Workshop Report

Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ Workshop I
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Summary Report
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ: Workshop I
Nagasaki University, December 7-8, 2012

§ Preface
The following is a summary report of the First Workshop “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ,” which was held at Nagasaki University, on December 7-8, 2012. It was cosponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Nagasaki University, PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC) and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University, Hanshin University, ROK and Fudan University, PRC.

This is not a time-sequential report of the workshop, but a substantive summary meant to serve as basic reference material for future workshops on the same theme that are planned by the same organizers as the First Workshop. While the discussion that emerged in the workshop bore abundant suggestions and implications, it was sometimes not well-focused on the theme of the workshop as a whole and each session. Therefore, in this summary report, we translate those suggestions and implications into language that is consistent with the objectives of the workshop and each session. Also, after the Workshop, the DPRK conducted an additional satellite launch on Dec. 12, 2012 and a third underground nuclear test on Feb. 12, 2013 and therefore, this report includes some follow-up comments responsive to such developments when appropriate. In these respects, the report constitutes neither an agreed upon statement of the participants nor of the co-sponsoring organizations. Responsibility for the contents is entirely attributable to the RECNA.

§ Basic Understanding of the Halperin Proposal on “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”
The Halperin proposal on a comprehensive agreement on peace and security (simply “Agreement” hereafter) is built on the basic recognition that: (1) The DPRK, or North Korea, as a de facto nuclear weapons power, is not acceptable considering the seeming inevitability that such a status would result in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, overtly or covertly, by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), which will, in turn, has serious negative implications to the global non-proliferation regime. (2) Thus, a distinct presence of the denial force, including international efforts to denuclearize the DPRK peacefully, must continue to remain robust. (3) Past efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are locked in a stalemate, and it is imperative to initiate a new effort that is designed so as not to drag the past. (4) To break the stalemate, a comprehensive agreement on peace and security in the region should be developed. The Agreement must make it possible to draw an end picture of a nuclear weapon-free NEA that will solve the pending issues and will be acceptable to all the parties concerned, including the DPRK and the U.S. and its allies. (5) In order to urge consideration by the DPRK, it is recommended that the Agreement be legally binding. (6) The prior consultation process among parties other than the DPRK is important and needs careful deliberations before the draft Agreement is officially proposed to the DPRK. (7) The method of entry into force of the Agreement, e.g. the EIF sequence among elements of the Agreement and possible measures for conditional accession to appease mutual distrust, also need careful deliberation. (8) To assist in-depth discussions, it is recommended that drafting of the Agreement commence.

The Halperin proposal for a comprehensive agreement includes the following six elements:
1. Termination of the state of Korean War
Recently, this point has been stressed by the DPRK. This element of the Agreement should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by the ROK, and perhaps by other state parties involved in the war. (cf: A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued late January 2013, interpreted as an advance pretext prior to its third nuclear test, states, “the DPRK drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged...There can be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula.” So the window of the dialogue is still open in this regard.)

2. Creation of a permanent council on security
The Agreement should create a permanent council and organization to monitor and enforce its provisions, including verification of the implementation of the NWFZ to be established as the 6th element of the Agreement. While the scope of the council’s role should be limited to the objectives to enforce the Agreement in the initial period, it could be left open as to whether the council might also become a forum to deal with general security problems in the region in the future. Countries other than the parties of the Six Party Talks will be invited to join the council, including France, UK, Canada and Mongolia.

3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent
This has been a key objective of the DPRK when it negotiated with the US. Considering the impact of the history of dictatorships in Iraq and Libya on the DPRK, we need means to make such a commitment credible by the provisions of the Agreement.

4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy
It should be affirmed that all parties to the treaty have the equal right to access necessary sources of any kind of energy. Any limitations on the DPRK need to apply equally to other non-nuclear states party to the agreement, especially the ROK and Japan. The DPRK will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized through some agreed mechanism.

5. Termination of sanctions
The parties to the Agreement will need to commit not to impose sanctions on any other party to the Agreement based on its nuclear programs as long as it fully adheres to the treaty. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state which violates its commitments under the Agreement. Each party to the treaty will have to consider its national law in relation to imposing sanctions based on other reasons.

6. Nuclear weapons free zone
The Agreement would contain a chapter which would create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). The principle idea of the NEA-NWFZ is as follows: The ROK, Japan and the DPRK (and possibly other states including Mongolia and Canada) would commit themselves not to manufacture, test (for any purpose) or acquire nuclear weapons, nor to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory. These non-nuclear states will re-join or remain parties of the NPT. The US, the PRC and Russia, as well as the UK and France, would agree to abide by the provisions of the treaty. They would agree not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state that was observing the terms of the Agreement.

§ General Assessment of the Situation of the DPRK
As a basis for discussion at the workshop, Peter Hayes provided an overview of the current situation in the DPRK. His main points are as follows: The DPRK leadership under young Kim Jong-Un is stable and more vigorous than it was under Kim Jong-II, while containing uncertainty due to his inexperience and lack of a personal political basis for his power. The DPRK economy is trapped by poverty and will remain so as long as it sticks to its nuclear irrationality. It will take huge reconstruction funding to overcome its economic problems.

The DPRK’s nuclear arms are considered to be primarily political, not military, in nature. Its nuclear threat is designed to coerce, not to deter. Furthermore its nuclear arms have neither credible warheads nor delivery systems. The DPRK’s violent rhetoric of nuclear threat against ROK, Japan and US are likely to be illegal and constitute nuclear aggression under international law. The reality of this situation has to be heard by DPRK leadership.
Deterrence arguments involving NEA have to be discussed from many angles. In relation to the DPRK, it has a strong and credible deterrence without nuclear weapons, in spite of its lack of self-awareness of this point. Its conventional forces are inferior and nondurable, but still can inflict serious casualties and damage to the ROK and the US, sufficient to deter their waging major wars against it. On the other hand, the DPRK nuclear deterrence will not be credible for years to come, and also will provide no military benefit to the KPA (Korean Peoples Army), considering the war fighting after the deterrence fails. Nuclear weapons require major resources to deploy, complicate military command and control, and constitute a distraction from the KPA’s major military mission. The DPRK’s conventional forces have also manifested their own characteristics during their recent conventional provocations that they seem to be deterred from escalating beyond a certain level of violence.

US extended deterrence will be sufficiently strong and credible with conventional forces only, operated by the US and its allies’ combined forces. The US extended nuclear deterrence to Japan, ROK and Taiwan is weak, regressive and not credible. Considering with any attack against the DPRK by means of nuclear ballistic missiles, we see the problem of over-flight over the territory of Russia or China. The only realistic means of nuclear delivery will be bombers, but nuclear bombing will have serious collateral effects to be avoided in a battle field like the Korean Peninsula.

In his in-depth and updated discussions on the nuclear issues in Northeast Asia, Peter Hayes refutes conventional arguments and myths regarding nuclear deterrence and the DPRK nuclear capabilities.

§ Necessity of Sustained Efforts and Comprehensive Strategy
In the workshop, there was general agreement that the emergence of a nuclear armed DPRK as a fait accompli should not be allowed and efforts toward a nuclear weapons free Northeast Asia should be sustained. Halperin stated, “The costs of accepting a DPRK operational nuclear capability are very high and we should not accept this outcome without at least one more sustained effort to find a solution.” In the Hayes speech, he said, “The US and the regional states cannot and should never accommodate a nuclear-armed DPRK, as some have argued.”

For many of the Japanese participants, especially those from Nagasaki, the denuclearization of the region is a natural requirement because the NEA is tied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragic history and a third nuclear weapon use in this region should be avoided by all means. However, a participant raised the problem of weakness or absence of feasibility considerations in the past studies of the NEA-NWFZ. This is exactly why a comprehensive strategy is now the theme of the workshop. While there were mixed assessments among participants on what the Six Party Talks had attained or would attain, many seemed to agree that the “DPRK’s verifiable denuclearization first” approach would not work anymore. The RECNA expressed that no doubt a new approach was necessary to break the stalemate regarding the nuclear problems in NEA and that the Halperin proposal on a Comprehensive Agreement provides a sound starting point of the future strategy for us to move in the right direction.

It is noted that there was some confusion among participants in understanding the concept of “comprehensiveness”. Obviously there are many international security issues to be solved in this region, such as territorial disputes, historical issues caused by past Japanese invasion and colonial rule, abduction issues highlighted in Japan, and ongoing military operations. These are all important, as well as substantial in nature, and might be raised in the future negotiation process for an Agreement that we are discussing. However, as was pointed out in the workshop discussion, it should be clear that our ‘comprehensiveness’ is a very limited concept and doesn’t mean to be all inclusive, so that the strategy may be practical and robust. ‘Comprehensiveness’ here should be focused specifically on our concern as to how a nuclear weapon free NEA will be realized. In this respect, an Agreement should be as simple as possible, at least at the outset, although there is no reason not to keep the door open for future possible expansion.

The importance of the sustained efforts was also emphasized from the viewpoint of confidence building among nations. Kazumi Mizumoto from the Hiroshima Peace Institute said, “(W)e have
to find a concrete solution in order to avoid a catastrophic result, which might actually occur if the situation becomes worse due to the escalation of current hostilities among the nations in this region. To keep proposing the idea of a NEA-NWFZ does function as a mechanism of confidence-building in NEA, and we need to think out a creative approach to change the atmosphere from the deadlock to trust and cooperation.

§ Relation to Global Efforts for Nuclear Disarmament

It was also clear that the emergence of a new nuclear weapon holder in NEA would undermine global efforts for a nuclear weapon free world, the renewed vigor of which had risen worldwide since 2007, and were later supported by Barak Obama’s Administration in the US. In the workshop and following public symposium, there were many arguments from the global nuclear disarmament perspective.

Randy Rydell from UN Office of Disarmament Affairs noted in his speech that, “All the NWFZ treaties associate their respective zones with global disarmament. Thus these zones are far more significant than just a measure to strengthen regional peace and security. They have also helped to de-legitimize nuclear weapons per se, rather than just their spread, testing, or use.” Also he added, “(W)hile the cumulative establishment of regional zones will not alone suffice to produce a world free of nuclear weapons, this is in fact their common larger goal. To this extent, the zones represent one of the best examples today of how multilateral anti-nuclear-weapon norms are taking root at the regional and local levels.”

In relation to the NEA-NWFZ, Mizumoto noted that such a zone would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the security policy of Japan and the ROK, and Japan’s global initiative for nuclear disarmament will gain more credibility, saying, “Under the NEA-NWFZ with a denuclearized DPRK, the negative security assurance provided by China and Russia, and no hostile intent, the US (extended) nuclear deterrence will no longer be a “vital element,” (and) Japan will be able to terminate the (nuclear umbrella) policy and be given more credibility for its non-nuclear policy and disarmament initiative.”

Not only the establishment of a NWFZ enhances global disarmament efforts, but also the other way around can happen, namely the vigor of such global efforts increases pressure on non-nuclear countries to adopt a policy toward a NWFZ. Examples were shown by Hiromichi Umebayashi from RECNA with regard to Japan, and examples that are relevant to the ROK as well. One example occurred in relation to the joint statement on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, set forth by Norway, Switzerland etc. at the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in April 2012 as well as at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2012. Japan, which, according to its own statement, knows more than any other countries about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, did not join in the statement because the statement conflicts with its national security policy which relies upon US extended nuclear deterrence. Strong public protests occurred against the government’s refusal to join in the statement, which added pressure to the policy review by the Japanese administration.

Another example demonstrates that the logic advanced in global nuclear disarmament forums has reached a level that may restrict non-nuclear countries that rely upon extended nuclear deterrence, thus it works in favor of pursuing possible establishment of a new NWFZ. The NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), a ten-nation group initiated by Japan and Australia, presented a working paper entitled, “Transparency of Nuclear Weapons” at the 2012 NPT PrepCom as an effort to implement the action plan for nuclear disarmament, unanimously adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In this working paper, they develop a standard report form to be used by nuclear weapon states (NWS) in order to secure progressive nuclear disarmament in a transparent manner. In the standard form they propose, a NWS has to report on “the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” The NPDI requests its rapid implementation by encouraging NWS to start reporting in 2013 PrepCom. Obviously this request should be directed not only to NWS, but also to states adopting security policy involving extended nuclear deterrence like Japan, Germany, Netherland and Canada, all members of the NPDI. The establishment of a NWFZ is a typical
means toward a security arrangement to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons regionally.

Such inter-relationship between global and regional nuclear disarmament policies was referred to by Rydell as follows: “with respect to these (NWF) zones, nuclear weapons politics is operating on both local and global dimensions.”

§ Creative Ideas and discussions for a NEA-NWFZ

The most productive aspect of the Nagasaki workshop was seen in the ideas developed regarding the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, the sixth element of the Agreement proposed by Halperin. An obvious question to be addressed is how a NWFZ treaty can deal with a state already armed with nuclear weapons like the DPRK.

Hayes proposed an innovative idea as to how a NEA-NWFZ treaty can embrace the DPRK as a full party to the treaty from the outset. According to his presentation based on a paper by three authors from the Nautilus Institute including himself, “The DPRK can be admitted at the outset as a full party, but also can be provided time to comply fully, which could not happen in less than two years, and might take as long as a decade to complete. During this time, nuclear weapons states can calibrate the degree to which their legally binding guarantee of non-attack using nuclear weapons to the extent that the DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapons, and reverted to non-nuclear weapons state status in compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as fulfilling the requirements to establish confidence that it has not only dismantled its weapons, but abandoned fully its aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons and to become a nuclear-weapons state. In turn, the other non-nuclear weapons states whose territory is covered by a NEA-NWFZ can waive the clause in the standard treaty text whereby the treaty comes into force only when all states have ratified and come into compliance, thereby entering it into force only on their own territory.” As Hayes refers, this waiver arrangement draws on the precedent of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

The idea is also accompanied by an additional innovative clause to be applied to non-nuclear weapon states, which says to the effect that, “Non-nuclear states such as South Korea and Japan could pull out of the treaty after five years if the North had not dismantled its nuclear programs.”

The calibration by nuclear weapons state regarding their security assurances in proportion to the DPRK’s implementation of its non-nuclear commitments, and the scenario to allow ROK and Japan to withdraw, will have various ramifications and need more articulation, especially in relation to the verification system to be provided in the treaty. However, as Hayes said, they are considered to be technically surmountable. Halperin also discussed these issues in his speech and provided other ideas, including a treaty provision that gives the ROK and Japan more flexibility when they consider withdrawal due to the slow progress of the DPRK’s compliance with the treaty’s non-nuclear obligations.

A Japanese participant raised a question about the possibility that China’s intermediate/medium range nuclear missiles might be pulled back by a certain distance from the border line of the NEA-NWFZ. The implication of the question was to meet the perception existing in the Government of Japan that a NEA-NWFZ should mitigate the nuclear threat from China by means of physical measures. To this question, there was a positive personal response from a Chinese participant. Theoretically the concept will have to be applied to all the relevant nuclear weapon states in a NEA-NWFZ. This concept has been known as the “thinning-out” in the NWFZ studies. The idea of “thinning-out” was introduced in the context of the Nordic NWFZ in 1970s to withdraw Soviet nuclear weapons from areas close to Finland’s eastern border and the Baltic Sea coast. (cf. Jan Praviz) We will need more studies on the merits, if any, and feasibility of the concept in relation to the specific situation of a NEA-NWFZ, but it seems worth further research on this subject.

A question was raised regarding whether a NWFZ should be composed of contiguous territorial areas because the Halperin concept involves countries which are geographically separated. It was noted that all the precedents of the existing NWFZs are made up of contiguous territories or
territories not intervened by other countries excluded from the Zone. However, there seemed to be a shared understanding among participants in the workshop that there is no general rule or official documents to require a NWFZ to be as such. It is also noteworthy that a Comprehensive Agreement itself is not a NWFZ treaty, but embraces chapters other than a NWFZ.

In the workshop, an explanation was given regarding the outline of a NEA-NWFZ treaty drafted by the “PNND (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Japan Working Team to Promote a NEA-NWFZ”. Although the draft outline doesn’t reflect the updated situation in the region, it has some provisions unique to the NEA region, including one relevant to Japan and the two Koreas. It is the nuclear disarmament education obligation, such as the transmission to present and future generations of the stories of the damage, short term and long term, inflicted on the citizens and cities by the atomic bombs dropped in 1945.

§ Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) and NWFZ

One of the constant themes at the workshop was the relationship of extended nuclear deterrence to a NWFZ as already seen above.

Alyn Ware noted that the UN principles on establishing NWFZs (outlined in the UN Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999) indicate that, “A nuclear-weapon-free zone should provide for the effective prohibition of the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing or transporting by the States parties to the treaty of any type of nuclear explosive device for any purpose, and should stipulate that States parties to the treaty do not permit the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices by any other State within the zone.” However, according to the principles, a NWFZ does not necessarily proscribe participation by States Parties in security arrangements involving extended nuclear deterrence.

He discussed the case of the South Pacific NWFZ in which Australia is a Party, yet maintains its policy to depend on END of the US. Ware pointed out that, Australia would not have joined the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SP-NFZ) Treaty if it had been required to abandon its END policy. Thus, the SP-NFZ, in order to include Australia, does not proscribe END. Although SP-NFZ could be criticized as being a weak prohibition (allowing for END) the effect on Australia of being a member of SP-NFZ may have been positive. Australia’s 1986 implementing legislation for SP-NFZ is quite strong banning not only manufacturing and possession but also research and development of nuclear weapons. Since then Australia has taken a stronger international stand against nuclear weapons including in its arguments to the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion that threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal and has shown leadership in organizing the International Commission such as Canberra Commission and ICNND (International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament). However, on the negative side, Ware said, it has allowed continued port visits of the US nuclear capable ships and maintained a lukewarm position in the ICJ follow-up resolution at the UN General Assembly calling for negotiations on a convention to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons (unlike other SP-NFZ members who co-sponsor or vote in favor).

While there was agreement in acknowledging some value of the flexible attitude in formulating a NWFZ, two further points were noted in the discussions at the workshop regarding the flexibility on END. One is an obvious legal argument. In a NEA-NWFZ treaty, which is a legally binding international treaty, there will be no need of END for non-nuclear state parties as long as the treaty is in effect and fully observed by all the state parties because there is no nuclear threat to be deterred because of the provision of negative security assurances. The other point is that efforts to dispel the illusion or myth of protection afforded by END will have to be continued. In doing this, a precaution will be necessary because such criticism on the credibility of END protection tends to invite the argument for requesting the US more stringent military procedures to ensure the implementation of the END.

§ Other Elements of a Comprehensive Agreement

The issue of missile control in NEA was discussed as a potential additional element to be included in a comprehensive agreement. There were very productive discussions. It became clear that the actual concern of missiles was related to the process by which to lift the sanction on the DPRK by
the UN Security Council resolutions and that a general regional missile control per se was not an issue in this regard. It is, in fact, a part of Halperin’s fifth element of the Agreement. Since the UNSC resolution prohibits any launch conducted by the DPRK using ballistic missile technology, it will be necessary to discuss when and under what conditions this sanction is to be lifted.

A view was expressed that, once the nuclear issue is solved, missiles would not be a serious problem. This means that, at least in the NEA regional context, we can focus on solving nuclear issues and that the sanction in relation to nuclear and ballistic missile issues can be dealt with as a single set of issues. In this respect, as was discussed in the workshop, the way the DPRK ballistic missile launches are reported in the media in Japan and the ROK is confusing and misleading and needs to be corrected. This confusion comes partly from the text of the UNSC resolution itself, thus prudent handling of it will be requested with the parties concerned in drafting and operating the Agreement. As for verification of the peaceful launch of rockets, it was noted that there has been a variety of research on this topic in the past and that the distinction between military and peaceful test launches is considered to be technically possible and will not become a major problem.

How to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle in NEA is undoubtedly one of the complex issues to be discussed in the Agreement. It is related to energy security needs, and thus, the energy assistance needs, of the DPRK, and to the scope of obligations on non-nuclear states of a NEA-NWFZ. The discussions on this issue in the workshop were again very productive and we obtained a reasonable common basis for future studies. The current disparity, in which only Japan enjoys the right of reprocessing and enrichment, is an unhappy prerequisite, but we will have to start from this point. The real question is in which direction to move. It will take some time to develop an agreed upon direction among the parties concerned; therefore, it will be wise to note that the treaty outline developed by the PNND Japan Working Team suggests that a NWFZ treaty stipulate the establishment of a Planning Mechanism for Future Energy Cooperation with a strict, credible mandate and leave the issue to the future process. As was noted in the workshop, the Fukushima disaster and Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy to follow should and will have critical bearing on that future process.

A seemingly common view shared in the workshop was that the stockpiling of plutonium by Japan should have a moratorium or be terminated as soon as possible. A reason for it raised in the session was that it would also lead Japan to develop the dry-cask storage of the spent nuclear fuels, a safer method than current pool storage. Internationalization or regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also discussed in the workshop, but there was a mixed view on the issue. It was pointed out that the politics behind the scene of such arguments in Japan is that those who want continuation of nuclear power plants are apt to discuss internationalization, but without putting forth any specific plans for Japan to undertake. There was clarification regarding the argument that the pursuit of a NWFZ is deeply related to the issue of reprocessing spent fuels, but the pursuit of a NWFZ is not a policy to prohibit nuclear power plants.

§ Players and Forums for Future Efforts
Shared concerns were expressed in the workshop as to how any idea such as developed by Halperin will be brought up to the level of a state policy option. A Japanese proverb is relevant in this regard, “It is better to get down to work than to worry about it.” A successful leap in this effort could happen at any time, and we should continue to develop and spread ideas. This said, there were various suggestions in the workshop.

The Chinese participant believes the Six Party Talks could still be a viable venue to solve nuclear issues of the NEA, and says China is committed to its leading role in it. There were some comments to urge China to exert much stronger influence upon the DPRK and more pressure should come from within the country in this respect.

Mongolia was frequently cited in the workshop as a country that can play a key role in developing a NEA-NWFZ. It was also cited as a possible state party to a Comprehensive Agreement. There were a number of reasons expressed for this position. Mongolia has a two-decade-long record of a strong anti-nuclear weapons policy since 1992. It is a country located in NEA, as is self-identified
as such, and maintains good relations with the DPRK as well as with all other countries in the region. And, it expresses a policy willing to support denuclearization of the region. When we pursue state-level involvement, Mongolia stands at the closest position in favor of it. These reasons were shared among the workshop participants. It was also noted that state-level involvement is a necessary condition for any UN level discussion to start on the topic of NEA-NWFZ.

There were discussions about the role of civil society in strengthening public support and engaging government officials and policy makers, including roles of parliamentarians and mayors. Strong support for a NEA-NWFZ by mayors in Japan was exhibited in the workshop. Also it was shown in the workshop that there were ongoing cooperative efforts on this issue between PNND Japan and PNND Korea. The importance of a people-to-people channel was also discussed in the workshop. While no specific arrangement was suggested, the idea of establishing multilateral cooperation to assist the people in the DPRK was mentioned. It was said that such an attempt would inevitably involve cooperation among the people in China. In relation to the role of the civil society, Yi Kiho from the ROK pointed out the importance of governance among civil societies that will ensure the effective inter-relationship of various groups and the continuity of subjects to be pursued. He argues that there are diverse civil society actors like local governments, parliamentarians, universities and civil groups, but a mechanism to bridge their activities is lacking.

In Nagasaki, the workshop played a critical role in elevating the issue of a NEA-NWFZ and the idea of a comprehensive approach to a level of common concern shared among key researchers and leaders of the community. It also provided a basis to spread the issue to other areas in Japan, including the Hiroshima and Tokyo metropolitan areas. Such a process led by academic researchers and supported by concerned civil groups will be effective as groundwork to engage officials at the government level if implemented in many cities in other parts of NEA.

(drafted by Hiromichi Umebayashi)
The United States, Japan and the ROK need to continue their efforts seeking to persuade the government of the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons and its capacity to produce weapons grade fissionable material. This goal may not be attainable either because the DPRK leadership is no longer willing, if it ever was, to give up this option, or because its price for doing so is more than these nations and others are prepared to pay. However, the costs of accepting a DPRK operational nuclear capability are very high and we should not accept this outcome without at least one more sustained effort to find a solution.

It seems clear that the approach tried thus far has reached a dead end. The approach had three elements. First, an effort was made to negotiate a common understanding of the end point of the process which included a de-nuclearized peninsula and an end to hostile intent. This understanding was embodied in general political statements among the six parties, between the US and the DPRK (Joint Statement of June 11, 1993) or between the ROK and the DPRK. They were not legally binding, were not very precise in what was being agreed, had no enforcement mechanisms, and no blueprint for how to reach the agreed endpoints.

Based on these guiding principles there was an effort to negotiate a set of specific steps that each side would take on a quid-pro-quo basis. A very broad agreement was negotiated during the Clinton Administration (Agreed Framework, October 1994) and a narrower one was negotiated during the Obama administration on February 29, 2012.

Since August 2003, a third element was added to the package, namely the six party talks. The assumption was that formalizing the role of Russia and Japan along with the two Koreas and China and the United States could facilitate the reaching and enforcement of an agreement.

This approach made sense and came close to reaching a final agreement. It also delayed the DPRK nuclear program for a substantial period of time and led to the disabling of the one reactor that has produced all of the weapons grade fissionable material which the DPRK now possesses. However, it was not able to produce a final settlement and is at a dead end.

Neither side seems willing to enter into another limited agreement. The US and the ROK want the DPRK first to dismantle its entire nuclear apparatus in a transparent and verifiable way. The DPRK wants a peace treaty and an end to hostile intent before it considers dismantling its nuclear capacity. The PRC and Russia appear to be supporting the DPRK or at least stressing the need for all elements. While the five parties (other than the DPRK) appear committed to all of these elements there are significant differences as to what steps should be taken first.

The US, Japan and the ROK on the one hand and NK on the other have very different perceptions of why the negotiations at least twice collapsed in acrimony. The North believes that it made and kept an agreement to dismantle its plutonium reactor in return for deliveries of fuel, two new nuclear power plants, and above all, movement toward full political and economic normalization—in short, an end to enmity. It believes that the USG broke the agreement by cutting off the fuel...
supply and not moving to end enmity. It believes that its commitment to the denuclearization of
the peninsula was a goal to which it remained committed.(2) The USG and the ROK believe that
that NK did commit itself to stop all of its nuclear programs and to permit verification of that
process. It believes that the North reneged on the agreement by proceeding with the clandestine
uranium program.

On February 29, 2012 there was a similar if narrower disagreement. The package agreed to
included a ban on all space and missile tests. The DPRK seems to have believed that it made it
clear that launches of space vehicles were not included while the U.S. believes its negotiators made
clear that such launches would be grounds for terminating the agreement.(3)

How valid the arguments on each side are in each of these episodes is very much beside the point.
Both believe firmly in their version and neither is likely to go this route again.

We need a new approach which takes account of where we are now and the fundamental interests
of the two sides. The first step in the process should focus on agreeing on the details of the final
solution embodied in a single binding international treaty. Only then should we negotiate the steps
that each party will take to bring the full agreement into force in a way that assures compliance
with all the provisions of the agreement.

Finally, the six party talks may have out lived their usefulness, if they ever had any. While the
PRC would like to see a de-nuclearized peninsula, it gives precedence to preventing instability or
a collapse in North Korea and has not been willing to bring the necessary pressure on the North.
Japan has been primarily focused on resolving the kidnapping issue. Russia is not a key actor and
is unlikely to become one. The DPRK continues to emphasize bilateral discussions with the USG
and, at times, with the ROK.

In light of this reality, bilateral conversations and negotiations are the way forward. When
agreement is in sight among the key actors, a larger group of states should be brought into the
process and invited to participate in a large international conference at which the agreement would
be formally negotiated and signed. This larger group of states would adhere to and help enforce
various parts of the treaty package.

Such an approach will at least avoid the misunderstandings of the past. The end result will be
spelled out in a binding international treaty with a clear understanding of the commitments of
each participant and with international enforced procedures for verification supported by a larger
group of countries. Every participant will know what the final result will be. The steps towards
implementation need to be equally unambiguous. They will need to be spelled out clearly and
precisely with no party free to add or subtract from the agreed steps by a unilateral statement to
the world or to its own society.

The DPRK will not consider giving up its nuclear weapons at least unless it is satisfied that it can
meet its security needs without these weapons. The North has learned from the past ten years that
the United States is ready to use force to bring about regime change in countries whose government
it does not like and can be deterred only by a credible threat of unacceptable retaliation which may
require nuclear weapons. It now understands, from its own experience, that USG commitments of
no hostile intent, to which it attached great significance, can simply be withdrawn The DPRK does
fear an American conventional or nuclear attack. It does not seem to understand that the US
military recognizes that it cannot prevent the DPRK from inflicting very heavy casualties on US
forces and civilians as well as those of South Korea before it could be defeated even if it does not
use nuclear weapons and that it is one of the few countries in the world and the only small country
that has a credible non-nuclear deterrent.

The DPRK has made it clear that its priority now is a peace treaty and a binding international
commitment for the US to end hostilities and establish normal relations with the DPRK. It must
be sure these objectives will be met before it is willing to consider taking irrevocable steps to
dismantle its nuclear capacity.

10
The US, Japan and the ROK on the other hand are unwilling to consider any concessions to the DPRK until it has dismantled its nuclear capability in a verifiable way. This impasse, which has continued since the collapse of the agreement in April 2012 cannot be broken by small steps. Only if both sides are confident that they will in the end have a binding agreement which meets their needs will they be willing to consider taking steps to move in that direction.

To repeat, the DPRK leadership may not be willing to dismantle its existing nuclear capability or its capacity to produce more weapons-grade material whatever offers are made. We can only test this proposition by developing a new initiative without making any new commitments or taking any steps based solely on good faith.

To break this impasse we should develop the text for a comprehensive treaty dealing with all of the outstanding issues affecting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Once new governments are in place the US, Japan and the ROK should develop an agreed treaty text and a diplomatic strategy to seek support for this effort. The three other parties to the six party talks will need to be consulted and will need to be full participants in the conference and in the comprehensive treaty. However, rather than debating endlessly the pre-conditions for convening the six party talks the other states should be approached one by one. Other states including the UK and France as well as Mongolia and Canada should be consulted and eventually invited, along with the six parties, to a diplomatic conference where the treaty text would be finalized and implementing steps agreed.

**Comprehensive agreement on peace and security in Northeast Asia**

The proposed comprehensive treaty would be signed and ratified by a number of states. Some sections would be adhered to only by some of the signatories; other would be adhered to by all the parties. Some provisions may go into effect as soon as the treaty is ratified by the required states. Other provisions would enter into force in the future when specified conditions are met.

The elements of the comprehensive Treaty on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia would include:

**Termination of the state of war**
This is clearly a major objective of the DPRK. This section should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by the ROK and perhaps other states party to the conflict. It should end the state of war and provide for the normalization of relations among the signatories while providing for the eventual unification of the peninsula.

**Creation of a permanent council on security**
The Treaty should create a permanent council and organization to monitor and enforce the other provisions of the treaty. The treaty should leave open the question of whether it might also become a forum to deal with future security problems in the region. In addition to the six parties and the other two nuclear weapons states, other states from the region and beyond would be invited to join including Mongolia and Canada. The IAEA might be asked to play a role in the monitoring process; other verification might be done by a staff recruited by the security organization and be composed of nationals from countries other than the six parties.

**Mutual declaration of no hostile intent**
This is a key objective of the DPRK which put great stock in getting such a statement from the Clinton Administration. It was flummoxed when the Bush Administration simply withdrew it and when this policy was continued by the Obama Administration. To be credible this commitment must be embodied in the treaty and affect all the parties’ relations with each other.

**Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy**
The right of all parties to the treaty to have access to necessary sources of energy including nuclear power, as provided for in the NPT, will need to be affirmed. Any limitations on the DPRK might need to apply equally to other non-nuclear states party to the treaty, especially the ROK and Japan.
The DPRK will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized. Beyond a general commitment this will probably need to be negotiated as a separate agreement.

**Termination of sanctions**

The Parties to the treaty will need to commit not to impose sanctions on any other party to the treaty based on its nuclear programs as long as it fully adhered to the treaty. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state which violates its commitments under the treaty. The United States would need to reserve the right to impose sanctions based on other issues as mandated by its laws and to impose sanctions unilaterally if it believed that the DPRK was violating the terms of the treaty. This might require the US to withdraw from the treaty.

**Nuclear weapons free zone**

Finally, the treaty would contain a chapter which would create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia. The elements of that Treaty are discussed in the next session.

**Elements of the NWFZ**

This chapter of the Treaty would be consistent with the UN resolutions concerning the appropriate elements of a NWFZ treaty. It would have specific obligations for the non-nuclear states and others for the nuclear powers.

The ROK, Japan and the DPRK (and possibly other states including Mongolia and perhaps Canada) would commit themselves not to manufacture, test (for any purpose) or deploy nuclear weapons, nor to allow nuclear weapons to be stored on their territory. The DPRK would commit itself to re-join the NPT and the other states making this commitment would agree to remain parties to the NPT if the provisions of this treaty were being observed.

The precise territorial scope of the non-nuclear commitments would need to be clearly specified and would depend, in part, on which other states, if any, other than the two Koreas and Japan made these commitments.

The non-nuclear states adhering to these commitments might agree to future restrictions on reprocessing. They would agree to permit agreed inspections on their territory by the security organization created by the treaty so as to insure effective verification of the agreement. The inspection provisions and the obligations to provide information would apply equally to all the non-nuclear parties to the treaty accepting the non-nuclear commitments.

In the case of North Korea there would need to be specific provisions providing for the destruction of their existing stockpile and production facilities under the auspices of the security organization.

The ROK would need to commit that if Korea were unified before the weapons and the production facilities were dismantled it would immediately turn over the weapons to a Nuclear Weapons State for destruction and agree to international supervision of the dismantlement of the facilities.

The US, the PRC and Russia as well as the UK and France would agree to abide by the provisions of the treaty and not to store nuclear weapons in the zone or support in any way violations of the treaty by the non-nuclear states. They would agree not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state that was observing the terms of the treaty. (Note that this offer by the USG is inherent in the clean negative security assurance offered by the USG in the Nuclear Posture Review and consistent with past commitments of Russia and China as well as the USG. The UK and France have made such commitments to states in other NWF zones). The parties would agree to confer and to take appropriate actions if any non-nuclear state party to the treaty was threatened with the use of nuclear weapons by another party to the treaty or another state with nuclear weapons.

There would need to be provisions spelling out issues of transit of nuclear armed ships or planes
and defining the territorial scope of the treaty in terms of international waters.

**Alternative transition and EIF Arrangements**

It goes without saying that any hope of success for the proposed treaty depends on the DPRK being willing at the end of the day to give up its nuclear weapons. There is a chance that with the right incentives and the right pressure especially from China (which is more likely to act quietly and bilaterally) it might be willing to do so. The provisions in the treaty relating to entry into force and possible transition period should be structured so as to maximize the pressure on the DPRK and to give both China and North Korea the greatest incentives to accept the framework. One piece of that is to include in the same treaty the other elements that the North has been seeking. Another is to propose a scenario for adherence by Japan and the ROK that contributes to this process.

One way to achieve this is to have a provision in the treaty which permits the ROK and Japan to sign and ratify the treaty on a conditional basis. The treaty could be structured so that it goes into effect when three of the nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, and China) ratify the treaty and when two non-nuclear states (Japan and ROK) ratify it. However, the ROK and Japan would have the right to withdraw from the treaty after 3 or 5 years, unless the provisions are being enforced effectively throughout the Korean peninsula. Effective enforcement would occur if either the DPRK ratified and implemented the treaty, or if it collapses and the peninsula is unified under the ROK. If this condition were not met, Japan and the ROK could opt to remain in the treaty for another period of 3 or 5 years or to terminate their obligation. If the condition were met, they would be permanent parties to the treaty subject only to the standard withdrawal clause.

The obligations of nuclear weapons states that ratify the treaty would apply only to those non-nuclear states that also ratify and are in compliance with all the provisions of the treaty.

These provisions would accomplish several purposes. First, the ROK would be obliged to surrender any nuclear weapons or weapons grade material it acquires as a result of the collapse of the DPRK. Second, China would know that if it persuaded the DPRK to adhere to the treaty, it would have a permanent treaty commitment by Japan and the ROK not to acquire nuclear weapons or permit them to be stored on their territory. The DPRK would be aware of this, and would know that it would have a negative security assurance from the USG if it joined the treaty.

Specific provisions would be included to develop a process by which the DPRK would dismantle its existing stockpile over some period of time and receive compensation, the specifics of which would be subject to agreement. A provision of the Treaty might permit the DPRK to accept the basic commitment that it become a non-nuclear weapons state while delaying its obligation to begin the dismantling process. Still it will not be easy to persuade the DPRK to give up its existing nuclear capability and it will certainly take some time.

In the interim having a process under way which presents a way to de-nuclearize the Korean Peninsula will contribute to the overall effort to prevent nuclear proliferation as well as contribute to security in East Asia and the alliances between the United States and Japan and the ROK.

12/1/12
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Notes


GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DPRK NUCLEAR SITUATION

Peter Hayes, Richard Tanter, Joan Diamond
Nautilus Institute
www.nautilus.org

1. **DPRK Leadership Transition**: The DPRK leadership under Kim Jong Un is stable and more vigorous that it was under Kim Jong Il, but also presents significant marginal uncertainty compared to his father's rule due to his inexperience and lack of a personal political basis for his power in the DPRK polity.

2. **DPRK Economy is Collapsed**: The DPRK economy is trapped in low level equilibrium. It has seen slight annual improvements in quality of life for urban elite, and party and military members; but the economy as a whole is precariously balanced and cannot grow quickly or substantially given its absolute deficits of infrastructural and human capacity. So long as it remains a nuclear threat, the DPRK will remain at the bottom of a very deep economic hole, sitting on a small pile of nuclear weapons, with no way to get out. It will take huge reconstruction funding to overcome these economic problems. Just to replace the transmission, distribution, and generation power system, for example, will cost roughly $38-40 billion.

3. **DPRK's Ecology is Endangered**: Decades of abuse, concentrated points of industrial pollution, and a degraded natural resource bases all present a huge cost to be paid by future generations of Koreans. This enduring legacy will present enormous costs later when, for example, urban domestic and industrial toxic waste sites are found to be co-located at risk to ground water and populations.

4. **DPRK Nuclear Armament**: The DPRK nuclear threat is primarily political and psychological, not military in nature, designed to coerce and compel, not deter or reassure. The only place that the DPRK knows it can strike with assurance (roughly 50 percent reliability) is a hole in the ground in the DPRK. It has no credible delivery capacity, let alone a reliable, reasonably accurate nuclear weapons system that mates a warhead with a delivery system with a high degree of assurance that it will not fail to fire, fail to be delivered, or backfire.

5. **Nuclear-Armed DPRK is Unacceptable**: A new nuclear armed state in this region must never be accepted due to the costs it imposed on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, to all of those interested in regional security and stability and to the US and its allies. Allowing it to continue its nuclear program and develop additional nuclear warheads and delivery capabilities runs the risk of war, including nuclear war. It also distracts all states in the region from addressing other important security issues. Finally, it leaves most North Koreans starving and without a future, and risks imperiling the South Korean social and economic miracle, should conflict break out. In short, the US and the regional states cannot and should never accommodate a nuclear-armed DPRK, as some have argued.

6. **DPRK LWR Project**: DPRK nuclear reactor project is primarily symbolic, not technological or economic in motivation. It can do little or nothing to alleviate power shortages in the
DPRK. It introduces a significant element of Fukushima or Chernobyl-type risk to the Korean Peninsula².

7. **Six Party Talks Are Dead:** The Six Party Talks are moribund and are highly unlikely to resume. In any case, they offered too little, too late; and were never more than faux multilateralism, to give cover to the United States to engage bilaterally with the DPRK given US domestic political constraints.

8. **DPRK Nuclear Aggression:** DPRK nuclear threats are designed primarily for compellence, not for deterrence purposes. Their flamboyant nuclear threat rhetoric aimed at Korea, Japan, and the United States has been aggressive and even barbaric³. In fact, it likely is illegal and constitutes nuclear aggression under international law. We should speak truth to power, whether it is American, Korean, or Japanese.

9. **DPRK Has Sufficient Non-Nuclear Military Deterrence:** DPRK deterrence, based on conventional forces, is sufficient, albeit relatively inferior and increasingly so over time. DPRK artillery and rockets cannot reduce Seoul to a sea of fire, but they can produce serious casualties and damage, and spread terror indiscriminately. Such attacks would be primitive and would not last long before the DPRK is crushed militarily (the DPRK runs out of fuel for its war machinery in less than 30 days, at which point, the DPRK military is walking to war). Nuclear weapons, from this viewpoint, draw fire, require major resources to deploy, complicate DPRK military command and control, and are a distraction from the KPA's major military mission. From a US-ROK perspective, the DPRK conventional military threat is substantial, but highly deterred from escalating beyond a low threshold of violence in its recent covert and overt conventional provocations⁴.

10. **Conventional Deterrence of DPRK is Strong:** US-ROK extended deterrence, based on conventional forces, is strong and credible without the need to resort to nuclear weapons, even *in extremis*⁵.

11. **US Nuclear Extended Deterrence is Already Recessed:** US nuclear extended deterrence to Japan, ROK, and Taiwan, is weak, recessed, and incredible⁶. To attack the DPRK, the only nuclear forces that are usable are long-range bombers. The US would conduct a slow-motion shuttle service nuclear attack on the DPRK—a few thermonuclear weapons at a time—far too few to affect a fast-moving battlefield, but too many to avoid serious collateral damage from blast and radiation effects on Koreans, North and South.

12. **Comprehensive Regional Security Strategy Needed:** Incremental, partial and inconsistent strategies to respond to the DPRK nuclear breakout, implemented by Democratic and Republican Administrations, in or out of alignment with conservative and progressive allied governments over the cycles of confrontation since 1991, have failed completely to stop and reverse the DPRK's nuclear breakout. At best, they slowed it to a slow-motion proliferation trajectory for about a decade. They then accelerated it by confrontation or neglect since 1998 as both the United States and the DPRK used their respective nuclear threats to try to force each other to change their postures and actions, that is to compel, not deter the other⁷.

A comprehensive approach based on a security settlement that addresses the DPRK’s core insecurities—nuclear, military, economic, and cultural—is required to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout, and to dismantle its nuclear forces. The Halperin proposal is a realistic pathway to achieve this outcome⁸. It has been examined closely now at two workshops, one in Tokyo (November 2011), and one in Washington DC (October, 2012)⁹.

13. **Nuclear Negative-Security Assurance is Necessary but Not Sufficient:** A critical
element is providing a legally binding, treaty-based guarantee that the nuclear weapons states, in particular, the United States, will not use nuclear weapons against the DPRK. Such an offer has never been made to the DPRK, which has continually emphasized the importance of such a guarantee. The standard US negative security assurance offered to the DPRK since 1992 was always moot due to US qualification that it was rendered inoperative if a non-nuclear weapons state engaged in aggression when in an alliance with a nuclear weapons-state. In effect, the United States insisted that the DPRK abandon its key military alliance with China in order to obtain a US guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons against the DPRK—an unrealistic and even ridiculous proposition that undermined US credibility in Pyongyang and Beijing.

14. Need to Adapt NEA-NWFZ Concepts to DPRK Nuclear Breakout: The original 3-3 NEA-NWFZ proposal advanced from Japan, especially those articulated by Professor Umebayashi, and separately, by John Endicott, today confronts the reality of a nuclear-armed DPRK. The DPRK’s declared nuclear armament creates a set of dilemmas for the 3+3 proposal that can be resolved only by use of legal precedent, creative diplomacy, expanded participation by more states in the NEA-NWFZ, political leadership at a unique moment of leadership change, and bottom-up welling for a peaceful, sustainable regional security order based on communicative, cooperative, and collaborative relationships, not one based on nuclear threat and military forces.

**Evolving Post-Six Party Talks Concept**

5 + 4.5

Later becomes

5 + 5 + 0.25

- 4 NPT-NNWS (ROK, Japan, Canada, Mongolia) join at the outset
- DPRK joins in a contingent status (0.5 NNWS);
- 5 NPT-NWS join with negative security assurance to DPRK calibrated to its compliance
- This “5+5” model takes time (but not without limit) to integrate fully the DPRK.
- Taiwan unilaterally declares will observe obligations of NNWS (0.25 NNWS)

15. DPRK Phased Compliance with NWFZ: In a NWFZ, the DPRK can be admitted at the outset as a full party, but also can be provided time to comply fully which could not happen in less than two years, and might take as long as a decade to complete. During this time, nuclear weapons states can calibrate the degree to which their legally binding guarantee of non attack using nuclear weapons to the extent that the DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapons, and reverted to non-nuclear weapons state status in compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as fulfilling the requirements to establish confidence that it has not only dismantled its weapons, but abandoned fully its aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons and to become a nuclear-weapons state. In turn, the other non-nuclear weapons states whose territory is covered by a NEA-NWFZ can waive the clause in the standard treaty text whereby the treaty comes into force only when all states have ratified and come into compliance, thereby entering it into force only on their own territory—as occurred in the Latin American NWFZ to enable Argentina and Brazil to join at the outset (it took these two states 18 years to complete the accession process). The benefits that might flow to North Korea in particular, a guarantee that it would not be
attacked with nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone would occur only if the North fully dismantled its nuclear capabilities under monitoring and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency or a substitute regional inspectorate established as part of the treaty. Non-nuclear states such as South Korea and Japan could pull out of the treaty after five years if the North had not dismantled its nuclear program by then. As was the case with South Africa’s abandonment of its nuclear program, North Korea would have to do more than just comply with its old “safeguards” obligations and establish genuine confidence that it no longer has nuclear weapons capabilities or aspirations held in reserve. Nevertheless, none of these obstacles— even the superficially impassable such as monitoring and verifying North Korea’s enrichment capacities—are insurmountable.

16. **Key Issues in a NEA-NWFZ:** The DPRK is not the only important issue facing a NEA-NWFZ. A NEA-NWFZ must resolve many complicated issues before it can be implemented. These include:

**Critical NEA-NWFZ Issues**

1. Are NWSs ready to forego the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear threat against NNWSs in the region?
2. Should NWSs impose a verifiable restriction on deployment of nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles on their own territory as part of the treaty?
3. Is a NEA-NWFZ consistent with continued nuclear extended deterrence?
4. Should nuclear fuel cycle cooperation be included as part of the NWFZ treaty or as a separate set of parallel side agreements?
5. Are conventional military means sufficient for U.S. and its allies to achieve security and to fulfil its mutual security obligations without recourse to nuclear threat or nuclear weapons?
6. Would NWSs disavow past agreements as to NWS prerogatives to station or re-introduce nuclear weapons into NNWSs covered by a NEA-NWFZ?
7. Would the firing of nuclear weapons out of the NWFZ be proscribed in a NEA-NWFZ?
8. Should NEA-NWFZ end at the standard 12 nautical mile coastal limit? Would NNWS have the right of innocent transit of coastal waters and airspace?
9. What monitoring and verification (M&V) and enforcement is needed in a NEA-NWFZ and specifically for DPRK?

**Legend:** NWS = NPT recognized Nuclear Weapons States  NNWS = NPT recognized Non-Nuclear Weapons States


17. **Expanded Scope of a NEA-NWFZ?** Halperin’s proposal suggests that it is time to break out of the moribund, rigid mold of the Six-Party talks and cast the net wider. On the US-allied side, for example, it was suggested that Canada might join a Northeast Asia NWFZ; and to make North Korea less isolated, Mongolia might also join the zone as a non-nuclear weapons state. The UK and France could also buttress the multilateral guarantee of the NPT nuclear states to the North and other non-nuclear states such as Japan and South Korea that they would not be attacked with nuclear weapons so long as they fulfilled their obligations as a party to the NWFZ including not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed or fired from their territories.

18. **Nuclear Fuel Cycle Competition vs Collaboration:** The vexed issue of nuclear fuel cycle inequality and discrimination— especially between Japan and the two Koreas— may hinder the implementation of a NEA-NWFZ. But regional fuel cycle collaboration also offers a way to engage the North, bring its full enrichment capacity out into the open and onto the table as a negotiable capacity, and reduce the perceived inequality between Japan (by foregoing breeder reactors and reprocessing in a post-Fukushima recognition that these are fantasies
that no longer justify billion-dollar subsidies) and South Korea (which would give up its aspiration to match Japan by “pyro-processing” spent fuel).14

19. **NWFZ Increases Deterrence, Predictability, and Strategic Stability:** Should the North Korean nuclear threat be removed, and the Korean Peninsula stabilized by the creation of a revamped non-partisan UN Command essentially a peace-keeping force in Korea, then a Northeast Asia NWFZ could free up US and allied aerial and ground forces to strengthen deterrence against a Chinese attack across the Taiwan Strait, thereby reducing the probability that China or the US might be the first to use nuclear weapons in this most dangerous of potential Asian conflict zones.15

Moreover, it was noted at the workshop that should the North Korean nuclear threat be removed, and the Korean Peninsula stabilized by the creation of a revamped non-partisan UN Command essentially a peace-keeping force in Korea, then a Northeast Asia NWFZ could free up US and allied aerial and ground forces to strengthen deterrence against a Chinese attack across the Taiwan Strait, thereby reducing the probability that China or the US might be the first to use nuclear weapons in this most dangerous of potential Asian conflict zones.16 From a Japanese perspective, a NEA-NWFZ would create an enduring geostrategic buffer between the two Koreas, and between China and Japan.17

20. **The Absurdity of Nuclear Threats in the 21st Century:** Given the pace of urbanization, including in-situ urbanization of rural villages and towns between major cities, a gigantic urban corridor is likely to emerge all the way from Beijing to Tokyo, and south to Shenzhen, by 2050. This would be the world’s first giga-city. Such an urban giga-city will generate new, linear, trans-boundary insecurities, which will require new, networked security transnational capacities to resolve. At the same time, a giga-city implies much increased mobility of people and labor, as well as inter-connected logistics and shared infrastructure. Targeting different parts of this giga-city will increasingly mean that nuclear weapons states are targeting their own vital interests, an absurd security strategy. This, the bottom-up groundswell of communities and cities seeking to establish their non-nuclear status on the one hand, and their green, interconnected, but self-reliant credentials on the other, establishes the social foundations for a NEA-NWFZ which cannot be sustained or even created by states alone.

21. **Conclusion—Leadership is Key:** After 2012, the “year of doing nothing,” the two possible sources of leadership to implement Halperin’s concept are the Obama administration and the new occupant of the Blue House in Seoul.

Should Seoul and Washington align their views and recognize the strategic advantages of reaching a regional security settlement, there is little doubt that the other regional powers would follow suit. The question is, who will kick-start the process? The devil may be in the details, but that’s what bureaucracies are there to work out. As we learned after US President Richard Nixon and China’s Chairman Mao Zedong met in 1972 and US President Ronald Reagan met Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, the world can change overnight.

A Six-Party summit of heads of state in mid-2013 could cut through the many snarled knots that have made it impossible so far to resume the Six Party talks, on the one hand, and address how to resolve the big insecurities that drove North Korea towards nuclear armament in the first place, on the other.

Would Obama risk sitting down with North Korea’s Kim in Nagasaki to discuss such a process, alongside the four other heads of state from the region?

If a complete deal were in the offing, why not?


This has been the case for decades. For an authoritative view on the DPRK from former CINC PAC Admiral Denis Blair, see Admiral C. Blair (ret), “With the single exception of planning and developing non-nuclear missile defense systems against nuclear ballistic missiles, past attempts to plan the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in an integrated campaign plan have not persisted. In nuclear wargames over the years, for both military commanders and appointed officials, once nuclear weapons were introduced into a campaign, nuclear escalation considerations dominated the conflict, rather than questions of the effective use of tactical nuclear weapons within an otherwise non-nuclear campaign that had not escalated. This syndrome has even been true for the use of nuclear weapons at sea, where collateral damage considerations are far less than they are on land. In wargames and planning, even when an adversary like North Korea resorts to the use of chemical weapons (like nuclear weapons, a weapon of mass destruction) commanders and officials have shown a preference for refraining from retaliatory use of nuclear weapons if the United States and the Republic of Korea can fight through the chemical weapons with non-nuclear forces and prevail.” In “Integration and Separation of Nuclear and Non-nuclear Planning and Forces,” in Taylor Bolz, editor, In the Eyes of the Experts, Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture, Selected Contributions by the Experts of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Institute Of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2009, pp. 77-78 at: http://www.usip.org/files/In%20the%20Eyes%20of%20the%20Experts%20full.pdf


Endicott’s 15 year series of workshops first proposed a 1,000 km range from the Korean DMZ that covered parts of Alaska, China, Mongolia, and Russia as well as Korea and Japan; and later, an ellipse that covered NE China, Mongolia, the Russian Far East, part of Alaska, the two Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan at the southern end. See J. Endicott, “Limited nuclear-weapon-free zones: the time has come,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 20: 1, 2008, p. 17, at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163270802006305. Endicott’s concept was reviewed critically by S. W. Cheon, op cit, pp. 106-115.
http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_03_01.jsp?page=2&num=42&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=DATATAPA03&ses=&category=11
Nautilus’ 3+2 phased concept was advanced in: Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (KJNWFZ) Briefing Paper, May 6, 2010, in English, Korean, and Japanese, at:
http://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/korea-japan-nwfz/
11 This approach is transposed from the Tlatelolco Treaty which established an ingenious and innovative legal mechanism by which reluctant states could be encouraged to join the zone at a later date. It consists of a provision in Article 28 (3) that allows a signatory state to “waive, wholly or in part” the requirements that have the effect of bringing the treaty into force for that state at a particular time.11 As Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles noted in his commentary on Article 28: “An eclectic system was adopted, which, while respecting the viewpoints of all signatory States, prevented nonetheless any particular State from precluding the enactment of the treaty for those which would voluntarily wish to accept the statute of military deenuclearization defined therein. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has thus contributed effectively to dispel the myth that for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone it would be an essential requirement that all States of the region concerned should become, from the very outset, parties to the treaty establishing the zone. In this way, the normative framework for a non-nuclear region can be established before all states are ready to actually implement the framework.” M. Hamel-Green, “Implementing a Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Precedents, Legal Forms, Governance, Scope, Domain, Verification, Compliance and Regional Benefits,” Pacific Focus, 26:1, April, 2011, pp. 97-98, at:
15 For related discussions, see:
16 For related discussions, see:

Japanese Perspectives on a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ

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1 Japan’s Nuclear Policies and NEA-NWFZ

It is generally accepted that there are four nuclear policies in Japan, although they are not recognized as official policies established by the government. The four policies were proposed by Eisaku Sato, prime minister of Japan from 1964 to 1972, in the early 1970s before the resolution for the three non-nuclear principles was adopted in the Diet in 1971. They are, namely, a non-nuclear policy (the three non-nuclear principles), reliance on the US nuclear deterrence (nuclear umbrella), promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (nuclear power plants), and active leadership for nuclear disarmament.

The idea of creating a NEA-NWFZ can be analyzed by examining the influence it may give to each principle as follows.

(a) Non-Nuclear Policy
Japan’s non-nuclear policy is based on the three non-nuclear principles: no possession, no development, no transition of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that a secret agreement was concluded between Sato and Nixon regarding the US transition of nuclear weapons to Japan’s territory and it is assumed that nuclear warheads were actually brought to the US bases in Japan. Since the decision of both the US and Russia to eliminate all the tactical nuclear warheads from operating vessels in early 1990s, it is also assumed that the principle of no transition has been maintained since then.

Japan can and should keep its non-nuclear principles after joining the NEA-NWFZ. The environment under the NEA-NWFZ, with no hostile intent and the provision of negative security assurance, will enable us to strengthen these principles by providing an opportunity to add one more principle --- no reliance on the nuclear umbrella. Besides, Japan’s non-nuclear principles can be applied to the DPRK after its de-nuclearization and the ROK, and if the two Koreas accepted these principles, the NEA-NWFZ would be strengthened.

(b) Reliance on Nuclear Umbrella
The real meaning of Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella, described in the National Defense Program Guidelines (Boei Keikaku no Taiko), is as follows.

“To address the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the extended deterrence provided by the United States, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, will be indispensable. In order to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the United States, and will also appropriately implement its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense and civil protection.” (Underlined by

1 “NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2011 and beyond”, Approved by the
In sum, there is no description with regard to a retaliatory nuclear attack by the US in the case of a nuclear attack on Japan. Several high-ranking uniformed staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force once told me in the 1990s that, “if Japan is actually attacked by nuclear weapons, the US nuclear deterrence cannot be called ‘umbrella’ but ‘broken umbrella,’ and we are not assuming such situations.” This story suggests that there is no detailed agreement between Japan and the US on the military operational level against a possible nuclear attack on Japan.

The co-existence of Japan’s non-nuclear policy and the nuclear umbrella policy has been regarded as a fundamental inconsistency by civil society. However, if Japan’s reliance on the nuclear umbrella is a policy to deal only with the “nuclear threat,” it would give Japan a greater chance to change it unilaterally. Technically speaking, there are only three sources of potential nuclear threat in NEA to Japan: the DPRK, China, and Russia. Under the NEA-NWFZ with a de-nuclearized DPRK, the negative security assurance provided by China and Russia, and no hostile intent, the US nuclear deterrence will no longer be a “vital element,” Japan will be able to terminate the policy and be given more credibility for its non-nuclear policy and disarmament initiative. Then, the nature of the US-Japan alliance will be changed and should be re-defined. Similarly, there will be no need of the nuclear umbrella provided for the ROK by the US and the nature of the ROK-US alliance might also be re-designed.

(c) Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Until the big earthquakes and the tsunami hit the eastern part of Japan and caused serious accidents in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants on March 11, 2011, Japan had kept 55 nuclear power plants operating, had actively been promoting the “peaceful use” of nuclear energy, and the government had fully endorsed the policy of nuclear fuel recycling. Since the Fukushima accidents, most of the power plants were temporarily shut down, the government has started to review the policy, and we have not yet reached a national consensus on the future policy on the civil use of nuclear energy, although it seems to me that a majority of Japanese civil society is strongly supporting the termination of generating electricity with nuclear power plants.

On the other hand, the current international regime of non-proliferation, based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is still maintaining a policy of promoting the “peaceful use” of nuclear energy, described in its article as follows.

“Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”

As the NPT was designed in the 1960s when people in the world were drawing a rosy picture of the future of the civil use of nuclear energy, it is my view that the international non-proliferation regime should be re-designed so that the potential and actual danger of nuclear power plants and the nuclear fuel recycling will be taken into account.

One question arises with regard to a fundamental measure to be taken under the NEA-NWFZ. Is it still appropriate to give full support for the promotion of nuclear power energy by all the member states institutionalized in the element “Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy?”


Conversion of nuclear fuel from civil use to military use is not the only danger we have to control. Possible accidents at nuclear power facilities for civil purpose, caused by natural disasters, mechanical malfunctions, and human error, might easily become an enormous threat to human society. Tight security and safety mechanism to control the civil use of nuclear energy should be introduced, especially to the narrow peninsula of the two Koreas and the islands of Japan, as one function of the NEA-NWFZ.

(d) Leadership for Nuclear Disarmament
In spite of its eagerness to play a leadership role in nuclear disarmament, in my view, Japan has not yet succeeded in achieving it, mostly due to its contradictory nuclear policies. The Japanese government’s leadership as a leading non-nuclear nation is easily offset by Japan’s reliance on US nuclear deterrence and the accumulation of a stockpile of plutonium as a result of its nuclear fuel recycling.

Therefore, if Japan actively takes initiative towards the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, it can be an important achievement of Japan in this field. Besides, if Japan makes a decision to disengagement from the US nuclear umbrella, or if Japan revises its nuclear fuel recycling policy, it will gain credibility as a leading nation for nuclear disarmament.

2 Japan’s Bi-lateral Relationship and NEA-WPFZ

For the creation of a NEA-WPFZ, however, there are some concerns in bi-lateral relationships with related nations.

(a) DPRK
As Japan has not yet normalized its relations with the DPRK, during the process of concluding a peace and security agreement by related nations, the issue of compensation by Japan to the DPRK for the period of colonial rule may arise, and it may easily complicate and prolong the negotiations.

The unsettled abduction issue is another source of negative influences for a successful conclusion of a NEA-WPFZ.

(b) ROK
The ongoing territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokto island between Japan and the ROK may become a big obstacle for creating a favorable environment for the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. If Japan fails to handle this issue of not to provoking anti-Japan sentiment in South Korea, it is expected that North Korea and China could join the anti-Japan club, resulting in a big negative impact for the creation of a NEA-NWFZ.

(c) China
Similarly, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Pinnacle Islands between Japan and China is a potential source of conflict that may damage the negotiations.

(d) USA
The issues related to the US military bases in Okinawa, including the relocation of Marines troops from Okinawa, introduction of the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey aircrafts, and the US soldiers’ crimes, are a potential factor of instability in the US-Japan alliance.

(e) Russia
The long-unsettled dispute of the Northern/Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia is a potential damaging factor for the relationship between the two countries.

3 The Meaning of Some Elements of NEA-WPFZ to Japan

Some elements included in the “Comprehensive agreement on peace and security in Northeast Asia” may exert a positive or negative influence on NEA-WPFZ.
(a) A Peace Treaty between the two Koreas and the Normalization between Japan and the DPRK
As I have mentioned above, the negotiations for Normalization between Japan and the DPRK might be a tough process for Japan if the DPRK makes one-sided claims of compensation because of colonial rule. Besides, the public sentiments of ROK, which normalized its relations with Japan in 1965, seems unsatisfied with prior compensation for colonial rule including the comfort women issue settled by the Japan-ROK Normalization Treaty in 1965. Therefore, after successful conclusion of a peace treaty to terminate the state of war, the two Koreas might jointly escalate their criticism against Japan with regard to its historical recognition and attitude for compensation.

(b) End of Hostile Intent
It has been empirically observed, from Japan’s point of view, that the nature of the DPRK’s hostility against the US is not the same as against Japan. The DPRK might put an end to its hostile intent against the US if the US admits the existence of the Kim Jong-Un administration, but it is less predictable how Japan can meet the demands of the DPRK that will result in an end to its hostility.

(c) De-nuclearization of Korean Peninsula and Japan
The meaning of de-nuclearization should be clearly defined so that the same standard will be applied to Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Major issues to be defined are: the treatment of the nuclear umbrella, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear fuel recycling. As Japan’s civil society is becoming more and more critical towards the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan, it may ask the Japanese government to introduce strict control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the DPRK and oppose support for building nuclear power plants there.

(d) Negative Security Assurance
The provision of negative security assurance is one of the most vital elements in the NEA-WPFZ. It eliminates the primary motivation of the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. Also, along with the de-nuclearization of the DPRK, it deprives Japan and the ROK of the motivation to seek protection from the US nuclear umbrella, for China and the DPRK are virtually the only potential and actual sources of nuclear threat to the two countries. However, among the five existing NWFZs, the nuclear weapon states signed and ratified protocol of only one or two NWFZs. In order to secure the three nuclear nations’ negative security assurance, Japan’s diplomatic role is of great importance.

4 Conclusions: Final Goal of NEA-WPFZ
Since mid-1990s, a number of proposals for NEA-WPFZ were made by many scholars and practitioners, including the proposals of: Kumao Kaneko, John E. Endicott, Andrew Mack, Seongwhun Chon & Tatsujiro Suzuki, Hiromichi Umebayashi, and the Nautilus Institute.

There are some common weaknesses in these proposals, and it might be worthwhile to consider them for our discussion.

Firstly, they emphasize the need and importance of creating a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, but none of them clearly explains the feasibility of their idea. The biggest reason is that it is almost impossible to accurately predict the behavior of the DPRK. Some proposals require the joining of the DPRK as a non-nuclear state at the initial stage, whereas others suggest creating a zone by Japan and the ROK in the first stage and later inviting the DPRK to join after making acceptable environment, due to the uncertainty of the DPRK’s diplomatic action.

Secondly, those proposals take different position with regard to the current status of the DPRK, whether it should be treated as a nuclear state or a non-nuclear state that violated the obligations of the NPT. If we treat the DPRK as a non-nuclear state at the initial stage, whereas others suggest creating a zone by Japan and the ROK in the first stage and later inviting the DPRK to join after making acceptable environment, due to the uncertainty of the DPRK’s diplomatic action.

Thirdly, if we start creating a zone in Japan and the ROK in the initial phase, which is suggested
by a majority of those previous proposals, we should expect Japan to take the lead, but Japanese current policy seems rather cautious towards the idea of a NEA-NWFZ.

“With regard to the plan to create a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone that includes Japan, the Government of Japan holds the view that efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue must first be undertaken in order to ensure Japan’s security and improve the security environment of Northeast Asia.” (Underline by the author.)

This is the same stance as the US and the ROK which want the DPRK first to dismantle its nuclear facilities and capabilities. As a measure to ensure Japan’s security, the Japanese government is sticking to the protection of the nuclear umbrella, and because Japan is under this protection, the Japanese government does not want to join the international voice that proclaims the inhumanity of nuclear weapons.

As the general election is approaching, the next Japanese administration is expected to be transition from the Democrats, which has been more pro-nuclear disarmament than the Liberal Democratic Party, to a coalition of the LDP and some conservative parties, Japanese policy may become more cautious. In addition, the position of the Government of the ROK, which is similarly under the US nuclear umbrella, seems cautious with regards to the creation of a NEA-NWFZ as well.

In spite of these negative factors, however, we have to find a concrete solution in order to avoid a catastrophic result, which might actually occur if the situation becomes worse due to the escalation of current hostilities among the nations in this region. To keep proposing the idea of a NEA-NWFZ does function as a mechanism of confidence-building in NEA, and we need to think out a creative approach to change the atmosphere from the deadlock to trust and cooperation.

To establish a stable cooperative relationship between Japan and the ROK, to precisely read the action of the DPRK, and to adjust the interests of the three nuclear powers – the US, China, and Russia - , are the preconditions to put forward the idea of creating a NEA-NWFZ. What we can learn from the previous experiences of establishing NWFZs in other regions is that a sudden unexpected dramatic change of situation is possible if the international environment changes. In order to avoid another nuclear disaster, the idea should be further revised by engaging the related nations. The efforts of Japan, including the government, politicians, practitioners, scholars, and the civil society is strongly required.

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By virtually any measure, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) have been a success story in past international efforts to prevent the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons in specific regions. But they have accomplished much more—they have also advanced the norm of global nuclear disarmament and are justifiably viewed in a fully multilateral context. They have also served to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. By expanding the scope of legal obligations concerning the possession or proliferation of nuclear weapons, these treaty regimes have contributed to the “rule of law” in disarmament and non-proliferation.

Today, 111 States have joined regional NWFZs, while the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia has also gained international recognition. Four regional treaties exclude the deployment or possession of nuclear weapons in virtually all the Southern Hemisphere. And in 2009, the treaty establishing the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone entered into force, creating the first such zone north of the Equator.

It is often forgotten that the basic concept of these zones emerged in the 1960s as part of what were called “partial measures”—an approach to global nuclear disarmament that built upon a series of more limited measures rather than a single comprehensive disarmament treaty pursued unsuccessfully in the 1950s.

Reflecting this partial-measure approach, all the NWFZ treaties associate their respective zones with global nuclear disarmament. Thus these zones are far more significant than just a measure to strengthen regional peace and security. They have also helped to de-legitimize nuclear weapons per se, rather than just their spread, testing, or use—using some innovative approaches.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the Tlatelolco Treaty was the first such treaty to cover a heavily populated area, the first to define the term “nuclear weapon”, and the first to require legally binding negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. It remains the only such treaty whose Protocols have been ratified by all five of these States.

The Treaty’s preamble indicated that “militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage.” This link between the regional aims of the treaty and the twin global goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament (GCD) appears in each of the treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

These references to GCD are significant but often misunderstood. The term appears in a dozen multilateral treaties including the NPT. It was first placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in 1959 (Resolution 1378) and the first Special Session of the General Assembly in 1978.
designated GCD as the “ultimate objective” of the world community in the field of disarmament.\(^4\)

The term integrates two separate aims of the UN that derive originally from the Charter, which distinguished between “disarmament” and the “regulation of armaments”. Over the years, the General Assembly has clarified through many resolutions that “disarmament” applies specifically to the elimination or prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction (biological and chemical), while the goals with respect to conventional arms were to regulate or reduce such weaponry.\(^5\) The General Assembly has also clearly established that these goals are to be pursued simultaneously, not sequentially.

In short, the agreed multilateral goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons—not simply to regulate them—and this is the goal that has been incorporated into the regional treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is worth recalling, however, that the treaties are also intended to serve the wider GCD goal, which includes conventional arms, even though such weapons are not explicitly addressed in those regional treaties. This meaning could well be significant in the context of efforts to establish such a zone in Northeast Asia, given the large deployments of conventional forces in the region.

The legal foundation for such zones rests initially with the UN Charter, which in Article 52 recognizes the role of “regional arrangements or agencies” in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article VII of the NPT also affirms the right of groups of States to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories.

In 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission adopted a set of seven principles to guide the establishment of such zones. These included—a ban on any type of nuclear explosive device for any purpose; verification and IAEA full-scope safeguards; a requirement for the zonal treaty to be “freely arrived at” among States of the region; and other standards relating to security assurances and conformity with international law and law of the sea.

While the 1999 guidelines did identify GCD as a goal of such zones, it did not refer to delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Each of the definitions of “nuclear explosive device” or “nuclear weapon” found in the five regional treaties states that the term does not include delivery vehicles “if separable from and not an indivisible part” of the weapon. Yet the UNDC guidelines stressed that each zone is “the product of the specific circumstances of the region concerned and highlights the diversity of situations in the different regions”.\(^6\) There is therefore no reason why delivery systems could not be included within the scope of a zonal treaty, if the parties believe that local circumstances so require.

Now some have questioned the value of such treaties since all their parties are already members of the NPT. Yet the zonal treaties go beyond the obligations of the NPT in many respects. Their parties receive legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. Unlike the NPT, these treaties also explicitly outlaw the basing of nuclear weapons among the States Parties. Some of these regional treaties establish organizations to facilitate implementation, while the NPT lacks such infrastructure. The regional treaties also require all States Parties not to engage in proliferation-related activities, in contrast to the “not in any way to assist” obligation in the NPT, which only applies to the nuclear-weapon States.

Most of these regional treaties also address environmental issues (e.g. against radioactive

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dumping). The Africa and Central Asia treaties include controls over the physical security of nuclear materials and facilities. Most have more stringent terms for treaty withdrawal—the South Pacific, Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia treaties require 12 months advance notice, while Tlatelolco only requires 3 months as does the NPT. The Central Asian treaty requires enhanced safeguards under the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. The Pelindaba treaty bans even “research on” any nuclear explosive device, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities—it has also set a precedent with some potential applicability in Northeast Asia, by addressing the issues of declaring and destroying nuclear-weapons facilities in the African zone. In addition, these treaties also have their own procedures for the settlement of disputes.

One zone receiving considerable attention today is the proposed Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction—a goal adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and reaffirmed at the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region date back to 1974, with a General Assembly resolution sponsored by Iran and Egypt. President Mubarak proposed expanding the concept to WMD in 1990.

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the States Parties affirmed that the 1995 Middle East Resolution was “the basis” for the indefinite extension of the NPT. They also endorsed several practical steps to establish such a zone. In consultation with States of the region, the UN Secretary-General and the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (the three sponsors of the 1995 Resolution) were jointly mandated to convene a conference in 2012 on establishing the zone, appoint a facilitator, and select a host government.

Yet recent statements by the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, the European Union, the League of Arab States, and the UN Secretary-General clearly indicate that while there is no consensus to convene this conference in 2012 there remains strong international support for the goal of establishing such a zone.

This experience with the Middle East zone may have some indirect relevance for the Northeast Asia zone in two respects. First, the initiative to establish the Middle East zone has long been linked by its supporters to the NPT regime and hence has been a regular subject of deliberations at NPT arenas. In other words, by framing the initiative in an NPT context, supporters have already established that this issue has global implications well beyond the region. Second, proponents of this zone have also sought to involve the UN and the Secretary-General in particular in the process of establishing this zone—this is another reflection of this effort to frame this initiative in a global context. The net effect of this approach has been to expand the domain of relevant “stakeholders” with an interest in the establishment of this zone. Whether this will suffice to ensure full participation by all States in the region in a future conference or treaty establishing the zone remains to be determined by the outcome of ongoing consultations.

It is noteworthy that while the initiative for establishing such zones comes exclusively from the States within the region, the United Nations has contributed to this process in many ways. Examples of past UN roles include activities by the General Assembly, which include statements and resolutions concerning the relevant treaties. In addition to their own public statements of support, the Secretaries-General have issued detailed reports, including a comprehensive study of such zones in 1975 and the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1991. As indicated, the UN Disarmament Commission has established guidelines for establishing these zones. More specifically, William Epstein, then a member of the UN Secretariat, assisted in the drafting of an early version of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In response to requests from interested delegations, the UN’s Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific actively supported the

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7 Article 6 of the Pelindaba treaty deals with the “Declaration, dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the facilities for their manufacture”.
establishment of the Central Asia zone, primarily through arranging for consultations among the relevant parties.\textsuperscript{10}

This track record of UN assistance provides a useful precedent for possible future contributions in establishing zones in additional regions, including Northeast Asia.

So what’s next for these zones? Five key challenges lie ahead. First is the job of getting all the nuclear-weapon States to ratify all the Protocols of the treaties. Second is the promotion of new zones especially in the Middle East, but also Northeast Asia and the Arctic. Third is further elaboration of the concept of a WMD-free zone in other regions, perhaps including the development of a model WMD-free-zone convention or an agreed set of principles similar to the approach taken by the UNDC concerning the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The fourth concerns the challenge of dealing with the dilemma created by non-NPT States that possess nuclear weapons, whose security assurances could be seen as constituting international recognition of their nuclear-weapon status.

Finally, many of the complex issues associated with the nuclear fuel cycle—in particular its dual-use applications for military and civilian uses—remain unresolved. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has underscored his own concerns on this issue. “We should never forget,” he has warned, “that the nuclear fuel cycle is more than an issue involving energy or non-proliferation; its fate will also shape prospects for disarmament.”\textsuperscript{11}

While governments of the regions concerned are responsible for establishing such zones, civil society has very important roles to play in shaping the political will needed to achieve this goal. National parliamentarians and local government officials have played active roles as have countless initiatives launched by groups in civil society, at times working in cooperation with the UN and IAEA. Common to many of these efforts have been initiatives to engage the media and to educate public opinion about the benefits offered by these zones.

In conclusion, while the cumulative establishment of regional zones will not alone suffice to produce a world free of nuclear weapons, this is in fact their common larger goal. To this extent, the zones represent one of the best examples today of how multilateral anti-nuclear-weapon norms are taking root at the regional and local levels.

It’s often said that “all politics is local politics.” Yet with respect to these zones, nuclear-weapons politics is operating on both local and global dimensions. As representatives of the people, legislators can serve not just as a bridge between the Executive and the public, but also between the world community and both national and local political systems. They have enormous potential to strengthen the political will needed from all countries to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone would be a great step forward in achieving this historic goal.

\textsuperscript{10} Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/309, 27 August 1997, para. 12.

Nuclear Cycle issues: ROK and Japan

Masa Takubo
Operator of Website Kakujoho (Nuclear Information)
8 December, 2012 Nagasaki

Japan’s nuclear power policy

• Zero Nuclear Power by the end of 2030’s
• Continuation of Reprocessing
Rokkasho reprocessing plant start-up schedule: Oct 10, 2013
Capacity: 8 tons/year

Japan’s Fast Breeder Reactor Policy

• 1956 Best suited to Japan’s conditions
• 1961 Indispensable if a self-reliant system is chosen
• ....

Japan’s AEC breeder goal moving away

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1985-95</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
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Result of reprocessing policy and FBR failure

• Accumulation of plutonium
  ➢ Theft ➢ Nuclear terrorism
  ➢ An example to be used by other countries ➢ proliferation
  ➢ Suspicion about Japan’s intention ➢ tension in Asia

Japan’s separated plutonium

• As of the end of 2011: 44 tons
  Enough for 5,500 Nagasaki type bombs
  Total: 44, 254 kg
  In Japan: 9, 295kg
  Overseas total: 34,959kg
  • UK: 17,028kg
  • France: 17,931kg
  The plan to consume plutonium as MOX fuel in Light Water Reactors is not working.
### Result of reprocessing policy and FBR failure (2)

- No preparation for spent fuel storage
- Dangerous dense packing at pools like Fukushima
- Pressure for starting reprocessing at Rokkasho just to secure the destination of spent fuel

### Danger of dense-packed pools

- Fukushima made the danger of dense storage in pools clear

![Pool at Fukushima Daiichi #4](image)

### Warning of 9/11 ignored

**Solution: Dry storage**

Nuclear Regulation Authority Chair Tanaka is advocating dry storage

### Fukushima dry storage

- A dry storage facility (completed in August 1995)
- 9 casks, 408 assemblies
- Permission: 20 casks, 150 tons

![Fukushima dry storage](image)

### Fukushima diichi #4 pool plan

**Fukushima Diichi #4 pool plan**

![Fukushima Diichi #4 pool plan](image)

### Tokai Plant #2

- Capacity: 24 casks (61 assemblies in each), about 250t
- Presently: 17 casks (2 empty)

![Tokai Plant #2](image)

Most countries with nuclear power plants use dry cask storage (Frank von Hippel)

![Lingen NPP, Germany](image)

![U.S. Connecticut Yankee (old picture)](image)

![Nuclear Westminster, GA](image)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary storage facility in Germany built in 1-2 months</th>
<th>Fukushima pools are dangerous</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization report, 2011</td>
<td>• So are others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To be used for 1-1.5 years</td>
<td>• Way to go: dry storage at power plant sites for safety reasons.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• This would also alleviate the pressure for starting the Rokkasho reprocessing plant</td>
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<tr>
<th>ROK policy on reprocessing</th>
<th>Problem with ROK’s position</th>
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<tr>
<td>The current agreement of nuclear cooperation with US expires on March 19, 2014</td>
<td>1992 Joint Declaration of North and South Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula “No enrichment, no reprocessing”</td>
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<td>Negotiation for a new agreement:</td>
<td>Solution?:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Japan is “allowed”, ROK should also be allowed to have reprocessing (and enrichment) facilities</td>
<td>Pyroprocessing is NOT reprocessing, is “proliferation resistant”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Japan’s reprocessing is bad for non proliferation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>US is resisting.</td>
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<th>Rational for Korean Reprocessing: Pools will become full starting 2016</th>
<th>Dry storage at Wolsong CANDU heavy water reactor</th>
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<th>MACSTOR-400</th>
<th>Reprocessing not solution for final disposal</th>
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<th>Plus Plutonium, Uranium Low level waste Pollution</th>
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<td>Reprocessing High level waste</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final disposal site</td>
<td>Not ready</td>
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<td>Pyroprocessing will not be ready in 2016</td>
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</table>
Separated civilian plutonium could threaten nuclear disarmament (IPFM)
Toward Missile Control and Disarmament in the Northeast Asia

Kazuhiko Tamaki

Vice president, Peace Depot Inc.
Editor in chief, “Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor”

December 8, 2012

The Republic of Korea and the United States agreed October 7 this year to expand the range of the ROK's ballistic missile up to 500 miles, or about 800 kilometers, which had been being limited to be shorter than 300 kilometers under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) exchanged in 2001. The expanded range is enough to reach any target in DPRK and even in the northeast and southwest portions of China and Russia. At the same time, both governments agreed to equip the ROK Army with unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, with 2.5 ton in weight and 300 miles cruising range. The biggest objective for these revisions is, according to the ROK defense officials, "to prevent North Korea's military provocations."

The DPRK, in response, criticized the revisions by ROK-U.S. as that "push the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the extreme pitch of tension and ignite a war against the DPRK any moment", warning that its army and strategic rocket force are "keeping within the scope of strike not only the bases of the puppet forces and the U.S. imperialist aggression forces' bases in the inviolable land of Korea but also Japan, Guam and the U.S. mainland" (National Defense Commission spokesman, October 9.)

Those moves will certainly bring about new dimensions to the "missile race" not only in Korean Peninsula but also in the whole Northeast Asia. The provocative rhetoric of the North will provide Japan of the "rationale" for accelerating the Missile Defense (MD) cooperation with the U.S. and may further stimulate the hawkish discussions to pursue the ballistic missile capabilities of its own for deterrence, which have been being prohibited since early 1970s under the "exclusively defensive posture" policy derived from Article 9 of the constitution. In turn, China, who already has various missile capabilities including those of intermediate range enough to reach ROK or Japan, may have intention to preserve or even strengthen such capabilities. Further, we should note the existence of U.S. cruise missiles, named as "Tomahawk (TLAM-C)", deployed on the nine surface ships home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan which the North Korea and China deem as the biggest conventional threat.

Thus, in working out for a concept of comprehensive security framework in this region, consideration on regional "missile control and disarmament" issue should be one of the main pillars. However there are not a few difficulties in dealing it multilaterally.

Firstly, there exists no universal legally binding regime for controlling and/or limiting missiles at the present other than Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which entered into force in November 2002. By subscribing it, "members voluntarily commit themselves politically to provide pre-launch notifications (PLNs) on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches (SLVs) and test flights. Subscribing States also commit themselves to submit an annual declaration (AD) of their country's policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles."(Website. www.hcoc.at/). The HCoC also requests the signatories "To exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security."(3.(c)). As of November 2012, there are 134 signatories in the HCoC. Among them are the four Six Party Talk members, namely the U.S., Japan, Russia and
the ROK while China and the DPRK still reserve the subscription.

The second difficulty in dealing with missile control and disarmament is the "dual-use" characteristics of the space launching vehicles (SLVs) related technologies, i.e. the technologies used in satellite launch for peaceful purpose and those of missiles as weapon systems, including delivering of the weapons of mass destruction, are essentially the same.

Ever since the 1998 launch of the SLV, or "Taepodong-1" in the western states' term, the DPRK has been insisting that purpose of launches have been bringing non-military satellites into the orbit and have no relation to the development of delivery vehicles for WMDs. On the last unsuccessful launch of "earth observation satellite" in April 13, 2012, the DPRK voluntarily provided pre-notification (PLN) to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and invited foreign experts and media to the launch site.

The UN Security Council, despite such measures taken by the DPRK, issued the Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2012/13) which "strongly condemn" the launch underscoring it "as well as any launch that uses ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle, is a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)." The DPRK in response issued the Foreign Ministry Statement on April 17 to "resolutely and totally reject the unreasonable behavior of the UNSC to violate the DPRK's legitimate right to launch satellites." and declared it "will continue exercising the independent right to use space recognized by the universally accepted international laws which are above the UNSC resolutions."

On the base of these developments, in discussing possible steps toward a missile control and disarmament in the Northeast Asia, several provisions of the HCoC should be taken into consideration while expanding the subject to include not only ballistic missiles but also cruise missiles. The preliminary stage may include:

* Subscription by China and DPRK to the HCoC.
* Mutual and indiscriminate acknowledgement of right of launching SLVs for peaceful purposes.
* Preparation of the permanent regional subsidiary body for promoting the openness and confidence through information exchange and mutual site visits, etc.
* Joint research and development on technological measures for verification, especially for distinguishing "peaceful" and "offensive" characteristics of the SLVs in problem.
* Possible criteria for control and disarmament for either ballistic or cruise missiles (including "drones").

In this course, Japan could play important roles as a non-possessor of the ballistic missiles with advanced space technologies. Anyway, it is essential for all relevant states to address in cool manner the scheduled launch by the DPRK in middle December.
Regional Cooperation and Civil Society in Northeast Asia

*Satoshi Hirose*

Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University

I. Introduction

Today, the Northeast Asia is regarded as one of the most unstable areas in the world and possible cradles for an armed conflict. In addition, the Northeast Asia is also recognized as an area of a residue of the cold war, namely nuclear hostility and possible nuclear proliferation. In order to change the situation and reverse the tide, a proposal of comprehensive approach for the Northeast Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is quite attractive, but there are still many difficult problems to overcome to materialize the proposal. In this short presentation, I would like to examine some basic obstacles of the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone with emphasis on the difficulties of regional cooperation in the area.

II. External reasons of instability

When we talk about the international environment of the Northeast Asia, we often mention the following countries and areas, Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the United States and possibly Russia, as key players. No one dares to say that the relations among those countries are good and desirable now. There is no prospect, at least in a foreseeable future, for reducing tension between China and Taiwan as well as between two Koreas. The border disputes among Japan, China, Republic of Korea are most likely at the worst situation since the end of the second world war. The potential military and nuclear rivalry between China and the United States is getting more and more actual. In addition, DPRK is still pursuing its nuclear program. In short, we must admit the fact that there are rather many potential reasons of international conflicts in the Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, unlike many other regions in the world, there is not yet any really working international arrangement for regional cooperation. There are several legal and de facto bilateral security arrangements, such as US-Japan Security Treaty, US-Korea Security Treaty or China-DPRK security cooperation but they are, so to speak, rather legacies of the cold war than the result of regional cooperation. Of course, there have been some attempts to establish a kind of stable and permanent framework for regional cooperation or better atmosphere for mutual cooperation in the region in the past, but there is no more such atmosphere or ongoing attempt now.

However, in spite of some adverse effects of political troubles, economic relations in the region are much better, aside from the exceptional case of DPRK. The trade in the region, including the United States, is growing rather steadily, even though there has been some problems of imbalance and occasional trouble. In terms of economic or financial cooperation, at first, the United States granted large sum of economic assistance to Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan to assist the recovery from war damage and to keep them in the Western bloc under the cold war. Then, Japan followed the United States and started economic assistance to Republic of Korea and Taiwan, and later, to China. Japan’s economic assistance in the region originally started as a part of its war reparation and, as a result, it did not develop into a base for regional economic organizations. Consequently, until now, there is no permanent regional framework for economic or financial cooperation in the Northeast Asia.
This lack of any stable arrangement for regional cooperation is a great disadvantage of the Northeast Asia because when we think about any particular problem to solve, there is no reliable place to start any negotiations.

III. Internal Problems

When we think about the situation in the Northeast Asia, internal situations of relevant countries are also, or sometimes, more important. Regarding recent border disputes among Japan, China and Republic of Korea, some people have already pointed out that the true reasons behind the scene been domestic political and social problems rather than international. I personally almost agree with these opinions. Exaggerating external threats and trying to stir up nationalism are common techniques for politicians in any countries. Especially during the time of economic or social difficulties, or intense political conflicts, some politicians tend to resort to this technique in order to strengthen their political leadership without paying much consideration to its grave consequences.

Unfortunately, this might be true in countries of the Northeast Asia. I do not want to go into details but, in Japan, long stagnation of economy and political disorder have given many people big frustration. In China, social tension from economic gap between rich and poor as well as the problem of corruption is getting more and more serious. The economy of DPRK is practically collapsing and without fundamental economic and social reform, which means the end of current regime, it is impossible to recover even with substantive external assistance. The people of Republic of Korea, might be suffering from the gap between their high expectation and reality, and a kind of instability.

For each country, it is very easy and convenient to find some enemies and blame the troubles on them. If they blame other countries, they may avoid domestic turmoil but, instead, it may deteriorate the international relations, which, I am afraid, might happen now in the Northeast Asia. Furthermore, it is quite difficult to solve these problems from outside. Domestic problems may affect the international environment and make it worse, and deteriorating international atmosphere would make more stress to the people in the region. This is a typical vicious cycle and we must stop this cycle to happen, or reverse this cycle. But how is the problem.

IV. Approach to Overcome the Difficulty

It is quite difficult to improve the situation in the Northeast Asia and I do not have any clear idea about where to start the process. There are some suggestions for improving crucial bilateral relations by solving outstanding problems like border disputes. However, the true reason behind the prolonged disputes is, in my opinion, domestic rather than external. I believe that most of relevant countries do understand the cost of continuing the disputes. But, the governments of the relevant countries have been reluctant to make any compromise because it may give an impression of weak leadership before their people.

It may be possible for the relevant governments to avoid escalation and, some country, most likely the United States, may try to mediate the disputing countries. This approach may improve the situation and will contribute to the confidence building in the region, but it will not solve the problems without solving domestic troubles in respective country. This is the most important and most difficult part. If the people in the region would seek for more conflict, there would be no hope anyway. But I do not think majority of the ordinary people in the region are willing to be involved in international conflict. The biggest problem is that majority of the people may still believe that there is no alternative than continuing deterrence toward their supposed enemy in order to protect themselves and their vital interest.

We must overcome these futile disputes among the governments. In other words, we must find ways to go through the boundaries and foster mutual understanding among the peoples of the relevant countries. This is also a formidable task. Especially, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for Japanese people to establish some substantive communications with the ordinary
people in DPRK. Maybe, the only possibility is trying to establish some channel through appropriate organizations in China. Well, I know it is also difficult for Japanese people to approach Chinese people now. However, I still believe that, fundamentally, it is easier for Japanese, Chinese and South Korean people to share their concerns about the situation in DPRK. We may start from this, sharing humanitarian concerns about the people in DPRK though it may look like too far from nuclear matters. Assisting the people in DPRK in order to avoid rapid and total collapse of the society of DPRK, particularly with nuclear capability, can be regarded as an common interest of all relevant countries, yet it may be quite difficult to implement at governmental level. But it must be easier at citizens' level and through such citizens' cooperation, we may nourish mutual understanding and trust among the people in the region.

V. Conclusion: Toward the stable peace

Frankly speaking, I do not think it is possible to push through any international arrangements in the Northeast Asia or promote confidence building measures at governmental level now. But it does not mean that we have to give up. As I mentioned, we may start with establishing multinational cooperation to assist the people in DPRK and that kind of attempt will inevitably involve cooperation among the people in China, since it is almost impossible to establish a direct channel from Japan or Republic of Korea. It may look like a detour and I am sure that it will take time to establish reliable solidarity among the people in the region especially when the relations at government level are worsening. However, as many people have already pointed out, power of civil society, regrettably which is absolutely lacking in the Northeast Asia now, is indispensable in the process of nuclear disarmament. I believe we should start building up the civil society in the region through the assistance to DPRK with hope that it will open a path to regional cooperation and confidence building in the long run.
Offering a Wreath of Flowers to A-bomb Victims (Dec. 7, 2012)

Visiting the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (Dec. 7, 2012)

Meeting with Yoriko Kawaguchi, Former Foreign Minister of Japan (Dec. 10, 2012)

Public Symposium with MPs Masayoshi Hamada and Tetsuo Inami at Meiji Gakuin Univ. (Dec. 10, 2012)
### Extended Nuclear Deterrence and a NE Asian NWFZ

*Alyn Ware*

**Regional NWFZs**
- Antarctica – 1959
- Outer Space – 1967
- Latin America and the Caribbean – 1967
- Seabed – 1971
- South Pacific – 1985
- South East Asia – 1995
- Africa – 1996
- Central Asia – 2006

**Core elements of a NWFZ**
- Prohibition of manufacture, production, possession, testing, acquisition, use and control of nuclear weapons by States parties
- Prohibition of deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States parties
- Protocols in which the Nuclear Weapon States give negative security assurances to the States parties.

**Variable elements of NWFZs**
- Zone of application
- Deployment or transit through, internal waters, territorial waters and exclusive economic zones
- Nuclear waste dumping
- Attacks on nuclear facilities
- Nuclear fuel cycle
- Administrative bodies

**Visits by nuclear capable ships and planes**

In general, States party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone remain free to decide for themselves whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to their ports and airfields, transit of their airspace by foreign aircraft and navigation by foreign ships in or over their territorial sea, archipelagic waters or straits that are used for international navigation.
Extended nuclear deterrence and NWFZs

- Protocols for Nuclear Weapon States prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the States Parties to the zones, but do not prohibit the defence of States Parties with nuclear weapons outside the zones.
- Zones where extended nuclear deterrence is or could be an issue:
  - South Pacific - 1985
  - Central Asia - 2006
  - Central Europe (proposed)
  - Arctic (proposed)
  - NE Asia (proposed)

South Pacific

- Australia maintains extended nuclear deterrence despite being a member of the Rarotonga Treaty
- Advantages:
  - Enabled inclusion of Australia in the zone
  - Enabled negation of the zone
  - Establishes a norm against nuclear weapons
  - Contradictions in the norm can be a stimulus to further change in policy
- Disadvantages:
  - Weakens the normative value of the zone
  - Provides context for nuclear deployment and cooperation – transit, port visits, nuclear cooperation.

Australia and the SP NWFZ

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986 - Part II

- 8. Manufacture, production and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices is prohibited
- 9. Research and development relating to manufacture or production of nuclear explosive devices prohibited
- 10. Possession of, or control over, nuclear explosive devices prohibited
- 11. Stationing of nuclear explosive devices in Australia prohibited
- 12. Testing of nuclear explosive devices prohibited
- 13. Facilitation of manufacture, production, acquisition or testing of nuclear explosive devices prohibited
- 14. Application of offence provisions outside Australia

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986 – Part II

- 15. (1) and (2). Visits of foreign ships and aircraft exempt.
- 15. (3) Provisions do not apply to weapons of other countries if outside Australia

Positive policy change in Australia?

Positives
- Position in the ICJ Advisory Opinion
- Leadership – Canberra Commission, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Negatives
- Port visits
- Lack of support for ICJ follow-up resolution and nuclear weapons convention
- Continued adherence to nuclear deterrence

Australia and nuclear deterrence

Defence White Paper 2009 Section 6:34

- For so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia. Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.

Central Asia NWFZ and nuclear deterrence


The signatories to the Tashkent Treaty are obliged to render all necessary assistance, including military assistance, in response to an aggression against a party to it. The type of weapon that may or may not be used in providing assistance is not specified.

Central Asia NWFZ

Positive changes:
- Shift to votes in favour of ICJ follow-up resolution and support for NWC
- Kazakhstan uses NWFZ as context for promoting global nuclear disarmament initiatives.

Negative
- Some NWS refuse to ratify the protocols
NE Asia NWFZ – Choices on extended nuclear deterrence

- Prohibit extended nuclear deterrence
  - D9 and PNND models: Obligations of intra-zonal States:
    - To eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its security policy.
    - Stronger norm against nuclear weapons
    - Avoids contradictions in policies

- Allow extended nuclear deterrence to apply outside the zone.
  - Easier to get agreement of Japanese and South Korean governments
  - Allay concerns of public subscribers to nuclear deterrence
  - Alternatives to nuclear deterrence in meeting perceived security threats from inter-zonal States much easier to advance than alternatives to nuclear deterrence in dealing with threats from NWS

Conditions to facilitate ending of extended nuclear deterrence in a NE Asia NWFZ or subsequent to it?

- Establishment of regional security mechanisms
- Building confidence in negative security assurances from NWS
- Development of sole purpose or no–first–use doctrines

Building political momentum for phasing out extended nuclear deterrence: 2009 US Nuclear Posture Review

- Sec 3. Reducing nuclear force levels:
  - Increase the contribution of non-nuclear systems to US regional deterrence and assurances in order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
  - Eliminate the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missile.

- Sec 4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners.
  - Increase the reliance on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures.
  - Affirm “negative security assurances”.

Parliamentarians and extended nuclear deterrence

- 2008: Joint statement of parliamentarians from NATO nuclear sharing countries;
- 2009: PNND event at United Nations. Joint paper implementing the vision for a nuclear-weapon–free world: Time to close the nuclear umbrella, by parliamentarians from NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Parliamentary support for NWFZs

- 2009 IPU resolution
- 2010 Parliamentary Statement on a Middle East Zone Free from Nuclear Weapons and other WMD
- Parliamentary resolutions and conferences for an Arctic NWFZ – now Danish policy
- Parliamentary resolutions for a Europe NWFZ (Belgium, Sweden)
Nuclear deterrence and military expenditure – the myth of ‘more bang for the buck!’

Australian Defence White Paper 2009, Section 6.34

- Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.

Australian Defence budget:
- 18.0 The Government has committed to real growth in the Defence budget of 3 per cent to 2017-18 and 2.2 per cent real growth thereafter to 2030. This will allow Defence to bolster capability and ensure that our men and women in uniform have all the capability, training, and protection they need to do their job as safely, as effectively, and as efficiently as is possible.

More buck for the bang!

- Top five countries in military spending are the P5 Nuclear Weapon States, China, France

- Other nuclear-weapon possessors:
  - India number 8. Israel number 17.

- Countries under extended nuclear deterrence:
  - Japan is number 6. Australia number 13. Canada, Turkey and Germany also feature in the top 15.

- Countries that have abandoned nuclear deterrence
  - New Zealand at number 62. Kazakhstan at number 66.
  - South Africa 43. Sweden 31, Switzerland 37.

SIPRI Yearbook 2012.

NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM
Dialogue on the Process to Achieve and Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World

- Inaugural issue on International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons
- Next issue on Nuclear Deterrence

www.abolitionforum.org
Addendum 1

Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ Workshop I

December 7 (Fri) – 10 (Mon), 2012
Nagasaki & Tokyo

北東アジア非核兵器地域の実現へ新しいアプローチの可能性
第1回 国際ワークショップ
2012年12月7日(金)～10日(月) 長崎・東京

COSPONSORS 共催団体

IN COOPERATION WITH 協力団体
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>10:15</td>
<td>Offering a Wreath of Flowers for A-bomb Victims (optional)</td>
<td>撥花（弔花）</td>
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<td>10:30</td>
<td>Visiting the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (optional)</td>
<td>長崎原爆遺址講演 (看護)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30-12:40</td>
<td>Preparatory Meeting with Interpreters with Lunch</td>
<td>(1F, Pompe Hall, Sakamoto Campus, Nagasaki Univ.)</td>
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<td>12:50-13:15</td>
<td>Meeting with President of Nagasaki Univ.</td>
<td>学長表敬</td>
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<td>13:15-13:25</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>移動, 会場移動</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30-14:05</td>
<td>Opening</td>
<td>(2F, Pompe Hall, Sakamoto Campus, Nagasaki Univ.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30-13:40</td>
<td>OPENING ADDRESS: Shigeru Katamine</td>
<td>講演者表敬, 八田和彦</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:40-14:05</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION: Hiromichi Umebayashi</td>
<td>イントロダクション：梅林宜彦</td>
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<td>&quot;NEA-NWFZ Initiative: Need for a New Approach&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;北朝鮮核問題解決のための新しいアプローチの必要性&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;北朝鮮核問題解決のための新しいアプローチの必要性&quot;</td>
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<td>14:05-15:30</td>
<td>Keynotes</td>
<td>MODERATOR: Susumu Shirabe</td>
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<td>14:05-14:30</td>
<td>KEYNOTE 1: Morton H. Halperin</td>
<td>モーテルーター：毛利</td>
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<td>&quot;A Proposal for a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security of NEA&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;A Proposal for a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security of NEA&quot;</td>
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<td>「北朝鮮核問題の平和と安全保障に関する合意的協定の提案」</td>
<td>「北朝鮮核問題の平和と安全保障に関する合意的協定の提案」</td>
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<td>KEYNOTE 2: Peter Hayes</td>
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<td>14:55-15:30</td>
<td>Q&amp;A</td>
<td>質疑応答</td>
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<td>15:30-16:00</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>休憩</td>
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<td>16:00-17:30</td>
<td>Session 1: Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ</td>
<td>セッションⅠ：北朝鮮核問題解決のための合意的協定に対する見解</td>
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<td>MODERATOR: Satoshi Hirose</td>
<td>モーテルーター：平越正生</td>
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<td>Kiho Yi - “ROK Perspectives”</td>
<td>輔導者：Roku</td>
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<td>Guihong Zhang - &quot;Chinese Perspectives&quot;</td>
<td>輔導者：毛利ierung</td>
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<td>Kazumi Mizuoto - &quot;Japanese Perspectives&quot;</td>
<td>輔導者：Kazumi</td>
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<td>Randy Rydell - &quot;Multilateral Perspectives&quot;</td>
<td>輔導者：Randy</td>
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<td>17:30-18:00</td>
<td>Preparatory Meeting with Interpreters (Public Symposium Panelists and Moderators)</td>
<td>公開シンポジウムパネリスト及びモーテルーター</td>
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<td>18:30-20:30</td>
<td>RECEPTION (Room Manaduru, Hotel New Nagasaki)</td>
<td>レセプション（ホテルニューナガサキ 房総の間）</td>
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10:00-11:30  Session 2: Overarching Themes
セッション2: 橋渡りなテーマ
MODERATOR: Alyn Ware
Masafumi Takubo

"Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues -- ROK and Japan"
田熊秀文

"Missile Control in Northeast Asia"
鶴巻一也

"Regional Cooperation and Civil Society in Northeast Asia"
白藤賢司

Taking a Collective Photo, and Lunch
写真撮影、昼食

13:00-13:50  Session 3: Issues on a NEA-NWFZ
セッション3: 北東アジア核兵器自由地域をめざす核関連
MODERATOR: Mitsuru Kurosawa
Koichi Nakamura

"Lessons from Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaties"
木村寛

Alyn Ware

"NEA-NWFZ and Extended Nuclear Deterrence"
エイレン・ウェア

Closing

MODERATOR: Hiromichi Umebayashi

Remarks by All Moderators and Speakers

15:00-17:00  International Public Symposium
公開国際シンポジウム

"Towards a NEA-NWFZ: Time for a New Approach"

OPENING ADDRESS

Hiromichi Umebayashi

Need for a New Approach

Morton H. Halperin

A Proposal for a Comprehensive Agreement

PANEL DISCUSSION

MODERATOR: Koichi Nakamura

PANELISTS: Peter Hayes
Kihong Yi
Zhang Guihong
Kazumi Mizumoto
Randy Rydell

CLOSING REMARKS: Susumu Shirabe
12/9
Sunday, December 9, 2012

9:00-10:30  Project Meeting (Room Hakacho, Hotel New Nagasaki)
プロジェクト会議（ソラクルーム長崎、新長崎）

Departure for Tokyo
東京へ移動

12/10
Monday, December 10, 2012

15:45-17:00  Meetings with Vice Minister and other officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan)
外務省副大臣などとの会合

18:00-20:00  International Public Symposium
公開国際シンポジウム
(Conference Room, Meiji Gakuin University)
(明治学院大学 白金校舎・本館10階大会議室)

“Toward a NEA–NWFZ — A Comprehensive Approach to the Regional Security”
「北東アジア非核兵器米域へ－地域安全保障のための包括的アプローチ」

OPENING ADDRESS: Tetsuo Inami

OPENING ADDRESS: Susumu Shirabe

MODERATOR: Hiromichi Umebayashi

SPEAKERS: Morton H. Halperin
Peter Hayes
Kohno Masatsugu
Zhang Guihong
Randy Rydell
Alyn Ware
Masayoshi Hamada

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Morton H. Halperin, Dr., Senior Adviser, the Open Society Foundations and the Open Society Policy Center

Dr. Halperin worked on nuclear policy issues in the Clinton, Nixon, Johnson and Kennedy administrations. He held a number of senior positions in the government including, most recently, as Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State (1998-2001). He taught at Harvard (1960-66) and, as a visitor at other universities including Columbia, George Washington, and Yale.

He has been affiliated with a number of think tanks including the Center for American Progress, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Century Foundation and the Brookings Institution. He has testified often before congressional committees most recently on the New START Treaty and US nuclear policy. Dr. Halperin served on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.

Dr. Halperin is the author and co-author of numerous books and articles on nuclear policy including Strategy and Arms Control, China and the Bomb, and Nuclear Fallacy.

Peter Hayes, Dr., Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

He is Professor of International Relations, Global Studies School, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director, Nautilus Institute in San Francisco and of Nautilus at RMIT.

He works at the nexus of security, environment and energy policy problems. Best known for innovative cooperative engagement strategies in North Korea, he has developed techniques at Nautilus Institute for seeing near-term solutions to global security and sustainability problems and applied them in East Asia, Australia, and South Asia.

Peter has worked for many international organizations including UN Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, and Global Environment Facility. He was founding director of the Environment Liaison Centre in Kenya in 1975. He has traveled, lived, and worked in Asia, North America, Europe and Africa. He has visited North Korea seven times. He was born in Melbourne Australia; today he is a dual national of Australia and the United States. He is married with two children.

Randy Rydell, Dr., Senior Political Affairs Officer, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

He is Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Office of Angela Kane, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. He served from January 2005 to June 2008 as Senior Counsellor and Report Director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMD Commission) and Senior Fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. He joined the UN Secretariat in 1998, where he served as an adviser to Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala and his successors, Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe and Nobuaki Tanaka, and Sergio Duarte. He has also served as Secretary of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2001) and as a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School (September 1998 to February 1999, and September 2009 to January 2010). Recipient of the “Unsung Heroes’ award, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2009.

Rydell worked for Senator John Glenn between 1987 and 1998 as a member of the Professional Staff of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the US Senate. He assisted in the drafting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1994 and other legislation. Before joining the Senate, he was an international political analyst at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 1980 to 1986.

Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

He also serves as the International Representative of the Peace Foundation, Director of Katearo Lawyers for Peace, International Consultant for the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (USA) and Consultant at Large for the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms. He is a member of the New Zealand Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control and has been on government delegations to the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the UNESCO Ministers of Education Conference in Geneva 2002 at which he was Head of Delegation. He has been awarded the 1996 UN International Year of Peace (New Zealand) prize and the 2009 Right Livelihood Award in honour of his peace education and disarmament work. He is on the international boards of a number of other organizations including the Global Campaign for Peace Education, Abolition 2000 and the Middle Powers Initiative, and was also the UN Coordinator for the World Court Project.

Guihong Zhang, Dr., Executive Director, Center for UN Studies, Fudan University

He is Executive Director of Center for UN Studies, and Associate Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University. He is Vice President and Secretary-General of Shanghai UN Research Association, the council member of the United Nations Association of China, China’s Association of South Asian Studies, and China-India Friendship Association. He is Vice President of Association of Asian Scholars (AAS) as well as Commander of AAS in China. He has participated in the “International Visitor Leadership Program” (2003) sponsored by U.S. Department of State and was a visiting scholar at the Henry L. Stimson Center (2002-2003), Monterey Institute of International Studies and University of Georgia (2008), University of Washington (2006), USA, and Asia Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University as well as Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2004-2005), India. His major areas of research are UN-related issues, Sino-U.S. Indian relations, International Organizations, and Asia-Pacific security.

Yi Kiho, Dr., Director, Center for Peace and Public Integrity, Hankyul University

He is a professor of Hankyul University in charge of Center for Peace and Public Integrity since 2008. Also he is working as the executive director of API (Asia Regional Initiative) having a partnership with Nautilus Institute since 2007. He served as the Korean coordinator of PRIDE by early this year. He had worked as a secretary general of Korea Peace Forum (2003-2006). His main concern is to build up Peace Network among people and CSOs in Asia. He had worked in Korea Christian Academy with a focus on Korean Political Change and Global Peace Network for about 10 years before 1999. With his work, in 1997 he finished his Ph.D dissertation titled ‘Social Movement Network in the democratization process of Korea’ in Yonsei University. Between 1999 and 2002, as a visiting scholar, he studied in Waseda University in Japan, concerning on Local Civil Movement and Peace in East Asia. Major publications include “Democratization and East Asia Civil Society” in Designing for Asian Community and Its Future (Nakamura Jun and Hirano Kenichiro Ed. Ishiyama, 2007) ‘Historical Reflections and New Challenges of Korean Peace Movements’ Minse-Gongbang, Autumn, 2007.

Mitsuru Kurosawa, Dr., Professor, Osaka Jogakuen University

Kazumi Mizumoto, Professor, Vice President, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
After graduating from Tokyo University, the Faculty of Law in 1981, he joined the Asahi Shim bun, a national newspaper, as staff reporter. While he was at the Asahi, he earned an M.A.L.D. degree at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in 1989. He covered the Metropolitan Police Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia before being assigned to Los Angeles as a correspondent from 1995 to 1997. In 1998, he joined the Hiroshima Peace Institute as an Associate Professor. His research interests include international relations, nuclear disarmament, and issues related to the suffering of the atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Masafumi Takubo, Operator, Japanese Nuclear Information Website Kakujojo.net
He is an independent nuclear policy analyst. He manages the nuclear information website Kakujojo, which he established in 2004. He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), which was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and non-proliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. He has written widely on nuclear power and weapons policy issues, including among others, "Wake up, stop dreaming: reassessing Japan’s reprocessing program," Nonproliferation Review, March 2008. His OP-ED "Japan’s Nuclear Mistake", coauthored with Frank von Hippel, cochair of IPFM, was published by New York Times November 28, 2012.

Kazuhiko Tamaki, Vice President, Peace Depot Inc.
Born in 1953, Kanshin Tamaki had joined the local/national peace movements in the middle 1970s. His main interests as an activist included anti-military bases research and campaign focusing on the entry of the U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons into the Japanese ports. He had also worked hard in the campaign to support and building solidarity with the South Korean people’s struggle for democratization from 70s to 80s. He participated in establishment of the Peace Depot 1997. Since 2004, he has been working as one of the co-editors and, since 2009, the editor in chief of the “Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor,” biweekly newsletter issued by the Peace Depot.

Susumu Shirabe, Dr., Chairman, PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
Dr. Shirabe is trustee for research affairs at Nagasaki University; he is also vice president in charge of the university’s social contribution initiatives. In addition to being a neurologist, he also holds positions as professor at Nagasaki University Hospital and the Center for Campus Health and Community Medicine. He is a second-generation atomic bomb survivor: both his mother and his grandparents survived the bombing of Nagasaki; his grandparents have since passed away. Two of his uncles were killed in the atomic bombing when they were students. Dr. Shirabe has been a member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) for more than twenty years, and he is international council member for the organization’s Japanese affiliate.

Hiromichi Umebayashi, Dr., Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (REENA)
He is also Special Advisor. Former President & Founder of Peace Depot Inc., Japan. He is a PhD holder in the field of Applied Physics from Tokyo University. After resigning from teaching in a university in 1980, he became a fulltime campaigner and researcher for peace disarmament and human rights issues. In April 2012, when REENA was established, he became its Director. He serves as the East Asian Coordinator of PNN (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament). Among his recent books is “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones” from Iwanami Shoten.

Satoshi Hirose, Professor, Vice Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (REENA)
Prof. Hirose is co-editor of “Disarmament Review”, an annual issued by the Japan Assembly of Disarmament Studies. He used to serve for the United Nations Development Programme as a programme officer and for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan as a legal adviser to the Japanese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. He also participated to the Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty held in New York in 1995 as a member of Japanese Delegation. He has a broad background in disarmament issues as well as in international cooperation and development assistance.

Mariko Mine, Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (REENA)
She has an extensive career as a researcher at Atomic Bomb Disease Institute, Graduate School of Biomedical Science, Nagasaki University.

Keiko Nakamura, Associate Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (REENA)
She also serves as the Japanese Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNNAD). In 2003, she joined the Peace Depot Inc., a Japanese non-profit, independent research institute which aims to build a security system that does not rely on military power, where she had served as Secretary-General from 2005-2012. She has written numerous articles on "Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor" (Peace Depot’s bi-weekly periodical) and “Yearbook Nuclear Disarmament and Peace.” She is a member of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies and Japan Association of Peace Studies.