

# Proposal:

A Comprehensive Approach  
to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone



RECNA March, 2015

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,  
Nagasaki University (RECNA)



The Logo represents a deformed Chinese character “出”, which means “exit” or “departure”. Here it symbolizes the “exit” from the nuclear deterrence and “departure” for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Nagasaki is famous for its port “Dejima” or Exit Island, the only port open to overseas during the period of national isolation in Japanese history.

#### **Acknowledgement**

We would like to express our deepest appreciation to Dr. Morton H. Halperin (the U.S., Senior Advisor, Open University Foundations), Dr. Peter Hayes (Australia, Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability), Dr. Shen Dingli (PRC, Associate Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University), Dr. Chung-in Moon (ROK, Professor, Yonsei University), Dr. Kiho Yi (ROK, Director, the Center for Peace and Public Integrity, Hanshin University), Ambassador Dr. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia, Chairman, Blue Banner), and Dr. Kazumi Mizumoto (Japan, Vice President, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University), for their valuable comments on the manuscript of this book.

We would also like to express our gratitude to the staff at Nagasaki University, including Dr. Shigeru Katamine (President, Nagasaki University), Dr. Susumu Shirabe (Vice President, Nagasaki University), and Dr. Byung-dug Jun (Professor, Nagasaki University) for their consistent understanding and support for this research, and to Ms. Shiho Hayashida for all her help in publishing this book.

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# Summary and Proposals

## Introduction

Nagasaki University was a victim of the atomic bombing in August 1945 and founded the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) three years ago. This proposal is written by the RECNA. The proposal will be submitted to concerned states and the international community and has been written with the sincerest of hopes that it serves as a proposal for policies so that Japan, being a victim of nuclear bombs, can contribute to realizing a nuclear weapon free world.

Japan's civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various forms that a NEA-NWFZ might take did not gain much traction with states in the region (except for Mongolia) although these forms gained substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, a conceptual breakthrough occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H. Halperin (former Special Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by Nautilus Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions that would realistically realize a NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed to establish a NEA-NWFZ as an element of a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA. He presented this concept at the Nautilus Institute workshop in Tokyo in November 2011.

The RECNA has held three international workshops in Nagasaki, Seoul and Tokyo in order to examine and develop the Halperin's proposal, and to make this Proposal. The workshops received support from other institutes that share interests in the comprehensive approach, including the Nautilus Institute. However, the RECNA is responsible for all contents of this Proposal.

This Proposal does not deal with the entire scope of Northeast Asian security; instead, it focuses on denuclearization issues while considering the implication denuclearization would have on regional security. On top of denuclearization, Northeast Asia is faced with various hot button issues, such as; territorial disputes, disputes on historical records, and rising military tensions stemming from United States, Japan, and China's new defense policies. Issues surrounding the denuclearization of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these problems; however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the NEA-NWFZ can be pursued relatively independently from these other issues. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons

issue will have a positive influence on various other issues.

The 70<sup>th</sup> memorial of the end of the Pacific War is in 2015. In Northeast Asia, Japan's colonization of Korea came to an end in 1945 and brought with it the National Liberation of Korea. However, it was the same year that led to the division of the Korean Peninsula and strained U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations that are ongoing even today. It will also be the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary since the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There are people ("hibaku-sha") still living in Japan and both Koreas who are experiencing medical aftereffects from the bombings and are "living testaments to the inhumanity" of nuclear weapons. We hope that this proposal will contribute to satisfying the yearning of the region for the unification of the Korean Peninsula and for a world free from nuclear weapons.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Northeast Asia's Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons**

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#### **ROK and Japan's Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence**

The Northeast Asian region's nuclear confrontation is severely aggravated as North Korea's nuclear weapons development program is currently triggering Japan and South Korea's stronger dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The result is a heightened risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional or not, and is diminishing international efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. There are many intertwining elements creating the current situation. These elements include North Korea feeling the U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will be a growing base of Japanese and South Korean proponents for developing their own nuclear weapons should their trust in depending on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the fact that strengthening of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve recent nuclear tensions in the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary to consider resolving all these issues.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and radioactive contamination of the Japanese fishing boats in 1954 by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test have left an anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the hearts of many Japanese. As a result, the Atomic Energy Basic Act of 1955 banned the military use of nuclear energy. On the other end of the spectrum, were Japanese policies adopted to depend on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence following Chinese nuclear weapon tests in 1964. Introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1968, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles stated that "Japan shall neither possess,

manufacture, nor allow to bring in nuclear weapons”, and was coupled with Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Since focus has been placed on North Korea’s nuclear weapon development program, Japan and the U.S. have enhanced discussions on possible measures to maintain the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence, yet the discussion about the non-nuclear elements of deterrence has also been included. The “Two-plus-Two” meeting involving the top defense and diplomatic officials from the two nations reaffirmed its “commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (**Paragraph 1.6**).

Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the fear of Japan gaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The demeanor of a small fraction of politicians and certain government bureaucracies’ attitudes towards nuclear weapon dependence are typically the cause of these anxieties (**Paragraph 1.7**). One reason for suspicions over Japan’s intent towards nuclear armament is how Japan is incapable of producing a logical explanation for its plutonium policies. In context of the Northeast Asian region, this issue has become a backdrop to South Korea’s argument for its nuclear sovereignty (**Paragraph 1.8**).

North Korea and South Korea were at the peak of a possible nuclear war during the Cold War. Beginning in 1958, the United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, which were not removed until 1991 following the end of the Cold War. It goes without saying that South Korea’s armed forces had cooperated with U.S. armed forces in maintaining nuclear war scenarios in ROK. In 1992, however, the two Koreas made a groundbreaking Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It came into effect together with “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the South and the North”. The preamble of the Joint Declaration even stated that their goal was “to create conditions and an environment favorable to peace and peaceful unification of Korea”. Thus, the declaration linked denuclearization intimately to reunification. The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization not only banned the production and development of nuclear weapons but also agreed to “not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (**Paragraph 1.10**).

The South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission set forth by the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization crumbled and it became evident that North Korea was developing its nuclear program. Aimed at preventing the development, South Korea worked closely with the U.S. to carry out diplomatic efforts. South Korea simultaneously strengthened its dependence on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, which has been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide its “Nuclear

Umbrella". The two nations agreed to intensify the extended deterrence following North Korea's first nuclear weapons test in 2006 and established the "U.S.-South Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee" in 2011. The U.S. stated that it would "provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities", which once again emphasized the element of non-nuclear, conventional weapons in its extended deterrence (**Paragraph 1.11**).

While there had been a demand in South Korea for nuclear sovereignty to develop a nuclear program, North Korea's development of their nuclear program gave steam to new efforts in South Korea. Following North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey showed 70% of the South Korean population backed developing their own nuclear weapons and several influential politicians reportedly expressed their desire for nuclear armament. Also, South Korea strongly emphasized their desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Agreement for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy into an agreement that includes a "comprehensive consent" clause similar to the one that Japan has under the Japan-U.S. Agreement, which continuously allows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

In accordance with the Obama administration's "Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)", the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence is to be reduced while strengthening conventional weapon's role for extended deterrence in South Korea and Japan, which is a welcome move. Considering the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause, however, the sheer presence of any nuclear component in extended deterrence prevents alleviating nuclear tensions in Northeast Asia. **It is necessary to develop the concept of "non-military (deterrence) – strong, trusting political relationships between the United States and its allies and partners"**, as was referred to in the same NPR.

## North Korea's Development of Nuclear Deterrence

The graphite-moderated reactor came online in 1986 after North Korea signed the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) in 1985. However, confrontations over the IAEA's inspection regarding the DPRK's initial declaration, as required by the NPT, became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. The situation led to rigid U.S.-DPRK meetings, which negotiations became the prototype of all following meetings regarding North Korea's nuclear program.

It is, therefore, safe to say that the fundamental logic for North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its possible denuclearization was set in the agreement reached in June 1993 at the U.S.-DPRK Meeting. This fundamental logic had repeatedly appeared in later negotiations with some modifications. The logic is built towards **achieving the following**

**two principles: “guaranteeing the security assurance against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons” and “denuclearizing Korean Peninsula with proper verification systems”.**

The 1994 “Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK” added the element of energy assistance. The Joint Statement agreed on at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005 added the element of consultations between the concerned state parties with the intent of normalizing U.S.-North Korea and North Korea-Japan diplomatic relations and to promote a lasting peace in Northeast Asia. Even today, this important element should form the base of agreements. As will be demonstrated later, the September 19<sup>th</sup> Joint Statement remains crucial, even in 2015. North Korea’s diplomatic strategy since 2006, in which the DPRK continued to negotiate for denuclearization while conducting nuclear tests, can be defined as **a diplomacy that attempts to eliminate the threat against its regime and to normalize international relations by playing both the processes and the products of developing nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards.** It must be assumed that such diplomatic strategy will continue taking place.

The 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK and its establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 demonstrated promising success towards the end of 2000 (**Paragraph 1.13**). However, the U.S. policy did not continue because of the administration change, and the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, which the Bush administration viewed as being a part of the Axis of Evil, became its worst. As a result, the KEDO process crumbled. Certain success and the ultimate failure of the KEDO process left a lesson to be learned. One lesson, which could be a precedent moving forward, is that KEDO succeeded in a multilateral scheme where the EU and nine other countries were involved in the U.S.-ROK-Japan centered program. On the other hand, a mechanism must be introduced to prevent hard-earned agreements from failing when a central player goes through administration changes.

The Six-Party Talks agreed on initial actions in February 2007 that were in line with the September 19<sup>th</sup> Joint Statement and North Korea froze three Yongbyon facilities (5 megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility). They also established five working groups. One group deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”. It was a possible platform for a more comprehensive discussion relating to denuclearization. In October of the same year, the six parties agreed on its second phase actions, which called for “the disablement of three facilities at Yongbyon” and “a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” by North Korea. It was estimated that, as of April 2009, the former agreement to disable North Korea’s facilities was 80% completed. Reaching an impasse on the

latter, the Six-Party Talks have not been held since December 2008.

In April 2009, North Korea announced its launch of the Juche Nuclear Industry, decided to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon, and publicized that it would begin enriching uranium to feed the reactor. In November 2010, Siegfried Hecker, a former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and other U.S. experts were invited to take a tour of the Yongbyon facilities. The Kim Jong-un regime's nuclear deterrence policies and the possibility of denuclearization will be detailed in **Chapter 4**. North Korea's diplomatic position towards denuclearization remains unchanged, however, in that it is attempting to develop nuclear deterrence and to remove a threat towards its regime.

## Chapter 2

### Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective

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The strong tide of global efforts, following President Obama's Prague speech, towards achieving a "Nuclear Weapon Free World" first manifested itself in the NPT Review Conference's 2010 Final Document. Each state party agreed that it "affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons" and "expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons". Moreover, all State Parties committed to "pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons". Namely, in this commitment, all state parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, agreed to place political obligations on state governments to evaluate security policies that stood in the way of achieving this goal and to alter such policies (**Paragraph 2.1**).

In 2013, the UN General Assembly held the sessions of the "Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons". The OEWG report clarified the **political obligation placed on each and every signatory government** per the 2010 agreement by noting a new concept that "States have differentiated roles and functions". It goes without saying that nuclear weapon states were emphasized to verifiably reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons. The OEWG report, though, added that non-nuclear weapon States "have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament" and that non-nuclear weapon States under extended nuclear deterrence could fulfill the role of "reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines". The OEWG further discussed

**“the role of nuclear weapon free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of nuclear weapons” (Paragraph 2.2).**

A deepening awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon use has led to a no-use declaration that states, “It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances”. Certain states attempted to discourage such an argument from growing by emphasizing the critical role nuclear deterrence plays in guaranteeing security. Analyzing the controversy objectively, however, it is contradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that using nuclear weapons could have while refusing to declare to not use nuclear weapons. **This contradiction can be resolved by pursuing security policies that deny the very possibility of using nuclear weapons (Paragraph 2.3).**

Included in the final document of 2010 NPT Review Conference was the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. This statement is significant in that, on top of reducing nuclear weapon hardware, it calls for a reduction of nuclear weapon policies. A standardized reporting format is necessary to assure the transparency of these reductions. Therefore, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which is a 12-nation group that includes Japan, has developed such a standard reporting format. One criterion in the standard format was to report “measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. It was pointed out that states with security policies dependent on extended nuclear deterrence were also required to report this criterion (Paragraph 2.4).

**Since 2010, a defining characteristic of discussions regarding obligations under the NPT is a demand for policy changes by nations dependent on extended nuclear weapon deterrence. Japan and South Korea setting policies towards achieving a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone would contribute greatly to increasing the NPT’s credibility and promoting denuclearization of the world (Paragraph 2.5).**

## **Chapter 3**

# **The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal**

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North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons program intensified Japan and South Korea’s dependence on nuclear deterrence, which has heightened the region’s nuclear

confrontation. Anxieties of a nuclear domino effect in Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored. The situation would be further complicated should Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. implement a joint missile defense program as a military response under the assumption that North Korea's developing ballistic missile program is linked to the development in their nuclear weapons program. The complication arises from the fact that the missile defense program would theoretically diminish the strength of China's strategic nuclear weapons.

The region's progressing nuclear dependence runs counter to the international community's goal of achieving a "Nuclear Weapon Free World". The reaction to heightened regional tensions caused by North Korea's nuclear weapons should not be to respond with strengthening dependence on extended nuclear deterrence or any military might, as is currently the case. Rather, focus should be placed on establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), which would be the foundation for a cooperative security system in the region. Reflecting on the political obligations developed in the global nuclear disarmament arguments after the 2010 NPT Review Conference and placed on non-nuclear weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence, Japan and South Korea have an important role to play in this effort. Being the only country to have experienced nuclear bombings, Japan has an exceedingly large responsibility (**Paragraph 3.1**).

There have been various, detailed proposals since the end of the Cold War for a NEA-NWFZ. At present, the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, including its various modifications, is considered to be a concise and pragmatic, fundamental structure. In this scheme, Japan, South Korea and North Korea would be the "**Intrazonal States**" and the U.S., Russia, and China—nuclear weapon states under NPT with deep ties to the region—would be the "**Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States**". The Intrazonal States would form a geographic nuclear weapon free zone and would be required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar to other NWFZ treaties. The Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States would be required to provide security assurances not to attack the zone with nuclear weapons and, hopefully, with conventional weapons (negative security assurances) as parties of the treaty itself rather than of its protocol (**Paragraph 3.2**). Details of the NEA-NWFZ are found in **Chapter 6**.

The 2011 Halperin Proposal was significant in that it shifted the framework of the arguments on a NEA-NWFZ from scheme-centered arguments to approach-centered arguments. In order to overcome the difficulties he had faced in working towards North Korean denuclearization, Halperin proposed establishing the NEA-NWFZ as one of the six elements for a "Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia". Halperin suggested that six elements to be included in the Comprehensive Agreement are as follows: 1. Termination of the State of War, 2. Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3. Mutual Declaration of No Hostile Intent, 4. Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5.

Termination of Sanctions, and 6. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

The Halperin Proposal has been backed for the following reasons that include Halperin's own arguments for the case: 1. Accepting North Korea's de facto nuclear weapon state may collapse the international non-proliferation system and lead to a domino effect in Japan and South Korea. 2. Therefore, international efforts, which should be tangible, should continue so long as there remains even a sliver of hope that North Korea can be denuclearized. 3. There must be a new approach that avoids placing blame for stalled past negotiations towards denuclearization of Korean Peninsula on one another. 4. Although there is a need for a comprehensive approach that simultaneously solves multiple pending issues, the approach should not attempt to solve all of the regional security issues at once. Rather, it should be a restrained approach that comprehensively solves issues directly related to denuclearization. 5. Reaching an agreement on the denuclearization issues could shape the discussion on solving the region's other security issues.

## Chapter 4

### The Possibility of North Korea's Denuclearization

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At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, First Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced a new strategic line on "carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously" and reaffirmed such a "promoting two fronts simultaneously" strategy during his 2013 New Year Address. The new strategy is a manifestation of a crucial change in that it has relativized its "military first (Songun) doctrine". Depending on the circumstances, tensions could potentially rise as high as they did in 2010. North Korea's provocative shock techniques have been analyzed as being aimed at altering the rules of the game and as difficult as it may be, it is crucial to be patient and react with a level head (**Paragraph 4.1**).

The North Korean Supreme People's Assembly adopted a "Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State" in April 2013 and set forth policies and doctrines for use of nuclear weapons. Around the same time, North Korea announced the Yongbyon graphite-moderated reactor would resume operations, and satellite imagery taken in August 2013 showed expanded uranium enrichment facilities. These developments implied that North Korea was solidifying its long-term position on maintaining its nuclear deterrence. But this does not necessarily mean that North Korea contends that its denuclearization is possible only after "the global denuclearization", or in other words after achieving a "World without

Nuclear Weapons”, as it was once stated by North Korea in the spring of 2013.

In June 2013 the DPRK National Defense Commission emphasized that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means “the complete one that calls for denuclearizing the whole peninsula including South Korea and aims at totally ending the U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK” and then proposed “senior-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and the U.S.” North Korea has since repeated the same line of argument for its denuclearization on the condition of complete elimination of threats. **It can be inferred that North Korea is staying their course in maintaining their nuclear deterrence while attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. It should be considered that a sufficient possibility of denuclearizing North Korea still exists (Paragraph 4.2).**

Because of the limited availability of information, assessments of North Korea's nuclear weapon capabilities often differ. One thing that is certain from the three nuclear weapon tests is that North Korea does in fact possess nuclear explosive devices. What has not been agreed on is whether or not North Korea has weaponized the devices to be loaded on delivery vehicles (Paragraph 4.3). As of the end of 2014, it has been estimated that North Korea is in possession of enough fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) to produce twelve nuclear warheads. According to the available information, North Korea's nuclear fissile material production capabilities are rather limited. However, it is difficult to predict how North Korea's capabilities will develop in the coming future. It is important to recognize that **as more time lapses until denuclearization negotiations resume, the more time is available for the situation to worsen (Paragraph 4.4).**

Since firing its first long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North Korea has launched five long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Rather than showing any signs of contradiction, publicly available technological information shows that all three launches since 2009 were satellite launches. It would then be reasonable to assume that the 1998 and 2006 launches carried the same purpose. However, it goes without saying that each of these launches leads to improving North Korea's ballistic missile launching capabilities. **The North Korean missile issues should be treated as an issue for the dual-use and crossover between space and ballistic missile technologies. The discussion needs to begin by exploring what standards are expected of all nations (Paragraph 4.5).**

The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements and resolutions in response to North Korea's nuclear weapon tests and “launches using ballistic missile technology”. Nuclear weapon issues can be traced back to North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, whereas missile issues can be traced back to the moratorium on ballistic missile test launches that resulted from the U.S.-DPRK talks following the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. It is important to recall that the

U.N. Security Council resolution demanding North Korea to not conduct “any launch using ballistic missile technology” first appeared in Resolution 1874 in 2009, which was the resolved in context of banning North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. **When the primary issue of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons) at hand is resolved, ballistic missile issue will become relatively a lesser concern (Paragraph 4.6).**

## Chapter 5

### A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

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Halperin’s six elements included in his Comprehensive Agreement remain necessary. However, there must be a detailed deliberation on how to structure such elements into an agreement. Considering the processes and details for establishing a peace treaty that replaces the armistice treaty, the element of “Terminating the Korean War” will be an especially enormous undertaking. In fact, what is necessary for a comprehensive approach in its initial stage is a fundamental treaty like something exemplified by the “Mutual Declaration of No Hostile Intent”, which is one of Halperin’s six elements. It should be a legal instrument to set political and ethical standards for the future that respects equal sovereignty and establishes a relationship based on respect and trust. In this respect, similar to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a Northeast Asia TAC was proposed during the workshop. As described above, this Proposal suggests that the agreement reached in a comprehensive approach should be composed of both legally enforceable, concise political agreements and agreements with details being introduced in phases (Paragraph 5.1).

Addressing the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy is included in Halperin’s six elements. This Proposal suggests adding elements regarding the rights of peaceful exploration of space and the ban of all weapons of mass destruction on top of nuclear weapons to the comprehensive approach. These additional two elements will inevitably be brought up in the discussion of the six elements. Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving these issues will smooth the process (Paragraph 5.2).

#### Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”

Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. and other countries, Halperin proposes a methodology where a legally binding agreement should be made first, and then followed by negotiations for details. In principle, this Proposal agrees

with Halperin's methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difficult and take too much time to go through parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal instruments (**Paragraph 5.3**).

Based upon such considerations, the "Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia" (CFA) is proposed in this Proposal as an instrument to be concluded and effectuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be possible, in this case, to include specific provisions within the CFA that are requested to be ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental, authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and work for support and verification to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached.

Specific Chapters of a "Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia" are divided into "Declaratory" or "Actionable" categories and are composed of the following four (**Paragraph 5.4**):

- (1)**Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties.** States lacking diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing its diplomatic relations. Encourage negotiations among states concerned for the Korean War Peace Treaty. (Declaratory)
- (2)**Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy.** Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members extends beyond the six-parties and is open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation of Mongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided by the Committee)
- (3)**Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.** It will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a NWFZ. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to place collective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateral sanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty matters. (Actionable)
- (4)**Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council.** The primary objective of this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective

will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with more comprehensive security issues. The council could host the verification mechanisms of the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering to cooperate for Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members. (Actionable)

## Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty

The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty” includes characteristics unique to the region, as shown below:

**State Parties:** A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” (South Korea, North Korea, and Japan are “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., China, and Russia are “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized Nuclear Weapon Free Status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy following up its 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012 (**Paragraph 5.5**).

**Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty:** Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame difficulties between Brazil and Argentina to enter into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter into force can be flexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force requirements of the NEA-NWFZ treaty can be provided for through ratification by the three nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states (Japan and Korea). It may be plausible to provide an option for Japan and Korea to withdraw from the treaty after three to five years, if North Korea continues not to join. By ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and South Korea will enjoy security assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon states other than the U.S. As for the benefits to North Korea, an article can be included to provide North Korea with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities, while the U.S. provides immediate security assurances in exchange for North Korea’s ratification (**Paragraph 5.6**).

**Requirements Prior to Negotiations:** Considering that states with nuclear weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address the issue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiations commence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of

nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States, South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “**prior moratoriums**” should be adopted before negotiations. The “prior moratoriums” should also explore **alleviating current sanctions** imposed on North Korea (**Paragraph 5.7**).

**Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence:** When a NWFZ treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the zone. This implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a NWFZ is a recommendable mechanism towards cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear weapons states in NEA-NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the security assurances exists regarding a NEA-NWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many concerns and fear over losing the nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is that states will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null and void; the state of affairs will return to pre-treaty conditions, thus they will not be defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may take sanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual national constitution (**Paragraph 5.8**).

## Views to the Diplomatic Process

United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering discussions on a NEA-MWFZ. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held in 2013 discussed the NEA-NWFZ. The results were recommendations to the Secretary General that the UN consider taking appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and play a proactive role to establish regional forums for transparency and trust. Such a proposal coming from the United Nations is a large leap forward. Mongolian President Elbedgorj expressed his support for the NEA-NWFZ concept at the United Nations High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013 and reported on the commencement of the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” to build trust, which was also a major step. As the UN Disarmament Commission reported in 1999, any initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from the free will of the regional nations concerned. In this respect, **it is essential that Japan and South Korea, individually or collectively, take initiatives to establish a NEA-NWFZ (Paragraph 5.10).**

Although there may be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would be considered most appropriate and practical to ensure a credible platform for the discussion of the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. Reportedly, North Korea, China, and Russia share an affirmative attitude towards resuming the Six-Party Talks at present. Considering that the United States is dealing with a vast amount of diplomatic problems, it is time for Japan and South Korea to act. Considering the NPT 2010 Final Document that expresses strong support of the Six-Party Talks, the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference will be a significant diplomatic platform to address the issue.

Considering the above analyses, the following proposals are made for a “Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone”:

# Proposal

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## Proposal One:

**Establishing a NEA-NWFZ should not be an attempt at merely denuclearizing North Korea. Rather, the objective should be to solve various security issues closely linked to the nuclear issues in Northeast Asia through concluding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.**

The CFA includes the following in its Chapters: (1) a declaratory chapter to terminate the Korean War and to provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty, (2) a declaratory chapter to assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy, and to establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, (3) a chapter to agree on an actionable treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ that includes all the necessary provisions for a NWFZ, (4) an actionable chapter to establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council, which will ensure the solid implementation of the CFA and to be open to discuss the region’s other security issues. Through analyzing North Korea’s international and national policies up to the present, this paper concludes there is a sufficient possibility that North Korea will agree to a properly designed NEA denuclearization process.

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## Proposal Two:

**In addition to standard provisions for a NWFZ treaty, a NEA-NWFZ treaty should include the following elements:**

(1) the treaty will, at the very least, include all six states in the Six-Party Talks. North Korea, South Korea, and Japan will form a geographic nuclear weapon free zone, and as neighboring nuclear states, U.S., China, and Russia will provide security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons against the zone, (2) all parties are requested to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, (3) the treaty will assure the rights of peaceful exploration of space as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty, (4) North Korea is obliged to dismantle its nuclear arsenals and related facilities within a time

frame with ample allowance, (5) the entry-into-force provision of the treaty will be made with incentives to enhance the likelihood of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan joining the treaty (**Paragraphs 5.5 & 5.6**).

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### **Proposal Three:**

**The Six-Party Talks should be resumed to discuss the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.**

The Six-Party Talks established the working group for “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”, which signifies its interest in exploring the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula from a more comprehensive point of view. Considering the NPT 2010 Final Document strongly supported the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the international community should unite to urge the resumption of the Talks before and after the 2015 Review Conference. Rather than dragging in the past, the resumed Six-Party Talks should take a fresh and bold approach, such as the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement” proposed here.

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### **Proposal Four:**

**Utilizing the opportunity of existing international support to promote a NEA-NWFZ, regional non-nuclear states Japan and South Korea should, individually or collectively, launch an initiative towards establishing a NEA-NWFZ** that includes the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. In 2013, the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters recommended the Secretary General to consider appropriate action for the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Also, the Mongolian president expressed his enthusiasm in support of a NEA-NWFZ at the United Nations High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in 2013. As can be found in a 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission document, establishing a nuclear weapon free zone requires initiatives from the states within the zone.

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### **Proposal Five:**

**The year 2015 should be used as an opportunity to begin the processes for a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.**

The year is the 70<sup>th</sup> memorial of the end of World War II, atomic bombings on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the division of the Korean Peninsula. The international community, and especially Northeast Asian nations, should make 2015 the year to begin endeavors towards achieving a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. The CFA will be the foundation for easing tensions and normalizing relations in NEA and for moving towards a cooperative regional security system.

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### **Proposal Six:**

**By proposing to establish a NEA-NWFZ, Japan and South Korea should fulfil their obligations set forth by the 2010 NPT Review Conference and contribute to maintaining the credibility of the Treaty.**

In the new review cycle following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all State Parties, including non-nuclear weapon States, have a political obligation to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons” (2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Action Plan 1). Furthermore, instead of focusing solely on the reduction of nuclear weapon hardware, the Review Conference agreed on the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. In this context, the obligations posed upon non-nuclear weapon States relying on extended nuclear deterrence, such as Japan and South Korea, are clearer.

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### **Proposal Seven:**

**Concerned states should consider establishing an independent non-governmental “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” so that denuclearization processes will not be influenced by**

## **administration changes within the concerned states.**

Diplomatic negotiations between nations bear difficulties because they could be influenced by unrelated international incidents, domestic political shifts, or conflicts. Negotiations regarding the denuclearization in Northeast Asia have not been an exception. It is, therefore, necessary to construct a device to minimize such negative influences. Maintaining the wide-ranging public support, just as support by Japanese heads of local municipality demonstrated, is one meaningful method of doing so. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider establishing an “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”, which would contribute towards maintaining stable negotiations by working parallel to the negotiations. Concerned states should agree to establish and support such an “expert group”.

# Introduction

**0.1** Nagasaki Medical School, one of the predecessors to Nagasaki University, was located just 500 meters away from the epicenter of the atomic bomb dropped by the United States of America on August 9, 1945. It was the first plutonium bomb ever used in a war field and only the second ever nuclear weapon, following the bombing of Hiroshima and claimed the lives of approximately 900 students and faculty staff on campus during the summer break. Even today, the names of all who perished are inscribed in a monument at the University's School of Medicine. Established as a national university following the war, Nagasaki University has academically been dedicated to the medical field of radiation treatment. Despite individual efforts, however, academic contributions to the disarmament of nuclear weapons have been nonexistent at an organizational level. When U.S. President Obama made his Prague address in April 2009, it acted as a catalyst for Nagasaki University to establish the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) in April 2012. Motivated by its objective to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapon-free world, the RECNA conducts research, disseminates information and is involved in nuclear disarmament education; working closely alongside Nagasaki City and Nagasaki Prefecture. The results of RECNA's first research project are being published in this book entitled "Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone".

**0.2** As a victim of nuclear weapons, Japan should adopt a non-nuclear security policy if it intends to further contribute to global nuclear disarmament, which will make it important to present any policy options for the government to consider. This became RECNA’s motivation to delve into the research field of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. With the expertise of the RECNA staff in mind, the NWFZ was also an optimal field of research for RECNA. Japan’s civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia NWFZ (NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various potential configurations of an NEA-NWFZ had limited appeal to states in the region (except Mongolia), despite gaining substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, a conceptual breakthrough occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H. Halperin (former Special Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by the Nautilus Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions that would realistically achieve an NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed establishing an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA (**HALPERIN 2011**) and presented this concept at the Nautilus Institute workshop on East Asian Nuclear Security in Tokyo in November 2011. This process-oriented concept was quickly adopted as a basis for implementing an NWFZ strategy in various countries, including Japan. Against this backdrop, the RECNA set out a research project entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”.

**0.3** Since 2012, the project organized three annual international workshops, which focused on examining a comprehensive approach to establishing an NEA-NWFZ. The first workshop was entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWFZ: Workshop I”; held at Nagasaki University in December 2012 to share the research objective and widely disseminate Halperin’s proposal. The second workshop held at Hanshin University in Seoul in June 2013 was entitled “Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System: Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWFZ Workshop II”. The program and title of the second conference were deemed fitting, given the upcoming 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 2013. The third conference, held in Tokyo in September 2014, was entitled “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World — Developing a Comprehensive Approach to NEA-NWFZ: Workshop III”. In consideration of the approaching year of 2015, which is the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the year of the NPT Review Conferences, the theme of a NEA-NWFZ was discussed in the context of global denuclearization at the third workshop. The programs of the three workshops are attached in the **appendix** of this publication. This paper is focused on nuclear issues in NEA, which is important for global nuclear

disarmament as well. Accordingly, this paper does not try to propose solutions to resolve all security issues in Northeast Asia.

**0.4** Halperin, who proposed the Comprehensive Agreement, has participated in all three workshops, which the Nautilus Institute, Hanshin University's Center for Peace and Public Integrity, Mongolian NGO Blue Banner and the Hiroshima Peace Institute cooperated to organize. The Nautilus Institute in particular, which has been dedicated to solving North Korean security and energy issues and organized the 2011 workshop in Tokyo where Halperin initially proposed the Comprehensive Agreement and follow-up workshops in Washington D.C. and others, has been a close partner of RECNA's research project. Its Executive Director, Peter Hayes, participated in all three workshops, while Hanshin University's Center for Peace and Public Integrity hosted the second workshop in Seoul. Thus, three workshops have been successful due to the participation and cooperation of many individuals and institutions. However, RECNA will prepare this proposal, the outcome of the research project, in its own capacity and also assume responsibility for all contents herein.

**0.5** The decision to publish this Proposal in 2015 is meaningful. Even though Northeast Asia experienced a historic turning point in 1945 when the Asia-Pacific War came to a close, remnants of the event continue to cause turmoil in the region. Considering the fact that 2015 marks the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the war, the people of the region hope it will herald a leap of progress in resolving pending regional issues. Although the Korean Peninsula was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, this year marked the starting point of the division that persists today. The nation is yearning for reunification, but military tensions between North and South Korea remain unabated and a normal relationship has yet to be established between North Korea and Japan and North Korea and the U.S. The year of 1945 also marked the first ever wartime use of nuclear bombs, on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There are still many atomic bomb survivors ("hibakusha") in Japan and Korea who continue to suffer from lingering medical aftereffects. Despite advancing years, they continue to appeal to make Nagasaki the last place on Earth to have ever experienced a nuclear bombing and realize a Nuclear Weapon-Free World. By proposing a comprehensive approach to a NEA-NWFZ, this publication wishes to contribute to and capitalize on the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary so that it may become a critical turning point for the future.



## Chapter 1

# Northeast Asia's Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

**1.1** This chapter outlines each Northeast Asian country's current state of dependence on nuclear weapons and the influence it has on the international security relationship in the region. The four nations in the region subject to this review are Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea, ROK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) and Mongolia. Although Mongolia is also geographically a neighbor to Central Asian nations, with which it maintains close relations, the state identifies itself as a nation of Northeast Asia (**ENKHS AIKHAN 2012**). The People's Republic of China (China) and the Russian Federation (Russia) have small portions of territorial areas that fall into the Northeast Asian region and the United States of America (U.S.) has military bases located in South Korea and Japan. These three nations, all nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are involved in the nuclear weapons policies of the aforementioned four nations in the region. Accordingly, the relationship between these nuclear weapon states and the four NEA nations will be examined when necessary. Holistic discussions regarding the international security of the region, require discussing hot-button issues such as territorial disputes, historical acknowledgements and risks of military balance at an escalated level arising from China's strengthening military capabilities, Japan's growing military strength and policy and the U.S. rebalancing its Asia-Pacific presence. **Issues surrounding the denuclearization**

**of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these aforementioned problems; however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the theme of regional denuclearization can be pursued relatively independently. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons issue will boost solving various other international security issues in the region.**

**1.2** This chapter concludes that the current state of Northeast Asia's dependence on nuclear deterrence is best described by a picture of North Korea's nuclear armament policy driving Japan and South Korea to intensify their dependence on an extended U.S. nuclear deterrent, which, in turn, results in the region remaining in a state of high nuclear confrontation. The result is a heightened risk of the tragic scenario of nuclear weapons being used, intentionally or accidentally and undermines the international community's efforts to realize a nuclear weapon-free world. It also solidifies and perpetuates the ground for a nuclear domino effect, where South Korea and Japan lean toward their own nuclear armament. The U.S. extended deterrence however, which is strengthened to cope with the North Korea nuclear program, includes not only nuclear but also non-nuclear deterrence (particularly missile defense). This shift began with U.S. President Bush's 2001 "Nuclear Posture Review" which introduced "New Triads" (**U.S. DOD 2002**), which the Obama administration built on in the context of "reducing the role of nuclear weapons" in its "Nuclear Posture Review" in 2010 (**U.S. DOD 2010**). Given the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause, however, their political significance remains relevant, even under extended nuclear deterrence with fewer nuclear components, which is why North Korea continues to perceive the U.S. extended deterrence as a threat to overthrow its regime. The result is North Korea's constant nuclear weapons policies, in which it flaunts its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capabilities as deterrence capabilities to nuclear attacks and as diplomatic cards for negotiations to eliminate the threat of being overthrown.

**1.3** Northeast Asia's dependence on nuclear weapons is characterized by another significant trait, which originates from the relationship among the U.S., China and Japan. The nuclear tensions between the U.S. and China, meanwhile, arise from opposing global strategies. Though initially caused by confrontations regarding the political status of Taiwan, modern-day nuclear tensions reflect a fight for hegemony. Conversely, Japan, which chose independence under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty following WWII, made it clear that it will protect itself from China's nuclear force by leveraging the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, after China conducted nuclear tests in 1964. China, however, sees the provision of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan as intended to work against China to start with. The recent Japanese request to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against North

Korea has inevitably fueled suggestions that it is also directed at China. Regardless of the fact that the U.S. has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its present-day extended deterrence, the situation with China remains unchanged, particularly because the current U.S. extended deterrence capabilities, which includes missile defense capabilities as the core component, will neutralize, or at least weaken China's strategic nuclear strength. In this way, even though Japan's response to North Korea's nuclear development program is regional, the response will reawaken global nuclear rivalry and represents another characteristic of the nature of nuclear dependence in Northeast Asia, which cannot be ignored. Conversely, if Northeast Asia's current situation of nuclear dependence were transformed through measures allowing the extended deterrence to be effectively reduced, it would contribute substantially to global nuclear disarmament.

**1.4** North Korea, South Korea and China share concerns over Japan becoming a nuclear armed state. In 1990, Major General Stackpole of the U.S. Forces Japan, stated that the role of the United States military in Japan, as per the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was to act as the “cap of a bottle” to prevent Japan from re-emerging as a military superpower. The general's frank statement reflects fear among Japan's neighboring countries of Japan becoming a military superpower and obtaining nuclear arms. The Chinese and South Korean governments have questioned Japan's intentions over its recent stockpiling of plutonium; clearly, concerns regarding Japan's nuclear armament have not faded. With regard to the recent debate reviewing Japan's right to collective self-defense, Professor Joseph Nye pointed out that the need for such collective self-defense capabilities must be confirmed and emphasized the importance of avoiding antagonism with China and South Korea, who are wary of Japan's right-wing extremism and militarism (NYE 2014). In light of Japan's current situation, there is undeniably concern that Japan could potentially harness its economic, technological and industrial capabilities to strengthen its military, including nuclear weapons (NAKANO 2014). Considering the fact that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and China expanding its military prowess, experts in the field warn that there is legitimate concern over Japan becoming a nuclear armed state if Japan's trust in the U.S. “Nuclear Umbrella” wavers and the nuclear threat in Asia grows (CHOSUN ILBO 2013).

## Japan's Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence

**1.5** As a non-nuclear weapon state, Japan signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in June 1976 and guaranteed the international community that it would not possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in

August 1945 and radiation exposure on tuna fishing boats from U.S. hydrogen bomb tests on the Bikini Atoll in March 1954 have since cemented opposition to nuclear weapons within Japanese civil society. Japan enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 and began developing nuclear energy. It reads, “The research, development and utilization of nuclear energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim to ensure safety and shall be performed independently under democratic administration and the results obtained shall be publicized so as to actively contribute to international cooperation.” (Article 2) and thus prohibits the military use of nuclear energy. When China conducted its nuclear weapon tests in 1964, Japan reaffirmed the aforementioned article and decided to rely on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This saw Japan adopt three Non-Nuclear Principles stating that “Japan shall neither possess, nor manufacture, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons”. In fact, during a plenary session of the House of Representatives on January 30, 1968, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato introduced the Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy, namely 1) to observe the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 2) to work toward global nuclear disarmament, 3) to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrence in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and 4) to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (**SATO 1968**). Japan’s current nuclear policies generally adhere to this framework. Japan’s new self-defense policies, detailed in the “National Defense Program Guideline for FY2014 and beyond”, state that it will be “observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and “with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable”. As well as confirming policies of dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, the guideline states “Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons” (**JAPAN NSC 2013**).

**1.6** The United States of America welcomed Japan’s dependence on its extended nuclear deterrence, which has repeatedly been guaranteed in multiple mutual agreements. Reviewed and updated in 1997, the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” states that “to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability” (**JAPAN-U.S. SCC 1997**). The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) met in May 2007 following North Korea’s first nuclear weapon test. The SCC focused on the U.S. extended deterrence in more detail and stated that the “U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities — both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities — form the core of extended deterrent and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan” (**JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2007**). The second most recent SCC joint statement, ignoring the unexpectedly simple 2014 SCC, stated that “the SCC reaffirmed the indispensable role our

two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security and reconfirmed our Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional" (**JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2013**). Such statement on extended deterrence coincides with the Obama administration's "Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR) of 2010. The NPR states that one of the primary objectives of U.S. nuclear policy should be "strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners". Furthermore, U.S. nuclear weapons "contribute to Alliance cohesion and reassure allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats" but that going forward, the fraction of nuclear weapons used for nuclear deterrence will be reduced while the percentage of non-nuclear weapons will grow (**U.S. DOD 2010**). Although reducing the percentage of nuclear weapons is a positive step forward, the sheer presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as was discussed in **Paragaph 1.2**, prevents nuclear tensions from improving. As affirmed in the same NPR report, it is important to focus more on the non-military extended deterrence, which means deterrence by "non-military – strong, trusting political relationships" (**U.S. DOD 2010**).

**1.7** Japan has repeatedly stated, directly and indirectly, that it would have to take up its own nuclear weapons should trust in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence policies be questioned. Regarding the provision of security assurance to North Korea, which was expected to be discussed at the first six-party talks in August 2003, Masashi Nishihara, then president of the National Defense Academy of Japan, bluntly opined "Washington should not sign a pact stating it has no intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea". He went on to declare the possibility of Japanese nuclear armament if "Tokyo could no longer rely on its alliance with Washington and thus might decide to develop its own retaliatory nuclear weapons" (**NISHIHARA 2003**). In reference to the Obama administration's "Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR) in 2008, a Japanese media outlet printed that a Japanese government representative and specialist was opposed to the U.S. Congressional Commission's proposal to retire the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM/N). Then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuya Okada, responded to this issue in January 2010 by clarifying that he had written a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in December 2009 that said "if, hypothetically, such a view were expressed, it would clearly deviate from my own views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament" (**OKADA 2009**). History suggests that Japan's government is dependent on and seeks out the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which parties in the U.S. have exploited. Such events have also resulted in many other nations believing that if Japan's trust in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence fails, Japan may become a nuclear armed state. As was the case with nuclear Tomahawk, the U.S. policies on nuclear weapons reduction was threatened to be derailed by Japan's policy to depend on U.S. nuclear umbrella. Considering the fact that one of the

pillars in its Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy involves promoting global nuclear disarmament, this situation seems hypocritical.

**1.8** In response to international concerns, Japan adopted a “No Plutonium Surplus Policy” in 1991 and to improve transparency, the annual “Plutonium Management Report” has published details of Japan’s plutonium stockpile since 1993. The most recent Plutonium Management Report published in September 2014 stated that as of the end of December 2013, 10.8 tons of Japan’s massive 47.8 ton stockpile of plutonium was held domestically and 36.3 tons in Europe (**JAEC 2014**). Ever since TEPCO’s (Tokyo Electric Power Company) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, the use for such large amounts of plutonium has remained unclear. Even amid such uncertainty, the new Strategic Energy Plan (**JAPAN METI 2014**) published in April 2014 spells out the policy for “Promotion of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”. International and Japanese specialists have expressed the view that this policy will increase the stockpile and adversely impact on international nuclear non-proliferation efforts (**TAKUBO & VON HIPPEL 2013**), (**US-JAPAN NUCLEAR WORKING GROUP 2013**). These arguments can be broken down into the following:

1. Lack of Rationale for Nuclear Fuel Cycles: in light of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear power plants, continuing nuclear fuel cycles (reprocessing) is irrational.
2. Concern of “Potential Nuclear Weapon Capabilities”: the lack of rationale suggests that Japan is intentionally attempting to gain nuclear weapon capabilities.
3. Negative impacts on Discouraging Other Nation’s Reprocessing Activities: because Japan received complete support from the United States for reprocessing, South Korea has also demanded the same in their U.S.-ROK. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (**KOREAN JOONGANG DAILY 2014**).
4. The Very Existence of a Plutonium Stockpile Threatens Nuclear Security: stockpiling a large volume of plutonium and transporting that stockpile pose a significant nuclear security risk.

In response to such international criticisms, Japan declared in March 2014 that it would hand all its plutonium and highly-enriched uranium used at the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) over to the United States and the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement reiterated their commitment to the global reduction of special nuclear materials (**JAPAN-U.S. LEADERS 2014**). Japan’s plans for using plutonium have, however, remained largely unchanged and international tensions regarding the matter remain unresolved.

## South Korea's Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence

**1.9** According to records by the United States Department of Defense, deployment of nuclear bombs and nuclear artillery at U.S. bases in South Korea began in January 1958 (NORRIS, ARKIN & BURR 1999). It occurred in the course of development of history as shown below: The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953 for the ceasefire of the Korean War; The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROK was then signed in October the same year and brought into effect in November 1954; The Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee was established via the Korean Armistice Agreement, but confrontations between the U.S. and Soviet Union diminished its functionality. Nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea were aimed at North Korea and it was said that “the only place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear foe is South Korea” (ARKIN & FIELDHOUSE 1985). It has been estimated that there were 660-686 weapons before 1977, 249 in 1983 and 151 in 1985 (HAYES 1990) at the Kunsan Air Base. Nuclear Weapons deployed included nuclear bombs, nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface missiles (Honest John, etc.), surface-to-air missiles (Nike-Hercules) and nuclear mines, among others. They were deployed in South Korea throughout the Cold War. A major joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, dubbed Team Spirit, began in 1976 and was carried out until the end of the Cold War. Perceiving each of these exercises as a provocative nuclear war rehearsal, North Korea assumed pre-war positions, which sparked further repeated escalations of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While depending on the U.S. nuclear deterrence, including the deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil, South Korea internationally committed itself to being a non-nuclear state by joining the NPT in April 1975, a year earlier than Japan.

**1.10** After the Cold War, in accordance with the so-called Presidential Initiative between Bush and Gorbachev, followed by Yeltsin, the U.S. removed all its nuclear weapons from the soil of South Korea. In September 1991, President Bush announced that the United States would withdraw all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense notified North Korea in December the same year that it had removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo then declared on December 18, 1991 that there were no nuclear weapons on the soil of South Korea. According to the 1991 Command History of the U.S. Pacific Command, which the Nautilus Institute obtained, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff told the U.S. Pacific Command that the U.S. sealift ships authorized to transport nuclear weaponry should be used as a priority to remove nuclear weapons from South Korea and that the removal should commence before the U.S.-ROK Military Committee

Meeting (MCM) and U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that were scheduled in November. These documented records coincide with the sequence of events that are publicly known as described above. The global security environment improved when the Cold War ended, as exemplified by the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, which also heralded improved inter-Korean relations. In December 1991, the two Koreas signed “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” followed by the “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in January 1992; two significant agreements which came into effect in February 1992. The following statements within the Joint Denuclearization Declaration are of particular significance. First and foremost, the preamble of the Joint Statement reads that the agreement would “create conditions and an environment favorable to peace and the peaceful unification of Korea”; hence, the agreement recognizes the objective of unifying the two countries. Article One declares that “South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” and Article Three promises “South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities”. Considering that both nations had already signed the NPT, the first article does not state anything new. The third article, however, declaring neither country would produce fissile materials, which could potentially be used to develop nuclear weapons, was groundbreaking and contrasted with Japan’s progress. The difference between Japan and the two Korea’s progress is undeniably stark. Following Japan’s negotiations with the United States, it was given permission to fully operate the Tokai Nuclear Processing Plant in 1981. A new Japan-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1988 also gave Japan comprehensive consent to build and operate the commercial scale Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility for thirty years, at which Japan installed a uranium enrichment facility in 1992. The North-South Korea Joint Denuclearization Declaration continued to serve a vital role for nuclear disarmament negotiations on the Korean Peninsula and in discussions for a NEA-NWFZ.

**1.11** As the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission provided for by the Joint Denuclearization Declaration failed and North Korea’s nuclear development program emerged, South Korea was driven to strengthen diplomatic efforts in cooperation with the United States to prevent North Korea’s nuclear program. Simultaneously, South Korea strengthened its dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, which has been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and South Korea Minister of National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the United States commitment to extend their “Nuclear Umbrella” to South Korea. A joint communiqué from the meeting held in 2006, just ten days after North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapon test in October, stated that the U.S. “offered assurances of firm U.S.

commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty” (**ROK-U.S. SCM 2006**). Similar to the extended deterrent provided to Japan, the Obama administration emphasized that the U.S. extended deterrent was not limited to nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, the 2011 SCM founded the “ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Policy Committee”. The most recent joint communiqué from 2014 promises to do the following in regard to extended deterrence: “The Secretary reaffirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen an extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities” (**ROK-U.S. SCM 2014**). While there had been a demand in South Korea for nuclear sovereignty to secure free hands to develop a nuclear program, North Korea’s development of their nuclear program revitalized national nuclear arguments in South Korea. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey showed 70% of South Koreans supported efforts to develop their own nuclear weapons and some influential politicians stated their desire for nuclear armament, which became subject to critical analysis (**HAYES & MOON 2014**). The South Korean President herself expressed concerns about the risk of nuclear domino triggered in the ROK (**BAKER & GALE 2014**). South Korea strongly emphasized its desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement. Rather than a joint agreement where South Korea is allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuels on case-by-case basis, South Korea requested a continued “comprehensive consent” clause, similar to that cited by Japan, which allowed it to reprocess spent nuclear fuels at will (**KANE 2010**). The request for comprehensive consent in reprocessing spent nuclear fuels was denied and the existing nuclear agreement was extended to March 2016 (**U.S. DOS 2014**). Considering current conflicts, such as Japan’s rights to reprocess spent nuclear fuels, this issue is bound to resurface.

## North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence Development

**1.12** North Korea’s nuclear weapon program has been developed by primarily using plutonium produced at its 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor near Yongbyon. The graphite-moderated reactor first came online in 1986; a year after North Korea signed the NPT. Confrontations over the IAEA’s inspection on the initial declaration by North Korea, as required by the NPT, became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. The situation led to a rigid U.S.-North Korea Meeting and the negotiations shaped the mold for all following meetings regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. Held on June 11, 1993, the negotiations concluded and reached agreements that the U.S. would provide North Korea with security assurance against the threat and use of force,

including nuclear weapons and that the Korean Peninsula would be denuclearized according to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, among others. Also agreeing to continue negotiations in future, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT (**PEOPLE'S KOREA 1993**). **The two core elements of “security assurance to North Korea against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons” and “denuclearizing Korean Peninsula with a verification mechanism” became a pattern that shaped the mold for all following agreements toward denuclearizing North Korea.** Later negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as implementing IAEA inspections on fuel removal from the graphite reactor, became strained and the multiple problems involved saw the situation deteriorate to the brink of war, known as the 1994 crisis. Former U.S. President Carter visited North Korea in June 1994 and met with then DPRK President Kim Il-sung to mediate a deal to resume talks. Part of the mediated deal was that in exchange for North Korea freezing its graphite-moderated reactor and reprocessing facilities, high-level talks between the two countries would resume in Geneva. The high-level talks in October 1994 created the “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (“Agreed Framework”), according to which the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded in March 1995.

**1.13** The Agreed Framework called for North Korea to halt all operations at the graphite reactor and related facilities in exchange for two 1000 MW light water reactors provided by KEDO and a supply of fuel oil as provisional energy aid. In the Agreed Framework, the United States guaranteed to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and North Korea would observe the 1992 Joint Denuclearization Declaration, among others. It is most notable that **on top of security assurances, energy aid was added to the negotiating table and negotiations achieved agreement to revitalize the Joint Denuclearization Declaration.** Founded by an agreement between the United States, Japan and South Korea, KEDO’s Executive Board was later joined by the European Union. Nine countries, including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Indonesia, joined KEDO one by one from 1995 to 2000. Having multiple countries participate in KEDO strengthened the guarantee that North Korea would continue to participate in the process. Furthermore, by taking time throughout the process to build mutual trust, this unprecedented, comprehensive and ambitious approach targeted efforts to overcome mutual distrust and achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The North Korean firing of the Taepodong ballistic missile in August 1998 brought with it a new set of problems. In response, the United States assigned former Secretary of Defense William Perry as the U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator to conduct a review of the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Perry’s public report, released in October 1999, stated that KEDO’s processes had successfully frozen North Korea’s nuclear program. The

report also suggested that to maintain the frozen nuclear program, the U.S. take a comprehensive and integrated approach to issues while coping with inevitable subsequent tensions (**PERRY 1999**). The Sunshine Policy adopted in February 1999 by President Kim Dae-jung and the Inter-Korean Summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in June 2000 paved the way to reaching the pinnacle of KEDO processes in October 2000. Jo Myong-rok, who was First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea and North Korea's number three, visited Washington and met with President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The DPRK-US Joint Communiqué said that “the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in future to build a new relationship free from past enmity” (**U.S. & DPRK 2000**). The United States Congress had consistently resisted supplying North Korea with fuel oil. However, it may be safe to say that the KEDO process had almost succeeded, despite many twists, turns and challenges along the way. Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang ten days later and met with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il. **KEDO's processes demonstrated that cooperation among multiple nations and improved relations between North and South are crucial in engaging North Korea in international efforts.**

**1.14** The administration change took place in the U.S. and when President G. H. Bush labeled North Korea the “Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union address in January 2002, it toppled the already wobbly balance of denuclearization negotiations in the Korean Peninsula. Suspicions of North Korea enriching uranium terminated KEDO's processes in October 2002 and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Although there were objections to the validity of the withdrawal procedure taken by the DPRK, the three-month cooling-off period expired and North Korea withdrew. Within this timeframe, the U.S. began the Iraq War after having labeled Hussein's regime the “Axis of Evil”, just as it had done to North Korea. It is presumed that these developments largely influenced North Korea's subsequent national strategy. In an effort to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table to peacefully resolve nuclear issues, China initiated the Six-Party Talks in August 2003, which involved China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S.. Through December 2008 there were six rounds and thirteen official Six-Party Talks sessions, with details of the talks found in **Box 1**. When North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear weapon test during the Six-Party Talks in 2006, it appeared North Korea was adopting **diplomacy that attempted to eliminate the threat against its regime and normalize international relations by playing both the processes and products of developing nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards.** One key negotiator stated — in retrospect — they should have recognized that in light of North Korea's nuclear test, it would take time to

## Six-Party Talk Timeline

August 27-29, 2003:	<p>First Round</p> <p>The party confirmed to work to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue through peaceful means.</p>
February 25-28, 2004:	<p>Second Round</p> <p>Followed by two working group meetings, all parties reaffirmed the objective of achieving a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. demanded a CVID ("complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement")</p>
June 23-26 2004:	<p>Third Round</p> <p>There was disparity between North Korea and the U.S., South Korea, and Japan regarding the range, verification, and compensation for freezing North Korea's nuclear program as an initial step for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons.</p>
July 26-August 7, 2004:	<p>Fourth Round First Session</p> <p>All concerned nations agreed on significant principles to establish nuclear free Korean Peninsula, normalize Japan-North Korea and U.S.-North Korea diplomatic relations, provide economic and energy assistance, and outline the "Safety Guarantee" document. The meeting adjourned and a consensus could not be reached regarding North Korea's rights for peaceful use of nuclear power and its uranium enrichment facility.</p>
September 13-19, 2005:	<p>Fourth Round, Second Session</p> <p>The parties released its first joint statement on September 19<sup>th</sup>. The statement confirms to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through a peaceful and verifiable manner, to respect North Korea's rights for peaceful use of nuclear energy, to provide North Korea with a light water nuclear reactor, to normalize the diplomatic relations between Japan-North Korea, U. S-North Korea, and to stabilize North Korea through economy/energy aids.</p>
November 9-11, 2005:	<p>Fifth Round, First Session</p> <p>The parties had detailed discussions on how the to implement the Joint Statement, but adjourned without reaching a consensus because North Korea opposed U.S. financial sanctions. (During this meeting, North Korea conducted missile tests and its first nuclear experiment.)</p>
December 18-22, 2006:	<p>Fifth Round, Second Session</p> <p>A work plan submitted by China, the chairperson, was discussed. The meeting adjourned with disagreement from North Korea, which demanded the U.S. to terminate its financial sanctions on North Korea.</p>

achieve nuclear disarmament and negotiations should have proceeded with a long-term perspective (**PRITCHARD 2007**).

**1.15** The Six-Party Talks agreed on the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, which included commitments to security assurances (**including conventional weapons**) and elements from the Agreed Framework, such as the 1992 Joint Declaration and provision of energy assistance. In addition, it also included new elements such as the agreement for North

February 8-13, 2007:	<p><b>Fifth Round, Third Session</b></p> <p>The parties agreed on “First Phase Actions” to shut down and seal the nuclear facilities around Yongbyon. In exchange, the parties would provide North Korea with fuel oil, and aid to its economy, energy, and human resources. The parties created five working groups, which are as follows: “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Chairperson: China)”, “Economy and Energy Cooperation (Chairperson: South Korea)”, “Normalization of Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson: U.S./North Korea)”, “Normalization of U.S.-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson: U.S./North Korea) and “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (Chairperson; Russia)”.</p>
March 19-22, 2007:	<p><b>Sixth Round, First Session</b></p> <p>The five working groups established during the Fifth Round reported on their progress. North Korea refused to substantiate negotiations due to U.S. financial sanctions and the meeting was adjourned.</p>
July 18-20, 2007:	<p><b>Sixth Round, Head of Delegation Meeting</b></p> <p>North Korea halted operations of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and it was found that the IAEA had begun operations in North Korea. Agreements were not reached regarding the “Second Phase Actions”.</p>
September 27-30, 2007:	<p><b>Sixth Round, Second Session</b></p> <p>To achieve the September 19<sup>th</sup> Joint Statement, the parties agreed on the second phase of actions for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, normalizing diplomatic relations between the parties, and the provision of economic &amp; energetic aid to North Korea (dated October 3).</p>
July 10-12 2008:	<p><b>Sixth Round, Second Head of Delegation Meeting</b></p> <p>The parties agreed on the need of a verification mechanism to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a monitoring mechanism to monitor each party state’s fulfillment of and respect towards the commitment. Agreements were also reached towards disabling the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, providing economic and energy aid, stabilizing the region, and holding ministerial conference. An unofficial six-party meeting was later held in Singapore on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, where the U.S. removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism (October 10).</p>
December 8-10, 2008:	<p><b>Sixth Round, Third Head of Delegation Meeting</b></p> <p>Japan, U.S., South Korea and Russia could not reach a consensus with North Korea in terms of a verification system. This has been the last Six-Party Talk as of January 2015.</p>

Korea to rejoin the NPT and the need for consultation among the parties concerned to promote lasting peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula (**SIX-PARTY TALKS 2005**). The September 19 Joint Statement is still cited as a key international agreement regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (for instance **NPT 2010-8**). Based upon the Joint Statement, the Six-Party agreed to the initial phase actions to freeze North Korea’s three Yongbyon facilities (the 5 MWe Graphite Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant or Radiochemical Laboratory and the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility) in February 2007. The party also established five working groups. One group deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia

Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group” (**SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-1**). It deserves attention for its potential as a platform for a more comprehensive consultation on regional security, including the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks also agreed on the second phase of action in October the same year, while the two primary actions were “the disablement of the three Yongbyon facilities” and “a complete and correct declaration of all nuclear programs of North Korea” (**SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-2**). North Korea made a public demonstration of demolishing the cooling tower of the graphite reactor in June 2008 to fulfill part of the disablement action. According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service Report, the disablement proceeded in eleven phases, which were 80% complete as of April 2009 (**NIKITIN 2013**). However, the Six-Party Talks became deadlocked over the process of verifying the “complete and correct declaration” by North Korea. The Heads of Delegation meeting of the Six-Party Talks held in December 2008 was the party’s last talk. Although issues of verifying North Korea’s nuclear program could have been given more time and passed to “third-phase actions”, the challenges arising from a possible U.S. administration change seem to have posed difficulties.

**1.16** In April 2009, North Korea publicly announced its launch of Juche Nuclear Industry and the decision to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon (**KCNA 2009-2**), then to begin enriching uranium as fuel for the reactor (**KCNA 2009-4**). Siegfried Hecker, a former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and other U.S. experts were invited to view the Yongbyon facilities in November 2010 (**HECKER 2010**). They found a 10MWt small, light water reactor in its initial construction stage and a surprisingly modern centrifuge cascade facility, as commented by Hecker, to enrich uranium. According to him, North Korean experts explained the enrichment facilities were up and running and they were intending to make up a six-stage cascade with 2000 centrifuges to enrich uranium and produce uranium dioxide fuel, although they had yet to acquire such technology. North Korea’s regime passed to Kim Jong-un in December 2011, yet the national strategy of striving to gain nuclear deterrence, as a means of regime protection, has remained unchanged. In April 2013, the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the “Law on Consolidating the Position of a Nuclear Weapons State”, which set forth policies regarding nuclear weapons and a doctrine for the use of such weapons (**KCNA 2013-6**). The doctrine declares that the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army is authorized to give the order to use nuclear weapons only when waging war against an invading nuclear weapon state and that North Korea will not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, unless they have joined a hostile nuclear enemy who attacks North Korea. The doctrine continues to state North Korea will observe strict rules on the security management of nuclear weapons and will not let nuclear weapons, technology or nuclear substances be smuggled out, etc. Reliable confirmation

that North Korea has successfully weaponized a nuclear bomb, however, remains pending. In April the same year, North Korea announced that the Yongbyon graphite reactor had resumed operations (**KCNA 2013-7**) and satellite imagery taken in August showed expanded uranium enrichment facilities (**ALBRIGHT & AVAGYAN 2013**). Further analysis of North Korea's recent activities, including details of their nuclear capabilities, can be found in **Chapter 4**.

## Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

**1.17** Sandwiched between two massive countries with nuclear weapons — Russia and China — Mongolia has received international recognition thanks to its unique “Single State Nuclear Weapon-Free Status”. Following the end of the Cold War, in February 1992, the “Mongolian People's Republic” was renamed “Mongolia” under a new constitution. In October the same year, then President Ochirbat stated in his address to the United Nations that Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to contribute toward regional and global disarmament and trust (**OCHIRBAT 1992**). On that note, the president went on to say that the Cold War had eroded national independence and sovereignty and that the conclusion of the Cold War gave nations like Mongolia high expectations of the new era — particularly that which was spelled out in the United Nations Charter. The Mongolian nuclear weapon-free declaration reflected the new Mongolian government's strategy founded at a time of change (**ENKHSAIKHAN 2014**). In December 1998, the United Nations General Assembly resolution titled “Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” (A/RES/53/77) was adopted without a vote. This was a welcome response to Mongolia's own declaration and also recognized that such effort would contribute to the peace, safety and stability of the region. Furthermore, Mongolia legislation adopted the “Law of Mongolia on its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” in February 2000 (**UNGA 2000**). This law prohibited any individual, legal entity, or state from developing, acquiring, possessing, deploying, or transporting nuclear weapons, etc. on the territory of Mongolia. It is also notable that the same law also allows NGOs and individuals to exercise “public oversight” in implementing legislation regarding the nuclear-weapon-free status.

**1.18** The largest challenge in maintaining Mongolia's “Single State Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” is to secure a legally binding security assurance from states with nuclear weapons. In response to Mongolia's request, five nuclear weapon states — the P5 — expressed a joint statement in October 2000 titled: “Statement on Security Assurances in Connection with Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”. Although the statement reaffirmed the political intent from the P5 to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against

Mongolia, it fell short of offering Mongolia legally binding security assurance. A UN-sponsored, non-governmental group meeting of experts was held in September 2001 in Sapporo, which involved individual experts from the P5 and Mongolia examining various models ranging from “minimal model” to “comprehensive model”. The former model was limited to a trilateral treaty between China, Mongolia and Russia that would agree to prohibit “deploying, storing, or passing nuclear explosive devices through Mongolian territory”. The latter model required the participation of the five nuclear weapon states, dealing with a wide-range of threats to Mongolia’s national security (**UMEBAYASHI 2011**). Mongolia’s diplomatic efforts toward the P5 continued hereafter and declarations were announced in October 2012 to reaffirm the P5 joint statement on security assurances (**UNGA-UNSC 2012**). However, this - once again - fell short of a legally binding framework (**UMEBAYASHI 2014-1**). Mongolia’s national government has officially committed its position in backing a NEA-NWFZ. During the United Nations High-Level Panel on September 26, 2013, Mongolian President Elbegdorj declared his intent to work with the countries of Northeast Asia in evaluating the potential to make the NEA-NWFZ a reality on an informal basis (**ELBEGDORJ 2013**). Mongolia plays a significant role in efforts to establish a NEA-NWFZ.

## Chapter 2

# Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective

**2.1** The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reinforcement of nuclear weapon dependency in Northeast Asia goes directly against the tide of the world striving for a “world without nuclear weapons”, as driven by President Obama’s Prague speech. Following the Prague speech, the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Final Document included adopting a 64-point “Action Plan”, which was the first step toward success. The Final Document included phrases such as “nuclear weapons convention” and “agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments”, etc. It further provided crucial instructions by stating that the NPT “affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-2) and “expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-1). The review conference also promised specific action plans to “rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-5) and “further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” (NPT 2010-6). The Final Document’s action calling for “all States and parties to commit to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-3) is a reminder that both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states are

both responsible for achieving the goals set forth. This call for action epitomizes what needs to be done to achieve a NEA-NWFZ.

**2.2** Even though the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — the only disarmament negotiation forum — has stalled, there have been increasing efforts to establish platforms to negotiate “the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons”. Austria, Mexico and Norway submitted their “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations” resolution to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee in 2011 (**AUSTRIA, MEXICO & NORWAY 2011**). This resolution reworks the CD’s four main agendas into two categories and tried to bring the long-standing confrontation regarding the priority of issues to an end. The three countries determined, however, that the resolution would find it difficult to attract widespread support and it was withdrawn. Named after a December 2012 resolution of the same title, an “open-ended working group (OEWG) to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” was established. The OEWG convened for fifteen days at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva over the course of three sessions held in May, June and August 2013, at which government officials, international institutions, experts and NGOs freely exchanged ideas. The OEWG was concluded on August 30 after manifesting a report “Discussions and proposals” chapter (**OEWG 2013**). According to Article VI of the NPT Treaty, all nations must bear responsibility for nuclear disarmament. In addition, the OEWG report introduced a new concept that “states have differentiated roles and functions” to fulfill this responsibility. The group added that “non-nuclear-weapon States have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament”. The OEWG report then introduces the “role of non-nuclear weapons States under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees” in “reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The report also stressed the role played by “nuclear-weapon-free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of nuclear weapons” (See **Box 2** for more information about the existing nuclear weapon-free zones in the world). **The context of the OEWG report implies that if states dependent on extended nuclear deterrence select policies for a NEA-NWFZ, it would be a step forward in global nuclear disarmament.**

**2.3** Spurred on by the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Final Document, an approach to push the stalled nuclear disarmament discussion forward has prioritized the “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”. This discussion focuses on the significance of problems stemming from extended nuclear deterrence. The joint statement released in May 2012 during the 1<sup>st</sup> Preparatory Committee for 2015 NPT Review Conference initially had 16 signatory

## Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the world

### What are Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones?

NWFZs are an international legal scheme whereby a geographical area is created in which no nuclear weapons exist. The significance of this scheme is not only to prohibit the development, manufacture, and deployment of nuclear weapons within the zone, but also to make nuclear-possessing states commit to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the states within the zone (provision of “negative security assurance”). NWFZs can also serve as an effective confidence-building measure among regional states and concerned states, as well as to contribute as important regional efforts to creating norms toward the global prohibition of nuclear weapons.

There are five existing NWFZs, and each one is stipulated by an international treaty. The Antarctic Treaty is a kind of NWFZ treaty. In addition, Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized by the international community.

There are three characteristics in common among the existing NWFZs. The first is the “nonexistence of nuclear weapon.” In these zones, the acquisition, possession, deployment, testing and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited. Secondly, in concept, security assurances are provided by the nuclear weapon states. This means that the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons against countries within the zones is prohibited. Moreover, regional organizations established in conjunction with NWFZ Treaties can contribute to strengthening mutual confidence by solving regional disputes and problems such as non-compliance with the treaty in a regional and peaceful manner. In addition to the above, the right of the States Parties to use nuclear energy peacefully is often stipulated in NWFZ Treaties.



① Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

- Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
- Entered into force: April 25, 1969
- Number of states parties: 33  
(including all nations in the region)

② South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

- Opened for signature: August 6, 1985
- Entered into force: December 11, 1986
- Number of states parties: 13

③ Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

- Opened for signature: December 15, 1995
- Entered into force: March 27, 1997
- Number of states parties: 10  
(including all nations in the region)

④ African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

- Opened for signature: April 11, 1996
- Entered into force: July 15, 2009
- Number of signatory states: 50, Number of state parties: 39

⑤ Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

- Opened for signature: September 8, 2006
- Entered into force: March 21, 2009
- Number of states parties: 5  
(including all nations in the region)

⑥ Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

- On December 4, 1998, the United Nations General Assembly recognized its nuclear-weapon-free status by adopting the resolution submitted by Mongolia.
- On February 3, 2000, the Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status was adopted.

⑦ The Antarctic Treaty

- Opened for signature: December 1, 1959
- Entered into force: June 23, 1961
- Number of states parties: 50  
(including 5 nuclear weapon states)

states, including Norway, Switzerland and Austria and has since continued to gain support. The fifth “Joint Statement on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, announced in 2014 during the UN General Assembly First Committee, saw 155 states sign. In parallel to the joint statement gaining support, a “Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” was held in March 2013, February 2014 and December 2014 in Oslo Norway, Nayarit Mexico and Vienna Austria, respectively. In connection to the extended nuclear deterrence, the attitudes of the Japanese government toward these developments have caught attention. Japan had not signed the first three joint statements, but finally did so for the fourth joint statement in October 2013. The joint statement says that “it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances”, which can be interpreted as a de facto declaration of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Heightened domestic public opinion shifted Japan’s attitude toward supporting the statement. Meanwhile, it became apparent that certain non-nuclear weapon states attempted to restrain the developing discussion on the inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Japan supported the joint statement delivered by Australia, which emphasized the need to “address the important security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.” Analyzing this response objectively, **it is contradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that using nuclear weapons could have while refusing to commit not to use the same. This contradiction can be resolved by shifting current security policies in favor of those which eliminate the very possibility of using nuclear weapons. One of the alternative policy options to this situation will pave the way for a nuclear weapon-free zone.**

**2.4** The statement to require to “rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global stockpile,” which appeared in NPT documents and elsewhere, not only puts the spotlight on the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenal, but also intends to reemphasize the commitment “to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed”. Furthermore, instead of focusing solely on disarming nuclear weapon hardware, the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” has been also discussed. This reveals the need to pursue manifesting a transparent and verifiable “Report” on the various soft and hard aspects of nuclear disarmament. The 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document lists concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament which should be taken by nuclear weapon states. It also urges nuclear weapon states to adopt a standard reporting form to submit a report regarding their implementation of these measures (**NPT 2010-4**), (**NPT 2010-7**). The “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI), founded by Japan and Australia, submitted a working paper to the First Session of the

Preparatory Committee in 2012. The submission, titled “Transparency of nuclear weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI), introduced a “Standard Reporting Form” (NPDI 2012). On top of reporting on the production of fissile material and the number, type and deployment status of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the form would have states report on the past year’s “measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. South Africa represented the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee and expanded on the aforementioned measures. The NAC stated that nuclear weapon states and their nuclear weapon-free alliances must report on the instruments and plans to diminish the role of nuclear weapons (MABHONGO 2012). This trend demonstrates that we have reached a point where **specific, detailed efforts have become necessary on the part of states dependent on extended nuclear deterrence to eliminate dependence on nuclear weapons.**

**2.5** As demonstrated above, **recent global disarmament discussions demand that non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those dependent on extended nuclear deterrence, make policy changes.** Considering the clear impact using nuclear weapons would have on humanity, North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and Japan and South Korea must alter their nuclear weapon dependence policies. It goes without saying that if these states feel threatened by nuclear weapons, then policies guaranteeing security should address the matter. To formulate and achieve comprehensible policies, states within the potential NEA-NWFZ must continue efforts to achieve the NWFZ. For example, South Korea and Japan can illegitimatize nuclear weapons by establishing policies that eliminate dependence on the nuclear umbrella, which would contribute significantly to improving the norms to prohibiting nuclear weapons from the region and beyond. This would also contribute to global nuclear disarmament. Japan, which is the only nation to have experienced atomic bombings in wartime, in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, should reaffirm its responsibility to fill the role of leading international nuclear disarmament and work with Korea, which is also home to many nuclear bomb victims. The two nations can collaborate to select policies that move toward a NEA-NWFZ, and now have the opportunity to make a large, international impact. The influence on NATO and other nuclear alliances would surely also be significant.



## Chapter 3

# The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal

**3.1** As was introduced in **Paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3**, North Korea's developing nuclear weapons program intensified Japan and South Korea's dependence on nuclear deterrence and has heightened the region's nuclear confrontation. Anxieties over a nuclear domino effect in Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored. As well as increasing the risk of nuclear war, the current situation heightens the psychological sense of being threatened, which leads to rising military tensions and the risk of not only nuclear but also conventional military confrontation. Although it is welcome that the United States has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its extended deterrence, this change in policy will not reduce the aggressive mindset in the current nuclear confrontation as long as any trace of nuclear weapons is involved. The result is overall security instability in the region. The region's escalating nuclear dependence runs counter to the international community's goal of achieving a "Nuclear Weapon-Free World". It also extraordinarily diminishes the role to be played by Japan, as the only country to have experienced nuclear bombings, in promoting global nuclear disarmament. The situation would be further complicated should Japan, South Korea and the U.S. respond militarily with a joint missile defense program to the assumption that North Korea's developing ballistic missile program implies a development in their nuclear weapons program. Because such missile defense capability would theoretically also diminish the effectiveness of the Chinese strategic

nuclear forces. This is an example of how regional tensions stemming from North Korea's nuclear weapons program impede global nuclear disarmament efforts. Achieving a NEA-NWFZ will lay the groundwork for a regional security system that eliminates such tensions. As part of the international community's nuclear disarmament efforts, non-nuclear weapon states dependent on extended nuclear deterrent are demanded to act as mentioned in **Chapter 2**. The NEA-NWFZ initiative would serve as an example from Japan and South Korea to respond to such a call.

**3.2** Since the end of the Cold War, various concrete proposals have been made to achieve an NEA-NWFZ as a step forward in establishing regional security. **Box 3** shows a list representing such proposals, organized by year. At present, the **Three-plus-Three Arrangement**, including its various modifications, is considered a simple and pragmatic basic structure. A model treaty has been drafted based on this arrangement (**UMEBAYASHI 2005**). In the NEA-NWFZ treaty with the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, the three states involved, namely South and North Korea and Japan are categorized as "**Intrazonal States**" and the other three states involved, the U.S., Russia and China, all of which are nuclear weapon states under NPT with deep ties to the region, are categorized as "**Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States**". The Intrazonal States would form a geographic nuclear weapon-free zone and be required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar to existing NWFZ treaties. A Neighboring Nuclear Weapon State would become a full state party of the treaty, as opposed to a party of its protocol and assume the obligation to refrain from committing any acts against the non-nuclear provisions of the treaty and provide security assurances not to attack the zone with nuclear weapons, hopefully even with conventional weapons (negative security assurances). If Mongolia, which has received UN General Assembly recognition for its nuclear weapon-free status, were to opt for membership of an NEA-NWFZ, a **Four-plus-Three Arrangement** would be optimal. However, as was shown in **Paragraphs 1.17 & 1.18**, it entirely depends upon the choice of Mongolia's diplomatic strategies in the post-2012 era. No doubt it is necessary for the zone to receive negative security assurances from all five nuclear weapon states. In this scheme, France and England, which are not "Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States", would be requested to provide such security assurances through a protocol of the treaty. It will be appropriate from the geographical perspective to have the U.S., Russia and China all directly involved in the treaty. It is no accidental coincidence that all states of the Three-plus-Three Arrangement are members of the Six-party Talks.

## Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Date, Year	Submitted by	Proposal Contents
March, 1995	John Endicott, et al.	Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ), involving only non-strategic weapons. A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom and later an elliptical zone to include part of Alaska, U.S..
1995	Andrew Mack	NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan.
March, 1996	Kumao Kaneko	A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom. Different obligations posed on nuclear weapons state and non-nuclear weapons states.
May, 1996	Hirofumi Umebayashi	Three plus Three nations arrangement involving ROK, DPRK and Japan as non-nuclear weapons states and China, Russia, U.S. as nuclear weapons states.
October, 1997	John Endicott, et al.	Northeast Asia League of Non-Nuclear States, involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (and DPRK if possible) as a phase I formation of the LNWFZ.
December, 2003	Seongwhun Cheon, Tatsujiro Suzuki	Proposal of a concept for a tri-party treaty between Japan, ROK, and DPRK to achieve long-term goals set at the six-party talks.
April, 2004	Hirofumi Umebayashi, et al.	A model NWFZ treaty with six nations, drafted based upon a Three plus Three nations arrangement.
Spring 2007	J. Enkhsaikhan	An approach to form a zone through relevant non-nuclear constituent states' attaining single state NWF status.
August, 2008	Democratic Party of Japan Disarmament Group	A draft treaty proposal based upon a Three plus Three arrangement.
November, 2008	Jaejung Suh	Adding protocols for the multilateralization of the Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
May, 2010	Peter Hayes, et al. (Nautilus Institute)	Idea for initially forming then expanding a NWFZ between Japan and ROK.
November, 2011	Morton H. Halperin	An approach to conclude a comprehensive agreement on key elements including the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, with a view to overcome the stalled Six-Party Talks.
October, 2012	Peter Hayes, et al. (Nautilus Institute)	An approach beyond the Six-Party Talks where Japan, ROK, DPRK, Mongolia, and Canada form a NWFZ and involves the five nuclear-weapon states. DPRK will gradually join the party.

**3.3** In 2011, Halperin proposed achieving an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia” (HALPERIN 2011, 2012, 2014). Significantly, it shifted the framework of the arguments on an NEA-NWFZ from scheme-centered (focused on the geographic scope) to approach-centered (focused on the process to achieve) arguments. Halperin’s proposal carried weight for several reasons; he used to work in formulating U.S. policies toward Asia at several U.S. administrations; the U.S. has been considered by the DPRK as the primary source of national threats that prompt it to develop nuclear deterrence; and therefore the U.S. has been a state with which North Korea wants to negotiate. The Halperin Proposal was shared and backed at the First Workshop for the following reasons (RECNA 2013). 1) Accepting North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as a *fait accompli* may potentially lead to a domino effect in Japan and South Korea, which could then trigger the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. 2) Accordingly, robust international efforts, which should be tangible and verifiable, should continue as long as hope remains, however minute, that North Korea can be denuclearized. 3) Past efforts to denuclearize North Korea have stalled. A new approach for negotiations is needed to avoid repeating past failures, which involve placing blame on one another for the reason negotiations failed. 4) Although there is a need for a comprehensive approach that simultaneously solves pending issues, this approach should not attempt to solve all the region’s security issues at the same time. Rather, it should be a restrained approach that comprehensively solves issues directly related to regional nuclear issues. As such, the Halperin Proposal is uniquely valuable and criticisms on it for repeating and rehashing other comprehensive proposals will not fit (e.g. GREEN 2012).

**3.4** There are six primary elements in Halperin’s proposal for a comprehensive security agreement. As Kurosawa pointed out, although details of each element have been slightly altered, there have been no major changes since the initial introduction in 2011 (KUROSAWA 2014). The six elements are: **1) Termination of the State of War, 2) Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3) Mutual Declaration of No Hostile Intent, 4) Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5) Termination of Sanctions and 6) Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.** In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly expressed its desire to achieve the first element. There have been various suggestions for the process to convert the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty and the details to be included in the peace treaty, but Halperin does not delve into this. However, he does mention that South Korea should be involved in the treaty, as well as the three armistice nations. The role of the second element—a permanent council—would, naturally, be to implement the agreement’s provisions. However, there have been no detailed

discussion regarding whether the council should handle broader security issues in the region. This council would also include more countries than those in the Six-Party Talks. The declaration of no hostile intent (third element) is reminiscent of the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué that took place in 2000 (**Paragraph 1.13, U.S. & DPRK 2000**). There were no details regarding what the mutual declaration between other nations would be. Just as previously, there is a need to provide North Korea with energy assistance. The fourth point, however, emphasizes that limiting North Korea's access to nuclear energy is discriminatory and cannot be allowed. The fifth element prohibits nations in the comprehensive agreement from individually placing sanctions on one another due to nuclear issues. However, the treaty should have provisions to allow sanctions to be imposed on states that violate the treaty. Halperin does not make any suggestions on how to lift sanctions currently placed by the UN Security Council resolutions. There are many details in the proposal regarding the sixth NWFZ element. While retaining the basic Three-plus-Three Arrangement, Halperin suggests the possibility of inviting Mongolia and Canada, as non-nuclear weapon states and France and the U.K. as nuclear weapon states, to the treaty. Further, there are provisions for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and thoughts on how to handle remaining nuclear weapons should Korea be reunified before completing the dismantlement. Halperin also devises an entry-into-force provision to increase the incentives for North Korea to join the treaty and provisions for the transition period. He also examines the possible entry-into-force provisions for Japan and South Korea to feel more secured in joining the treaty (**HALPERIN 2014**). Details regarding this are discussed in **Chapter 5**. If an NEA-NWFZ is established by solving these six elements, it could be a catalyst toward constructive discussions over broader security issues in the region.



## Chapter 4

# The Possibility of North Korea's Denuclearization

### The Kim Jong-un Regime's Policy Intent

**4.1** At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, First Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced strategies on "carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously" (KCNA 2013-5), which the 2015 New Year Address reconfirmed (KCNA 2015). Rather than focusing on North Korea maintaining its "military first" policy line, it is far more important to focus on the fact that North Korea is relativizing its "military first" policy line. It can be said that "the end of son'gun (military first strategy) is thus main meaning of byungjin (move two things simultaneously strategy)" (FRANK 2014). Developing North Korea's economy would require developing Northeast Asia's economic alliances, which, it is argued, would also require solving nuclear issues (KOO 2014). First Secretary Kim Jong-un's political regime will be stable, but the economic destitution is likely to be long-lasting (HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012). They will pursue efforts to open the economy slowly and under strict control. Although the execution of Jang Sung-taek, who was North Korea's number two government official, was shocking, experts do not believe it implies a shift in strategy (MOON 2014). It is unlikely that the Kim Jong-un regime would engage in provocations that would trigger a full-scale war on the

Korean Peninsula. While it cannot be ruled out that events similar to the ROKS Cheonan sinking in 2010 and bombardment of Yeonpyeong, which heightened tensions, will recur, North Korea appears to be calculating the level at which they ratchet up tensions. Since such tension escalation by North Korea is considered a shock technique aimed at altering the rules of the game, it is crucial to react with a level head, however difficult.

**4.2** This section focuses on analyzing the Kim Jong-un regime's policies in relation to denuclearization issues. Just after a year in office, North Korea successfully launched a satellite in December 2012. The United Nations Security Council Resolution responded by intensifying sanctions on North Korea in January 2013. North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs then stated that "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized." (KCNA 2013-1) and that "there will no longer exist...the September 19 joint statement", then "overall efforts should be directed to denuclearizing big powers, including the U.S., rather than the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" (Statement by the DPRK. National Defense Commission, KCNA 2013-2). At around the same time, the regime restructured its policies to strengthen its position as a nuclear weapon state (KCNA 2013-6), as was introduced in Paragraph 1.16. The shifting policies implied that North Korea was solidifying a long-term position on maintaining its nuclear deterrence. However, this strategic line does not necessarily mean that North Korea has taken a rigid position that its denuclearization is impossible before the "world-wide denuclearization" or "a world without nuclear weapons" is attained. Rather, it has soon become apparent that it maintains an open window to negotiate denuclearization while consolidating the domestic system as a nuclear armed state. The DPRK National Defense Commission released a "crucial" statement in June 2013, which defined that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be "the complete one that calls for denuclearizing the whole peninsula, including South Korea, and aims to eliminate the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK and then said "We propose senior-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and the U.S." (KCNA 2013-8). This means that North Korea suggested the denuclearization process contingent on the removal of U.S. threats, as before. In September 2013, the DPRK Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Kil-yon, attended the United Nations High-level Meeting on nuclear disarmament and expressed a similar attitude with regard to its denuclearization (PAK 2013). It can be inferred that North Korea is sticking to its policy of maintaining nuclear deterrence while attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. In fact, North Korea has never mentioned that its nuclear weapons were intended to give it parity or dominance; rather, the weapons have consistently been a means of self-defense. **There is still sufficient potential to achieve a denuclearized North Korea.**

## The Technological Side of North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Capabilities

**4.3** It has been confirmed that North Korea conducted three nuclear weapon tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013, which demonstrated that North Korea's nuclear capabilities are gradually improving. General information regarding these three nuclear tests can be found in **Box 4**. The October 2006 nuclear weapon test is estimated to have had a nuclear weapon yield of less than 1 kiloton (**U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006**), (**PABIAN & HECKER 2012**) and most experts agree that North Korea "failed to meet their target". That is because a single kiloton is significantly below the 10~20 kiloton nuclear weapon yield sought after in a typical first nuclear weapon test (**KIM 2013**). The second experiment in May 2009 had an estimated nuclear weapon yield of several megatons — 4~6 times the yield of the first (**U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2009**), (**PABIAN & HECKER 2012**). According to public records, there have been no detections of radioactive nuclides, which would be evidence of a nuclear explosion (**KIM 2013**), (**CTBTO 2009**). The third experiment in February 2013 is estimated to have had a nuclear weapon yield similar to the second (several kilotons) and is considered by experts to have been a "success". The first two experiments were plutonium bombs, and although the evidence is missing, the third experiment may have utilized uranium (**KIM 2013**), (**CTBTO 2009**). North Korea stated that the third experiment used "a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power", which would imply that North Korea had successfully developed a nuclear bomb that could be fitted to a missile (**KCNA 2013-3**). There have been various opinions regarding this statement. In February 2013, one expert published that "North Korea has the capability to mount a warhead on the Nodong missile" (**ALBRIGHT 2013**) and another publication in April 2013 printed that the U.S. Department of Defense has "moderate confidence" that North Korea had acquired the ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads so that they could be fitted to ballistic missiles" (**SHANKER, SANGER, & SCHMITT 2013**). There are opposing opinions even within the U.S. government (**ibid**), (**SCHMITT 2013**) and other experts have said that "there is no evidence" (**THIELMANN 2013**). The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), which is an authority on evaluating nuclear weaponry, released that there is "no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability" (**KRISTENSEN & NORIS 2014**). Conversely, on January 6, 2015 the South Korean Ministry of National Defense released a statement saying North Korea "appeared to have made a 'significant' advance toward making a nuclear warhead small enough to fit onto a long-range missile" (**CHOE 2015**). Continuing to analyze North Korea's nuclear capability is crucial. There has also been discussion regarding North Korea's ambiguous public statements. In March 2014, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that North Korea would use "more diversified nuclear deterrence" and would "not rule out a new form of nuclear test for bolstering its nuclear deterrence" (**KCNA 2014-1**). There

has been much speculation regarding the details of these new tests but North Korea's "calculated ambiguity has been a feature of national nuclear postures" (LEWIS 2014), (BERGER 2014).

## Box 4

### North Korean Nuclear Tests

1<sup>st</sup> Test: October 9<sup>th</sup>, 2006

■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 0.5~1.0 kt

Fissile Material: Plutonium

North Korean Statement<sup>1)</sup>: Successful experiment using domestically developed technology. No risk of radiation exposure.

U.S. Director of National Intelligence: Confirmed on October 16<sup>th</sup> that a nuclear experiment took place and that the nuclear weapon yield was below 1.0 kiloton.

CTBTO: Magnitude 4.1<sup>3)</sup>

■ Scientific Findings

U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A statement released on October 16<sup>th</sup> said that radioactive nuclides were detected in samples collected on October 11<sup>th</sup>.

CTBTO: The IMS's (International Monitoring System) Yellowknife Seismological Array in Canada announced on October 23<sup>rd</sup> that it had detected Xe133<sup>3)</sup>.

2<sup>nd</sup> Test: May 25<sup>th</sup>, 2009

■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 2~7kt

Fissile Material: Plutonium

North Korean Statement<sup>4)</sup>: A new plateau was reached with improved explosive power and control technology.

CTBTO: Magnitude 4.52<sup>5)</sup>

U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A June 15<sup>th</sup> statement announced that the nuclear weapon yield was estimated at being several kilotons<sup>6)</sup>.

■ Scientific Findings

No radioactive nuclides were detected.

3<sup>rd</sup> Nuclear Test: February 12<sup>th</sup>, 2013

■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 7.4~25kt

Fissile Material: Undetermined whether plutonium or uranium was used.

North Korean Statement: Higher nuclear weapon yield and a smaller, lighter nuclear bomb. Diversified its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

CTBTO: Magnitude 5.0<sup>9)</sup>

U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A February 12th statement announced that the nuclear weapon yield was estimated at being several kilotons<sup>10)</sup>.

■ Scientific Findings

CTBTO: Xe131m and Xe133 were detected 55 days after the experiment at Takazaki. The Ussuriysk Astrophysical Observatory also detected the isotopes<sup>11)</sup>.

1) KCNA 2006-2

2) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006

3) CTBTO

4) KCNA 2009-3

5) CTBTO 2009

6) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2009

7) PARK 2013

8) KCNA 2013-3

9) CTBTO 2013-1

10) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2013

11) CTBTO 2013-2

**4.4** One method of measuring North Korea's nuclear capabilities would be to assess its stockpile and production capacity of fissile material (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium). There have been estimates that by 2012, North Korea had produced four to eight nuclear warheads (KIM 2013), (SIPRI) and, assuming sustained production, would have approximately 12 nuclear warheads as of 2014 (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012), (HECKER 2015). It is necessary to continue pursuing the relevant issue while keeping in mind that North Korea's volume of fissile material will continue to grow if left unchecked. Nevertheless, considering the relatively small volume of fissile material in North Korea compared to other nuclear weapon states, the situation should be handled with a level head. It was estimated that North Korea had produced 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium prior to their 2006 nuclear weapon experiment (HECKER & LIOU 2015). Taking into consideration the three nuclear experiments, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimated that North Korea possessed 30 to 34 kilograms as of December 2014 (TASS 2014). North Korea announced the resumption of operations at the graphite-moderated reactor (Paragraph 1.16), (KCNA 2013-6) and satellite images confirmed the reactor was operational (ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VARGANTINI 2014-1), (HANSEN 2013). Afterward, however, the reactor ceased operations for an unconfirmed reason and there are worries that the spent nuclear fuel is being reprocessed (ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VERGANTINI 2014-2). It also appears as though construction of the experimental light water reactor set for completion in 2012 has been delayed (ALBRIGHT, KELLEHER-VERGANTINI & YOU 2014). North Korea would theoretically gain the capacity to produce 20kg of plutonium per year once the light water reactor is completed (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012). It would also appear as though North Korea is increasing its uranium enrichment capabilities. Satellite imagery shows the expansion of the Yongbyon enrichment facilities. Furthermore, the possibility of another smaller enrichment facility cannot be ruled out. Much about North Korea's plutonium production and enriched uranium (degree of enrichment and general capabilities) remains uncertain, but it is expected that the country will gain the technological capability over the next two years to produce four to six nuclear weapons (HECKER 2015). **It is crucial that dialog with North Korea recovers as soon as possible and that policy is needed to ensure the involvement of North Korea. The longer it takes for denuclearization negotiations to resume, the more time is available to do no good.**

**4.5** This section evaluates the technological aspects of North Korea's missile issues. Since firing its first long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North Korea has launched five long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Although there was no press release prior to the launch of Taepodong-1, North Korea revealed four days later that it had successfully

launched its first satellite (**KCNA 1998**). There has been no third-party evidence showing that such satellite made it into orbit. Ever since, North Korea has issued some form of press release either before or after its launches. See **Box 5** for details of launches since 1998. In 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles, including the Taepodong-2. In its press release, the country then attempted to legitimize its missile development program as a means of restoring military balance, citing the Iraq War and the U.S. accusing North Korea of being the “Axis of Evil” (**KCNA 2006-1**). Although one-sided, the press release detailed North Korea’s stance on consistency regarding the moratoriums it agreed with the U.S. and Japan regarding missile launches. In 2009, North Korea announced prior to the launch that it would outfit the Unha-2 rocket to launch the Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite (**KCNA 2009-1**). Regarding the two launches in 2012, North Korea explains that it failed to launch the Unha-3 outfitted with a Gwangmyeongseong-3 in April, but then succeeded in December. In relation to three launches

## Box 5

### North Korean Satellite/Ballistic Missile Launch Tests

August 31 <sup>st</sup> , 1998	<p>Taepodong-1 (Also known as Paektusan Ilbo-1 or Unha-1 in North Korea<sup>1) 2)</sup>  <b>Performance:</b> North Korea announced it was a three-stage rocket<sup>3)</sup>. A three-staged system is generally assessed as having improved the payload’s propulsion<sup>2),4),5)</sup>. It has also been suggested that the launch was an attempt to launch the Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite<sup>5)</sup>. The firing range was estimated at 2,000~2,900km and the payload was approximately 100~200kg<sup>2)</sup>.</p> <p><b>Launch Site:</b> Musudan-ri  <b>Results:</b> The first stage plummeted into the Sea of Japan, and the second into the Pacific Ocean. Although the claim has not yet been confirmed, North Korea announced it had succeeded in launching its first satellite<sup>3)</sup>.</p>
July 5 <sup>th</sup> , 2006	<p>Taepodong-2 (Paektusan Ilbo-2 or Unha -2)<sup>2),4)</sup>.  <b>Performance:</b> Because there is no video footage for this missile test, it is not known whether or not it was the same rocket as the Taepodong-2 launched in 2009<sup>4)</sup>. The Japanese Government believes it was a two-stage ballistic missile, which used a new type of booster in the first stage and a Nodong in the second stage. The firing range was estimated to be 6,000 kilometers<sup>6)</sup>.</p> <p><b>Launch Site:</b> Musudan-ri  <b>Results:</b> After the rocket reaches a few kilometers altitude in under a minute after launch, the first stage of the rocket breaks apart midflight—as opposed to separating—and the fragments fall near the launch site<sup>6)</sup>. Seven missiles were launch in succession. The third rocket was the Taepodong-2.</p>
April 5 <sup>th</sup> , 2009	<p>Taepondong-2 (three-staged rocket, Unha-2)  <b>Performance:</b> Three-staged rocket<sup>4)</sup>. The Japanese Government believes the rocket was derived from the Taepodong-2. For example, it may have been a two-staged missile with a propulsion system attached to the payload—hence making it a 3-staged rocket<sup>7)</sup>.</p>

1) **AOKI 2014**  
 6) **JMOD 2007**  
 11) **JMOD 2014**

2) **KIM 2013**  
 7) **JMOD 2010**

3) **KCNA 1998**  
 8) **KCNA 2009-1**

4) **SCHILLER 2012**  
 9) **KCNA 2012-1**

5) **ELLEMAN 2013**  
 10) **KCNA 2012-2**

since 2009, publicly available technical information does not contradict the assumption that all three launches were satellite launches. Also it would be reasonable to assume that the 1998 and 2006 launches carried the same mission. It is natural, however, that each of these launches will help improve North Korea's ballistic missile launching capabilities. While claiming launches were nothing more than satellite launches, North Korea implied its capability to attack the mainland U.S. in its propaganda against the U.S. (e.g. **KCNA 2013-4**). The successful December 2012 satellite launch also indicates that North Korea's three-stage rocket technology is improving. However, North Korea's inability to control its satellite indicates its guidance technology has yet to mature. In general, the capability to launch a satellite does not immediately confirm the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. There are tests necessary for the heavier payload weight and atmospheric reentry, etc. that differ from those requested to launch a satellite (**ELLEMAN 2013**). Analysis of

	<p>Launch Site: Musudan-ri</p> <p>Results: The rocket flew more than 3,000km before plummeting into the Pacific Ocean<sup>7</sup>. Although North Korea announced the launch was a success, there has been no evidence that the satellite entered orbit and is thus widely viewed as being a failure<sup>2), 4)</sup>.</p> <p>Summary: Prior to the launch, North Korea announced on February 24<sup>th</sup> that it would deploy the Gwangmyeongseong-2, an experimental communication satellite, by launching an Unha-2 Rocket.<sup>8)</sup></p>
April 13 <sup>th</sup> , 2012	<p>Modified Taepodong-2 Model (Unha-3)</p> <p>Performance: Three-stage rocket derived from the Taepodong-2.</p> <p>Launch Site: Tongch'ang-dong (Known as the "Sohae Satellite Launching Station" in North Korea.)</p> <p>Results: The rocket launched the Gwangmyeongseong-3 climate satellite, which failed to enter orbit<sup>9)</sup>.</p> <p>Summary: North Korea announced the launch in advance and showed the preparation stages to foreign observers. The satellite was launched without the presence of observers.</p>
December 12 <sup>th</sup> , 2012	<p>Modified Taepodong-2 Model (Unha-3)</p> <p>Performance: Three-staged rocket derived from the Taepodong-2. Varying nations have estimated the firing range to be between 3,400 and 15,000 kilometers<sup>2)</sup>.</p> <p>Results: North Korea announced that the earth observation satellite Gwangmyeongseong-3, Type 2 successfully entered orbit<sup>10)</sup>. International authorities have verified the claim. North Korea launched its own satellite faster than South Korea<sup>1)</sup>. The Japanese Ministry of Defense stated that North Korea's missile development had "entered a new stage"<sup>11)</sup>.</p> <p>Summary: North Korea announced the launch in advance and registered with the United Nations under the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.</p>

fragments from the Unha-3 recovered by South Korea showed that the rocket was suitable for launching a satellite but not for launching a ballistic missile (WRIGHT 2013). Other experts argue that North Korea's threat of ballistic missiles is nothing more than a political performance (SCHILLER 2012). The North Korean missile issues should be considered as exemplifying the problem of dual-use technology that has applications for both space exploration and ballistic missile development. The discussion needs to begin on the basis of a universal standard applicable to all nations.

## Box 6

### UN Security Council Resolutions and related statements on North Korea's Nuclear Tests and Projectile Launches

May 11 <sup>th</sup> , 1993	<p>Security Council Resolution 825 (1993) The Council urges North Korea to recall the North-South Korea Joint Denuclearization Declaration and to reconsider its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.</p>
November 4 <sup>th</sup> , 1994	<p>Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1994/64 The Council welcomed the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the freezing of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors and other related facilities. The Council requests the IAEA resume its Safeguards Agreement.</p>
July 15 <sup>th</sup> , 2006	<p>Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006) The Council condemns the multiple missile launches North Korea conducted on July 5<sup>th</sup> and demands the country suspend its ballistic missile programs. The Council also banned other nations from providing missile related materials and technology to North Korea.</p>
October 6 <sup>th</sup> , 2006	<p>Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2006/41 The Council condemned the Foreign Minister of North Korea's announcement of upcoming nuclear tests made by the Foreign Minister of North Korea on October 3<sup>rd</sup>. It urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.</p>
October 14 <sup>th</sup> , 2006	<p>Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) The Council condemns the nuclear weapon experiment North Korea conducted on October 9<sup>th</sup> and demands the country to suspend all nuclear tests and launching of ballistic missiles. In response to North Korea's first nuclear test, the resolution invokes Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, and sanctions against North Korea by banning all imports of military equipment to the nation.</p>
April 13 <sup>th</sup> , 2009	<p>Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2009/7 Condemns North Korea's missile launch conducted on April 5<sup>th</sup>.</p>
July 13 <sup>th</sup> , 2009	<p>Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) The Council strongly condemns North Korea's second nuclear test conduct on May 25<sup>th</sup>. In response to the second nuclear test, the Council demanded DPRK to terminate its nuclear tests and "any launching using ballistic missile technology." This was the Council's first time to use such an expression. Under Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, additional sanctions against North Korea, including freezing its assets and banning financial trades, were invoked. Additionally it requested members of the UN to report on the progress made towards implementing the sanction.</p>

## The International Response to North Korea's Developing Nuclear and Missile Capabilities

**4.6** The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements and passed resolutions in response to North Korea's nuclear weapons tests and launches using ballistic missile technology. **Box 6** summarizes these actions in historical order. The nuclear weapons issues can be traced back to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 1993. The missile issues can be traced back to the 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile tests (announced

June 7 <sup>th</sup> , 2010	Security Council Resolution 1928 (2010) The Council reiterated the request for reports on progress towards invoking sanctions against North Korea in resolutions 1718 and 1874, and extended the deadline for submission of the report.
June 10 <sup>th</sup> , 2011	Security Council Resolution 1985 (2011) Extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.
April 16 <sup>th</sup> , 2012	Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2012/13 The Council condemned North Korea's missile launch conducted on March 13 <sup>th</sup> , stating that it violated the Security Council's Resolution that suspended "any launch that uses ballistic missile technology".
June 12 <sup>th</sup> , 2012	Security Council Resolution 2050 (2012) The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.
January 22 <sup>nd</sup> , 2013	Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013) The Council condemned North Korea's missile tests and demanded the country terminate all nuclear tests and "any launch that uses ballistic missile technology." Invoking Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council resolved to strengthen the sanctions against North Korea by freezing its assets, banning financial trading, and travel. It requested other nations to report the condition of the sanction against North Korea.
March 7 <sup>th</sup> , 2013	Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013) The Council strongly condemns DPRK's third nuclear test held on February 12 <sup>th</sup> , and demands the country to terminate all nuclear tests and "any launch that uses ballistic missile technology." Invoking Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council decided to strengthen the sanction against North Korea freezing its assets, banning financial trading, and traveling. Additionally it requested members of the UN to report on the progress made towards implementing the sanction.
March 5 <sup>th</sup> , 2014	Security Council Resolution 2141 (2014) The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.

by DPRK Foreign Ministry, **KCNA 1999**), which was a result of U.S.-North Korea talks after the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. The UN Security Council Resolution 1874 passed in 2009 banned North Korea “from any launch using ballistic missile technology”. It should be reminded that this demand to ban “any launch using ballistic missile technology” was introduced by linking such technology to North Korea’s nuclear weapon development program. It is also undeniable that North Korea has the same right to launch satellites into orbit for peaceful purposes as the rest of the world. The problem lies in using this technology to deliver a weapon of mass destruction. There is a need to clarify the correlation between the nuclear weapon problem and the ban on the “launch using ballistic missile technology”. Especially, when economic/financial sanctions are concerned, the issues of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and those of missile launches have to be carefully distinguished because the consensus foundation of international law differs quite significantly between the two. In the former issues, there have been solid legal foundations such as NPT, Chemical Weapon Convention and Biological Weapon Convention. Solving the primary issue of weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) will subsequently reduce the gravity of the ballistic missile issues. The issue of reasonable arms control of ballistic missiles is not simple and should be discussed separately (**RECNA 2013**).

## Chapter 5

# A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

### Validity of Halperin's Six Elements

**5.1** Halperin's six elements, introduced in **Paragraph 3.4**, are an appropriate starting point for feasibly achieving the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. Resolving the first element, "The Termination of the Korean War", would mean settling the negative historical legacy of the region. Taking into account the fact that North Korea has repeatedly demanded an end to the Korean War recently (for example **KCNA 2010**), this is undoubtedly an issue that should be addressed and included in the comprehensive approach. However, agreeing on the details and negotiation process of a peace treaty, which would replace the Korean Armistice Agreement, will likely be a great undertaking, in itself. There are many critical issues, such as the Maritime Military Demarcation Line, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the handling of U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK. and their joint military exercises based upon the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and ROK. There is also the vital issue of reunification of the two Koreas. Under the comprehensive approach, concise political agreements and specific details should be considered in staged phases with an enforceable legal framework. This element and the third element, "Mutual Declaration of No Hostile Intent", are closely related. The U.S. China, DPRK and ROK would be central to negotiating

this first element. If these four nations and more specifically the U.S.-DPRK and ROK-DPRK, were to mutually declare a non-hostile intent, element one will likely be achieved in substance. A paper that refers to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) provides useful information for this purpose (HAYES 2014). The TAC expresses equality of sovereignty, refraining from intervention in the domestic affairs of another nation, non-aggression, prohibiting subversion of a nation and the right to national existence. Denuclearizing North Korea has been negotiated consistently in relation to North Korea's energy development. The KEDO served that purpose (Paragraph 1.13) and the September 19<sup>th</sup> Joint Statement of the Six-Party-Talks stated that "the light water reactor offer to North Korea will be discussed at an appropriate time" while also mentioning "economic cooperation in areas of energy, trade and investment". As such "provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy" — the fourth element — is essential to a comprehensive approach. There is also a need to reach a mutual agreement that deals with North Korea's current 'Juche Nuclear Industry' (Paragraph 1.16). Considering that North Korea is adamantly resisting sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the fifth element "Termination of Sanctions" will be essential to reach a comprehensive agreement. Halperin's second element of establishing a Permanent Security council is mandatory to implement an enforceable legal framework. Thus, although there may be many adjustments to be made in the comprehensive approach toward establishing a NEA-NWFZ, Halperin's Six Elements are valid and should be included.

**5.2** Certain elements not included in the Six Elements have been applied in this section. The first is the **right to peaceful exploration of space**. North Korea has repeatedly opposed sanctions that have been imposed for launching satellites. The comprehensive process to resolve the nuclear problems requires that all state have the right to develop space technology for peaceful purposes. At present all the member states of the Six-Party Talks are members of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Mutual agreement on an international level for handling ballistic missile launches is lacking, as was discussed in Paragraph 4.6 and discussions within a regional framework are difficult. Furthermore, solving issues regarding ballistic missiles are not necessarily vital to resolving nuclear issues. The other element introduced here is eliminating concerns over chemical weapons. All states participating in the Six-Party Talks join the Biological Weapon Convention, but as for **the Chemical Weapon Convention**, North Korea is yet to be a member. The September 19 Joint Statement provided security assurances against both nuclear and conventional weapons use (Paragraph 1.15). If this can be accomplished as part of the comprehensive process, the agreement would be easily extended to ban and eliminate chemical weapons regionally. These additional two elements toward a comprehensive approach will inevitably surface in the discussion of the six elements. Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving these issues will smooth the process.

With regard to the “provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy” element, the challenge will be to address equal rights for the “nuclear fuel cycle” in the context of denuclearization and the provision of energy to stabilize North Korea. The objective of the former subject would be the “regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle”. An examination of the ‘Asian Super Grid’ is proposed to resolve the latter (SUZUKI 2014).

## Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”

**5.3** Halperin’s six elements in his “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA” and two additional elements closely tied to them, the right for peaceful space development and chemical weapons ban, are considered below to examine how to be organized in a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. and other countries, Halperin proposes a methodology in which the legally binding outline of the final agreement should be agreed to start with, followed by negotiations of the details (HALPERIN 2011, 2014). This Proposal agrees with this Halperin’s methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difficult or take too long to go through the parliamentary process necessary for a legal instrument to be ratified. In this proposal, we suggest concluding a legally binding document called a “**Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia**” (CFA), which is to be signed by heads of the member states of the Six-Party-Talks. Appointing an independent group of non-governmental, **authoritative experts** for support and verification can alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA and work for support and verification to ensure the continuity of negotiations after initial agreement is reached.

**5.4** The characteristics of each element introduced in the comprehensive approach are not uniform. Some elements may be issues and others may be organizational matters; some may be simple and others complicated. Accordingly, the specifics of the CFA are proposed to be organized in four Chapters as shown below and are classified as either “Declaratory” or “Actionable”.

- 1) Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing their diplomatic relations. Encourage negotiations for a peace treaty among the states concerned for the Korean War.

(Declaratory)

- 2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear, to be accompanied by commitments to exclusively peaceful use. Establish a **Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee** that is dedicated to contribute to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula and a stable Northeast Asia. The invitation for Committee members extends beyond the Six-Parties and is open to any state supporting the cause. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided by the Committee.)
- 3) Agree on a **treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ**. The treaty will provide for all actionable measures that regulate a nuclear weapon-free zone. It is advisable to ensure the treaty reflects the ideas introduced in **Paragraphs 5.5 - 5.8**. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement will protect the rights of signatory states to peaceful space exploration in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will address imposing sanctions on states in violation of the agreement and restrict a state party from independently imposing sanctions on another state party. (A Complete treaty. Actionable)
- 4) Establish a **permanent Northeast Asia Security Council**. The primary objective of this council will be to enforce the CFA. The secondary objective will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian security issues. In future, it would be advisable to become a platform for more comprehensive discussions regarding regional security issues. This council could also be positioned to serve as a mechanism to verify the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the **executive council** while member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any states or international organizations offering cooperation to achieve peace and security in Northeast Asia are welcome to be general members. (Actionable. Details of the Council will be provided in this chapter.)

## Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

**5.5** Halperin's proposal depicts the geographical scope of a NEA-NWFZ centered on North Korea, South Korea and Japan, adding Mongolia, Canada and others for possible participation. The proposal also states that a unified Korea should also be a non-nuclear state and is essentially similar to the "Three-plus-Three Arrangement" and correlates to it. Mongolia declares itself as being a Northeast Asian state (**ENKHS AIKHAN 2012**), but the nation has yet to express its interests to join a NEA-NWFZ. Mongolian efforts to institutionalize its nuclear weapon-free status through negotiations with China and Russia, followed by the P5 have been concluded with some success in October 2012 (**Paragraphs 1.17**

**and 1.18**). Because of this achievement, it is unlikely, under current circumstances, that Mongolia will propose the subsequent step. The outcomes of Mongolia's negotiations with the P5 have not been perfect, however and a legally binding security assurance, which is Mongolia's primary desire, has yet to be achieved. Accordingly, there is the potential for change in the situation after a certain period has elapsed and an opportunity presents itself. Because countries including Canada may convolute the regional definition of "Northeast Asia", a regionally definable treaty may be more effective, unless there is an obvious diplomatic advantage to including Canada. Nevertheless, Mongolia and Canada can serve a vital role as members of the "Energy Cooperation Committee" and "Northeast Asia Security Council" provided for in the CFA.

**5.6** Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point toward the lack of mutual trust and confidence between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame hostilities between Brazil and Argentina, demonstrates, however, **a system in which articles enter into force can be structured to overcome trust issues and achieve a NEA-NWFZ**, regardless of distrust among the states. More specifically, as Halperin suggested, the treaty could be structured to go into effect when the three nuclear weapon states (U.S., China and Russia) ratify the treaty and when two non-nuclear weapon states (Japan and ROK) do so. However, it would be plausible to include an option for Japan and Korea to secede from the treaty if North Korea did not join the treaty within three to five years. (**HALPERIN 2011**) Amending the treaty as such would effectively remove Japan and South Korea's concerns and encourage positive participation from both countries toward promptly effectuating the treaty. A significant merit for Japan and Korea to accelerate implementation of the treaty is obtaining security assurances from non-alliance nuclear weapon states. For Japan, it will resolve the threat of China's nuclear weapons. Hayes also recognizes the right for Japan and Korea to exclude certain articles from the treaty. Once the articles are removed, however, the treaty will be ratified and immediately come into effect for the signatory states (**HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012**). North Korea's suspicions and concerns toward the nations concerned are deeply rooted. To resolve these suspicions, the treaty would specify that North Korea would join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Furthermore, as long as North Korea remains nuclear weapon-free, the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states will provide legally binding negative security assurance. Halperin proposes that North Korea would be allowed a specified timeframe to dismantle nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-related factories and facilities. During this time frame, North Korea would be permitted to join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, even if its disarmament is not complete. The U.S. would immediately provide security assurances during this timeframe (**HALPERIN 2014**).

**5.7** In reality, not all Japan and South Korea's concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons capability will be resolved by the entry-into-force processes detailed in **Paragraph 5.6**. The threat of nuclear weapons existed in the region prior to negotiations for a NEA-NWFZ treaty. Once the negotiations begin, however, the threat of nuclear weapons is replaced by suspicions of whether negotiations are being executed in good faith. This is also true of North Korea. North Korea may be possessed by a threatening idea whether or not the U.S. is negotiating in good faith. The unique nature of these relationships stem from the fact that states with nuclear weapons are attempting to achieve a NWFZ and requires prior deliberation. These problems may be resolved by agreeing on several **moratoriums prior to negotiations** to assure negotiations are held in good faith. North Korea would need a moratorium on nuclear tests and other nuclear weapon-related activities. The U.S., South Korea and Japan would likely need a moratorium on joint military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. In relation to prior moratoriums it would be desirable to consider **some measures to alleviate sanctions currently imposed** on North Korea.

**5.8** Some Japanese and South Korean politicians and policy makers supporting the NEA-NWFZ are fearful of losing U.S. extended nuclear weapon deterrence. The sentiment is deeply rooted and they are not alone. A lack of understanding the nuclear weapon-free zone often sparks such fears. Conversely, it may be the unnecessary fear of what happens when the treaty is broken. In reality, nuclear weapon-free zones are protected by international law that prohibits attacks and threats with nuclear weapons, which is known as the negative security assurance. Accordingly, non-nuclear weapon states need not rely on extended nuclear deterrence to form a NWFZ. This fundamental principle must be understood and was emphasized at the workshops (**DHANAPALA 2014**), (**MANTELS 2014**). **This is why a NWFZ is encouraged as a framework of cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear weapons.** (Because the CFA includes a mutual agreement of non-aggression, the NEA-NWFZ would also be an area that does not permit the use or threatened use of conventional weapons. Considering past negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it may be possible to include conventional weapons as part of security assurances to be provided in a NEA-NWFZ treaty.) There is a need to respond, however, to an ineradicable doubt toward enforcing the law amidst the current, international political scene. The doubt is that non-nuclear weapon states will be defenseless, should the treaty be violated and the states are threatened by nuclear attacks. Once this occurs, the treaty will immediately be null and void and international affairs will return to a state unbound by a treaty. If the alliance with the U.S. continues, actions will be taken according to this alliance. To calm this

doubt, Halperin suggests that the treaty include an article purporting that if any of the state parties were to violate the treaty by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, the treaty would be nullified. Moreover, other states parties can take sanctions against the offender in accordance with the international law and in methods their individual national constitution allows (HALPERIN 2014). Although this is a natural condition for any treaty, including this article within the treaty is intended to eliminate concerns. Conversely, emphasizing conditions to eliminate concerns may misleadingly suggest that the mentality toward extended nuclear deterrence in the NWFZ remains unchanged.

## Current State of Affairs in Nations Involved in the Comprehensive Approach for a NEA-NWFZ

**5.9** This chapter will introduce the state of affairs in Japan, South Korea and North Korea. The **Japanese** government has recently come to officially discuss the issue of NEA-NWFZ. The most recent edition of a P.R. publication of “Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy” (Edition 6, March 2013) reads, “the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, in which Japan, South Korea and North Korea form a nuclear weapon-free zone and the U.S., China and Russia provide negative security assurances, is recently gathering attention.” Natsuo Yamaguchi, Chief Representative of Komei Party and Katsuya Okada, former Foreign Minister of Japan and current President of Democratic Party of Japan, spoke at the Third Workshop Public Session in September 2014, both giving words to the effect that Japan’s proposal for a NEA-NWFZ may incentivize North Korea to denuclearize. Support from Japan’s public sector and mass media are also high. Over 540 heads of local governments have signed a petition to show support toward establishing a NEA-NWFZ. In April 2014, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors submitted the signatures to UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon. The majority of discussions to promote a NEA-NWFZ in Japan, however, are conducted in the context of denuclearizing North Korea and weak in emphasizing the obligation under NPT for nuclear dependent non-nuclear weapon states to eliminate their dependence on nuclear deterrence in their security policies. The Japanese government has been steadfast in its position that “the situation of the region is premature” and has yet to take any actions to move forward. In **South Korea**, discussions regarding “Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula” are often strongly associated with reunification issues. However, in various sectors of the ROK, there are growing opportunities where the theme of “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”, not just “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is raised for discussions. Cheju Peace Forum has discussed this subject several times. The Kim Dae-jung Peace Memorial Symposium in October 2014, for example, hosted a session named “Options for Nuclear Weapons Free Northeast Asia”. Also, the South Korean Chapter of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-

Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) has held study sessions on a NEA-NWFZ. Joint efforts by Parliamentarians and citizens groups from Japan and South Korea have continued. As for **North Korea**, historically there has been little reference specifically to NEA as a NWFZ (**PAIK 2014**). There is no doubt that North Korea has received literature and updated information on the comprehensive approach, including a NEA-NWFZ, but there has been no detailed response. The Rodong Sinmun of the DPRK recently carried an article that reflected on the 1994 agreed framework and referred to a NWFZ. It reads “The DPRK put forth a proposal for building a nuclear-free zone through peaceful dialog and negotiations and combined it with the method of removing the U.S. nuclear threat by relying on international law.” (**KCNA 2014-2**). More details and the context of the article remain unknown.

**5.10** This section introduces the state of affairs of the U.S., China and Russia, based on ideas from researchers. As for the **U.S.**, various reactions were available to Halperin’s proposal at the workshop organized by the Nautilus Institute in Washington D.C. in October 2012. The workshop received comments from a broad spectrum of experts. Those include the following. A supportive comment is that a new policy for engagement, such as the comprehensive agreement, is necessary instead of repeatedly demanding a CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament) of DPRK nuclear weapons (**BOSWORTH 2012**); The theme of a NEA-NWFZ is an appropriate and new challenge for the Six-Party Talk (**GOODBY 2012**). Opinions on adverse influences on Japan-U.S. and ROK-U.S. security relationships were expressed, followed by suggestions to remedy them (**SHIFFER 2012**). Some remarks expressed skepticism and difficulty (**GREEN 2012**) and apprehension toward Japan and South Korea’s wavering trust in extended nuclear deterrent of the U.S. (**SMITH 2012**). Many of the divergent views on Halperin’s proposal seem resolvable by understanding the proposal in more detail. At present, it is recognized that this issue is relatively low on the Obama administration’s long list of diplomatic priorities, including issues of the Middle East and Ukraine. Accordingly, the administration will not initiate a move, but would also not oppose moves by Japan and South Korea to take the initiative (**HALPERIN 2014**). Through opportunities to discuss the proposal with many experts from **China**, it became evident that those who correctly understood the details of the proposal did not object (**SHEN 2014**). **Russian** specialists will likely also agree once the specifics of the proposed NEA-NWFZ are thoroughly understood. Russia is working to strengthen economic relations with the Korean Peninsula and cautious of growing U.S. influence seeks to stabilize the region. Furthermore, Russia has traditionally supported progress of discussions within the Six-Party Talks framework (**MIZIN 2012**). Russia served to chair the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group” (**Paragraph 1.15**) established at the Six-Party Talks. It is reported that, in the working group in question, there were growing efforts to put the issue of

the denuclearization of North Korea in more comprehensive security issues of the region (NIKITIN 2014).

## Views to the Diplomatic Process

**5.11** The United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering the discussion at hand. Angela Kane, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, expressed her thoughts when visiting Nagasaki in August 2012. Her view was that there was a dire need to denuclearize the Middle East and Northeast Asia, but that it was difficult for the regions to make progress in (YAMAZATO 2012). This is likely a common understanding at the United Nations. The 59<sup>th</sup> and 60<sup>th</sup> sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held in 2013 discussed the NWFZ and specifically denuclearizing Northeast Asia. Reports from these sessions showed various opinions regarding the establishment of the NEA-NWFZ were shared and included recommendations to the Secretary-General. The board recommended that the UN consider taking appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and play a proactive role in establishing regional fora for transparency and confidence building (UNGA 2013). Since the initiative to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned (UNDC 1999), the role for the UN to play at this stage is limited; however, such recommendations submitted by the UN are a large leap forward. As was mentioned, the UN is currently capable of serving a vital role in the process of confidence building. Emphasis should be placed on the efforts of Mongolian President Elbedgorj from the One State Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. He expressed his support for the NEA-NWFZ concept at the United Nations High-Level Panel in September 2013 and commenced the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” for confidence building (ELBEGDORJ 2013). It is desirable for the UN to take part in these discussions. Meanwhile, held at Daegu, South Korea in November 2013, China’s Chen Jian, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and former Ambassador to Japan, spoke at the 13<sup>th</sup> East Asian UN system seminar (CHEN 2013). He expressed the view that a collaboration of proactive initiatives between Japan and Korea was essential to achieve a NEA-NWFZ. Frequently discussed throughout this proposal, Japan and South Korea have a crucial role in developing the NEA-NWFZ diplomatic process. In 2013, the South Korean Government announced their “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (ROK MOFA 2013). It is desirable for each state to take such initiatives toward promoting international dialog in the region.

**5.12** The final section of this paper will examine the platform for discussions and the processes to achieve, regarding a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of

Northeast Asia” or more specifically regarding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for denuclearization in Northeast Asia” that has been proposed in this book. Although there may be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would be the most appropriate and practical way to ensure the platform for this discussion. The Six-Party Talks has already established the “**Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group**”, expressing its interests in discussing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in wider context. Efforts are currently underway to resume the Six-Party Talks and reportedly North Korea, China and Russia share an affirmative attitude (**NEBEHAY 2014**). Although some believed it would be best to scrap the Six-Party Talks in favor of a fresh start with a new platform and new ideas (**RECNA 2013**), North Korea and China’s opinions are crucial at this time and it is also critical to secure China’s continuous involvement in efforts to denuclearize Northeast Asia. It is also important that, as can be found in the consensus final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (**Paragraph 1.15, NPT 2010-8**), the international community unanimously holds high expectations of the Six-Party Talks. As for the United States, it has been incapable of launching a new initiative to engage North Korea since the so-called Leap Day Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea on February 29, 2012 failed in the resuming Six-Party Talks due to the missile launch by North Korea. It was just after the DPRK regime shift took place from General Secretary Kim Jong-Il to First Secretary Kim Jong-un. The U.S. visibly has its hands full with urgent issues in the Middle East, Ukraine and Afghanistan. Considering the discussions in this book of proposals, it is an opportunity for Japan and South Korea, independently or collaboratively, to take the lead. The Six-Party Talks should resume and be a platform for these discussions and work to achieve mutual agreements for a comprehensive approach. Just as Halperin consistently emphasizes, it is vital that Japan and Korea examine policy details and explore various routes and venues for close consultations with the U.S., China and North Korea before actually resuming the Six-Party Talks (**HALPERIN 2011, 2012, 2014**). Considering the NPT 2010 Final Document strongly supports the Six-Party Talks (**NPT 2010-8**), the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference will be a significant diplomatic platform to address the issue.

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# Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ Workshop I

December 7 (Fri)–10 (Mon), 2012  
Nagasaki & Tokyo



北東アジア非核兵器地帯の実現へ新しいアプローチの可能性  
第1回 国際ワークショップ

2012年12月7日(金)～10日(月) 長崎・東京

COSPONSORS 共催団体



IN COOPERATION WITH 協力団体



12/7

Friday, December 7, 2012



10:15	<b>Offering a Wreath of Flowers for A-bomb Victims (optional)</b> 献花(任意)
10:30	<b>Visiting the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (optional)</b> 長崎原爆資料館見学(任意)
11:30-12:40	<b>Preparatory Meeting with Interpreters with Lunch</b> (1F, Pompe Hall, Sakamoto Campus, Nagasaki Univ.) 通訳との打ち合わせ、昼食。(長崎大学坂本キャンパス・ポンペ会館1階)
12:50-13:15	<b>Meeting with President of Nagasaki Univ.</b> 学長表敬
13:15-13:25	<b>Registration</b> 移動、登録
<b>13:30-14:05</b>	<b>Opening</b> 開会 (2F, Pompe Hall, Sakamoto Campus, Nagasaki Univ.) (長崎大学坂本キャンパス・ポンペ会館2階会議室) MODERATOR: Mariko Mine モデレーター: 三野真璃子
13:30-13:40	<b>OPENING ADDRESS: Shigeru Katamine</b> 開会挨拶   片峰 成
13:40-14:05	<b>INTRODUCTION: Hiromichi Umebayashi</b> イントロダクション   梅林宏道 -“NEA-NWFZ Initiative: Need for a New Approach” 『北東アジア非核兵器地帯等構想：新しいアプローチの必要性』
<b>14:05-15:30</b>	<b>Keynotes</b> 基調講演 MODERATOR: Susumu Shirabe モデレーター: 菅 崇
14:05-14:30	<b>KEYNOTE 1: Morton H. Halperin</b> 基調講演①: モートン・H. ハルペリン -“A Proposal for a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security of NEA” 『北東アジアの平和と安全に関する包括的協定の提案』
14:30-14:55	<b>KEYNOTE 2: Peter Hayes</b> 基調講演②: ピーター・ヘイズ -“General Assessment of the DPRK Nuclear Situation” 『DPRK 核問題の現状』
14:55-15:30	<b>Q&amp;A</b> 質疑応答
<b>15:30-16:00</b>	<b>Break</b> 休憩
<b>16:00-17:30</b>	<b>Session I : Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ</b> セッションI : 北東アジア非核兵器地帯への包括的アプローチに対する見解 MODERATOR: Satoshi Hirose モデレーター: 広瀬 剛 Kiho Yi -“ROK Perspectives” 李 紀業(イ・キホ)「韓国からの視点」 Guihong Zhang -“Chinese Perspectives” 張 貴洪(チャン・グイホン)「中国からの視点」 Kazumi Mizumoto -“Japanese Perspectives” 水本和実「日本からの視点」 Randy Rydell -“Multilateral Perspectives” ランディ・ライデル「多国間協力の視点」
17:30-18:00	<b>Preparatory Meeting with Interpreters (Public Symposium Panelists and Moderators)</b> 通訳との打ち合わせ(公開シンポジウムのパネリスト、モデレーター)
18:30-20:30	<b>RECEPTION (Room Manaduru, Hotel New Nagasaki)</b> レセプション(ホテルニュー長崎 真鶴の間)

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Saturday, December 8, 2012

**10:00-11:30 Session 2: Overarching Themes**

セッション2：横断的なテーマ

MODERATOR: Alyn Ware

モデレーター：アラン・ウェア

Masafumi Takubo

田塚 敏文

"Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues -- ROK and Japan"

「日韓の核燃料サイクル開発」

Kazuhiko Tamaki

田崎 一彦

"Missile Control in Northeast Asia"

北東アジアにおけるミサイル管理

Satoshi Hirose

広瀬 剛

"Regional Cooperation and Civil Society in Northeast Asia"

「北東アジアにおける地域協力と市民社会」

**11:30-13:00 Taking a Collective Photo, and Lunch**

写真撮影、昼食

**13:00-13:50 Session 3: Issues on a NEA-NWFZ**

セッション3：北東アジア非核兵器地帯をめぐる諸課題

MODERATOR: Mitsuru Kurosawa

モデレーター：黒澤 暁

Keiko Nakamura

中村 綾子

"Lessons from Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaties"

「既存の非核兵器地帯条約からの教訓」

Alyn Ware

アラン・ウェア

"NEA-NWFZ and Extended Nuclear Deterrence"

「北東アジア非核兵器地帯と拡大核抑止」

**13:50-14:30 Closing**

総括セッション

MODERATOR: Hiromichi Umebayashi

モデレーター：梅林 宏道

Remarks by All Moderators and Speakers

各モデレーター、発言者から一言

**15:00-17:00 International Public Symposium**

公開国際シンポジウム

(4F Hall, New Building, Bunkyo Campus, Nagasaki Univ.)

(長崎大学文芸キャンパス・新棟4階ホール)

"Towards a NEA-NWFZ : Time for a New Approach"

「北東アジア非核兵器地帯の実現へ：新しいアプローチの可能性」

**15:00-15:10 OPENING ADDRESS**

主催者あいさつ

**15:10-15:20 Hiromichi Umebayashi**

梅林 宏道

"Need for a New Approach"

「新しいアプローチの必要性」

**15:20-15:45 Morton H. Halperin**

モートン・H・ハルペリン

"A Proposal for a Comprehensive Agreement"

「包括的協定の提案」

**15:45-16:55 PANEL DISCUSSION**

パネル・ディスカッション

MODERATOR: Keiko Nakamura

モデレーター：中村 綾子

PANELISTS: Peter Hayes

ピーター・ヘイス

Kiho Yi

李 起孝

Zhang Guihong

張 貴洪

Kazumi Mizumoto

水本和実

Randy Rydell

ランディ・ライデル

**16:55-17:00 CLOSING REMARKS: Susumu Shirabe**

閉会あいさつ：清 崇

12/  
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Sunday, Desember 9, 2012



9:00-10:30 Project Meeting (Room Hakucho, Hotel New Nagasaki)  
プロジェクト会議(ホテルニュー長崎、白鳥の間)

## Departure for Tokyo

東京へ移動

12/  
10

Monday, Desember 10, 2012



15:45-17:00 Meetings with Vice Minister and other officials(Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Japan)  
外務省副大臣などとの会合

## 18:00-20:00 International Public Symposium

公開国際シンポジウム  
(Conference Room, Meiji Gakuin University)  
(明治学院大学 白金校舎・本館 10 階大会議室)

“Toward a NEA-NWFZ — A Comprehensive Approach to the Regional Security”  
「北東アジア非核兵器地帯へ—地域安全保障のための包括的アプローチ」

OPENING ADDRESS: Tetsuo Inami

開会挨拶：稲見哲男

OPENING ADDRESS: Susumu Shirabe

開会挨拶：興 肇

MODERATOR: Hiromichi Urabayashi

モデレーター：堀林宏道

SPEAKERS: Morton H. Halperin

モートン・H. ハルペリン

Peter Hayes

ピーター・ヘイズ

Kiho Yi

李起暎

Zhang Guihong

張貴洪

Randy Rydel

ランディ・ライデル

Alyn Ware

アラン・ウェア

Masayoshi Hamada

浜田昌良

CLOSING REMARKS: Meiji Gakuin University

閉会挨拶：明治学院大学

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ノーチラス研究所 / Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

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韓信大学 (韓国) / Hanshin University

明治学院大学 / Meiji Gakuin University

復旦大学 (中国) / Fudan University

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<http://recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/en-asia/>

## Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System

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# 1. PROGRAMS

### Program for Workshop June 20<sup>th</sup>

**Title: Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System:**

**Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ Workshop II**

**Date:** June 20<sup>th</sup>, Thursday, 2013

**Venue:** Changgong Memorial Hall #2311 at Hanshin University (Seoul Campus)

**Agenda:**

08:30 Registration

09:00 Welcome and Introduction

09:15 Report and Updates from Nagasaki workshop I:  
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi (Director, RECNA, Nagasaki Univ.)

09:30 **Session I**

**Denuclearization as a Key to Common Security**

Moderator: MOON Chung-In (Prof. Yonsei Univ.)

Keynote I : LIM Dong-Won (Former Minister of Unification)

Panels: Country perspectives (each 10m)

- ROK: Park Sun-Song (Prof. Dongkuk Univ)
- DPRK<sup>1</sup>: : LEE Jung-Chul (Prof. Soongsil Univ.)
- USA: Peter HAYES (Executive Director, Nautilus Institute)
- JAPAN: MIZUMOTO Kazumi (Prof. Hiroshima Peace Institute)
- Russia: BAEK Jun-kee(Prof. Hanshin Univ.)

10:40 Break

11:00 Discussion

12:00 Lunch

13:30 **Session II**

**Comprehensive Agreement for Peace and Security**

Moderator: Peter HAYES (Executive Director, Nautilus Institute)

## Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System

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Keynote II: Morton H. HALPERIN

(Senior Advisor, Open Society Foundation)

Panels (each 10m)

- Christoph POHLMANN (Director, FES Korea)
- Jargalsaikhan ENKHTSAIKHAN  
(Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia)
- Alyn WARE (Global Coordinator, PNND)

Discussion

15:00 Break

15:30 **Session III**

**Discussion**

Moderators:

YI Kiho (Director, CPPI, Hanshin Univ.) &

NAKAMURA Keiko (Associate Prof, RECNA)

- From Armistice to Peace Agreement
- Building and Strengthening Mutual Trust through  
bilateral/multilateral cooperation
- Next Steps toward Comprehensive Agreement including NWFZ

17:00 Closing with suggestion for Workshop III in Tokyo:  
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi

17:40 Break

18:00 Dinner with reception

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1) Since we could not have a DPRK participant, we would like to have a person who can give comments in the perspective of DPRK.

# Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World

— Developing a Comprehensive Approach  
to NEA-NWFZ: Workshop III

September 14 (Sun) -16 (Tue) , 2014

Tokyo



北東アジアの非核化と世界の非核化  
—北東アジア非核兵器地帯への包括的アプローチ・ワークショップⅢ

2014年9月14日(日)～16日(火) 東京



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### Hosted by/ 主催

Nagasaki University/ 長崎大学

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University /  
長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター (RECNA)

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PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC: Council comprised of Nagasaki Prefecture, City and University) / 核兵器廃絶長崎連絡協議会

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Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation/ 広島平和文化センター

United Nations Information Centre/ 国連広報センター



The Logo represents a deformed Chinese character "出", which means "exit" or "departure". Here it symbolizes the "exit" from the nuclear deterrence and "departure" for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Nagasaki is famous for its port "Dejima" or Exit Island, the only port open to overseas during the period of national isolation in Japanese history.

本ロゴは、漢字の「出」をデザイン化したものである。鎖国時代の日本で唯一開かれていた港である長崎の「出島」をイメージし、核抑止から「出」て、北東アジア非核兵器地帯へと「出発」しよう、という意味が込められている。

9/14

Sunday, September 14, 2014 (Venue: Grand Prince Hotel, NEW Takanawa)



**14:30—15:30** Press Conference (Conference Room: *Hakugyoku*)

**15:30—16:00** Registration (Conference Room: Tenpyo)

**16:00—16:10** Introduction by **Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI**

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**16:10—17:40** **Session I: Global Denuclearization and Northeast Asia**

With the 2015 NPT Review Conference approaching, the gap between the ones who call for a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons based on their inhumanity and those who continue to emphasize on the “step-by-step” approach, claiming that time is not ripe yet for such a legal discussion, has become more evident. Against such a background, policies taken by non-nuclear weapon states which rely on the extended nuclear deterrence have become increasingly critical. This session will focus on issues related to global nuclear disarmament, and, in such context, on nuclear issues related to the peace and security of Northeast Asia, and examine the significance of establishing a NEA-NWFZ.

Chair: **Yukio SATO**

Speakers: **Heather WILLIAMS**

“Global nuclear disarmament and the role of non-nuclear weapon states”

**Valere MANTELS**

“Extended deterrence and a Nuclear weapon Free zone in NE Asia”

**Alexander I. NIKITIN**

“Prospects for Denuclearization in Northeast Asia and Policy of Russia”

Discussants: **Yoshiki MINE**

**Takao TAKAHARA**

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**18:00—20:30** **Dinner Session** (Open session) (Conference room: *Heian*)

Chair: **Shigeru KATAMINE**

Keynote: **Jayantha DHANAPALA**

“Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World”

Remarks: **MP from LDP** (TBC)

**Natsuo YAMAGUCHI**

**Katsuya OKADA**

Messages: **Edward MARKEY** (TBC)

**Tomihisa TAUE**

9/15

Monday, September 15, 2014 (Venue: Meiji Gakuin University, 2nd Building, RM 2401)



9:00—10:30

## Session II: Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia

In 2011, Dr. Morton H. Halperin proposed a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia” as an idea for a diplomatic process to overcome the stalemates regarding efforts that had been underway in various ways to denuclearize Korean Peninsula. This is an initiative aimed at establishing a NEA-NWFZ, while solving, as a comprehensive package, other outstanding issues that have close relation. This session will discuss his updated proposal, taking recent situation into consideration.

Chair: **Nobuyasu ABE**

Speakers: **Morton H. HALPERIN**

“A Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia”

**Mitsuru KUROSAWA**

“An Observation about the Updated Agreement”

Discussants: **Bo-Hyuk SUH**

**Alexander I. NIKITIN**

**Yasushi NOGUCHI**

11:00—12:30

## Session III: Northeast Asian Security Environment

This session will overview the security environment of Northeast Asia as a backdrop of a “Comprehensive Agreement” discussed in Session II to help improving such an approach as well as to study possible changes in the regional security environment resulting from pursuing and realizing a “Comprehensive Agreement.”

Chair: **Chung-in MOON**

Speakers: **Dingli SHEN**

“Chinese views on NEA-NWFZ”

**Hak-soon PAIK**

“Security environment of Northeast Asia and Prospects for the Six-Party Talks: A South Korean View”

**Kab-woo KOO**

“A Psychological Approach to North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear Discourse of the Kim Jong Un Regime”

Discussants: **Hirofumi TOSAKI**

**Kiho YI**

14:00—15:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Session IV: Specific Issues to Examine the Comprehensive Agreement</b></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>This session will deepen the understandings of each element contained in a “Comprehensive Agreement,” identify difficulties involved in each element, and develop possible measures that could be taken in order to solve such difficulties.</p> </div> <p>Chair: <b>Nobumasa AKIYAMA</b></p> <p>Speakers: <b>Peter HAYES</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Overcoming US-DPRK Hostility: The Missing Link Between a Northeast Asian Comprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War”</p> <p><b>Tatsujiro SUZUKI</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Energy and Nuclear Cooperation in Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia”</p> <p><b>Keiko NAKAMURA</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Present sanctions and the process to a Comprehensive Agreement”</p> <p>Discussants: <b>Sun-song PARK</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Hideya KURATA</b></p>
16:00—17:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Session V: Players for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia</b></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>This session will discuss possible roles taken by various actors, including state governments, parliaments and parliamentarians, and civil society, in order to achieve a Comprehensive Agreement and a NEA-NWFZ.</p> </div> <p>Chair: <b>Kiho YI</b></p> <p>Speakers: <b>Jargalsaikhan ENKHSAIKHAN</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Mongolia’s Nuclear Weapon Free Status: a regional dimension”</p> <p><b>Alyn WARE</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Roles of Parliamentarians”</p> <p><b>Masao TOMONAGA</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Roles of Civil Society”</p> <p>Discussants: <b>Bo-Hyuk SUH</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Kazuhiko TAMAKI</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Satoshi HIROSE</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Ihkpyo HONG</b></p>
17:30—17:40	<p>Closing Remarks by <b>Peter Hayes</b> and <b>Susumu SHIRABE</b></p>

9/16

Tuesday, September 16, 2014 Related Events



9:30—11:00	<b>Japan-Korea Researchers Caucus</b> (Open to all participants) (Venue: Grand Prince Hotel Takanawa, Conference room <i>Suzuran</i> ) Moderators: <b>Sun-song PARK</b> , <b>Satoshi HIROSE</b>
13:30—15:00	<b>PNND Japan Parliamentary Forum</b> (Open session) (Venue: 1st Members' Office Building of the House of Representatives, conference RM 2) Chair: <b>Taro KONO</b> Speakers: <b>Morton H. HALPERIN</b> <b>Mikyung LEE</b> <b>Cheik LEE</b> <b>Ikpyo HONG</b>
15:00—15:50	<b>Visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>
18:30—20:00	<b>NGO Forum</b> (Open session) (Venue: Meiji Gakuin University) Speakers: <b>Horton H. HALPERIN</b> <b>Bo-Hyuk SUH</b> <b>Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI</b>