

## Summary Report

Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ: Workshop I  
Nagasaki University, December 7-8, 2012

### § Preface

The following is a summary report of the First Workshop “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ,” which was held at Nagasaki University, on December 7-8, 2012. It was cosponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Nagasaki University, PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC) and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University, Hanshin University, ROK and Fudan University, PRC.

This is not a time-sequential report of the workshop, but a substantive summary meant to serve as basic reference material for future workshops on the same theme that are planned by the same organizers as the First Workshop. While the discussion that emerged in the workshop bore abundant suggestions and implications, it was sometimes not well-focused on the theme of the workshop as a whole and each session. Therefore, in this summary report, we translate those suggestions and implications into language that is consistent with the objectives of the workshop and each session. Also, after the Workshop, the DPRK conducted an additional satellite launch on Dec. 12, 2012 and a third underground nuclear test on Feb. 12, 2013 and therefore, this report includes some follow-up comments responsive to such developments when appropriate. In these respects, the report constitutes neither an agreed upon statement of the participants nor of the co-sponsoring organizations. Responsibility for the contents is entirely attributable to the RECNA.

### § Basic Understanding of the Halperin Proposal on “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”

The Halperin proposal on a comprehensive agreement on peace and security (simply “Agreement” hereafter) is built on the basic recognition that: (1) The DPRK, or North Korea, as a de facto nuclear weapons power, is not acceptable considering the seeming inevitability that such a status would result in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, overtly or covertly, by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), which will, in turn, has serious negative implications to the global non-proliferation regime. (2) Thus, a distinct presence of the denial force, including international efforts to denuclearize the DPRK

peacefully, must continue to remain robust. (3) Past efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are locked in a stalemate, and it is imperative to initiate a new effort that is designed so as not to drag up the past. (4) To break the stalemate, a comprehensive agreement on peace and security in the region should be developed. The Agreement must make it possible to draw an end picture of a nuclear weapon-free NEA that will solve the pending issues and will be acceptable to all the parties concerned, including the DPRK and the U.S. and its allies. (5) In order to urge consideration by the DPRK, it is recommended that the Agreement be legally binding. (6) The prior consultation process among parties other than the DPRK is important and needs careful deliberations before the draft Agreement is officially proposed to the DPRK. (7) The method of entry into force of the Agreement, e.g. the EIF sequence among elements of the Agreement and possible measures for conditional accession to appease mutual distrust, also need careful deliberation. (8) To assist in-depth discussions, it is recommended that drafting of the Agreement commence.

The Halperin proposal for a comprehensive agreement includes the following six elements:

1. Termination of the state of Korean War

Recently, this point has been stressed by the DPRK. This element of the Agreement should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by the ROK, and perhaps by other state parties involved in the war. (cf: A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued late January 2013, interpreted as an advance pretext prior to its third nuclear test, states, "the DPRK drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged...There can be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula." So the window of the dialogue is still open in this regard.)

2. Creation of a permanent council on security

The Agreement should create a permanent council and organization to monitor and enforce its provisions, including verification of the implementation of the NWFZ to be established as the 6<sup>th</sup> element of the Agreement. While the scope of the council's role should be limited to the objectives to enforce the Agreement in the initial period, it could be left open as to whether the council might also become a forum to deal with general security problems in the region in the future. Countries other than the parties of the Six Party Talks will be invited to join the council, including France, UK, Canada and

Mongolia.

### 3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent

This has been a key objective of the DPRK when it negotiated with the US. Considering the impact of the history of dictatorships in Iraq and Libya on the DPRK, we need means to make such a commitment credible by the provisions of the Agreement.

### 4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy

It should be affirmed that all parties to the treaty have the equal right to access necessary sources of any kind of energy. Any limitations on the DPRK need to apply equally to other non-nuclear states party to the agreement, especially the ROK and Japan. The DPRK will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized through some agreed mechanism.

### 5. Termination of sanctions

The parties to the Agreement will need to commit not to impose sanctions on any other party to the Agreement based on its nuclear programs as long as it fully adheres to the treaty. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state which violates its commitments under the Agreement. Each party to the treaty will have to consider its national law in relation to imposing sanctions based on other reasons.

### 6. Nuclear weapons free zone

The Agreement would contain a chapter which would create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). The principle idea of the NEA-NWFZ is as follows: The ROK, Japan and the DPRK (and possibly other states including Mongolia and Canada) would commit themselves not to manufacture, test (for any purpose) or acquire nuclear weapons, nor to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory. These non-nuclear states will re-join or remain parties of the NPT. The US, the PRC and Russia, as well as the UK and France, would agree to abide by the provisions of the treaty. They would agree not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state that was observing the terms of the Agreement.

## § General Assessment of the Situation of the DPRK

As a basis for discussion at the workshop, Peter Hayes provided an overview of the current situation in the DPRK. His main points are as follows: The DPRK leadership under young Kim Jong-Un is stable and more vigorous than it was under Kim Jong-Il, while containing uncertainty due to his inexperience and lack of a personal political basis for his power. The DPRK economy is trapped by poverty and will remain so as long as it sticks to its nuclear irrationality. It will take huge reconstruction funding to overcome its economic problems.

The DPRK's nuclear arms are considered to be primarily political, not military, in nature. Its nuclear threat is designed to coerce, not to deter. Furthermore its nuclear arms have neither credible warheads nor delivery systems. The DPRK's violent rhetoric of nuclear threat against ROK, Japan and US are likely to be illegal and constitute nuclear aggression under international law. The reality of this situation has to be heard by DPRK leadership.

Deterrence arguments involving NEA have to be discussed from many angles. In relation to the DPRK, it has a strong and credible deterrence without nuclear weapons, in spite of its lack of self-awareness of this point. Its conventional forces are inferior and nondurable, but still can inflict serious casualties and damage to the ROK and the US, sufficient to deter their waging major wars against it. On the other hand, the DPRK nuclear deterrence will not be credible for years to come, and also will provide no military benefit to the KPA (Korean Peoples Army), considering the war fighting after the deterrence fails. Nuclear weapons require major resources to deploy, complicate military command and control, and constitute a distraction from the KPA's major military mission. The DPRK's conventional forces have also manifested their own characteristics during their recent conventional provocations that they seem to be deterred from escalating beyond a certain level of violence.

US extended deterrence will be sufficiently strong and credible with conventional forces only, operated by the US and its allies' combined forces. The US extended nuclear deterrence to Japan, ROK and Taiwan is weak, regressive and not credible. Considering with any attack against the DPRK by means of nuclear ballistic missiles, we see the problem of over-flight over the territory of Russia or China. The only realistic means of nuclear delivery will be bombers, but nuclear bombing will have serious collateral effects to be avoided in a battle field like the Korean Peninsula.

In his in-depth and updated discussions on the nuclear issues in Northeast Asia, Peter Hayes refutes conventional arguments and myths regarding nuclear deterrence and the DPRK nuclear capabilities.

#### § Necessity of Sustained Efforts and Comprehensive Strategy

In the workshop, there was general agreement that the emergence of a nuclear armed DPRK as a fait accompli should not be allowed and efforts toward a nuclear weapons

free Northeast Asia should be sustained. Halperin stated, "The costs of accepting a DPRK operational nuclear capability are very high and we should not accept this outcome without at least one more sustained effort to find a solution." In the Hayes speech, he said, "The US and the regional states cannot and should never accommodate a nuclear-armed DPRK, as some have argued."

For many of the Japanese participants, especially those from Nagasaki, the denuclearization of the region is a natural requirement because the NEA is tied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragic history and a third nuclear weapon use in this region should be avoided by all means. However, a participant raised the problem of weakness or absence of feasibility considerations in the past studies of the NEA-NWFZ. This is exactly why a comprehensive strategy is now the theme of the workshop. While there were mixed assessments among participants on what the Six Party Talks had attained or would attain, many seemed to agree that the "DPRK's verifiable denuclearization first" approach would not work anymore. The RECNA expressed that no doubt a new approach was necessary to break the stalemate regarding the nuclear problems in NEA and that the Halperin proposal on a Comprehensive Agreement provides a sound starting point of the future strategy for us to move in the right direction.

It is noted that there was some confusion among participants in understanding the concept of "comprehensiveness". Obviously there are many international security issues to be solved in this region, such as territorial disputes, historical issues caused by past Japanese invasion and colonial rule, abduction issues highlighted in Japan, and ongoing military operations. These are all important, as well as substantial in nature, and might be raised in the future negotiation process for an Agreement that we are discussing. However, as was pointed out in the workshop discussion, it should be clear that our 'comprehensiveness' is a very limited concept and doesn't mean to be all inclusive, so that the strategy may be practical and robust. 'Comprehensiveness' here should be focused specifically on our concern as to how a nuclear weapon free NEA will be realized. In this respect, an Agreement should be as simple as possible, at least at the outset, although there is no reason not to keep the door open for future possible expansion.

The importance of the sustained efforts was also emphasized from the view point of confidence building among nations. Kazumi Mizumoto from the Hiroshima Peace Institute said, "(W)e have to find a concrete solution in order to avoid a catastrophic

result, which might actually occur if the situation becomes worse due to the escalation of current hostilities among the nations in this region. To keep proposing the idea of a NEA-NWFZ does function as a mechanism of confidence-building in NEA, and we need to think out a creative approach to change the atmosphere from the deadlock to trust and cooperation.

### § Relation to Global Efforts for Nuclear Disarmament

It was also clear that the emergence of a new nuclear weapon holder in NEA would undermine global efforts for a nuclear weapon free world, the renewed vigor of which had risen worldwide since 2007, and were later supported by Barak Obama's Administration in the US. In the workshop and following public symposium, there were many arguments from the global nuclear disarmament perspective.

Randy Rydell from UN Office of Disarmament Affairs noted in his speech that, "All the NWFZ treaties associate their respective zones with global disarmament. Thus these zones are far more significant than just a measure to strengthen regional peace and security. They have also helped to de-legitimize nuclear weapons per se, rather than just their spread, testing, or use." Also he added, "(W)hile the cumulative establishment of regional zones will not alone suffice to produce a world free of nuclear weapons, this is in fact their common larger goal. To this extent, the zones represent one of the best examples today of how multilateral anti-nuclear-weapon norms are taking root at the regional and local levels."

In relation to the NEA-NWFZ, Mizumoto noted that such a zone would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the security policy of Japan and the ROK, and Japan's global initiative for nuclear disarmament will gain more credibility, saying, "Under the NEA-NWFZ with a denuclearized DPRK, the negative security assurance provided by China and Russia, and no hostile intent, the US (extended) nuclear deterrence will no longer be a "vital element," (and) Japan will be able to terminate the (nuclear umbrella) policy and be given more credibility for its non-nuclear policy and disarmament initiative."

Not only the establishment of a NWFZ enhances global disarmament efforts, but also the other way around can happen, namely the vigor of such global efforts increases pressure on non-nuclear countries to adopt a policy toward a NWFZ. Examples were shown by Hiromichi Umebayashi from RECNA with regard to Japan, and examples that are

relevant to the ROK as well. One example occurred in relation to the joint statement on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, set forth by Norway, Switzerland etc. at the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in April 2012 as well as at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2012. Japan, which, according to its own statement, knows more than any other countries about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, did not join in the statement because the statement conflicts with its national security policy which relies upon US extended nuclear deterrence. Strong public protests occurred against the government's refusal to join in the statement, which added pressure to the policy review by the Japanese administration.

Another example demonstrates that the logic advanced in global nuclear disarmament forums has reached a level that may restrict non-nuclear countries that rely upon extended nuclear deterrence, thus it works in favor of pursuing possible establishment of a new NWFZ. The NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), a ten-nation group initiated by Japan and Australia, presented a working paper entitled, "Transparency of Nuclear Weapons" at the 2012 NPT PrepCom as an effort to implement the action plan for nuclear disarmament, unanimously adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In this working paper, they develop a standard report form to be used by nuclear weapon states (NWS) in order to secure progressive nuclear disarmament in a transparent manner. In the standard form they propose, a NWS has to report on "the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies." The NPDI requests its rapid implementation by encouraging NWS to start reporting in 2013 PrepCom. Obviously this request should be directed not only to NWS, but also to states adopting security policy involving extended nuclear deterrence like Japan, Germany, Netherland and Canada, all members of the NPDI. The establishment of a NWFZ is a typical means toward a security arrangement to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons regionally.

Such inter-relationship between global and regional nuclear disarmament policies was referred to by Rydell as follows: "with respect to these (NWF) zones, nuclear weapons politics is operating on both local and global dimensions."

#### § Creative Ideas and discussions for a NEA-NWFZ

The most productive aspect of the Nagasaki workshop was seen in the ideas developed regarding the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, the sixth element of the Agreement

proposed by Halperin. An obvious question to be addressed is how a NWFZ treaty can deal with a state already armed with nuclear weapons like the DPRK.

Hayes proposed an innovative idea as to how a NEA-NWFZ treaty can embrace the DPRK as a full party to the treaty from the outset. According to his presentation based on a paper by three authors from the Nautilus Institute including himself, “The DPRK can be admitted at the outset as a full party, but also can be provided time to comply fully, which could not happen in less than two years, and might take as long as a decade to complete. During this time, nuclear weapons states can calibrate the degree to which their legally binding guarantee of non attack using nuclear weapons to the extent that the DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapons, and reverted to non-nuclear weapons state status in compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as fulfilling the requirements to establish confidence that it has not only dismantled its weapons, but abandoned fully its aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons and to become a nuclear-weapons state. In turn, the other non-nuclear weapons states whose territory is covered by a NEA-NWFZ can waive the clause in the standard treaty text whereby the treaty comes into force only when all states have ratified and come into compliance, thereby entering it into force only on their own territory.” As Hayes refers, this waivering arrangement draws on the precedent of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

The idea is also accompanied by an additional innovative clause to be applied to non-nuclear weapon states, which says to the effect that, “Non-nuclear states such as South Korea and Japan could pull out of the treaty after five years if the North had not dismantled its nuclear programs.”

The calibration by nuclear weapons state regarding their security assurances in proportion to the DPRK’s implementation of its non-nuclear commitments, and the scenario to allow ROK and Japan to withdraw, will have various ramifications and need more articulation, especially in relation to the verification system to be provided in the treaty. However, as Hayes said, they are considered to be technically surmountable. Halperin also discussed these issues in his speech and provided other ideas, including a treaty provision that gives the ROK and Japan more flexibility when they consider withdrawal due to the slow progress of the DPRK’s compliance with the treaty’s non-nuclear obligations.

A Japanese participant raised a question about the possibility that China’s



intermediate/medium range nuclear missiles might be pulled back by a certain distance from the border line of the NEA-NWFZ. The implication of the question was to meet the perception existing in the Government of Japan that a NEA-NWFZ should mitigate the nuclear threat from China by means of physical measures. To this question, there was a positive personal response from a Chinese participant. Theoretically the concept will have to be applied to all the relevant nuclear weapon states in a NEA-NWFZ. This concept has been known as the “thinning-out” in the NWFZ studies. The idea of “thinning-out” was introduced in the context of the Nordic NWFZ in 1970s to withdraw Soviet nuclear weapons from areas close to Finland’s eastern border and the Baltic Sea coast. (cf. Jan Praviz) We will need more studies on the merits, if any, and feasibility of the concept in relation to the specific situation of a NEA-NWFZ, but it seems worth further research on this subject.

A question was raised regarding whether a NWFZ should be composed of contiguous territorial areas because the Halperin concept involves countries which are geographically separated. It was noted that all the precedents of the existing NWFZs are made up of contiguous territories or territories not intervened by other countries excluded from the Zone. However, there seemed to be a shared understanding among participants in the workshop that there is no general rule or official documents to require a NWFZ to be as such. It is also note-worthy that a Comprehensive Agreement itself is not a NWFZ treaty, but embraces chapters other than a NWFZ.

In the workshop, an explanation was given regarding the outline of a NEA-NWFZ treaty drafted by the “PNND (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Japan Working Team to Promote a NEA-NWFZ”. Although the draft outline doesn’t reflect the updated situation in the region, it has some provisions unique to the NEA region, including one relevant to Japan and the two Koreas. It is the nuclear disarmament education obligation, such as the transmission to present and future generations of the stories of the damage, short term and long term, inflicted on the citizens and cities by the atomic bombs dropped in 1945.

#### § Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) and NWFZ

One of the constant themes at the workshop was the relationship of extended nuclear deterrence to a NWFZ as already seen above.

Alyn Ware discussed the case of Australia which is a central member of the South

Pacific NFZ but maintains its policy to depend on END of the US. Ware pointed out that, although Australia could join the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SP-NFZ) Treaty only with this contradictory policy, it could lead to the conclusion of the treaty, thus contributing to bringing the Zone into existence. As a result, on the positive side, Australia enacted its 'SP-NFZ Treaty Act 1986' to ban not only manufacturing and possession but also research and development of nuclear weapons, and then took a positive position in getting 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion and has shown leadership in organizing an International Commission such as Canberra Commission and ICNND (International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament). However, on the negative side, Ware said, it has allowed port visits of the US nuclear capable ships and maintained negative position in the ICJ follow-up resolution at the UN General Assembly.

While there were varying understandings on the Australian END policy, there was agreement in acknowledging some value of the flexible attitude in formulating a NWFZ. As Ware pointed out, it will allay concerns, whether legitimate or not, of those who believe in END and make it easier to get Japan and the ROK to join a NEA-NWFZ. Such assertion coincides with experiences frequently gained in Japan during the conversation with governmental officials and parliamentarians. It is undeniable that the END constitutes a key issue to be addressed in order to expand supporters of a NEA-NWFZ beyond those already in favor.

According to discussions in the workshop, two further points should be noted regarding the flexibility on END. One is an obvious legal argument. In a NEA-NWFZ treaty, which is a legally binding international treaty, there will be no need of END for non-nuclear state parties as long as the treaty is in effect and fully observed by all the state parties because there is no nuclear threat to be deterred because of the provision of negative security assurances. The other point is that efforts to dispel the illusion or myth of protection afforded by END will have to be continued. In doing this, a precaution will be necessary because such criticism on the credibility of END protection tends to invite the argument for requesting the US more stringent military procedures to ensure the implementation of the END.

#### § Other Elements of a Comprehensive Agreement

The issue of missile control in NEA was discussed as a potential additional element to be included in a comprehensive agreement. There were very productive discussions.

It became clear that the actual concern of missiles was related to the process by which to lift the sanction on the DPRK by the UN Security Council resolutions and that a general regional missile control per se was not an issue in this regard. It is, in fact, a part of Halperin's fifth element of the Agreement. Since the UNSC resolution prohibits any launch conducted by the DPRK using ballistic missile technology, it will be necessary to discuss when and under what conditions this sanction is to be lifted.

A view was expressed that, once the nuclear issue is solved, missiles would not be a serious problem. This means that, at least in the NEA regional context, we can focus on solving nuclear issues and that the sanction in relation to nuclear and ballistic missile issues can be dealt with as a single set of issues. In this respect, as was discussed in the workshop, the way the DPRK ballistic missile launches are reported in the media in Japan and the ROK is confusing and misleading and needs to be corrected. This confusion comes partly from the text of the UNSC resolution itself, thus prudent handling of it will be requested with the parties concerned in drafting and operating the Agreement. As for verification of the peaceful launch of rockets, it was noted that there has been a variety of research on this topic in the past and that the distinction between military and peaceful test launches is considered to be technically possible and will not become a major problem.

How to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle in NEA is undoubtedly one of the complex issues to be discussed in the Agreement. It is related to energy security needs, and thus, the energy assistance needs, of the DPRK, and to the scope of obligations on non-nuclear states of a NEA-NWFZ. The discussions on this issue in the workshop were again very productive and we obtained a reasonable common basis for future studies. The current disparity, in which only Japan enjoys the right of reprocessing and enrichment, is an unhappy prerequisite, but we will have to start from this point. The real question is in which direction to move. It will take some time to develop an agreed upon direction among the parties concerned; therefore, it will be wise to note that the treaty outline developed by the PNND Japan Working Team suggests that a NWFZ treaty stipulate the establishment of a Planning Mechanism for Future Energy Cooperation with a strict, credible mandate and leave the issue to the future process. As was noted in the workshop, the Fukushima disaster and Japan's nuclear fuel cycle policy to follow should and will have critical bearing on that future process.

A seemingly common view shared in the workshop was that the stockpiling of plutonium

by Japan should have a moratorium or be terminated as soon as possible. A reason for it raised in the session was that it would also lead Japan to develop the dry-cask storage of the spent nuclear fuels, a safer method than current pool storage. Internationalization or regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also discussed in the workshop, but there was a mixed view on the issue. It was pointed out that the politics behind the scene of such arguments in Japan is that those who want continuation of nuclear power plants are apt to discuss internationalization, but without putting forth any specific plans for Japan to undertake. There was clarification regarding the argument that the pursuit of a NWFZ is deeply related to the issue of reprocessing spent fuels, but the pursuit of a NWFZ is not a policy to prohibit nuclear power plants.

### § Players and Forums for Future Efforts

Shared concerns were expressed in the workshop as to how any idea such as developed by Halperin will be brought up to the level of a state policy option. A Japanese proverb is relevant in this regard, "It is better to get down to work than to worry about it." A successful leap in this effort could happen at any time, and we should continue to develop and spread ideas. This said, there were various suggestions in the workshop.

The Chinese participant believes the Six Party Talks could still be a viable venue to solve nuclear issues of the NEA, and says China is committed to its leading role in it. There were some comments to urge China to exert much stronger influence upon the DPRK and more pressure should come from within the country in this respect.

Mongolia was frequently cited in the workshop as a country that can play a key role in developing a NEA-NWFZ. It was also cited as a possible state party to a Comprehensive Agreement. There were a number of reasons expressed for this position. Mongolia has a two-decade-long record of a strong anti-nuclear weapons policy since 1992. It is a country located in NEA, as is self-identified as such, and maintains good relations with the DPRK as well as with all other countries in the region. And, it expresses a policy willing to support denuclearization of the region. When we pursue state-level involvement, Mongolia stands at the closest position in favor of it. These reasons were shared among the workshop participants. It was also noted that state-level involvement is a necessary condition for any UN level discussion to start on the topic of NEA-NWFZ.

There were discussions about the role of civil society in strengthening public support and engaging government officials and policy makers, including roles of parliamentarians and mayors. Strong support for a NEA-NWFZ by mayors in Japan was exhibited in the workshop. Also it was shown in the workshop that there were ongoing cooperative efforts on this issue between PNND Japan and PNND Korea. The importance of a people-to-people channel was also discussed in the workshop. While no specific arrangement was suggested, the idea of establishing multilateral cooperation to assist the people in the DPRK was mentioned. It was said that such an attempt would inevitably involve cooperation among the people in China. In relation to the role of the civil society, Yi Kiho from the ROK pointed out the importance of governance among civil societies that will ensure the effective inter-relationship of various groups and the continuity of subjects to be pursued. He argues that there are diverse civil society actors like local governments, parliamentarians, universities and civil groups, but a mechanism to bridge their activities is lacking.

In Nagasaki, the workshop played a critical role in elevating the issue of a NEA-NWFZ and the idea of a comprehensive approach to a level of common concern shared among key researchers and leaders of the community. It also provided a basis to spread the issue to other areas in Japan, including the Hiroshima and Tokyo metropolitan areas. Such a process led by academic researchers and supported by concerned civil groups will be effective as ground work to engage officials at the government level if implemented in many cities in other parts of NEA.