

は終結に 蔣介石政府解放のおかげで、 朝鮮戦争

CROSS SECTION

'Unleashing' of Chiang Helped End Korean War

One of the world's best-hated, most respected, most criticized leaders — Chiang Kai-shek — is the subject of the following provocative letter republished from *The New York Times*. Yu-tang Liu, now resident in United States, was formerly professor of government at Tsinghua University, Peiping.

DR. YU-TANG LIU
New York Times

So much derision has been heaped upon President Eisenhower's "unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek," and so little has been said in its defence, that one wonders whether this early act by Mr. Eisenhower as president was really such an amateurish gesture of futility.



CHIANG KAI-SHEK

... mistake to deride his influence

Governor Harriman in his address to the Democratic committee on March 8, said that

let us, as Al Smith would say, look at the record.

★ ★ ★

MR. EISENHOWER MADE A PERSONAL trip to Korea in the course of the presidential campaign in 1952. He conferred with political and military leaders there.

The Communists had sued for peace in the spring of 1951 when General Ridgway's offensive was mounting.

But the Communists dragged on the-war and protracted the truce negotiations with no prospect of agreement to the principle of voluntary repatriation of POW's up to the start of 1953.

In his first message to Congress in February, 1953, President Eisenhower "took the wraps off Chiang."

★ ★ ★

ON MARCH 28, THE COMMUNISTS agreed to the principle of exchange of sick and wounded which they stated "should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of POWs."

On June 8 the prisoners of war agreement, embodying the principle of voluntary repatriation, was signed.

The Korean truce was finally signed on July 27, 1953.

The fact, plain and undeniable, was and has remained that after the "unleashing" the war in Korea stopped. Would it have stopped even without the "unleashing episode"? Would it have stopped anyway if Adlai Stevenson were in the White House instead?

★ ★ ★

WERE THERE OTHER FACTORS WHICH contributed to the stopping of the Korean war? Whatever the answers to these questions, the overwhelming truth was that the Korean war was over.

Have we already forgotten how much that meant to every man, woman and child in this country, in Great Britain, in the Philippines, in every member of the United Nations which joined in the heroic effort to stop Communist aggression?

★ ★ ★

THERE HAD BEEN NO DEFINITE prospect of peace for two and a half years until the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek.

I personally believe that the "unleashing" led directly to the ending of the Korean war.

The Chinese Communists did not want another front to fight on while the Korean war continued to drain their blood and

共産党軍が臨戦態勢にある地域

Where Red China's Forces Are Ready to Strike



トーマス・シェリング教授（メリーランド大学、ノーベル経済学賞）
「核使用の可能性はキューバ危機の時よりも高かった」



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「ダレス国務長官、小型核兵器による報復を示唆」 「限定核戦争：米国の新戦略」 「ニクソン副大統領、共産中国に対し核攻撃の警告」

DULLES SAYS U. S. PINS RETALIATION ON SMALL A-BOMB

Less-Than-Massive Policy in
Event of War Bars Use of
City-Destroying Weapons

LINE DRAWN ON FORMOSA

Ban on Military Action Hinted
by Secretary if Reds Limit
Invasion to Offshore Isles

By **ELIE ABEL**

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 15—

LIMITED ATOMIC WAR: A NEW U. S. STRATEGY

Weapons and Uses of Manpower Are
Designed for Changed Concepts

By **MANSON W. BALDWIN**

Washington indicated last week that American atomic weapons might be used like bullets against military targets in case of Communist aggression anywhere in the world.

This doctrine of a so-called limited atomic strategy—a modification of the Administration's earlier "massive retaliation" policy—was first enunciated by Secretary of State Dulles and was immediately supported by the President. It follows earlier decisions by the National Security Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Taken collectively, these decisions imply not an irrevocable and general decision to use atomic weapons under any and all circumstances but a very clear trend toward primary dependence upon an atomic strategy.

This strategy does not yet necessarily imply the use of city-destroying weapons in all cases of aggression, but we do appear to be more and more committed, particularly in defense of Western Europe, to the utilization of so-called tactical, or battlefield A-weapons, a strategy of limited atomic war, or less-than-massive retaliation.

Battlefield Weapons

Partially as an effect, partially as a cause of this change in emphasis in military policy, a whole new family of so-called tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons have been, or are being,


Force is now organized and trained—administratively, tactically and logistically—primarily for atomic war, though both the Tactical and the Air Defense Commands still retain a reduced nonatomic capability.

West Europe's Defenses

It is in NATO defense formulas that the limited atomic war concept has had the greatest influence. In Western Europe five U. S. divisions, plus many additional units, are committed to ground defense. The Army has backed them up with all the newest atomic carriers we have, and the Air Force has special tactical atomic units based on the Continent and England, while the Navy is ready in the Mediterranean. The NATO Council has agreed to base future strategy upon the assumption that atomic weapons will be used tactically against Russian aggression, and this decision is making a fundamental change in past concepts. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said last week that our defense concepts are still based essentially upon the line of the Rhine, but there is good reason to believe that already we are commencing to substitute a "forward" strategy. Soon, some Allied planners believe, we can, with the help of tactical A-weapons, annihilate Russian offensives and destroy them at or near the line of the

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 20, 1955.

HOW ATOMIC WEAPONS HAVE CHANGED MILITARY TACTICS



Atom warfare material is based, in part, on the book, "Atomic Weapons in Land Combat," by Col. G. C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner (Military Service Publishing Co.)

NIXON GIVES REDS WARNING ON ATOM

Asserts Any New Aggression
in Pacific Will Be Met by
Nuclear Weapons

By **RICHARD J. H. JOHNSTON**
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CHICAGO, March 17— Vice President Richard M. Nixon today warned the Chinese Communists in the bluntest of terms that they would be met with atomic weapons if they embarked on any new aggression.

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
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ダレス国務長官、
米国は張り子の虎ではない」



U. S. MIGHT CITED

But No Precise Stand Is Given on Offshore Isles by Secretary

*Text of address by Mr. Dulles
is printed on Page 4.*

By ELIE ABEL

Special to The New York Times,

WASHINGTON, March 8 —
Secretary of State **Dulles warned**
Communist China tonight that
the United States was no "paper
tiger."

The tiger analogy is a favorite of Communist propagandists, who depict the United States as snarling bravely enough but in the end backing away from a fight. Mr. Dulles suggested that the American tiger still had powerful teeth and claws.



第1回アジア・アフリカ会議（バンドン会議）（1955）

CHOU ASKS FOR U. S. TALKS ON EASING FORMOSA CRISIS; WASHINGTON SETS TERMS

At Bandung: Faces in the Spotlight **MOVE AT PARLEY**



Gamal Abdel Nasser
Egypt



Chou En-lai
Communist China

Premier Says Peiping
Does Not Want War
With This Country

By **TILLMAN DÜRDIN**

Special to The New York Times.

BANDUNG, Indonesia, April 23—Chou En-lai announced here today that Communist China was prepared to negotiate directly with the United States over Formosa and Far East questions in general.

A statement to this effect was released by the Premier of Communist China at the headquarters of the Asian-African conference.

周恩来、台湾危機緩和を目指した対話を米に要請。
ワシントンは対話条件を設定。



MILESTONES: 1953–1960

NOTE TO READERS

“Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations” has been retired and is no longer maintained. For more information, please see [the full notice](#).

The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958

Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in the 1950s resulted in armed conflict over strategic islands in the Taiwan Strait. On two separate occasions during the 1950s, the PRC bombed islands controlled by the ROC. The United States responded by actively intervening on behalf of the ROC.



Map of the Taiwan Strait

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[1953–1960: Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy](#)

[Dien Bien Phu & the Fall of French Indochina, 1954](#)

[The East German Uprising, 1953](#)

[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization \(SEATO\), 1954](#)

[The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958](#)

[U.S.–China Ambassadorial Talks, 1955–1970](#)

[The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955](#)

[Bandung Conference \(Asian–African Conference\), 1955](#)

[Khrushchev and the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, 1956](#)

[The Suez Crisis, 1956](#)

台灣海峽危機
1954、1955、1958

上海コミュニケ(ニクソン訪中に関する米中共同声明)(1972)



(NY13-Aug.1) GENEVA PRINCIPALS--U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and Wang Ping-an, Red China's ambassador to Poland, wave to spectators at Geneva, Switzerland, where they open diplomatic talks today. Top subject of the meeting will be discussion of ways to ease tension in the Far East. Peiping radio announced today their intention to release 11 U.S. airmen held captive since 1953. (AP Wirephoto via radio from London) (See Story) (38c21020rcal) 1995

ダレス国務長官はいかに戦争を防いだか



U NU
BURMA



PHUMIPHON
THAILAND



NGO DINH DIEM
VIETNAM



SAVANG
LAOS



RAMON MAGSAYSAY
PHILIPPINES



SAUD
SAUDI ARABIA



TAWFIK AL-SUWAIDI
IRAQ

HOW DULLES AVERTED WAR

AT 2 a.m. on June 18, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was awakened by the ringing of the telephone in the bedroom of his home in Washington. It was the officer of the dog watch at the State Department with an urgent radio message from Korea. President Syngman Rhee had ordered his troops guarding the prisoners of war compounds to release all captured North Koreans and Red Chinese. The handful of American officers and noncoms at the camps were powerless to prevent the action and the prisoners were streaming away from the compounds by the thousands.

Dulles listened quietly, grunting an occasional "Yow" to acknowledge. Then he reached over to switch on the light. And at that moment, as his fully aroused mind shook off the fog of sleep, Dulles saw himself and the nation standing on the brink of a new war. It was the first of three times during the Eisenhower administration when the U.S. was brought perilously close to war—and when the new policy of deterrence instituted by Dulles preserved peace.

Why Rhee's highhanded action threatened war will be explained below. This, plus the full story of our other close brushes with war in the past three years, is revealed here for the first time with new information provided by the Secretary and by the State Department. In the conduct of his office, Dulles not only radically revised the "containment" policy of the Truman administration but also altered drastically the basic concept of the job of Secretary of State.

Dulles' direction of U.S. foreign affairs is under attack these days as the presidential election year gets under way. The new information made available to this writer, however, bulwarks the substantial case to be made for Dulles, a case that until now has not been made as strongly as it could because important sections of the record could not be made public.

Here is that record.

The Eisenhower administration's foreign policy began to take shape aboard the cruiser *Helena* as the President-elect returned to the U.S. after having made his promised

visit to Korea. With those cabinet officers whom he had already selected, Eisenhower held daily conferences to consider what should be done about the stalemated war. Dulles led most of these discussions. In the singular lifelong preparation for the job he was about to undertake, he had probably devoted more thought to the subject of war and peace than any other man alive. He believed that he had isolated one of the major underlying causes of war: in a word, miscalculation.

All the great wars of modern history, Dulles is convinced, were started by national leaders who thought they could get away with it. When they found out that they could not, it was too late. The Korean war, Dulles argued, had been caused by Moscow's mistaken belief that the U.S. would be unwilling to fight to stop armed aggression against South Korea. As much as Dulles admired his predecessor Dean Acheson's courageous reaction to the aggression, he felt that Acheson had made a tragic mistake in suggesting, just six months before the

Communists attacked, that South Korea was outside the U.S.'s "vital perimeter" area.

As Dulles presented these conclusions in the meetings aboard the *Helena*, Eisenhower listened thoughtfully. (At times he listened a little impatiently too. More accustomed to the quick, crisp manner of a military briefing officer than to the thoughtful pauses of Dulles, Eisenhower was once heard to exclaim, "Why doesn't he speak up faster and say what he has on his mind?" When Dulles had finished, the newly elected President made his first vital decision. He would make every effort to bring an honorable truce out of the negotiations then in progress. But if the Communists tried to continue keeping the U.N. command and the U.S. bogged down in stalemate, the U.S. would this time fight to win.

This would mean carrying the air attack into Manchuria, where the Chinese army and air force bases had been protected by the Truman administration's decision not to cross

冷戦と中国—ソ連同盟の運命
(1945～1959)

沈志华◇著

无奈的选择

冷战与中苏同盟的命运

【下】

THE COLD WAR AND (1945-1959)
THE FATE OF
THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE
1945-1959



社会科学文献出版社
SOCIAL SCIENCES ACADEMIC PRESS (CHINA)

フルシチョフー毛沢東会談



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米国の外交関係（1955～57）
第3巻：中国

FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

1955–1957
VOLUME III

CHINA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

アイゼンハワーの脅し…
世界を救った大統領の秘密の闘い」
ーイヴァン・トーマス著

A black and white portrait of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, looking directly at the camera with a slight smile. He is wearing a dark suit, a white shirt, and a dark tie with small white dots.

IKE'S BLUFF

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S
SECRET BATTLE TO SAVE THE WORLD


EVAN THOMAS

Author of THE WAR LOVERS

では、私たちは何をすべきなのか？」
―レオ・トルストイ

LEO TOLSTOY

What Then Must We Do?




with an introduction by
RONALD SAMPSON

GREEN



CLASSIC





How Cozy Is Russia and China's Military Relationship?

Dmitri Trenin
Q&A

Russia and China's strategic military cooperation is becoming ever closer. President Putin has announced that Russia is helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches.

TOPICS DISCUSSED

FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY RUSSIA IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Alexander Gabuev discusses why foreign investors steer clear of Russia's far East

PODCAST:

Tatiana Flegontova, Alexander Gabuev, and Janis Kluge detail how trade is doing five years after Crimea

BROOKINGS



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2015年カーネギー平和財団主催「核政策国際会議」



CARNEGIE
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RESEARCH ▾


EXPERTS ▾

PROGRAMS ▾



CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY CONFERENCE

ローズ・ゴットミュラー 軍備管理・安全保障担当国務次官(当時)



CARNE
ENDOW
INTERN
AL PEACE



OR
PEAC

NT F
DNA

A woman with short brown hair, wearing a dark patterned jacket over a light blue shirt, is speaking at a podium. She is gesturing with her hands. The background is dark with some faint text visible. Overlaid on the image is Japanese text in white.

"I am talking about a grassroots effort now to train and develop the support we need among the public to then come back to the Senate ...

85% of the American public supported the treaty back in 1999 ...

Today ... they don't remember what it is."

(CTBTについて)「私が申し上げているのは、議会对策に必要な一般市民の支持をえるための草の根レベルの教育や活動だ・・・

1999年には、米国市民の85%がCTBTを支持していた・・・

今日、米国市民はCTBTが何であるかも覚えていない・・・」

Could the use of nuclear weapons ever be justified?

核兵器の使用が正当化されることはあり得るか？



CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RESEARCH ∨

EXPERTS ∨

PROGRAMS ∨



CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL
NUCLEAR POLICY CONFERENCE

Yes (はい) 43%

No (いいえ) 57%

A woman with glasses and a patterned scarf is holding a white protest sign. The sign has text in red, blue, and green. The background is blurred, showing other people and a building.

NO more
Hiroshimas !
NO more
Nagasakis !