820 | 6) | ||||
| Air-launched systems (Bombers, etc.) | 900 | |||||||
| Missile , nuclear bomb | 400 | 1 | 400 | 3) | ||||
| Non-strategic air-launched nuclear weaponsAir-carried non-strategic nuclear weapons ●Cruise missile Kh-22 Burya (AS-4) ●Short range attack missile Kh-15 (AS-16) ●Unguided bomb v) |
500 | 1 | 500 | 7) | ||||
| Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement, etc. | 〜2,500 | 8) | ||||||
| Total inventory | 〜6,850 | |||||||
| 【Notes】 | ||||||||
| 1) | This is in line with the latest estimates (Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1). A change from a year ago consists of 10 SS-19s in reserve and an increment of 20 (mobile) SS-27M2s. Furthermore, Russia were conducting test launches of minimized SS-27M2s (Podvig, Pavel 2016) and railway-borne ICBMs (Podvig, Pavel 2017-1) but these projects are thought to be on hold or abandoned（Podvig, Pavel 2017-4; Podvig, Pavel 2018-2). Russia has also been testing supersonic SS-19-borne warheads allegedly capable of breaching the U.S. missile defense (Tass 2018). Some estimates maintain that SS-19s are free of nuclear warheads (Podvig, Pavel 2017-2). With a view to complying with the New START Treaty, SS-18s’ warheads are believed to have been reduced from ten to six and SS-27 Mod 2s’ from four to three. These reductions are now in reserve. |
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| 2) | Russian strategic nuclear submarines currently consists of ten submarines in operational deployment and one in maintenance. The Delta III class, with K-44 Ryazan’s sole exception (Navaltoday 2017), is all thought to have been retired (Podvig, Pavel 2018-1). As for Delta IV, K-114 Tula has now been returned to service (Podvig, Pavel 2017-5), resulting in five ships in operational deployment and one, K-117 Bryansk, in overhaul (Podvig, Pavel 2017-6). SLBM Blavars on three Borei-class submarines have been reduced to five warheads from the standard six, in order to adhere to the New START. The total Russian count, as a result, is 608 deployed warheads (3 warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 1 submarine + 4 warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 5 submarines + 5 warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 3 submarines), leaving 160 in reserve (48 warheads per Delta III, 64 per Delta IV in overhaul, and 48 not deployed on Blavars. | |||||||
| 3) | The estimate (actual number of aircraft tasked for nuclear missions is around 70 aircrafts) for strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons is placed at 70 (Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1), comprising 25 (actual 14) Bear H6, 30 (actual 25) Bear H16, and 13 (actual 11) Blackjack aircraft. These each carry 6, 16, and 12 cruise missiles, respectively (a total of 616), for a total of around 600 deployed or reserve. These nuclear weapons are not deployed to bombers in peacetime. Approximately 200 warheads have been allocated for the bombers and are in storage at Ukrainka Air (Amur Oblast) and Engels Air (Saratov Oblast) Bases for bombers. These are counted as being deployed. The remainder are stored at a central depository and are counted as reserve stockpiles. An estimate for strategic bombers tasked for nuclear assignments is 55 Bear H6s/H16s and 11 Blackjacks for an operational missile total of approximately 200 missiles (Podvig, Pavel 2017-3). | |||||||
| 4) | Russia’s reserve stockpile consists of warheads not loaded on ICBMs, those stored temporarily out of submarines during overhaul or not allocated to bombers, and non-strategic weapons. These are said to be stored in 48 locations across the Federation (Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s tactical warheads have been significantly reduced, with current estimates pegging them at some 1,840 (see 520 + 820 + 500 on table). Each warhead, while tagged to a specific launch pad, is not deployed operationally and centrally stored (Kristensen, Hans M. 2012). The Russian Foreign Ministry, during the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, affirmed that all non-strategic warheads are categorized as nondeployed and assembled at multiple central storage sites (Uliyanov, M. I. 2014). According to a new noteworthy research finding about Russian tactical weapons (Sutyagin, Igor 2012), such concepts as operational deployments, central storages and surpluses need to be redefined, in accordance with the Russian military’s unique operational practices. Sutyagin’s analysis says that, of about 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, some 1,000 are “operationally allocated” to launch pads and, though not loaded onto delivery means, kept in alert readiness for immediate use. Some of these may be found aboard ships or with ordnance units under the direct command of strike forces. Although this table adheres to Kristensen’s reserve category, large amounts, conceptually, resemble more closely with Kristensen’s operational deployments. | |||||||
| 5) | There are estimated to be 520 ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons. Of these, defensive missiles account for approximately 360 warheads, anti-air missiles 290 warheads, anti-ballistic missiles 68 warheads, and anti-ship missiles for coastal defense five. After the Cold War ended, the government publicly announced that it would scrap all its tactical nuclear weapons that were for ground combat, but even today it still retains around14 short-range attack missiles that are vehicle mobile. Furthermore, Russia has also deployed cruise missiles that may be in violation of the INF Treaty(Reuters 2017). | |||||||
| 6) | There are estimated to be approximately 820 sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons, allocated to approximately 190 warships, submarines, ship-based aircraft, and helicopters. They are made up of anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine rockets, land-attack cruise missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges. Most of the missiles are for dual nuclear and non-nuclear use (Kristensen, Hans M. 2012). | |||||||
| 7) | Approximately 500 warheads are estimated to be allocated to aircraft in cruise missiles, short-range attack missiles, and gravity bombs. They are carried by the Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name: Backfire C) intermediate-range bomber and the Su-24 (NATO reporting name: Fencer D) and Su-34 (NATO reporting name: Fullback) strategic bombers. Russia has been testing a new supersonic dual-purpose (nuclear/conventional) air-to-surface missile, Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, aboard the Mikoyan MiG-31 (“Foxhound”) (Sputnik News 2018). | |||||||
| 8) | In the Megatons to Megawatts program carried out after the end of the Cold War, the high enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia’s retired nuclear warheads was diluted and sold to the United States as fuel for nuclear power plants. This program was concluded at the end of 2013. Under this program, 20,000 nuclear warheads were disassembled over a 20-year period (NNSA 2013). In the coming years, Russia is expected to continue disassembling at a rate of 200-300 warheads per annum (Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-2). | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| English pravda.ru 2015: “Russia successfully test-launches new ICBM Rubezh,” http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/26-03-2015/130124-russia_new_ballistic_missile-0/ (accessed April 7,2015) | ||||||||
| Kremlin 2018: “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012. https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2017: “Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons,” briefing to George Washington University Elliott School’s Short Course on Nuclear Weapons and Related Security Issues, April 21, 2017. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brief2017_GWU_2s.pdf (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2017: “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 73, NO. 2, 115–126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1290375. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-2: “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, 2018. http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Navaltoday 2017: “Russian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Ryazan returns to service,” February 16, 2017. http://navaltoday.com/2017/02/16/russian-nuclear-powered-ballistic-missile-submarine-ryazan-returns-to-service/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| NNSA 2013: “Under U.S.-Russia Partnership, Final Shipment of Fuel Converted From 20,000 Russian Nuclear Warheads Arrives in United States and Will Be Used for U.S. Electricity,” December 11, 2013. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/megatonstomegawatts (accessed January 8,2014) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 2009. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.2968/065006010 (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2014: “Russian missile force readiness rate,” http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/russian_missile_force_readines.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Deployment of RS-26 Rubezh reportedly postponed until 2017,” May 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/deployment_of_rs-26_rubezh_rep.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019,” January 19, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/flight_tests_of_barguzin_rail-.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-4: “Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again),” December 4, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_rail-mobile_icbm_is_c.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-5: “Tula submarine completed overhaul,” December 28, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/tula_submarine_completed_overh.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-6: “Bryansk begins overhaul,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/bryansk_begins_overhaul.shtml (accessed February 9,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Two Project 667BDR submarines withdrawn from service,” March 14, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml (accessed March 15,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018-2: “By cancelling RS-26 Russia keeps its options open,” April 2, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml (accessed April 3,2018) | ||||||||
| Reuters 2017: “U.S. believes Russia deployed new missile in treaty violation,” February 14, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-missiles-idUSKBN15T2CS (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry 2018: “Foreign Ministry statement,” http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3054864?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB (accessed February 7,2018) | ||||||||
| Space Launch Report 2017: “2017 Major Suborbital Log,” http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/log2017.html#log2 (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2014: “Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops to Conduct 120 drills, Test 12 ICBMs by 2015,” June 2, 2014. http://sputniknews.com/military/20140602/190295445.html (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2018: “Russia’s Avangard Hypersonic Glider Warhead Enters Production – Source,” March 4, 2018. https://sputniknews.com/military/201803041062210266-avangard-hypersonic-glider-enters-production/ (accessed March 4,2018) | ||||||||
| Sutyagin, Igor 2012: “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Royal United Services Institute, November 2012. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf (accessed June 11,2018） | ||||||||
| Tass 2018: “Russia to use SS-19 ICBMs as carriers for Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles — source,” March 30, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/995167 (accessed May 20,2018) | ||||||||
| Uliyanov, M. I. 2014: NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/17, 25 April 2014. http://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/17 (accessed May 20,2018) | ||||||||
| ©RECNA Nuclear Warhead Data Monitoring Team | ||||||||
| a) | ICBM R-36M2 Voevoda | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Р-36М2 “Воевода” | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-20V | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-18 Mod. 6 Satan | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Two-stage liquid propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Silo | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 10 warheads | |||||||
| Yield： | 500kt/800kt per 1 warhead | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 34.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 211 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 11,000 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 220 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Dombarovsky Air Base : 18 missiles Uzhur Air Base : 28 missiles |
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| Remarks： | Voevoda means commander. In a large-scale exercise conducted by Russian Strategic Forces on October 30, 2013, a Voevoda was launched from Dombarovsky Air Base and successfully impacted on Kura Test Range in Kamchatka. This was probably also for the purpose of acquiring data on extension of service life. The previous test was on December 24, 2009. The Voevoda is expected to be retired by 2022. As a replacement, the liquid-fueled Sarmat is presently under development. It is planned to be deployed from 2020, but the plan has been delayed. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.218 | ||||||||
| CNN 2016: “Russia unveils ‘Satan 2’ missile, could wipe out France or Texas, report says,” http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/26/europe/russia-nuclear-missile-satan-2/index.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-20/R-36M/15A14/15A18,” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.95-98. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65, NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2009: “Successful launch of R-36M2 missile,” December 24, 2009. http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/12/successful_launch_of_r-36m2_mi.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-1: “New heavy ICBM expected to be ready in 2019,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/new_heavy_icbm_expected_to_be.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-2: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs-24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-1: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces,” October 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_large-scale_ex.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-2: “Some new missile system to be deployed in Dombarovskiy,” December 18, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “Sarmat ICBM to be ready by 2020,” February 25, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/sarmat_icbm_to_be_ready_by_202.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||||||
| b) | Intercontinental ballistic missile UR-100N UTTH | |||||||
| Russian designation： | УР-100Н УТТХ | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-18 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-19 Mod. 3 Stiletto | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Two-stage liquid propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Silo | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 6 warheads | |||||||
| Yield： | 400kt per 1 warheads | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 24.3 m, Diameter 2.5 m, Weight 106 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,000 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 350–430 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Tatishchevo Air Base | |||||||
| Remarks： | UR is the abbreviation for “Universal Rocket” and UTTH for “improved tactical and technical characteristics.” Replacement with the fixed silo-based Yars(SS-27 Mod2) began in 2014, and the UR-100N UTTH is expected to be retired by 2019. Meanwhile, Russia has been flight-testing “supersonic warheads” with SS-19s allegedly capable of breaching the U.S. missile defense. The latest test launch was conducted on October 25, 2016, launching a missile from the Dombarovsky Air Base and striking a test site in Kamchatka. The previous test was on April 19 of the same year. Some observers believe warheads have been removed from SS-19s. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.222. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-18/UR-100N/15A30/15A35,” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.94-95. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65, NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Silo modernization in Kozelsk,” July 4, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/07/silo_modernization_in_kozelsk.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2015: “Flight test of a Project 4202 vehicle,” February 26, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/02/flight_test_of_a_project_4202.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-1: “Reports of a Project 4202 flight test,” April 20, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/04/reports_of_a_project_4202_flig.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-2: “UR-100NUTTH launch from Dombarovskiy, most likely with Project 4202 payload,” October 25, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/ur-100nutth_launch_from_dombar.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Tass 2018: “Russia to use SS-19 ICBMs as carriers for Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles — source,” March 30, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/995167 (accessed May 20,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| c) | ICBM RT-2PM Topol | |||||||
| Russian designation： | РТ-2ПМ “Тополь” | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-12M | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-25 Sickle | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Transporter erector launcher | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | 1 warheads | |||||||
| Yield： | 800kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 350–430 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Yoshkar-Ola Air Base : 9 missiles Novosibirsk Air Base : 18 missiles Irkutsk Air Base : 9 missiles Barnaul Air Base : 36 missiles |
|||||||
| Remarks： | Topol means “poplar”. On October 26, 2017, Russian Strategic Missile Troops carried out a major exercise in which a missile was launched from the northwestern Plesetsk test range, which landed in the Kura test range on Kamchatka. This was thought to be for obtaining data for extending the service life of the missiles. Previously, the test was conducted on October 2, 2016. Currently, replacement by the mobile-launched Yars(SS-27 Mod2) is underway, and the Topol is expected to be retired by 2021. Using RT-2PM Topol, Russia is believed to be developing payload for the 4K51 Rubezh ICBM system. The latest test launch was conducted on December 26, 2017, with a missile launched from Kapustin Yar in southern Russia landing in Sary-Shagan in Kazakhstan. Currently, however, this program is either put on hold or abandoned. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.232. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-12M Topol,” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.91-92. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65, NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs-24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-1: “Topol launch from Kapustin Yar tests new combat payload,” October 10, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/topol_launch_from_kapustin_yar_1.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-2: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces,” October 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_large-scale_ex.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Another new warhead test in a Topol launch from Kapustin Yar,” March 4, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/03/another_new_warhead_test_in_a.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-2: “Topol-E launched from Kapustin Yar,” May 20, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/topol-e_launched_from_kapustin.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015: “New payload tested in a Topol launch from Kapustin Yar,” December 24, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/12/new_payload_tested_in_a_topol.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-1: “Launch of Topol from Plesetsk,” September 9, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/launch_of_topol_from_plesetsk.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-2: “Three ballistic missiles launched in one day,” October 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/three_ballistic_missiles_launc.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Annual exercise of strategic forces,” October 26, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/annual_exercise_of_strategic_f.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Launch of Topol from Kapustin Yar,” December 26, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/launch_of_topol_from_kapustin_1.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018: “By cancelling RS-26 Russia keeps its options open,” April 2, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml (accessed April 3,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2013: “Russia Test-Fires ICBM to Target in Kazakhstan,” December 27, 2013. http://sputniknews.com/military/20131227/185997002.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2014: “Russia Test Launches ICBM During Exercises Led by Putin,” May 8, 2014. http://sputniknews.com/military/20140508/189672546.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| d) | ICBM RT-2PM2 Topol M | |||||||
| Russian designation： | РТ-2ПМ2 “Тополь-М” | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-12M1 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-27 Mod. 1 (silo) | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Silo | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | 1 warhead | |||||||
| Yield： | 800kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 350–430 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Tatishchevo Air Base : 60 missiles | |||||||
| Remarks： | Deployment of 60 silo-based Topol M missiles seemed to be completed at Tatishchevo Air Base. In 2015, however, a new plan surfaced in 2015 projecting further deployments with seven regiments including Tatishchevo. The latest test launch was conducted on January 16, 2017. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed at the Kura test range on Kamchatka. It is assumed the objective was to validate ballistic stability and other technical characteristics. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-12M1/2 Topol-M (RT-2PM2),” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.93-94. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65, NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Some new missile system to be deployed in Dombarovskiy,” December 18, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Topol-M deployment in Tatishchevo continues,” February 13, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/02/topol-m_deployment_in_tatishch.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Test launch of silo-based Topol-M from Plesetsk,” January 16, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/test_launch_of_silo-based_topo_1.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| e) | Intercontinental ballistic missile RT-2PM2 Topol M | |||||||
| Russian designation： | РТ-2ПМ2 “Тополь-М” | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-12M2 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-27 Mod. 1 (mobile) | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Transporter erector launcher | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | 1 warhead | |||||||
| Yield： | 800kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 350–430 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Teykovo Air Base : 18 missiles | |||||||
| Remarks： | Deployment of 18 mobile-launched Topol M missiles has been completed at Teykovo Air Base. The latest test launch was conducted on November 1, 2014. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed at the Kura test range on Kamchatka. It is assumed the objective was to gather relevant data for potential lifetime extensions. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-12M1/2 Topol-M (RT-2PM2),” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.93-94. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65, NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs-24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “Test launch of silo-based Topol-M,” November 1, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/11/test_launch_of_silo-based_topo.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| f) | ICBM Yars | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Ярс | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-24 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-27 Mod. 2 (mobile) | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Transporter erector launcher | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 4 warheads | |||||||
| Yield： | 100kt? per 1 warhead | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 250m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Teykovo Air Base : 18 missiles Novosibirsk Air Base : 27 missiles Nizhniy Tagil Air Base : 27 missiles Irkutsk Air Base : 9 missiles Vypolzovo Air Base : 9 missiles |
|||||||
| Remarks： | The latest test launch was conducted on September 20, 2017. The missile launched by Yoshkar-Ola unit from the Plesetsk test range landed at the Kura test range on Kamchatka. The previous test took place on December 26, 2014. The mobile-launched Yars is consecutively replacing the SS-25. Russia undertook to develop a railway-borne ICBM system, RS-24 Yars (Barguzin BZhRK), in reaction to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) initiative. The program is now believed to have been postponed or abandoned. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-24 Yars,” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.98-99. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2011: “RS-24 deployment in Teykovo, Novosibirsk, and Kozelsk,” December 19, 2011. http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/12/rs-24_deployment_in_teykovo_no.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-1: “Mobile RS-24 to be deployed in Irkutsk,” November 15, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/11/mobile_rs-24_to_be_deployed_in.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-2: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs-24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Two RS-24 Yars regiments begin combat duty,” December 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/two_rs-24_yars_regiments_begin.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “RS-24 launch from Plesetsk,” December 26, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/rs-24_launch_from_plesetsk.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-2: “Some details about rail-mobile Barguzin,” December 26, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/some_details_about_rail-mobile.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-1: “Barguzin project refuses to die,” May 18, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/barguzin_project_refuses_to_di.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016-2: “RS-24 Yars is replacing Topol in Vypolzovo and elsewhere,” September 21, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/rs-24_yars_is_replacing_topol.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019,” January 19, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/flight_tests_of_barguzin_rail-.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Training launch of Yars ICBM from Plesetsk,” September 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/09/training_launch_of_yars_icbm_f.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-4: “Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again),” December 4, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_rail-mobile_icbm_is_c.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2013: “Russia Plans Rail-Mounted Missiles to Counter US Global Strike Program,” December 18, 2013. http://sputniknews.com/military/20131218/185683711.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| g) | ICBM Yars | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Ярс | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-24 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-27 Mod. 2 (silo) | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Silo | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 4 warheads | |||||||
| Yield： | 100kt? per 1 warhead | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | 250 | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Kozelsk Air Base : 12 missiles | |||||||
| Remarks： | Fixed silo types have been deployed by replacing the SS-19s at Kozelsk Air Base from 2014. There is also a plan to replace some of the SS-18s at Dombarovsky Air Base with silo-based missiles. The latest test launch was conducted on September 12, 2017. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed at the Kura test range on Kamchatka. While the objective was likely to validate ballistic stability and other technical characteristics, some reports claim that the test was also about “minibus” warheads targeting the U.S. missile defense. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “RS-24 Yars,” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.98–99. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2011: “RS-24 deployment in Teykovo, Novosibirsk, and Kozelsk,” December 19, 2011. http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/12/rs-24_deployment_in_teykovo_no.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-1: “RS-24 missiles to replace UR-100NUTTH in Kozelsk,” July 24, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/07/rs-24_missiles_to_replace_ur-1.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012-2: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs-24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “First two RS-24 Yars installed in silos in Kozelsk,” August 20, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/08/first_two_rs-24_yars_installed.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Test of silo-based RS-24 Yars from Plesetsk,” October 28, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/10/test_of_silo-based_rs-24_yars.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Test launch of Yars missile with “experimental warheads”,” September 12, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/09/test_launch_of_yars_missile_wi.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Yars launch in September tested parallel deployment of warheads,” October 4, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/yars_launch_in_september_teste.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2013: “Russia Test Fires New Yars Ballistic Missile,” December 24, 2013. http://sputniknews.com/military/20131224/185893612.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| h) | ICBM Sarmat | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Сармат | |||||||
| Alternate name： | RS-28 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | SS-X-30 Satan 2 | |||||||
| Propulsion： | Two-stage liquid propellant | |||||||
| Launch platform： | Silo | |||||||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 10 warheads ? | |||||||
| Yield： | 500kt per 1 warhead ? | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 36.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 200 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 11,000 km | |||||||
| Circular error probability： | ? | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Dombarovsky Air Base Uzhur Air Base |
|||||||
| Remarks： | In development as a replacement for the SS-18. The new model was slated for deployments from 2020 but this program is seen experiencing delays. Reportedly, they are to comprise an ordnance of 46 missiles for the Dombarovsky and Uzhur Air Bases: six each for six regiments plus ten for another regiment. In October 2016, the Russian developer of Sarmat released the photographs. Sarmat’s test launches commenced on December 27, 2017, and a second test, conducted either on March 28 or 29, 2018, had some public disclosure. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018: “Russia’s Strategic Rocket Force Tests Ejection of Deadly Sarmat Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/russias-strategic-rocket-force-tests-ejection-of-deadly-sarmat-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/(accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| The Missile Threat 2017: “SS-X-30 “Satan II” (RS-28 Sarmat),” 17 May 2017. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/ (accessed May 28,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Some new missile system to be deployed in Dombarovskiy,” December 18, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “Sarmat ICBM to be ready by 2020,” February 25, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/sarmat_icbm_to_be_ready_by_202.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Sarmat to be deployed in Uzhur and Dombarovskiy,” May 9, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/sarmat_to_be_deployed_in_uzhur.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Sarmat ejection test, at last,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/sarmat_ejection_test_at_last.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Second ejection test of Sarmat,” March 30, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/second_ejection_test_of_sarmat.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| TASS 2018: “Key facts about Russia’s advanced Sarmat ICBM system,” March 1, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/992360 (accessed May 28,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| i) | Submarine-launched ballistic missile R-29R | ||
| Russian designation： | Р-29Р | ||
| Alternate name： | RSM-50 | ||
| NATO designation： | SS-N-18 Mod. 1 Stingray | ||
| Propulsion： | Two-stage liquid propellant | ||
| Launch platform： | Project 667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delfin | ||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 3 warheads | ||
| Yield： | 50kt per 1 warhead | ||
| Specifications： | Length 14.1 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 35.3 ton | ||
| Range： | 6,500 km | ||
| Circular error probability： | 900 m | ||
| Remarks： | The latest test launch was conducted on October 26, 2017. Russian Strategic Missile Troops carried out a major exercise in which a Delta III nuclear submarine launched two Stingray missiles from the Sea of Okhotsk, which landed in the Chizha test range on the Kanin Peninsula. | ||
| 【Source】 | |||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.331. | |||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “R-29R Volna (SS-N-18 ‘Stingray’/RSM-50/3M40),” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, pp.89–91. | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2012: “Successful R-29R SLBM launch from the Sea of Okhotsk,” October 19, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/successful_r-29r_slbm_launch_f.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces,” October 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_large-scale_ex.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “Multiple missile launches during a command and control exercise,” May 8, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/multiple_missile_launches_duri.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Three ballistic missiles launched in one day,” October 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/three_ballistic_missiles_launc.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Annual exercise of strategic forces,” October 26, 2017 http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/annual_exercise_of_strategic_f.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| j) | SLBM R-29RMU Sineva | ||
| Russian designation： | Р-29РМУ Синева | ||
| Alternate name： | RSM-54 | ||
| NATO designation： | SS-N-23 Mod. 1 | ||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage liquid propellant | ||
| Launch platform： | Project 667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delfin | ||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 10 warheads (Minimum seems to be 4 warheads) | ||
| Yield： | 100kt per 1 warhead | ||
| Specifications： | Length 14.8 m, Diameter 1.9 m, Weight 40.3 ton | ||
| Range： | 8,300 km | ||
| Circular error probability： | 500 m | ||
| Remarks： | Sineva means “blue”. The latest test launch conducted on October 26, 2017. Russian Strategic Missile Troops carried out a major exercise in which a Delta IV nuclear submarine K117 Bryansk launched a Sineva missile from the Barents Sea, which landed in the Kura test range on Kamchatka. Russia has developed the R-29RMU2 Liner, which is an improvement over the R-29RMU Sineva, and the Russian Navy reportedly began receiving Liner ICBMs in 2014.The latest test launch was conducted on September 29, 2011. In reality, the Liner is a Sineva with reduced (i.e., four) warheads. | ||
| 【Source】 | |||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.336. | |||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “R-29RM Shetal/Sineva (RSM-54/3M27),” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, pp.88–89. | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2011: “Second test of the Liner SLBM – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces,” September 29, 2011. http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/09/second_test_of_the_liner_slbm.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces,” October 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_large-scale_ex.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2014-1: “Liner version of the R-29RM SLBM accepted for service,” April 2, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/04/liner_version_of_the_r-29rm_sl.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-2: “Multiple missile launches during a command and control exercise,” May 8, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/multiple_missile_launches_duri.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-3; “Sineva missile launched from Tula submarine,” November 5, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/11/sineva_missile_launched_from_t.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Three ballistic missiles launched in one day,” October 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/three_ballistic_missiles_launc.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Annual exercise of strategic forces,” October 26, 2017 http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/annual_exercise_of_strategic_f.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| RusNavy.com 2012: “Russia Finished Development of SLBM Liner,” February 24, 2012. http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=14406 (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| k) | SLBM R-30 Bulava | ||
| Russian designation： | Р-30 Булава | ||
| Alternate name： | RSM-56 | ||
| NATO designation： | SS-N-32 | ||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | ||
| Launch platform： | 955 class submarine (Borey) | ||
| No. of warheads： | Maximum 10 warheads (6 warheads seem to be carried.) | ||
| Yield： | 100kt? per 1 warhead | ||
| Specifications： | Length 12.1 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 36.8 ton | ||
| Range： | 8,300 km | ||
| Circular error probability： | 250–300 m | ||
| Remarks： |
Bulava means “cudgel”. Currently deployed on three Borei-class submarines. The last test launch was conducted on May 22, 2018, with the first vessel of this class, K-535 Yuriy Dolgorukiy, firing four Bulavas from the White Sea and striking the Kura test range on Kamchatka. To date, while there had been three consecutive launches of two missiles each, a quadruple salvo was unprecedented. 29-32 Bulavas are known to have been test-launched. The last test was conducted on June 26, 2017. |
||
| 【Source】 | |||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “Bulava (RSM-56),” Jane’s Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, p.79 | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Bulava production numbers; January 25, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/01/bulava_production_numbers.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-2; “Bulava launch from Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine,” October 29, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/10/bulava_launch_from_yuri_dolgor.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-3; “Missile deliveries in 2014 and plans for 2015,” December 19, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/missile_deliveries_in_2014.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015; “Alexander Nevskiy with missiles on board,” April 13, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/04/alexander_nevskiy_with_missile.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Success reported in salvo Bulava launch from Yuri Dolgorukiy,” September 27, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/success_reported_in_salvo_bula.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Four-missile salvo launch of Bulava from Yuri Dolgorukiy,” May 22, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/05/four-missile_salvo_launch_of_b.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| l) | 667BDR Strategic nuclear submarine Kalmar | ||
| Russian designation： | 667БДР “Кальмар” | ||
| NATO designation： | Delta III | ||
| No. of tubes： | 16 | ||
| SLBM： | Stingray (RSM-50) | ||
| Specifications： | Length 155 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,000 ton | ||
| Submerged speed： | 25knot（km/h46 km） | ||
| Where deployed： | Pacific Fleet base (Vilyuchinsk) | ||
| In service： | K-44 Ryazan | ||
| Remarks： | Deployment began in 1976, and 14 submarines were commissioned. Today the K-44 Ryazan, returned to service from long-term overhaul in February 2017, remains the only active submarine of this class. It was understood that Russia’s plan was to begin replacing three Delta III submarines in active commission with the new 955 Borei I class. Recently, the K-223 Podolsk and K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets were retired. | ||
| 【Source】 | |||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233. | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Three ballistic missiles launched in one day,” October 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/three_ballistic_missiles_launc.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Ryazan Project 667BDR submarine is back in service,” February 15, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/02/ryazan_project_667bdr_submarin.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Two Project 667BDR submarines withdrawn from service,” March 14, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| m) | 667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delfin | ||
| Russian designation： | 667БДРМ “Дельфин” | ||
| NATO designation： | Delta Ⅳ | ||
| Propulsion： | Three-stage solid-propellant | ||
| No. of tubes： | 16 | ||
| SLBM： | Sineva (RSM-54) | ||
| Specifications： | Length 167 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,600 ton | ||
| Submerged speed： | 22–23knot（km/h41–43 km） | ||
| Where deployed： | Northern Fleet base (Gadzhiyevo) | ||
| In service： | K-51 Verkhoturie K-84 Ekaterinburg K-114 Tula K-117 Bryansk K-18 Karelia K-407 Novomoskovsk |
||
| Remarks： | Deployments began in 1985, with seven constructed to date but the six listed above in service today. Four and five are regularly kept in operational deployment, with the remainder in overhaul. As of June 1, 2018, only K-117 Bryansk is believed to be in overhaul. Since 2013, the 667BDRM Kal’mar has participated in each annual maneuver and test-fired missiles. Currently, five 955A (Borei II) submarines, an improvement over the 955 Borei I class, are under construction, to replace the 667BDRM. |
||
| 【Source】 | |||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233 | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Annual exercise of strategic forces,” October 26, 2017 http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/annual_exercise_of_strategic_f.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Tula submarine completed overhaul,” December 28, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/tula_submarine_completed_overh.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017-4: “Bryansk begins overhaul,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/bryansk_begins_overhaul.shtml (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| n) | 955 Strategic nuclear submarine Borey | ||
| Russian designation： | Борей | ||
| NATO designation： | Borey | ||
| No. of tubes： | 16 | ||
| SLBM： | Bulava (RSM-56) | ||
| Specifications： | Length 170 m, Width 13.5 m, Displacement underwater 19,400 ton | ||
| Submerged speed： | 25 knot（km/h 46 km） | ||
| Where deployed： | Northern Fleet base (Gadzhiyevo) (1st and 3rd vessels) Pacific Fleet base (Vilyuchinsk) (2nd vessel) |
||
| In service： | K-535 Yuriy Dolgorukiy K-550 Alexsandr Nevskiy K-551 Vladimir Monomakh |
||
| Remarks： | Three 955 vessels are being built as the successor to the 667BDR type. The first vessel, the Yury Dolgorukiy was commissioned in January 2013, and the second, the Alexander Nevsky in December 2013. The third vessel, the Vladimir Monomakh was also commissioned in December 2014. All three vessels have successfully launched SLBM Bulavas. On the other hand, five 955A vessels are being built as substitutes for the 667BDRM type. Previously each vessel was reported to have 20 missiles, but now the general view is that there are 16. The first vessel, Knyaz Vladimir, was launched in November 2017 and expected to be commissioned in 2018. The second vessel, Knyaz Oleg and the third Generalissimus Suvorov, will be completed in 2018-19. The fourth vessel, Imperator Aleksandr III, is expected to be commissioned in 2019. The construction of the fifth vessel, Knyaz Pozharskiy, started on December 23, 2016. It is due for commission in 2020. All these plans will likely be delayed. In addition, Russia, in reaction to the U.S. building twelve new nuclear submarines, is planning to launch four more Borei-class nuclear submarines. | ||
| 【Source】 | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, pp.185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-1: “Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine officially accepted for service,” January 10, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/01/yuri_dolgorukiy_submarine_offi.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-2: “Project 955A submarines to carry 16 missiles,” February 21, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/02/project_955a_submarines_to_car.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2013-3: “Aleksandr Nevskiy submarine joined the Pacific Fleet,” December 23, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/aleksandr_nevskiy_submarine_jo.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Ekaterinburg and Vladimir Monomakh join the fleet,” December 19, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/ekaterinburg_and_vladimir_mono.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2014-2: “Sixth Project 955 Borey submarine laid down,” December 26, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/sixth_project_955_borey_submar.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015-1: “Alexander Nevskiy arrived in Kamchatka,” September 30, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/09/alexander_nevskiy_arrived_in_k.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015-2: “Seventh Project 955 Borey submarine laid down,” December 18, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/12/seventh_project_955_borey_subm.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2016: “The eighth Project 955 Borey submarine laid down at Sevmash,” December 23, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/12/the_eighth_project_955_sub.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic fleet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Sputnik News 2014: “Russia to Begin Building 9 Submarines by Next Year,” February 7, 2014. http://sputniknews.com/military/20140207/187297952.html (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| TASS 2014: “Russia’s Sevmash shipyard lays down 5th Borei-class nuclear sub – Knyaz Oleg,” July 27, 2014. http://tass.com/russia/742472 (accessed June 11,2018) | |||
| Tass 2017-1: “Russia starts development of Borei-B nuclear-powered submarines,” November 7, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/974454 (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Tass 2017-2: “Russian Navy to receive improved Borei-class strategic submarine in 2026 — source,” December 25, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/982864 (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| Tass 2018: “Russian Navy to get improved Borei-class nuclear submarine in 2019,” April 25, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/1001781 (accessed May 26,2018) | |||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||
| o) | Cruise missile Kh-55 | |||||||
| Russian designation： | X-55 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | AS-15A Kent A | |||||||
| Carried by： | Tu-95MS（NATO reporting name：Bear H） | |||||||
| Yield： | 200kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 8.09 m, Diameter 0.51 m, Weight 1.7 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 2,500 km | |||||||
| Remarks： | The Tu-95MS6 carries six missiles internally, and the 95MS16 can carry a further 10 missiles underneath the wings. The sea-launched variant of these missiles is the non-strategic nuclear RK-55 (SS-N-21). The much stealthier (250 kT) Kh-102 is in development to replace the Kh-55. The conventional Kh-101 warhead is already in deployment and saw action for the first time on November 17, 2015, when Tupolev Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers in Syria fired the missile in an air raid. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.365. | ||||||||
| FAS 2013: “AS-15 KENT – Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/as-15.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-1: “Kh-55 (AＳ-15 ‘Kent’/Kh-555/RKV-500/Kh-65)”, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.184–186. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-2: “Kh-101/-102 “, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.189–190. | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 360 2015: “Russia launches long-range air sorties into Syria,” 18 November 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/56062/russia-launches-long-range-air-sorties-into-syria (accessed June 10,2016) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers used in Syria strikes,” November 17, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/11/tu-95ms_and_tu-160_strategic_b.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2012: “Russian Air Force to Get New Cruise Missile in 2013,” September 26, 2012. http://sputniknews.com/military/20120926/176233341.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| p) | Cruise missile Kh-55SM | |||||||
| Russian designation： | X-55CM | |||||||
| NATO designation： | AS-15B Kent B | |||||||
| Carried by： | Tu-160（NATO designation：Blackjack） | |||||||
| Yield： | 200kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 8.09 m, Diameter 0.77 m, Weight 1.7 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 3,000 km | |||||||
| Remarks： | The Tu-160 carries 12 missiles. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.365. | ||||||||
| FAS 2013: “AS-15 KENT – Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/as-15.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “Kh-55 (AＳ-15 ‘Kent’/Kh-555/RKV-500/Kh-65)”, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.184–186. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| q) | Short range attack missile Kh-15 | |||||||
| Russian designation： | X-15 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | AS-16 Kickback | |||||||
| Carried by： | Tu-160（NATO designation：Blackjack） | |||||||
| Yield： | 350kt | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 4.78 m, Diameter 0.46 m, Weight 1.2 ton | |||||||
| Range： | 150 km | |||||||
| Remarks： | The Tu-160 can carry 24 missiles, but the Kh-15 is reported to have been retired. Podvig does not count it as part of strategic nuclear forces. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.365. | ||||||||
| FAS: “Raduga Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback),” http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/as-16.htm (accessed July 10,2013) | ||||||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015: “Kh-15 (As-16 ‘Kickback’/RKV-15)”, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.177–178. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012. https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| r) | Strategic bomber Tu-95 MS6/-16 | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Туполев Ту–95MC6/-16 | |||||||
| NATO designation： | Bear H6/16 | |||||||
| Nuclear weapon： | Air launch cruise missile Kh-55. The Tu-95 MS6 can carry six missiles internally. In addition, the 95 MS16 can carry a further 10 missiles underneath the wings for a total of 16 (however, its flight range drops commensurately)。 | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 49.5 m, Span 51.1 m (Propeller aircraft) | |||||||
| Max. speed： | 830 km/h | |||||||
| Range： | 10,500 m | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Ukrainka Air Base and Engels Air Base | |||||||
| Remarks： | On May 8, 2014 and October 30, 2013, Russian Strategic Missile Troops carried out a major exercise in which a Bear H launched six cruise missiles at land-based targets representing military facilities in enemy territory. Russia is planning to deploy a new aircraft to replace the current strategic bomber from 2020. At the same time, the Tu-95MS is being modernized. In November 2015, the Russian Air Force began to receive Tu-95MSMs, with improved combat and radar and target-acquiring/radionavigation capabilities. The new Tupolev bomber is capable of carrying up to eight of the newest long-range cruise missiles, Kh-101 (conventional) or Kh-102 (250 kT nuclear, still in development). The bomber will remain in service until 2025. On November 17, 2016, the Tu-95MSM saw its first combat in Syria, launching Kh-101s in an air strike. | |||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.382. | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2012: “Modernization of Tu-95MS bombers,” September 20, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/09/modernization_of_tu-95ms_bombe.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2013: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces,” October 30, 3013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_large-scale_ex.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014: “Tupolev design bureau to work on new strategic bomber,” February 18, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/tupolev_design_bureau_to_work.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2012: “Russia Looking at 2020 for New Generation Long-Range Bomber,” July 2, 2012. http://sputniknews.com/military/20120702/174358197.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2014: “Russian Tu-95 Bear Bomber Launches Cruise Missiles During Drills,” May 8, 2014. http://sputniknews.com/military/20140508/189674387.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2015: “Russia’s Tu-95 Bomber Upgraded to Carry New Nuclear-Tipped Missiles,” November 21, 2015. http://sputniknews.com/military/20151121/1030508547/tu-95-bomber-upgrade.html (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| TASS 2016: “Russia’s Tupolev-95MSM bomber delivers first-ever strike on mission to Syria,” November 17, 2016. http://tass.com/defense/913163 (accessed June 1,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| s) | Strategic bomber Tu-160/M | |||||||
| Russian designation： | Туполев Ту-160 ‘Белый лебедь’ | |||||||
| NATO designation： | Blackjack | |||||||
| Nuclear weapon： | It carries 12 air-launched Kh-55SM cruise missiles, or 24 short-range Kh-15 attack missile gravity bombs. | |||||||
| Specifications： | Length 54.1 m, Span 55.7–35.6 m | |||||||
| Max. speed： | 2,200 km/h | |||||||
| Range： | 14,000 km | |||||||
| Where deployed： | Ukrainka Air Base | |||||||
| Remarks： | The Russian nickname is the White Swan (Belyy Lebed). In the mid-2000s, Russia began to modernize about a dozen Tu-160s in its bomber fleet. Phase one modifications upgraded the bomber’s fire power by enabling it to carry two new long-range cruise missiles, the Kh-101 (conventional warhead) and the Kh-102 (nuclear warhead). Currently, phase two modifications are under way, swapping most of its electronics and improving its radionavigation system, and due for completion by 2019. The modified Tu-160M had its first test flight in November 2014. From 2023, Russia is set to produce the Tu-160M2, a variant equivalent to the Tu-160M modification. This series is reported to number 50 planes at a minimum. The new Tupolev’s maiden flight was on January 25, 2018. On the same date, the Russian Air Force placed its purchase order for the first ten Tu-160M2s. PSC Tupolev is set to manufacture Russia’s proposed next-generation stealth strategic bomber: Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Dal’ney Aviatsii (PAK DA) or “”prospective aviation complex for long-range aviation.”” This first flight is projected for 2021. This new product is expected to replace Tu-160s, Tu-95MSs and Tu-22M3s. |
|||||||
| 【Source】 | ||||||||
| Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.397. | ||||||||
| Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018: “Russia Orders First 10 Upgraded Supersonic Nuclear-Capable Bombers,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/russia-orders-first-10-upgraded-supersonic-nuclear-capable-bombers/ (accessed February 2,2018) | ||||||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2018-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 185–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912. (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Tupolev design bureau to work on new strategic bomber,” February 18, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/tupolev_design_bureau_to_work.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Paval 2014-2: “Plans for the new strategic bomber,” May 22, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/plans_for_the_new_strategic_bo.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015-1: “Tu-160 bombers to undergo another round of modernization by 2019,” May 27, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/05/tu-160_bombers_to_undergo_anot.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2015-2: “Russia wants to build 50 new Tu-160 bombers,” May 28, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/05/russia_wants_to_build_50_new_t.shtml (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 26,2018) | ||||||||
| RUSSIAN AVIATION 2014: “The upgraded Tu-160 performed its first flight,” November 27, 2014. http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2014/11/27/2767/ (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2012-1: “Russia to Upgrade Over 10 Tu-160 Bombers by 2020,” February 7, 2012. https://sputniknews.com/military/20120207171200584/ (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2012-2: “Russia Looking at 2020 for New Generation Long-Range Bomber,” July 2, 2012. https://sputniknews.com/military/20120702174358197/ (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| Sputnik News 2015: “Russia to Produce Successor of Tu-160 Strategic Bomber After 2023,” June 4, 2015. https://sputniknews.com/military/201506041022954769/ (accessed June 11,2018) | ||||||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | ||||||||
| t) | Ground-based non-strategic nuclear weapons | ||||
| Russian designation（NATO designation） | Yield (kt) |
Range (km) |
Launch platform | ||
| Anti-ballistic missile | |||||
| 53T6 (Gazelle) | 10 | 80 | Silo | ||
| Air defense missile | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S-300P (SA-10/20) | ? | 200/400 | Transporter erector launcher | ||
| S-300V (SA-12) | ? | 100 | Transporter erector launcher | ||
| Coastal defense missile | |||||
| Redut (SSC-1B) | 350 | 500 | Transporter erector launcher | ||
| Short-range ballistic missile | |||||
| Tochka/-U (SS-21) | 10 or 100 | 70/120 | Transporter erector launcher | ||
| Iskander (SS-26) | ? | 300 | Transporter erector launcher | ||
| 【Source】 | |||||
| FAS: “S-300PMU SA-10 GRUMBLE,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “S-400 SA-20 Triumf,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-400.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “S-300V SA-12A GLADIATOR and SA-12B GIANT,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300v.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “Iskander / SS-26,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-26.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-1: “A-30 (SH-08 ‘Gazelle’),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.261–262. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-2: “Iskander 9M720/9M723 Tender,” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.80–82. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-3: “OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 ‘Scrab’/97M79),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.82–85. | |||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,”; Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012. https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||||
| u) | Sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons | ||||
| Russian designation（NATO designation） | Yield (kt) |
Range (km) |
Launch platform | ||
| Anti‐ship cruise missile | |||||
| P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9) | 200 | 110 | Corvette | ||
| P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12) | 350 | 550 | Cruiser | ||
| P-700 Granit (SS-N-19) | 500 | 625 | Nuclear submarine、Aircraft carrier、Cruiser | ||
| Kh-41 Moskit (SS-N-22) | 200 | 250 | Destroyer、Corvette | ||
| Land-attack cruise missile | |||||
| RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21) | 200 | 2,400 | Nuclear submarine | ||
| Anti-submarine rocket | |||||
| RPK-2 Vyuga (SS-N-15) | 200 | 35 | Nuclear submarine、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc. | ||
| RPK-6 Vodopad (SS-N-16) | 200 | 50 | Nuclear submarine、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc. | ||
| Torpedo | Nuclear submarine | ||||
| Depth charge | Aircraft carrier、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc. | ||||
| 【Source】 | |||||
| FAS: “SS-N-9 Siren,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-n-9.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “SS-N-12 Sandbox,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-n-12.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “P-700 3M-45 Granat SS-N-19 SHIPWRECK,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-n-19.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “Moskit / SS-N-22 Sunburn,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-n-9.htm (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| FAS: “SS-N-15 Starfish,” http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/ss-n-15.htm (accessed July 10,2013) | |||||
| FAS: “SS-N-16 Stallion,” http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/ss-n-16.htm (accessed July 10,2013) | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-1: “P-50/-120 (SS-N-9 ‘Siren’/4K85 Malaxit),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, p.196. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-2: “P-80/-270 Zubr/Moskit (SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’/3M-80/3M82),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.197–198. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-3: “P-500 (4K80 Basalt),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.198–199. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-4: “P-700 (3M45),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.199–200. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-5: “RK-55 Granat (3M410),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.200–201. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-6: “RPK-2 (81R Vyuga/90RU Tsakra),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.235–236. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-7: “RP-6/-7,” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.236–237. | |||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012. https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| Sutyagin, Igor 2012: “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Royal United Services Institute, November 2012. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||||
| v) | Air-carried non-strategic nuclear weapons | ||||
| Russian designation（NATO designation） | Yield (kt) |
Range (km) |
Launch platform | ||
| Cruise missile | |||||
| Kh-22 Burya (AS-4) | 200 | 310 | Medium-range bomber | ||
| Short range attack missile | |||||
| Kh-15 (AS-16) | 350 | 150 | Medium-range bomber | ||
| Unguided bomb | 20–1,000 | Medium-range bomber、Fighter-bomber | |||
| 【Source】 | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-1: “Kh-15 (As-16 ‘Kickback’/RKV-15),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.177–178. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-2: “Kh-22 (AS-4 ‘Kitchen’/Burya),” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.178–179. | |||||
| IHS Jane’s 2015-3: “Russian Federation/Nuclear bombs,” IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.225–226. | |||||
| Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012. https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 11,2018) | |||||
| →Return to Russian nuclear weapons | |||||
