

How to Move towards North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone?

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NEANWFZ and the Norm of Nonproliferation

- An important element of the NEANWFZ is the joint commitment to the principle and norm of nuclear nonproliferation.
- Substantiate DPRK's nonproliferation commitment:
 - Setting up domestic law and regulatory systems to align its export control standard and practice with that of the international community;
 - Following the principles and control lists of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Australia Group, etc.;
 - Accepting training from international partners and providing training to its own officials and experts on best practice and gold standard;
 - And providing a high degree of transparency over its export control system and accepting necessary international monitoring and verification.

NEANWFZ and Joint Commitment to Nuclear Risk Reduction

- Reduce the risk of nuclear war before NEANWFZ's realization.
- Possible measures:
 - Increasing role of nuclear weapons in this region
 - Substantiate unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral commitments to unconditional No First Use of nuclear weapons
 - China's regional nuclear forces
 - Emerging threat from conventional weapons on nuclear systems
 - United States, Russia, and China engage with DPRK on building shared understanding on risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation.
 - Help DPRK develop sophisticated understandings about:
 - the limited role of nuclear weapons;
 - the risks of destabilizing nuclear postures such as pre-delegating nuclear launch authority to low-level military officers and keeping nuclear weapons on high alert;
 - the complexity of nuclear signaling during the fog of war, and dangers of misunderstanding and misjudgment leading to inadvertent escalation.

NEANWFZ and the Transformation of DPRK

- Realization of NEANWFZ requires mitigating mutual threat perception between main rival states, especially between DPRK and the United States.
- Building a new peace regime is not only about building artificial security structure or regional organizations/institutions. A more fundamental goal of peace building should be aiming at gradually changing the mindset, which won't automatically happen simply after a new security structure or a new regional security organization is put in place.
- Changing DPRK's mindset and transforming the country requires breaking the country's isolation and promoting information, thinking, and people to people exchange at all levels.
- Contradictory goal from sanctions.
 - Partial sanction relief could be designed to most effectively facilitate the goal of DPRK liberalization and transformation.

NEANWFZ and the Mitigation of Big Power Competition

- Growing big power competition/rivalry
 - Deepening U.S.-China strategic rivalry could become the dominant force, shaping future regional security landscape.
 - Competitive US-China geopolitical interests in this region could undermine cooperation to realize DPRK denuclearization and NEANWFZ.
- The goal of establishing a peace regime should be limited.
 - Manage but not seek to redefine big power relations.
- Within the framework of NEANWFZ, bilateral and multilateral dialogues, as well as joint working groups, should tackle technical and policy disagreements on missile defense and possible INF missile deployment.
 - Such efforts are necessary:
 - to contain the hostility between DPRK and its rivals;
 - and to prevent a new strategic fault line between the United States, Japan, and ROK on one side and China, Russia, and DPRK on the opposite side from taking shape.