

Resume for Session 1, “General assessment —Current situation about peace and security in North East Asia and denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula.”

June 1, 2019

**How did we get here and where are we now?
From “Fire and Fury” to US-DPRK Summits and the Aftermath¹**

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Kyodo News/RECNA

¹ This presentation is based on my interviews with current and former officials from U.S., Japan and R.O.K. from 2018 to May 2019. The number of the interviews is more than 50. Most of these interviews were conducted under back-ground rule. Several of them are close aides to President Trump, President Moon and Prime Minister Abe.

1

1. Change of the Tide

<Dual Escalation in 2017>

○Verbal Escalation (Aug-Nov.2017)

”Fire and Fury”, “Totally destroy NK,” “Little Rocket man,”

○Military Escalation (Summer-Dec.2017)

3 ACs deployment to the region, B52 operations backed by J-SDF and ROK AF
Hwasong-12,(IRBM), Hwasong-14(ICBM), Hwasong-15(ICBM)

<Expanding Intelligence Channel>

○New Year’s Statement by Chairman Kim Jong Un (Jan. 2018)

○South-North Intelligence Diplomacy accelerated(Jan-Feb.2018)

○President Moon’s envoys’ visit to WH and Trump’s Impromptu Response (Mar.2018)

○Engagement by US Intelligence Community (Mar.-Apr.2018)

2



Suh Hoon and Chung Eui-yong



Andrew Kim, Mike Pompeo and 2 Kims



“I want to see him. What about the next month?”

Donald J. Trump on March 8, 2018

2. Intelligence Process and its Side-effect

<Exclusion of Regionalists at Foggy Bottom>

○Very Limited Engagement of State Department at the early stage



”I resigned because I felt that, at that point, the State Department was being left out.”

Joseph Yun, former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy

○Lack of Preparation, but “OK Result” at the Singapore Summit in June, 2018

○4-Point Joint Statement, without any Follow-up Mechanism

3. Hard Reality before Hanoi

<Re-energizing Diplomatic Process, But...>

○Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol's visit to Oval Office on January 18, 2019

(But, his arrogant attitude and deceptive comments like "We have no ICBM" upset Pompeo)

○No Substantial Negotiation during Steve Biegun's trip to Pyongyang from Feb.6 to 8.



"President is prepared to walk away." *Steve Biegun, the US Special Representative for NK, told senior diplomats in the region before the Hanoi summit.*

5

<Tactical Decision by Kim Jong Un>

○No Negotiation-Mandate given to Kim Hyok Chol (who seems to have no technical knowledge about NK's nuclear program in details)

○Any Indication on Denuclearization should be directly sent by Chairman Kim himself

○Any Serious Decision should be reached only between Kim and Trump

<Modest or Ambitious Benchmark set by Biegun>

○to reach "a Common Definition of Denuclearization"

○to set a "Freeze" on NK's WMD and Missile Programs

○to make "a Progress on a Road-map" for Denuclearization



6

4. What went wrong in Hanoi?

- Lack of Preparation and Baseless Optimism shared by Trump and Kim

- Two “Dictators” without any bureaucratic choreograph

- Miscalculation on both sides

- Overvaluation of Yongbyong Facility by Kim

- Overestimate of deal-maker’s capability by Trump

- Ambiguous Explanation and Abrupt Presentation

- Unclear description of Yongbyong by Kim

- ”Out of blue” presentation on “Big Deal” by Trump

- Overdue Request by US and Allies

- Biological and Chemical Programs