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NUCLEAR WEAPONS >

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Avoiding a Cold War with China





210241

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IRAQ

HOW DULLES AVERTED WAR

AT 2 a.m. on June 18, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was awakened by the ringing of the telephone in the bedroom of his home in Washington. It was the officer of the dog watch at the State Department with an urgent radio message from Korea. President Syngman Rhee had ordered his troops guarding the prisoners of war compounds to release all captured North Koreans and Red Chinese. The handful of American officers and noncoms at the camps were powerless to prevent the action and the prisoners were streaming away from the compounds by the thousands.

Dulles listened quietly, grunting an occasional "Yow" to acknowledge. Then he reached over to switch on the light. And at that moment, as his fully aroused mind shook off the fog of sleep, Dulles saw himself and the nation standing on the brink of a new war. It was the first of three times during the Eisenhower administration when the U.S. was brought perilously close to war—and when the new policy of deterrence instituted by Dulles preserved peace.

Why Rhee's highhanded action threatened war will be explained below. This, plus the full story of our other close brushes with war in the past three years, is revealed here for the first time with new information provided by the Secretary and by the State Department. In the conduct of his office, Dulles not only radically revised the "containment" policy of the Truman administration but also altered drastically the basic concept of the job of Secretary of State.

Dulles' direction of U.S. foreign affairs is under attack these days as the presidential election year gets under way. The new information made available to this writer, however, bulwarks the substantial case to be made for Dulles, a case that until now has not been made as strongly as it could because important sections of the record could not be made public.

Here is that record.

The Eisenhower administration's foreign policy began to take shape aboard the cruiser *Helena* as the President-elect returned to the U.S. after having made his promised

visit to Korea. With those cabinet officers whom he had already selected, Eisenhower held daily conferences to consider what should be done about the stalemated war. Dulles led most of these discussions. In the singular lifelong preparation for the job he was about to undertake, he had probably devoted more thought to the subject of war and peace than any other man alive. He believed that he had isolated one of the major underlying causes of war: in a word, miscalculation.

All the great wars of modern history, Dulles is convinced, were started by national leaders who thought they could get away with it. When they found out that they could not, it was too late. The Korean war, Dulles argued, had been caused by Moscow's mistaken belief that the U.S. would be unwilling to fight to stop armed aggression against South Korea. As much as Dulles admired his predecessor Dean Acheson's courageous reaction to the aggression, he felt that Acheson had made a tragic mistake in suggesting, just six months before the

Communists attacked, that South Korea was outside the U.S.'s "vital perimeter" area.

As Dulles presented these conclusions in the meetings aboard the *Helena*, Eisenhower listened thoughtfully. (At times he listened a little impatiently too. More accustomed to the quick, crisp manner of a military briefing officer than to the thoughtful pauses of Dulles, Eisenhower was once heard to exclaim, "Why doesn't he speak up faster and say what he has on his mind?" When Dulles had finished, the newly elected President made his first vital decision. He would make every effort to bring an honorable truce out of the negotiations then in progress. But if the Communists tried to continue keeping the U.N. command and the U.S. bogged down in stalemate, the U.S. would this time fight to win.

This would mean carrying the air attack into Manchuria, where the Chinese army and air force bases had been protected by the Truman administration's decision not to cross


日本の軍部から提起された質問について、推奨される米 国の立場

ENCLOSURE "A"


RECOMMENDED POSITIONS REGARDING THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY A JAPANESE MILITARY SOURCE

1. As a preamble to discussions with Japan or other non- 1
Communist countries regarding questions of the nature presented 2
by the Japanese, the United States should make the following 3
points: **共産主義国が攻撃しないよう抑止力を働かせるこ 4
とが自由主義国におけるもっとも重要な目的だ。**
 - a. A central aim of free world policy must be to deter 5
the Communists from the use of their military power. The 6
deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United 7
States and its Allies show they are united in their deter- 8
mination to use appropriate military force against such 9
aggression. 10

米核兵器配備数(海上)



米核兵器陸上配備数(太平洋地域) Pacific Deployments On Shore



Q: もし日本が核武装したら、米国の支援を得られるか？

QUESTION

7. If Japan were to decide to arm herself with nuclear weapons, could she depend upon U.S. support for such a plan?

POSITION

As indicated in the position, question 3, the United States would support a Japanese decision to arm herself with atomic weapons. The scope and phasing of the U.S. support would be determined by appropriate negotiations between the two countries.

A: 支援の規模や程度は検討の余地があるが、基本的に米国は日本の核武装を支持する

ダレス国務長官はいかに戦争を防いだか



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APRIL 2010



TIME

米国を再び核大国にする

MAKING AMERICA NUCLEAR AGAIN

TRUMP'S GAMBLE

BY W.J. HENNIGAN

INSIDE THE DOOM FACTORY

BY SIMON SHUSTER



SLASH THE RED TENTACLES SMOTHERING ASIA



アジアを苦しめる赤い触手を切り捨てろ
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
コッチ兄弟帝国の裏側

SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 5:11PM ET

Inside the Koch Brothers' Toxic Empire

Together, Charles and David Koch control one of the world's largest fortunes, which they are using to buy up our political system. But what they don't want you to know is how they made all that money

By **TIM DICKINSON**



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
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AUTHOR INTERVIEWS

Answering The Old Question: Who Lost China?


November 8, 2014 · 6:04 AM ET

NISHANT DAHIYA

1945 was a momentous year in world history — particularly so in Asia, where Allied forces, having vanquished Germany, turned their attention to Japan. And in many ways, the main theater of action was China.

China at that time was divided between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and the Communists under Mao Zedong. Both were fighting the Japanese — but they would soon turn on each other. In the meantime, they "competed with each other for the ears of American representatives, the dominant power in Asia by far" says Richard Bernstein.

Bernstein is the author of *China 1945*, an authoritative and engaging book that examines the slide into civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists — and how, despite the efforts of U.S. envoys and diplomats, "America and the future leaders of Asia's biggest country had entered into a quarter century of bitter enmity, and the prize that was China was already slipping away," he tells me in an email interview.



China 1945

Mao's Revolution and America's Fateful Choice

by Richard Bernstein

Hardcover, 445 pages

T4917 * \$1.50 * A BANTAM EXPORT EDITION

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OF THE VIETNAM WAR**

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ジョージ・マーシャル将軍と中国



マッカーシー上院議員の「赤狩り」



金日成の朝鮮統一野望



毛沢東、金日成の朝鮮統一に反対



最后的“天朝”
——毛泽东、金日成与中朝关系
(1945-1976)



マッカーサー元帥と朝鮮戦争



朝鮮戦争と中国共産党



中国共産軍とカラークー氏の義父



原子武器爆炸

毛主席语录

实际上并不可怕。
人的一只纸老虎，看样子可怕，
原子弹是美国反动派用来吓

空中爆炸景象



闪光



火球

地面爆炸景象

地面与空中爆炸比较，地面爆炸火球接触地面，近似半球形；尘柱粗大，一开始就和烟云连结在一起。



火球



蘑菇状烟云

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トルーマン大統領、中国に対し核使用の警告

The New York Times.

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LATE CITY EDITION

Becoming fair and cold today. Continued fair and cold tomorrow.
Temperature Range Today—Max., 41; Min., 32
Temperatures Yesterday—Max., 39; Min., 39
Full U. S. Weather Bureau Report, Page 31

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Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 — The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives agreed today on an excess profits tax, retroactive to July 1, that would yield \$3,300,000,000 annually. President Truman had asked for \$4,000,000,000.

The committee thus completed

PRESIDENT WARNS WE WOULD USE ATOM BOMB IN KOREA, IF NECESSARY; SOVIET VETOES PLEA TO RED CHINA

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'Just, Peaceful World' Is
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BACKS M'ARTHUR, ACHESON

President Says U.N. Action Will
Be Pushed and U. S. and Allies
Bolstered to Meet Crisis



Mayor Michael V. DiSalle
Associated Press Wirephoto

KEY PRICE JOB GOES

トランプは北朝鮮に核で脅した。アイゼンハワーは？

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Trump threatened to nuke North Korea. Did Ike do the same?

August 11, 2017 at 7:00 p.m. GMT+9

The myth of Ike's nuclear recklessness could lead us into war.



Was President Dwight D. Eisenhower willing to go nuclear? (AFP/Getty Images)

ほとんどのアメリカ人には知られていないが、
アメリカは一度、
北朝鮮をほぼ全滅させた』ことがある

THE IRISH TIMES

Unknown to most Americans, the US 'totally destroyed' North Korea once before

In its Korean War bombing campaign, the US 'burned down every town in North Korea'

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Updated: Wed, Sep 20, 2017, 11:56

David McNeill in Tokyo



最后的“天朝”
——毛泽东、金日成与中朝关系
(1945-1976)

修订版

沈志华

現在のような状況下で、米国の条件を受け入れるとすれば、間違いなく彼らの野望を拡大させ、また我々の力と威信を根こそぎ奪うことになるだろう。

2017年10月



“Accepting these US terms under the present circumstances would inevitably inflate its ambitions and annihilate our own power and prestige.”